Money. Doing it Right this Time.

Something I don't understand: why is Japan able to keep a debt-to-GDP ratio of 230% without anything going seriously wrong? IIRC, they can still borrow at extremely low interest rates. What's going on here, and what makes them different from the PIGS in the way they handle soverign debt?
 
Something I don't understand: why is Japan able to keep a debt-to-GDP ratio of 230% without anything going seriously wrong? IIRC, they can still borrow at extremely low interest rates. What's going on here, and what makes them different from the PIGS in the way they handle soverign debt?


The core reason that people will loan to Japan at low rates is that they do not expect Japan to default. And so the safety is high. Recall that when making investments the factors people consider include rate of return, and safety. Many people choose safety, despite a low rate of return, and Japan has been judged safe. Now as I understand it the other factors that make Japan different from other nations are very high domestic savings rates, which means that very little of Japan's national debt is of foreign origin. Also Japan has been running a trade surplus for decades, and that is a good source of income for debt repayment that other debtor nations don't have. However, this is not sustainable forever, and the earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Dai-ichi disasters, and the choices made as a consequence of them to end the use of nuclear power in Japan may combine with Japan's aging population to end Japan's ability to live on deficits. Many believe Japan had lived on deficits too long already, without ever addressing the core economic and fiscal issues causing them. But now the situation very suddenly became far worse. Now they will have to import fossil fuels at far higher rates, eating away at their trade surpluses. Now their economy has been forced lower, and the costs of repairing that will be massive. And all the while their population is aging and retiring.

So while I think there are logical reasons why Japan has been able to borrow cheap in the past, I think that they are fast running into the point where they must make some fundamental changes in their fiscal picture.
 
Can we discuss the Efficient Market hypothesis?

It has always seemed to me that there is a paradox inherent to the EMH, namely that if the EMH is true, then markets will sooner or later "train" people to believe in the EMH. However, once everybody believes in the EMH, it follows that instead of trying to beat the market by picking stocks, they will just invest in index funds. But without stock pickers to correct errors in the valuations of individual stocks, the EMH can not be right.

Is there some refutation to this, or was the point from the start that the EMH is only a half-truth and not an absolute?

Another issue: if stocks tanked in 2008, this means there was at least some part of the market that was "caught by surprise" by the financial crisis. I understand that EMH advocates "blame" the crisis on poor monetary policy, but shouldn't markets be able to predict errors in monetary policy as well as any other dynamic? Is monetary policy seen as an exception to the rule, or is the thesis that markets were still "right" in an ex-ante, probabilistic, stochastic sense, i.e. they assigned a higher weight to the more probable outcome more in their valuations but the less probable outcome manifested in the end?

Also is there some error in monetary policy that the tech-bust can be attributed to? How do EMH advocates generally interpret that bust?
 
Ooh, the EMH is fun. You'll love this post by Nick Rowe.

Arguably the market did "predict" errors in monetary policy: policymakers (by most accounts) didn't drop the ball until Lehman in October 08, but market participants downgraded their inflation forecast and income forecast as early as June of that year. Is that what you're going for?

And yes, I'd argue that the markets were right ex-ante. Who in March 08 would have predicted the huge fall in growth and inflation just six months later? Things were bad but there was no indication, as of yet, that the Fed would drop the ball the way they did. Ex-ante and ex-post matter. If your model of monetary policy is a mean-zero error around 5% NGDP growth, and the Fed wakes up one day and hits you with a massive negative shock, you were still right ex ante - by definition you couldn't have predicted the shock.

Your observations probably deserve more substantive comment and I'll expand on all of this when I have the chance. :)
 
Markets = collections of people. People = irrational. Collections of people = irrational with sheeple herding behavior. Therefor markets = irrational with sheeple herding behavior.

EMH is a religion, not a science.
 
See, I can't get behind the premise that people are irrational. Boundedly rational, sure. Beset by information and transactions costs, surely. But actively irrational? Nah.
 
