Lee commands the North, what happens?

[Nuka-sama]

What would happen, if on the eve of Robert E. Lee's defection to the Confederacy, he had decided to take President Lincoln's offer to be the commander of Union forces? Would it be a quick Northern victory, but slavery remained in place? Would reconstruction happen at all? I'm very eager to hear your thoughts

 

[r16]

the war would last from 1861 to 1865 and would end with South wasted yet integrated in a way by 1890 , nothing would have changed .

 

[Dachs]

Well, look at Lee's early combat record. In his first major assignment for the Confederacy, he was sent to take over the forces in West Virginia, developed an overly complicated plan that relied on too many disparate parts clicking in place in juuuust the right way, and promptly got his army ripped apart by Old Rosy, of all people (the weirdest reversal in the ACW) at Cheat Mountain. He does something like that for the Federals, he gets busted down to divisional command (like Sherman did after his abysmal performance invading Kentucky and East Tennessee in late 1861) and maybe works his way back up by the end of the war.

I don't think Lee's generalship abilities were all that well developed in 1861; he wasn't going to pull off any miracles for anybody, and he wasn't going to crush the South with one swift stroke. And this is a what-if that could easily go several different ways. It's not one of those more palatable "for want of a nail" things that have much more clearly defined short-term effects.

 

[MajKira]

there would still be a big clash even if Lee would have commanded North Army
the confederacian South has still another good commanders too
but the best northern commander was of course Ulysses Grant
and good to see slavery eliminated giving America modern development

 

[MikeL49NYVI]

I have a different view of all of this. First of all, Lee was offered command of all the Federal armies, which means he had the complete confidence of Lincoln and Congress. He was widely recgonized as the number one soldier in America at the time. Even if he had taken the field, one or two reverses would not have mattered. Look what the north endured from most of its other early generals.
Plus being Lee, he would have been given much more of a free hand to get the armies ready. Much of the interferrence that Washington put on its eastern generals was because they were afraid of Lee. It was not until Grant was given control did they stop meddling with the military.

Sure, the south had some other very good generals, but they were just as ambitious and argumentative as the northern ones. What held them together, and made them a real team, was Lee. He was the force that kept that army togther. If you take that force away and give it to the north, you have a completly different set of circumstances.

Lee knew men, and their strengths and weaknesses. You can be sure that McCellan would have nothing more important to do than train the recruits and militia. And Grant would have risen to a higher command much earlier. Lee knew both of them during the Mexican War.

Not likely one swift blow, that is almost certain. There was no single war-ending battle for the entire conflict. But it surely would not have lasted for 4 years, with the resulting bitterness that was partially responsible for the reconstruction period.

As for the West Virginia campaign: Lee was never held accountable for that. He was in a portion of the state that was literally in rebellion against the rest of Virginia. He had regiments that had no training, little supplies, and inexperienced officers. If there was any doubt concerning him, he would not have been the first choice to take over when J.E. Johnston was wounded at 7 Pines.

Lee was the heart and soul of the south, and still is. If he had not been there, and instead with the north, there is every indication that everything changes.

 

[Glassfan]

Like the one great Virginian who fought for the Union - Thomas - Robert E. Lee might have been looked upon with some suspision in the North. Lee's great talent, of course, was in defense, indeed some of his principal failures were on offense or in the meeting battle - Malvern Hill, Antietam and Gettysburg. On defense, Lee would place himself on strong defensive ground and let the Army of the Potomic break itself on his works (Frederisksburg). His defensivemindedness might have been a problem for the Union in that it had to invade and conquor the South. Furthermore, Lincoln's constant pressure on his generals to attack would have affected Lee differently than Jefferson Davis' support of his.

In my opinion, Lee would have had a less impressive career in the North than the south.

 

[LightSpectra]

My name is Mr. Exaggeration, and I think Lee was a moderately competent general who leeched fame off of his actually talented subordinates Longstreet and Jackson. He's nothing but the 19th century version of Hindenburg.

