Knowledge from history

[aronnax]

History as we know it is the explanation of why and how events in the past have occurred and historians come up with their explanations through infering whatever evidence they have lying around.

Many historians take the written accounts of people who had archive the events that happened within their lifetime. Let's take the writings of Appian. How can historians take his writing as credible sources and use them as evidence for what happened or why something happened?

Do we take his word as true knowledge because a lot of people or accounts happen to be coherent with his writings?
Do we take it as true because there exist no contradictions? Or is it a combination of the two?

How can we determine what makes a source a reliable source for extracting knowledge? Especially in a time where records are fewer?

 

[sophie]

Do we take his word as true knowledge because a lot of people or accounts happen to be coherent with his writings?
Do we take it as true because there exist no contradictions? Or is it a combination of the two?

You've already answered your own question. This is history in a nutshell. It's basically a bunch of old guys in armchairs arguing over, at least from the perspective of the ordinary person, completely irrelevant minutiae. Who to believe, really, is who makes the most compelling argument, given the evidence available. As time progresses certain arguments fall to the wayside as new evidence is presented or compelling counterarguments are given.

 

[aronnax]

You've already answered your own question. This is history in a nutshell. It's basically a bunch of old guys in armchairs arguing over, at least from the perspective of the ordinary person, completely irrelevant minutiae. Who to believe, really, is who makes the most compelling argument, given the evidence available. As time progresses certain arguments fall to the wayside as new evidence is presented or compelling counterarguments are given.

But that is not a good answer is it? It's equivalent to saying all knowledge of history cannot be 100% confirmed. There is no right answer, there is only possible answers.

 

[GoodGame]

I found this syllabus:http://frontpage.montclair.edu/brizuelae/Guidelines501.htm


In short: "YOU are HISTORY!"








EDIT: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historiography

 

[Lone Wolf]

Do we take his word as true knowledge because a lot of people or accounts happen to be coherent with his writings?
Do we take it as true because there exist no contradictions? Or is it a combination of the two?

Of course it's a combination of the two, and it also depends on the nature of the sources. Stuff like background and potential biases of the author is also important.

Plus not every historical source is narrative history. Laws and other legislation, for example, are also sources.

Sometimes, the first impression a source gives you is deceptive, though. Medieval Russian chronicles are written in a what seems to be very impersonal, distant and rather simplistic style - but relying on that impression is dangerous.

 

[Dachs]

But that is not a good answer is it? It's equivalent to saying all knowledge of history cannot be 100% confirmed. There is no right answer, there is only possible answers.

This is why history is not a science.

Of course, one generally accepts most things a given source has to say unless those things are either 1) prima facie ridiculous or unlikely or 2) directly contradicted by another source or by other information (e.g. archaeological information); to do otherwise would be solipsistic. In the case of contradictions, if they are to be resolved, usually the earlier source is preferred, although the nature by which each source came by his information and any potential reasons the source might have to color his information are also taken into account.

And, of course, one must always be conscious of the tenuousness of one's inferences, and willing to change one's conclusions based on new data.

 

[cybrxkhan]

This is why history is, as Dachs said, not a science.

That's also why it's classified as a Humanities subject at many universities. It is interpretation of available evidence, and interpretation is not necessarily 100% definite nor is it required to be. Like the other humanities subjects, you study something - books for Literature, art for Art History, and historical events and evidence for history - and figure out its meaning.

Sometimes history is also classified as a social science, but hard science doesn't like to think of social science (and definitely not the humanities) as a real science, or at least that's the impression I've been getting.

 

[sophie]

There is no right answer, there is only possible answers.

Now you're getting it!

Or, refer to what Dachs said.

 

[aronnax]

But what I want to know is, if knowledge is something that is true and history cannot give you a confirmed truth, can history still give you knowledge?

 

[Masada]

Eh, I think we deal with 'knoweldge' that isn't gospel truth all the time (RE: Newtonian Physics, traditional Darwinian evolution. Both of which are used because they're simple and what they model is still, more or less with some exceptions, accurate).

 

[aronnax]

Eh, I think we deal with 'knoweldge' that isn't gospel truth all the time (RE: Newtonian Physics, traditional Darwinian evolution. Both of which are used because they're simple and what they model is still, more or less with some exceptions, accurate).