See, I can't get behind the premise that people are irrational. Boundedly rational, sure. Beset by information and transactions costs, surely. But actively irrational? Nah.

I'm sorry to inform you, but you are here proving one fine example of irrationality!

You see, because you want to believe is what must seem to you an appealing theory, you are willing to irrationally defend it. Your goal orients your beliefs, and makes you seek justifications for them, instead of doing a cold analysis of the situation. "Information costs", "transaction costs", and so on, are only ex post facto (we're doing latin here, right? :p) explanations for the predictive deficiencies already observed with that theory. And they are wrong, because they do not accurately describe the issue, they're just consequences of what is really wrong with any "rational" be-all model for economics. These are just unknowns about the behaviors of other people, but what matters is why those unknowns ("costs", as some economists with a warped world view like to call them) exist.They exist because people all have individually different goals and preferences. No one is exactly a clone of someone else. No one is motivated by exactly the same combination of stimulus, of desires. There is no average consumer, no average producer, no average trader. And it that does not exist, there can be no rational theory of the market, because no one can add and average together the actions of all its participants. You can't average different things!
And individuals are not even constant over time either, but that's besides the main point anyway.

Make yourself a favor, get "Debunking Economics" from Steve Keen and read chapter 2, "the calculus of hedonism", about the fiction of aggregate demand curves. I bet you haven't yet! And the whole thing remains one of the best short books exposing the bullcrap on which the "mathematical" aspects of neoclassical economics is based.
 
Forgive me, I am not a scholar in these fields, but I have read a little on the theories that underpins things like EMH and what strikes me is they have some rather extreme presuppositions (often in the name of simplicity):

1. Market participants are nearly omniscient.
2. Market participants conduct themselves with Kantian honesty.

While issue 1 is clearly absurd I find issue 2 much more interesting as it seems that periods with efficient markets were often characterised with a large degree of honesty. Often due to regulations that put firewalls between sectors with conflicting interests, strong efficient prosecution of financial fraud and a general aversion to financial vehicles that provides a venue for obfuscation tactics.

BTW, I'd really like to see a (micro)economic theory that factors in willfully deceptive actors. I'm sure it will be a huge pile of fear and loathing.
 
Ooh, the EMH is fun. You'll love this post by Nick Rowe.

Nice, that captures some of what I've been thinking quite succinctly. This'll take me some time to wrap my head around though. :D

Integral said:
And yes, I'd argue that the markets were right ex-ante. Who in March 08 would have predicted the huge fall in growth and inflation just six months later? Things were bad but there was no indication, as of yet, that the Fed would drop the ball the way they did. Ex-ante and ex-post matter. If your model of monetary policy is a mean-zero error around 5% NGDP growth, and the Fed wakes up one day and hits you with a massive negative shock, you were still right ex ante - by definition you couldn't have predicted the shock.

I see your point, and I may be mistaken here, but didn't the Fed basically stick to it's promises by targeting the inflation rate rather than NGDP at the time? Did the markets "predict" for them to break those promises?
 
Forgive me, I am not a scholar in these fields, but I have read a little on the theories that underpins things like EMH and what strikes me is they have some rather extreme presuppositions (often in the name of simplicity):

1. Market participants are nearly omniscient.
2. Market participants conduct themselves with Kantian honesty.

While issue 1 is clearly absurd I find issue 2 much more interesting as it seems that periods with efficient markets were often characterised with a large degree of honesty. Often due to regulations that put firewalls between sectors with conflicting interests, strong efficient prosecution of financial fraud and a general aversion to financial vehicles that provides a venue for obfuscation tactics.

BTW, I'd really like to see a (micro)economic theory that factors in willfully deceptive actors. I'm sure it will be a huge pile of fear and loathing.


That's an interesting point. Regulations in many case force transparency. Market participants often try to prevent transparency. It was found after thew 2008 financial crisis that many of the financial instruments, derivatives, were so opaque that expert accountants could not figure out the worth of them with 3 days work on a supercomputer.