 

[MajKira]

Lee and South was perfect match together with Longstreeet and Jackson and North had to do muchy to overcome them for winning the war, Grant done good by assignment from Lincoln for commanding main army for wintaking Fort Sumter and capital richmond, Virginia
Strength
2,100,000 northern 1,064,000 southern
Casualties and losses
140,414 killed in action ~365,000 total dead 275,200 wounded north
72,524 killed in action ~260,000 total dead 137,000+ wounded south

So North had to pressure hard, what was only to be done through Grant

Lee could have won in Ghettysburg making life very very hard for Lincoln and his government
it was one of the key battles to decide who will win in the end

 

[Glassfan]

My name is Mr. Exaggeration, and I think Lee was a moderately competent general who leeched fame off of his actually talented subordinates Longstreet and Jackson. He's nothing but the 19th century version of Hindenburg.

Another good point. Without the initial advantage of superior, agressive officers like Jackson and Stuart in the early stages of the war, Lee would not have built a reputation.

 

[Dachs]

I have a different view of all of this. First of all, Lee was offered command of all the Federal armies, which means he had the complete confidence of Lincoln and Congress. He was widely recgonized as the number one soldier in America at the time. Even if he had taken the field, one or two reverses would not have mattered. Look what the north endured from most of its other early generals.
Plus being Lee, he would have been given much more of a free hand to get the armies ready. Much of the interferrence that Washington put on its eastern generals was because they were afraid of Lee. It was not until Grant was given control did they stop meddling with the military.

It must be hard to see your computer screen with those rose-tinted glasses on.

As for the West Virginia campaign: Lee was never held accountable for that. He was in a portion of the state that was literally in rebellion against the rest of Virginia. He had regiments that had no training, little supplies, and inexperienced officers. If there was any doubt concerning him, he would not have been the first choice to take over when J.E. Johnston was wounded at 7 Pines.

Lee was absolutely responsible for screwing up at Cheat Mountain. He came up with a dumb plan and it backfired on him despite having something vaguely close to numerical parity in theater and local manpower superiority.

And the main reason he got to command the Army of the Potomac (later Army of Northern Virginia) is because he was conveniently in Richmond attempting to manage the Valley campaign from a desk (and not doing particularly well) after having cocked up the defense of the Atlantic coast. They were missing a general officer and they had one without a job close at hand. If Lee had had the confidence you seem to have ascribed to him, he would've gotten an army-level command from the start.

 

[privatehudson]

I think my opinion on Lee has been stated often enough beforehand so I'll summarise here. He had a better record than any other Confederate Army commander, got on better with Davis than any other Army Commander and had the kind of people skills and diplomacy that was needed to get the best out his subordinates - each of whom had undoubted talents but just as many if not more flaws in their characters.

But that's not the point of this thread, the question is rather how he would have done as commander of all the Federal Armies. This should therefore be a discussion primarily about his strategic talents, unless there is some indication that he would have done something similar to McCellan, i.e. tell Lincoln that he can "do it all" and take to the field as well.

But as to how well Lee would have done in overall command, probably quite well if he'd been given time to settle into the position and promote capable field commanders to subordinate positions. I doubt it would have been a quick fix leading to a short and easy war though.

Its hard to imagine he could have done any worse than McCellan, a man incapable of inflicting a serious defeat on an enemy despite outnumbering them and knowing their campaign plan. Which leads me into a comment about Antietam...

Lee's great talent, of course, was in defense, indeed some of his principal failures were on offense or in the meeting battle - Malvern Hill, Antietam and Gettysburg. On defense, Lee would place himself on strong defensive ground and let the Army of the Potomic break itself on his works (Frederisksburg). His defensivemindedness might have been a problem for the Union in that it had to invade and conquor the South.