But doesn't Darwinian evolution lack a strong opposition that contradicts the theory of evolution that is also base on strong evidence, logic and reasoning?

We can accept Darwinian evolution as knowledge because so far there isn't strong logical contradictions with it, it is coherent with all other accepted knowledge and it works.
Even when logical problems shoot up around the evolution, a refined knowledge of evolution involves chipping away the loose ends and modifying the base of evolution's logic.

But this can't be applied as the same with large sections of history. For example, the high casualty death toll in the trenches during WWI was traditionally blamed on poor, misguided leadership. Lions led by donkeys. This was accepted as historical fact that was backed with many sources.

But in the 1960s, a new revisionist thinking began to be accepted as historical fact where the high casualty death toll can't be blame, or entirely blamed on the actions of the leadership.
This isn't just refining a loose end in the original thinking, but rather the complete removal and replacement with it.

Progress in Science has usually led to theories and facts getting more accurate. In fact the knowledge derived from Science seems to be more "The answer is A because we experiment and options B,C,D,E...Y,Z didn't work. Scientific knowledge seemed to be achieved by ruling out what cannot be correct rather than finding out what can be correct.
However Historical theories and facts can undergo massive change and often, historians come to their conclusions but making an opinion base on their view of the evidence.

 

[Plotinus]

There are plenty of things you can know about history. For example, if a lot of reliable sources tell you that King Thing invaded the Imperial Empire, then you may not know that he did so (at least on a strict criterion of knowledge), but you do know that there is a very strong probability that he did so. And that is knowledge of even the strictest sort. Moreover, you know that either King Thing invaded the Imperial Empire or the historian Chroniclus, who describes the event, was not telling the truth. That too is knowledge.

However, I really think you're being rather inconsistent with your criterion of "knowledge". You say that the theory of evolution counts as knowledge because "there isn't strong logical contradictions with it, it is coherent with all other accepted knowledge and it works". But the same could be said for e.g. the claim that Napoleon invaded Russia. Why does the former count as "knowledge" but not the latter?

You say that e.g. the explanation for high casualty rates in the trenches of WWI has changed, indicating that we can't be certain about it. Of course - that's something that is uncertain. But that doesn't mean that there aren't other historical claims which are more certain, such as Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Similarly, there are scientific claims which are less certain. E.g. consider the debate between supporters of the theory of punctuated equilibrium and their opponents. It's unfair to compare an incredibly well supported scientific theory such as evolution with a relatively uncertain historical theory such as the causes of WWI casualty rates. If you compared very well supported scientific theories with very well established historical claim, or controversial scientific theories with controversial historical claims, you'd see a closer parallel between them.

Obviously science has methods for resolving controversy which history lacks. You can always, at least in theory, do some kind of experiment to work out whether a scientific hypothesis is correct or not, whereas in history if the evidence isn't there there's nothing you can do other than search for it and hope it turns up. But I don't see that as relevant to the question whether either tells us the truth.

 

[aronnax]

There are plenty of things you can know about history. For example, if a lot of reliable sources tell you that King Thing invaded the Imperial Empire, then you may not know that he did so (at least on a strict criterion of knowledge), but you do know that there is a very strong probability that he did so. And that is knowledge of even the strictest sort. Moreover, you know that either King Thing invaded the Imperial Empire or the historian Chroniclus, who describes the event, was not telling the truth. That too is knowledge.

However, I really think you're being rather inconsistent with your criterion of "knowledge". You say that the theory of evolution counts as knowledge because "there isn't strong logical contradictions with it, it is coherent with all other accepted knowledge and it works". But the same could be said for e.g. the claim that Napoleon invaded Russia. Why does the former count as "knowledge" but not the latter?

You say that e.g. the explanation for high casualty rates in the trenches of WWI has changed, indicating that we can't be certain about it. Of course - that's something that is uncertain. But that doesn't mean that there aren't other historical claims which are more certain, such as Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Similarly, there are scientific claims which are less certain. E.g. consider the debate between supporters of the theory of punctuated equilibrium and their opponents. It's unfair to compare an incredibly well supported scientific theory such as evolution with a relatively uncertain historical theory such as the causes of WWI casualty rates. If you compared very well supported scientific theories with very well established historical claim, or controversial scientific theories with controversial historical claims, you'd see a closer parallel between them.