Is fraud rational? Well, if they get away with it it is. If they go to prison, not so much. Is a market efficient if information is deliberately concealed? Is a market efficient when participants lobby the government for rules that permit the deliberate concealment of information needed for rational choices?
 
I'm sorry to inform you, but you are here proving one fine example of irrationality!

You see, because you want to believe is what must seem to you an appealing theory, you are willing to irrationally defend it. Your goal orients your beliefs, and makes you seek justifications for them, instead of doing a cold analysis of the situation. "Information costs", "transaction costs", and so on, are only ex post facto (we're doing latin here, right? :p) explanations for the predictive deficiencies already observed with that theory. And they are wrong, because they do not accurately describe the issue, they're just consequences of what is really wrong with any "rational" be-all model for economics. These are just unknowns about the behaviors of other people, but what matters is why those unknowns ("costs", as some economists with a warped world view like to call them) exist.They exist because people all have individually different goals and preferences. No one is exactly a clone of someone else. No one is motivated by exactly the same combination of stimulus, of desires. There is no average consumer, no average producer, no average trader. And it that does not exist, there can be no rational theory of the market, because no one can add and average together the actions of all its participants. You can't average different things!
And individuals are not even constant over time either, but that's besides the main point anyway.

Make yourself a favor, get "Debunking Economics" from Steve Keen and read chapter 2, "the calculus of hedonism", about the fiction of aggregate demand curves. I bet you haven't yet! And the whole thing remains one of the best short books exposing the bullcrap on which the "mathematical" aspects of neoclassical economics is based.


Heterogeneity doesn't imply irrationality, and you know it.



I take your words on aggregation to heart. I know how hard it is, I know that in general there is no way to aggregate preferences, and I think it's criminal that most economists gloss over those problems! We do so much macro with a representative average consumer, and a representative average firm, and yeah, the world doesn't work like that. In some ways the divergences of the model from the real world are important (debt dynamics are one salient example). In other ways, the models capture the important features of reality at the expense of being simple.

Aggregating capital is even worse, though it gets short shift in the coursework.

They do still touch on the difficulties of aggregation in the first-year sequence, though I'd prefer if it were given more emphasis.
 
Heterogeneity doesn't imply irrationality, and you know it.

I'm pretty convinced that it implies non-rationality. I mean, does it even make any sense to speak of the rational behavior of an heterogeneous group of people? Rationality assumes they must all have the same goal. If the goals are different, there is no one rational way for them to behave as a group.

The idea of a "rational market" is like the idea of a "national interest"...

I take your words on aggregation to heart. I know how hard it is, I know that in general there is no way to aggregate preferences, and I think it's criminal that most economists gloss over those problems! We do so much macro with a representative average consumer, and a representative average firm, and yeah, the world doesn't work like that. In some ways the divergences of the model from the real world are important (debt dynamics are one salient example). In other ways, the models capture the important features of reality at the expense of being simple.

Aggregating capital is even worse, though it gets short shift in the coursework.

They do still touch on the difficulties of aggregation in the first-year sequence, though I'd prefer if it were given more emphasis.

But doesn't it strike you as... wrong to pass such models off as valuable tools for setting public policy when they have such flaws in their foundations? I'm not against the use of models per se, but it should be made very clear that they are big simplifications, and the limitations discussed. You're an economist, I take it? Let models be used for that and then fail often enough, and people will be asking "what are these economists good for?" one of these days. Well, more people that already are! This is nothing personal, but I must say that I believe economics as a profession to be way overrated now as a science. You're politicians, really, picking models depending on the assumptions you favor. You should assume that.
 
Can we discuss the Efficient Market hypothesis?

It has always seemed to me that there is a paradox inherent to the EMH, namely that if the EMH is true, then markets will sooner or later "train" people to believe in the EMH. However, once everybody believes in the EMH, it follows that instead of trying to beat the market by picking stocks, they will just invest in index funds. But without stock pickers to correct errors in the valuations of individual stocks, the EMH can not be right.

Is there some refutation to this, or was the point from the start that the EMH is only a half-truth and not an absolute?