How exactly was the battle of Antietam a failure by Lee, or for that matter how exactly would it be considered either Lee on the offensive or a meeting battle? With the exception of the counter attacks on the left (Hood and so on) and A P Hill's action towards the end of the day the Confederate Forces were on the defensive. Both of those attacks were in response to the threat posed by a Federal assault rather than Lee trying to occupy federal starting positions so it was hardly Lee on the offensive. A battle where the vast bulk of one army spent the whole of the previous day on the field hardly qualifies as a meeting engagement either.

It tends to be difficult to define many Civil War actions as one side offensive, the other defensive. But if you must put it in those terms its hard to include Antietam as an example of Lee's inability to fight offensive/meeting battles whilst ignoring say Chancellorsville or Second Bull Run which don't fit that theory.

And the main reason he got to command the Army of the Potomac (later Army of Northern Virginia) is because he was conveniently in Richmond attempting to manage the Valley campaign from a desk (and not doing particularly well) after having cocked up the defense of the Atlantic coast. They were missing a general officer and they had one without a job close at hand. If Lee had had the confidence you seem to have ascribed to him, he would've gotten an army-level command from the start.

Interesting, you make his role of military advisor to the President (a position that I would have thought involved a degree of trust) sound like a meddling pen pusher who spent his days idly lazing around Richmond until Davis ran out of other people to hand the command to.

I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say Lee was by far and away the clear cut choice for the command, but he certainly wasn't offered it just because he happened to be on the spot at the time. Davis trusted him and his abilities, regardless of his disappointing performance to that date.

 

[bestrfcplayer]

there would still be a big clash even if Lee would have commanded North Army

The clash would have been smaller because David Twiggs would have been the highest Confederate General if Albert Johnston died like he did in RL, then the Confederates would have been screwed.

the confederacian South has still another good commanders too

The only good Confederate Generals were.... I can't think of any because the South REPLACED THERE TOP GENERALS EVERY SIX MOUNTS....... And I'm not exaggerating on that either.

but the best northern commander was of course Ulysses Grant

This is actually a decant statement.

and good to see slavery eliminated giving America modern development

Well, abolishing slavery kinda screwed the South after the war until the North fixed everything up. It would have been better if the Southern plantation workers had moved their slaves into the factories. This way they could keep their slaves with out breaking the law (well, only if they Payed them though).

 

[Dreadnought]

The simple answer: it all depends on who his subordinates were.

Lee had a very generalized relationship with his corps officers, and was fond of giving general orders to be carried out specifically by his subordinate commanders.

 

[Glassfan]

How exactly was the battle of Antietam a failure by Lee, or for that matter how exactly would it be considered either Lee on the offensive or a meeting battle?

Lee was leading the Army of Northern Virginia on it's 1862 invasion of the North. McClellan's Army of the Potomic was shadowing and the two forces met at Antietam Creek (Sharpsburg). With both sides recently arriving and no defensive fortifications built, that would make it a meeting engagement. Since Lee was invading, that would put him on the offensive. And while the battle was tactically a draw, Lee's invasion was halted and he withdrew back into Virginia, a strategic defeat for the South. As you're no doubt aware, President Lincoln used the victory to announce the Emancipation Praclamation.

 

[Dachs]

Lee was operationally in retrograde motion at Antietam; he had already penetrated Maryland, lost the Lost Orders, found out that he had lost the Lost Orders, and was in the process of withdrawing. Sharpsburg is kind of right next to the Potomac River, after all. The Army of Northern Virginia was already retreating in a frantic effort to pull together as many troops as possible before the Federals defeated them in detail. McClellan initiated offensive operations when he drove in the Confederate pickets east of Sharpsburg in the days preceding the Antietam engagement.

Interesting, you make his role of military advisor to the President (a position that I would have thought involved a degree of trust) sound like a meddling pen pusher who spent his days idly lazing around Richmond until Davis ran out of other people to hand the command to.

I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say Lee was by far and away the clear cut choice for the command, but he certainly wasn't offered it just because he happened to be on the spot at the time. Davis trusted him and his abilities, regardless of his disappointing performance to that date.

