This was actually a good thing. Lincoln's recommendations were generally good ones, and having Halleck to fulfill the role McClellan should have fulfilled (essentially a glorified and more powerful version of Meigs) was ideal for an army that was committed to offensive operations and thus had to be extra careful about supply. The old Clausewitzian saw about political control of the military seems relevant.
Invariably, the failures of Federal generals in the eastern theater could not be chalked up to "too much interference from Washington". Lincoln didn't force Porter to sit idly by while the Army of Virginia was annihilated, nor did he endow McClellan with the dash and speed of a snail with indigestion. Nobody in Washington told Hooker to freeze or Burnside to have his soldiers commit suicide. At the same time, Halleck's instructions to, say, Meade kept the Army of the Potomac operating in a manner that made sense considering the overall Union strategy, but allowed Meade considerable leeway in determining how he pursued those instructions. When Grant moved east, his habit of taking over the Army of the Potomac's field operations may have been a good thing in an operational sense, but it was no upgrade over 1863 in the grand-strategic sense.
Dachs:
I was going to continue answering both you and privatehudson in one post, but you have so much in yours, that I felt it deserved its own response, just as hudson's did.
" a glorified and more powerful version of Meigs" That would be about right, and I think that if Mac could have stayed out of trouble then he would have thrived there. But that was no more in his make-up than moving decisively was. As I understand it, Mac's reputation in the army was 2nd only to Lee. He was chosen to go observe the Crieman War as the US representative, and write a paper on what he saw and learned. And even though he left the army, when the war broke out, he was instantly recieved back in, and made a general. So I doubt that he would have been happy being a glorious Meigs.
I understand and agree with you about the Federal generals. There is a law that is applied to studies of organizations. You probably know that name of it, I forget. But it states that "any organization tends to adopt the characteristics of its leader" I may not have the quote exactly right, but it certainly fits with Mac, and the Army of the Potomac. Remember after Antietam Lincoln called it "McCellan's body guard"
Halleck I am not so sure about. There are several historians who just do not care much for him, and the job he preformed for the country. I really have not much of an opinion, but I'd like to quote
Stephen Sears in the "Landscape Turned Red"
"Halleck was called "Old Brains" and seldom admiringly. A dumpy,paunchy,figure with stareing, fishlike eyes, he was quite without presence: his natural habitat was an office desk rather than a battlefield. yet in one respect the two men were much alike.(He is comparing halleck and Mac here) Both were versed in the rules of bureaucratic survival: be even cautious, deflect responsibility whenever possible, protect flanks and rear at all times from the hostile fire of critics."
So I am not sure how much he actually helped with anything, but I am amused at how he and Lincoln contrived to get Hooker to resign.
I do not agree with your Grant statement, if you are referring to the eastern theather of the war when you write "in the grand strategic sense". Grant's idea of latching outo Lee, and not letting go, while sending Sheridan into the Shenandoah Valley to destroy the supply of Lee's army I thnik is very sound and all about offensive actions. It was brutal war, especially to the mid-19th century civilian. But it was effective, and it won.
Anyway, it has occured to me that we may be getting to far from the topic of this post. No one has yelled at us yet, so maybe we are OK.