Another issue: if stocks tanked in 2008, this means there was at least some part of the market that was "caught by surprise" by the financial crisis. I understand that EMH advocates "blame" the crisis on poor monetary policy, but shouldn't markets be able to predict errors in monetary policy as well as any other dynamic? Is monetary policy seen as an exception to the rule, or is the thesis that markets were still "right" in an ex-ante, probabilistic, stochastic sense, i.e. they assigned a higher weight to the more probable outcome more in their valuations but the less probable outcome manifested in the end?

Also is there some error in monetary policy that the tech-bust can be attributed to? How do EMH advocates generally interpret that bust?
You are absolutely correct. I was talking exactly about this a couple days ago. Markets are efficient when they harness superior crowd wisdom. You should not be able to beat properly functioning markets at their game with any consistency, but people do all the time. One of the reasons is as you mention. The more everyone starts believing one thing, the more a crowd because a mob or a herd. Either way, it goes from being a large mass of people acting independently to everyone acting in unison. There's no crowd wisdom when there's one thought in the crowd.

As people start trusting that the market is their best bet, and become passive participants, that which makes the market a good bet becomes a bad bet. So yeah, you nailed the paradox of efficient market theory.

People beat the market all the time, regularly, using strategies that are not luck. The market is not close to perfectly efficient.
 
I don't think the fact that markets are hard to beat should be understated, though:

http://www.amazon.com/dp/1576754073...tiveASIN=1576754073&adid=139DXX56JEKE39FP3WPV

The preview version of that book has some interesting nuggets of wisdom in it.
It is hard.

It is also totally doable. I know financial advisors who do it regularly, what some of the strategies are (and that's key, sticking to strategy), and how to spot mutual fund managers who will outperform the markets in the coming times.

Most financial advisors neither know nor care to beat the market. Most of being a financial advisor is being good at sales. Some of them find the investment part more interesting than the sales part. I once got into an argument with a manager who had been an advisor. He said "efficient market theory means tells us you can't beat the market" and that anyone saying otherwise is chasing El Dorado or selling snake oil. He went on to say that clients don't care about a few hundred basis points of alpha, they just want to make sure you aren't going to lose their money.

His view is the popular view of most professional investors, especially the latter half. That's another reason why the markets are beatable. So many in the market aren't even trying to maximize profit.

I can go on about this with Morningstar categories, mutual funds, and corporate 401k planning board member. Now there's a negative market distortion if I've ever seen one.
 
It is hard.

It is also totally doable. I know financial advisors who do it regularly, what some of the strategies are (and that's key, sticking to strategy), and how to spot mutual fund managers who will outperform the markets in the coming times.

Most financial advisors neither know nor care to beat the market. Most of being a financial advisor is being good at sales. Some of them find the investment part more interesting than the sales part. I once got into an argument with a manager who had been an advisor. He said "efficient market theory means tells us you can't beat the market" and that anyone saying otherwise is chasing El Dorado or selling snake oil. He went on to say that clients don't care about a few hundred basis points of alpha, they just want to make sure you aren't going to lose their money.

bolded reminded me of this:

dilbert-index-funds.gif
 
This is an issue that has raised a lot of attention, misunderstanding, and misinformation in recent years. And so a primer.

Modern banking can get very complicated. But in traditional terms, banks have two sides to what they do. They take in deposits and make loans.

Why? What role does that fill? Banks are part of the industry called "financial intermediaries". That is, middlemen. Depositors have more money than they have a use for at current. They want to earn some money putting their money to work. Borrowers need more money than they currently have. And they are willing to pay to use someone else's money.

Banks make the connection between these two groups of people.

They reduce the risks and the transactions costs to both borrowers and lenders. And by doing so, they make capital for businesses cheaper and more available. And that allows a greater creation of wealth to the society.



Banking of this sort has been with us a long time. It's not a new thing in the world. English kings explicitly allowed goldsmiths to engage in banking at least 400 years ago. It may well date to the early 13th century in Italy. I'm not aware of it existing older than that. But wouldn't be surprised if it did.