Very true. Mostly a case of hyperbole due to wanting to get a certain point across.

 

[Glassfan]

Lee was operationally in retrograde motion at Antietam; he had already penetrated Maryland, lost the Lost Orders, found out that he had lost the Lost Orders, and was in the process of withdrawing. Sharpsburg is kind of right next to the Potomac River, after all. The Army of Northern Virginia was already retreating in a frantic effort to pull together as many troops as possible before the Federals defeated them in detail. McClellan initiated offensive operations when he drove in the Confederate pickets east of Sharpsburg in the days preceding the Antietam engagement.

After the fighting at the South Mountain passes, Lee did indeed retreat westwards (not south to Virginia) to mass his divided forces before again offering battle to McClellan. He chose Sharpsburg as being midway between Longstreet's Corps at Hagerstown and Jackson's at Harper's Ferry. It was not his intention to continue his retreat from Union forces but to gather his divided army and fight it. In that elements of both armies arrived around Antietam Creek within a day of each other, and that no formal defensive works had been erected, and that fragments of both armies continued to arrive throughout the battle, it was a meeting engagement, - though as you say, Union forces fired the first shots.

Lee's invasion of the North had failed, however.

But we are in agreement that Robert E. Lee was not as great as reputation makes him out - and that he would have been even less effective fighting for the Union?

 

[privatehudson]

Lee was leading the Army of Northern Virginia on it's 1862 invasion of the North. McClellan's Army of the Potomic was shadowing and the two forces met at Antietam Creek (Sharpsburg). With both sides recently arriving and no defensive fortifications built, that would make it a meeting engagement.

• A meeting engagement, a term used in warfare, is a combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place.

From the US Defense Department's military dictionary.

The majority of McCellan's army spent the entire day beforehand on the battlefield. A sizeable portion of Lee's army was present at the start of the battle as well. Both sides were clearly aware of the other, even if McCellan was clearly unable to see just how weak Lee's position and force was. The first day of Gettysburg is a meeting engagement, Antietam was not.

None of which really explains the sidestepping of Chancellorsville or Second Bull Run in your analysis of Lee as defensive minded however.

Since Lee was invading, that would put him on the offensive.

Strategically yes, tactically no, it wasn't clear which you meant.

And while the battle was tactically a draw, Lee's invasion was halted and he withdrew back into Virginia, a strategic defeat for the South. As you're no doubt aware, President Lincoln used the victory to announce the Emancipation Praclamation.

Given that McCellan managed to bungle one of the best opportunities of the war to defeat an army in detail, then bungled a battle in which his army nearly smashed Lee's despite his inability to co-ordinate it (or for that matter use all of it unlike Lee), the victory was a rather hollow one. Lincoln made the aftermath count more than anything McCellan did during or after the battle. In fact the best result of the aftermath was Lincoln firing McCellan, even if his choice of replacement was a mistake.

But we are in agreement that Robert E. Lee was not as great as reputation makes him out - and that he would have been even less effective fighting for the Union?

He certainly wasn't as great as his reputation in the South, Lost Cause writers and to the modern general public that I can agree with.

 

[privatehudson]

The only good Confederate Generals were.... I can't think of any because the South REPLACED THERE TOP GENERALS EVERY SIX MOUNTS....... And I'm not exaggerating on that either.

Uhmmm... what?

Lee commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for nearly three years, Johnston commanded it for about 11 months. Braxton Bragg was in command of the Army of the Tennessee for about a year. There were occasions when Davis did replace a commander as the result of defeat or retreat such as Johnston during the Atlanta campaign or Hood after Nashville but for the most part Davis showed a willingness to retain generals in position if he had faith in them.

At least I'm assuming you meant months, if you meant mounts (horses) that's a rather strange statement!

 

[MikeL49NYVI]

privatehudson:

Excellent posts!!! You have hit exactly upon the entire crux of the matter. No need for me to repeat what you have said. I would like to reinforce a couple points here.