Obviously science has methods for resolving controversy which history lacks. You can always, at least in theory, do some kind of experiment to work out whether a scientific hypothesis is correct or not, whereas in history if the evidence isn't there there's nothing you can do other than search for it and hope it turns up. But I don't see that as relevant to the question whether either tells us the truth.

Okay I see your point and accept it. So, I'll work on the grounds that you set.
Let's compare a very well supported scientific theory and a well established historical claim.
I can, through experimentation, prove that ice melts into water. I heat ice, it melts, there's my evidence. The experiment itself can be retried and retried again with different adjustments and I'll still get the same result. So we accept this as knowledge "Ice melts into water". It will always be coherent.

What about this, the Declaration of Independence was signed in the year 1776. The proof we have is the actual Declaration itself, dated 1776 and probably thousands of written accounts of the signing itself. It becomes a reasonable approximation that the Declaration was signed 1776. But we have no way to actually confirm this. No one alive can vouch for it, there is no way to recreate this event. For all we know, they signed it in 1775, swore everyone there to secrecy and then pretend to sign it the next year with a forged declaration.
I know that sounds completely insane, but we cannot definitely disprove that can we? We cannot 100% rule out this crazy alternative and at the same time, we cannot 100% confirm that the declaration was signed in 1776. We can at best say that the Declaration was most likely signed correct?

Since we cannot confirm anything in history (once all living participants die). We cannot confirm that it is true. We can only estimate to different degrees how true something is. It's at best, most probably knowledge but not definitely knowledge.

 

[Plotinus]

You could say exactly the same thing about any scientific claim. Maybe ice doesn't melt into water - maybe your eyes are deceiving you when you perform an experiment that appears to prove it. Or maybe your memory is deceiving you when you think you remember performing such an experiment. Maybe you're just dreaming and you actually inhabit a universe where ice doesn't even exist, let alone melt into water. Maybe you're just an AI trapped in an elaborate computer simulation.

The point is that you can multiply extreme sceptic hypotheses in any field, whether it be history or science. Yes, perhaps all the sources that tell us when the Declaration of Independence was signed are lying or incomprehensibly mistaken. It's possible. But how likely is it? Not likely enough to warrant saying that we don't know when it was signed. Similarly, perhaps all the evidence, including the evidence of our senses, that tells us that ice melts into water is also mistaken. But, again, how likely is that? Not very, it seems, so we can reasonably say that we know ice melts into water. If by "knowledge" you mean to exclude any doubt whatsoever, then the only things we know are logical truths, and even those might be suspect. By such a strict criterion we can't know any contingent truths at all, whether they are truths of natural laws or of history. But we don't normally use "knowledge" in such an extremely strict way. Almost all of what we call "knowledge" is, as you say, an estimate; the point is that we still call it "knowledge".

 

[aelf]

Eh, I think we deal with 'knoweldge' that isn't gospel truth all the time (RE: Newtonian Physics, traditional Darwinian evolution. Both of which are used because they're simple and what they model is still, more or less with some exceptions, accurate).

Why use scientific theories as examples and not economics?

 

[aronnax]

You could say exactly the same thing about any scientific claim. Maybe ice doesn't melt into water - maybe your eyes are deceiving you when you perform an experiment that appears to prove it. Or maybe your memory is deceiving you when you think you remember performing such an experiment. Maybe you're just dreaming and you actually inhabit a universe where ice doesn't even exist, let alone melt into water. Maybe you're just an AI trapped in an elaborate computer simulation.

The point is that you can multiply extreme sceptic hypotheses in any field, whether it be history or science. Yes, perhaps all the sources that tell us when the Declaration of Independence was signed are lying or incomprehensibly mistaken. It's possible. But how likely is it? Not likely enough to warrant saying that we don't know when it was signed. Similarly, perhaps all the evidence, including the evidence of our senses, that tells us that ice melts into water is also mistaken. But, again, how likely is that? Not very, it seems, so we can reasonably say that we know ice melts into water. If by "knowledge" you mean to exclude any doubt whatsoever, then the only things we know are logical truths, and even those might be suspect. By such a strict criterion we can't know any contingent truths at all, whether they are truths of natural laws or of history. But we don't normally use "knowledge" in such an extremely strict way. Almost all of what we call "knowledge" is, as you say, an estimate; the point is that we still call it "knowledge".