It has been around for all of the modern era. And has largely made the modern era possible. To attack something that all of our prosperity rests on in nonsensical. It demonstrates an ignorance of how the world works that is dangerous to all of us.



*****
Someone want to chime in with the Marxist critique of banking? As I understand it, making money work is not work, and so does not deserve an income.

But as I just showed, making money work is work. And so does deserve some sort of an income for doing so.
*****

So banks make the connections between savers and borrowers. What else do they do and how do they do it? Banks have two primary kinds of depositors. Checking accounts and savings accounts. Simple version, savings accounts earn interest for the depositor, checking accounts make the depositors money quickly and easily available for a variety of purposes.

The money to pay for all of this comes from the loans the banks make. All those loans charge interest, which is the primary revenue of the bank. Out of that revenue, the bank has to pay the interest on deposits, and cover all the costs of the checking accounts, plus all the costs of running the bank and some rate of return to the bank's owners.



But banks can't loan out all of the money that is deposited with them. Because they never know when their depositors are going to want their money back. And so they have to keep a fraction of it in reserve to cover what their depositors are going to want on any given day. Now in the US we normally talk about a 10% reserve ratio. Why? Well it makes the math easy :mischief: But really, because it's dictated by law. It doesn't have to be 10%. Some nations have gotten away from mandatory reserve requirements. They can do that because they have more properly regulated and run banks, and so can safely run with a lower reserve.

You see, the higher the reserve requirement, the less money the bank has to loan out. But the lower requirement, the more the banks can loan. Lower reserves mean lower interest rates and more loans to the economy, and so more economic growth. Higher reserves, higher interest rates, less growth.


Contrary to current political myth, fractional reserve banking in and of itself does not push inflation. Because all the money "created out of thin air" when loans are made is destroyed again when the loans are repaid. It is not an ever expanding quantity of money. It is a stagnant amount of money until the monetary base is expanded again, or the slow but inexorable velocity of money speeds up a bit.

The thing is, that most of the danger that comes out of finance does not come out of conventional banking. Conventional banking is actually very well understood and easy to deal with. The problems come when finance is allowed to be creative. When it is allowed to take chances.



The fundamentals of money and banking are among the simplest and most basic in economics. There's really no disagreement about the principles. And so there's really no reason for anyone who has had high school AP economics or a few college courses to get it so fundamentally wrong as we hear in some of the political debate today.

Yes, the banks keep 10% of the deposited money. However, when the 90% loaned is then redeposited into the bank, the bank can now loan out another 90%, and when that 90% is then deposited again the bank can once again loan another 90%, etc, etc. The bank has created money out of thin air through fractional reserve banking - people loaning, then redepositing, then loaning, etc. With £100 deposit, the bank (through several loans and deposits) will make £1000 (or there abouts) available in the economy.

Yes, the money is destroyed when repaid, no one is arguing with you there. However, the interest is still payable. The interest on that £1000 of several loans is still payable. Where does the interest come from? Not from the original depositors money, but from new loans by other people. There is more debt money than deposit money, by a factor of at least ten. More debt is needed to service the old debt. That is why deflation is so dangerous, as the money supply shrinks there will be mass defaults as there is not enough money flowing in the system to service old debts. If credit is not available, deposits shrink (because most deposits is actually someone's debt), and everyone crashes because the whole system is based on there being more money than there actually is.

Oh, and in actual fact 10% reserve is not what banks hold. It is actually far lower. Look it up mr I know all because I'm an economist man (even though institutionalists like you cause the financial crises that have continuously racked the world).


Until next time, educated ones.
 
Yes consiprator, the entire monetary/banking system is build on a feeble house of cards that is destined to crumble to the ground once people figure out the banksters' trickery :run: :run:

Most civilized nations don't have reserve requirements. I covered this on page 6 a different thread. The money multiplier isn't relevant for monetary transmission purposes. :)

@inno, hygro, monsterzuma: I see your posts and will respond tomorrow.
 
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