This is basically a question about leadership qualities, not any particular battle(s). Lee took what he was given; men, material, generals, strategic position, and the political one as well. He did what had to be done to win the war. And he almost succeeded. Where he needed to be bold, and audacious, he was. When he needed to fight defensively, he did.

Personally he was a man of great faith and principal, and those things tempered all of his actions. He had the complete confidence of Jeff Davis. Don't forget Davis was Sec. of War at one time, and knew Lee well.
(BTW Davis is another item all together but he held onto Bragg far too long, and I think it was for more than one year)

Lee's actions (for the purposes of this discussion) have to be taken in the context of what I just mentioned. We can't compare what he did with what he had to what he might have done in the north wih all different circumstances. The real clues are found in the excellent leadership qualities that Lee exhibited.

Now, before Dachs can come up with another obnoxious comment, I agree that Lee has become overrated in history, almost mythical. I agree he made miscalucations and errors in judgement. He was a human, afterall, and not God. Grant (whom I agree was the best of the north) made them also. Just look at Cold Harbor. But we have the great advantage of hindsight, and also we can see what the other side was doing at the same time, none of those men, in real life and death situations had that advantage.

The biggest advantage that Lee would have had, wearing blue, was that he did, and would have, had the confidence of Lincoln and the government. They would not have been a meddeling with him as they were with lesser men. Not to say there would not have been some, but look what happened with Grant. Lincoln brought him in, gave him complete authority. He was able to replace incompetent generals, remove much of the Washington garrison for field duty, and ignore all the political pressure. We can assume that Lee would have been given much the same authority. Can you imangine a team of Lee, Grant, Sherman, Thomas , Sheridan, Kearney, Reynolds, and Meade ? All united under one man they all respect and will willingly follow?

No more Burnside, Hooker (although he was a very good corps commander) McCellan, Butler, Summer, Porter, Hunter, and a great many others.

Also, as I wrote in my earlier post. The south would not have been the same without Lee. It is again about leadership qualities. The northern generals, and politicians were afraid of Lee, very afraid. He dominated their tactical and strategic thinking and movements. This is simply a matter of fact, you can look it up. The 2nd Bull Run and Maryland campaigns in 1862 are a perfect example of this.

If Lee is a Federal general, then that intimidation factor does not exist, and the great bulk of the conduct of the war in the east is completly changed. It is not fought in the same way.

So, part of the discussion would have to include the southern war effort without Lee. Jackson and Longstreet have been mentioned here, and rightfully so. J.E. Johnston and P.T.Beaureguard were also in the mix, they shared command at 1st Bull Run, and P.T. went west to fight at Shiloh.

It is probable that Johnston would have stayed in the east. But he and Davis could not get along at all. In fact they pertty much hated each other by the war's end. Look at the Atlanta campaign. But one area where Lee had the advantage over J.E. was that Lee was able to get along with his subordinates, and meld them into a excellent fighting army. Johnston never had that touch.
Longstreet is the best guess to take command when Johnston gets wounded. But Longstreet's record in independent command is not distinguished at all. And he quarrelled with many of the ANV officers throughout the war. He did not have Lee's people skills. Jackson was brilliant in his Valley Campaign. But he failed during the 7 Days fighting.
And he too was not real good and making friends and influencing people.

Lee and Jackson were a team, they trusted and understood each other. Similar to Grant and Sherman. That personal friendship cannot be underestimated here. 2nd Bull Run, Chancellorsville, the Maryland campaign, most of that happens like it does because of Lee and Jackson's close relationship.

If Lee is in the north, none of this occurs, and the southern leadership is headless. There was no one else who had the leadership quailities in the south that Lee had, no one ever showed anything close to it, especailly on a large scale. A.P. Hill argued fought with both Jackson and Longstreet.
Consider what happened after Jackson was killed: Lee had to split his corps into two, because no one else was as good as Jackson.