I suppose it boils down to that knowledge definition. I was equating knowledge as the absolute truth rather than the approximate truth.

Now that raises another question. If knowledge in a general sense mean an approximate truth, at what proximity would it no longer be considered "knowledge"?

 

[GoodGame]

I suppose it boils down to that knowledge definition. I was equating knowledge as the absolute truth rather than the approximate truth.

Now that raises another question. If knowledge in a general sense mean an approximate truth, at what proximity would it no longer be considered "knowledge"?

Try a statistical approach using confidence intervals, or similar statistical testing (e.g. T-tests, proportions tests, etc..).

Or think of it this way: you posit there is no absolute knowledge, but then you want an absolute rule for deciding how inabsolute a particular fountain of knowledge is? Doesn't that seem like a fundamental paradox?? If we accept that knowledge is inabsolute (a sane concept IMHO), then we have to accept that miscellaneous sources of knowledge can not be completely collaborated, short perhaps of individual empiricism. Back to using statistics, the threshold chosen as the decision point (typically "alpha" or "beta") for such tests is arbitrary. Some people like to be 99% confident, some accept 90% confidence, etc... There's a bit of subjective compromise in deciding what threshold, and what tests to run.

I doubt anyone uses statistics much in histiography, though it might support specific conclusions about a historical work. I suspect the general rule is collaboration, as in how many sources agree on a particular point, despite their probable biases and inaccuracies. And even then subjective skepticism might still be applied in the analysis.



Anyone, I'd say the divergence in this thread is hanging on the idea that science (although greater in my bigoted mind than social science) is somehow producing absolute knowledge, which I think is a naive assumption. Scientific journals rarely publish that the sky is blue in Albequerque at 3pm, but they're doing experiments backed by statistical rigor and still stating conditional conclusions. They at best reach a theory, not an absolute law.

 

[Masada]

But doesn't Darwinian evolution lack a strong opposition that contradicts the theory of evolution that is also base on strong evidence, logic and reasoning?

Eh, traditional Darwinian evolution is set against Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, which is a more advanced, nuanced and all around betterer explanation of How Things Work. It incoporates Darwinian evolution, certainly, but it also takes a leaf from other books: Mendelian genetics notably. Which basically blows that whole arguement up, sorry for wasting your time: I should have made it clearer.

But this can't be applied as the same with large sections of history. For example, the high casualty death toll in the trenches during WWI was traditionally blamed on poor, misguided leadership. Lions led by donkeys. This was accepted as historical fact that was backed with many sources.

I doubt that the high death toll from the First World War was ever blamed wholly on poor leadership. It might have been blamed on the results of some things like Gallipoli. And if you asked Lord_Baal nicely, because he's far more a scholar of that kind of stuff, then it might become apparent that even the Lions led by Donkeys arguement had exceptions. But even then, that doesn't make it historical fact. A historical fact would be that such and such an event happened on such and such a day.

Why use scientific theories as examples and not economics?

Because those are used as a short-hand approximation of what Actually Happens. I suppose I could have put up LM/SM as a possible economics example. We know that LM/SM doesn't work for a variety of reasons, but that it's a very useful analytical tool regardless because the thing is so damned easy to understand and returns results that in most cases are useful. I suppose the same could be said for all economics models, but that's another thing entirely

I doubt anyone uses statistics much in histiography, though it might support specific conclusions about a historical work. I suspect the general rule is collaboration, as in how many sources agree on a particular point, despite their probable biases and inaccuracies. And even then subjective skepticism might still be applied in the analysis.

Fixing numbers to words is a pain the ass, and subjective as hell. It ain't worth the effort in most cases. You can use it for archeological things though. I've seen it put to good use for coins and pottery in Southeast-Asia for instance. The modelling that accompanied it was worth far more though.