A.P. Hill, and Ewell were both excellent division commanders, when they were not fighting with their superiors. But they were not as effective as corps commanders. Hood went west, got an army and(partly through political scheming) went out and destroyed it.

The list goes on, but suffice it to say that Lee held the southern forces together. When that trait is taken away, and given to the north, an entirely different picture presents itself. Both aspects have to be considered. Personally I do not see the war lasting past 1863, if this occurs.

Incidently, Lee was NOT frantically retreating and scrambling to get his army together at Sharpsburg. That is completly wrong. Yes, he fell back to an excellent defensive position where Jackson could easily reach him, once he was done capturing Harper's Ferry. He stayed there for 2 days waiting, and bluffing McCellan into inaction. And after the battle, he stayed for another day, daring Mac to attack again. Hardly the actions of a general out of control of a situation, and an in a state of panic.

Mnay think Lee was overrated, and I do agree. But do not discount that fact that he was still very good, and would have been if fighting for the north.

 

[privatehudson]

privatehudson:

Excellent posts!!! You have hit exactly upon the entire crux of the matter. No need for me to repeat what you have said. I would like to reinforce a couple points here.

Likewise I'll just make a few remarks since I generally agree with what you put.

(BTW Davis is another item all together but he held onto Bragg far too long, and I think it was for more than one year)

Probably, that was just how long he was in charge of the Army of the Tennessee, he held other commands both before and after that tenure but I was just going for a summary to refute the point being made.

The biggest advantage that Lee would have had, wearing blue, was that he did, and would have, had the confidence of Lincoln and the government. They would not have been a meddeling with him as they were with lesser men. Not to say there would not have been some, but look what happened with Grant. Lincoln brought him in, gave him complete authority. He was able to replace incompetent generals, remove much of the Washington garrison for field duty, and ignore all the political pressure. We can assume that Lee would have been given much the same authority. Can you imangine a team of Lee, Grant, Sherman, Thomas , Sheridan, Kearney, Reynolds, and Meade ? All united under one man they all respect and will willingly follow?

To be honest I'm not sure this would have happened quite so easily in the early stages of the war since Lincoln's hands were often tied by the need to appease political groups. Butler for example wasn't removed from command until early 1865 because his political power made doing so difficult prior to the Presidential Elections.

It is probable that Johnston would have stayed in the east. But he and Davis could not get along at all. In fact they pertty much hated each other by the war's end. Look at the Atlanta campaign. But one area where Lee had the advantage over J.E. was that Lee was able to get along with his subordinates, and meld them into a excellent fighting army. Johnston never had that touch.

It is worth adding that Johnston either did not understand, or did not care about the importance of informing Davis of his actions and the motivation behind them. This left Davis and the country often baffled and frustrated at the seeming lack of direction to any army lead by Johnston.

Longstreet is the best guess to take command when Johnston gets wounded. But Longstreet's record in independent command is not distinguished at all. And he quarrelled with many of the ANV officers throughout the war. He did not have Lee's people skills.

Yeah as I've said before I'm a great admirer of Longstreet but frankly he was no army commander. He was a fine corps commander and once you set him in motion he would fight like hell but he was not a good choice for independent command.

Jackson was brilliant in his Valley Campaign. But he failed during the 7 Days fighting.
And he too was not real good and making friends and influencing people.

That's one heck of an understatement! Jackson is probably just about the worst choice to lead the army since he didn't keep his subordinates informed of any of his plans and had a rather bizarre habit of arresting high ranking subordinates who he saw as failing in their duty. That in itself wouldn't be a huge problem if they had failed on a scale like A P Hill or Ewell did at corps level, but when that definition of "failure" includes retreating without permission to avoid being attacked from three sides by an enemy force that outnumbers you this isn't a good thing.

But that overall point you make is important and so far largely not discussed, Lee fighting for the North doesn't just impact on how the Northern war effort would have gone, it impacts on how the south would have fought their war without him taking over the ANV after Seven Pines.