Looks like the standard of debate here rose exponentially - good!
And why should such a criterion be trusted? Wouldn't such criterion be inherently subjective? Wouldn't such a definition be in effect a religious statement even if couched in scientific terms? Fact is, we are inherently agnostic about the potential aspects of such an entity, where we would look, and if it exists or not.
The problem here is that there are two quite different ways of thinking about the nature and existence of God, or indeed of anything.
The first way could be called an
existentialist mode of inquiry. It begins by asking whether something exists, and then proceeds to asking what sort of thing it is.
The second way could be called an
essentialist mode of inquiry. It begins by asking what sort of thing something is, and then proceeds to asking whether it exists.
You seem to be taking an existentialist approach. You're assuming that the word "God" has some kind of referent, and saying that we can't know much about this referent - in particular, you are saying that it is jumping the gun to attribute various properties to this referent from the outset, without first going out and (somehow) ascertaining that it actually
has these properties. But in your view, it is impossible to do that, so we're stuck.
But of course, those you're criticising aren't doing this, because they are essentialists. They are defining what they mean by "God"
first, and only
then asking whether a thing that meets that definition exists.
If we bear in mind the difference between these two approaches and make it clear which one we're following, these confusions might be avoided. Personally it seems to me that the existentialist approach is best in a mystical or spiritual sort of context, where someone
actually experiences something that seems to them divine in some way. In such a case, the basic datum is this experience, and the procedure is to ask what entity (if any) actually was experienced. But I would say that outside this sort of case, an essentialist procedure makes the most sense. How can we ask whether something exists if we don't define it first? If we don't define it, we don't even know what sort of thing we're talking about.
Eternal implies infintely old, so I supposed it's infinitely big.
"Eternal" is traditionally taken to mean
either infinitely old,
or outside time altogether, so neither old nor new.
That's funny... Plotinus actually did/does study those... not on the net, but in real life. "the bible is infallible truth"? Says who? Not Plotinus.
Don't worry - you can't take
everything Fifty says seriously...
Let me spell out what I mean when I say that if "infinite" means "infinite with respect to everything", then your definition of god can't exist.
First of all, I take your view on the relationship between God and rationality to be that the thing itself, God, still obeys at least the laws of logic. Its that we cannot come to know that thing through logic and reason alone. If that is a mischaracterization of your view, let me know.
Given that, it seems like construing "infinite" as "infinite with respect to everything" makes God unable to exist. I'll just call this notion of infinite "infinite*" so you know where I am using it in that way:
1) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely good.
2) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely evil.
3) Infinitely good and infinitely evil are mutually contradictory properties.
4) It is logically impossible for something to possess mutually contradictory properties.
5) So an infinite* God is impossible.
If you don't like talk of good and evil, it is easy to come up with more mundane examples:
1) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely arrogant.
2) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely humble.
3) Infinitely arrogant and infinitely humble are mutually contradictory properties.
4) It is logically impossible for something to possess mutually contradictory properties.
5) So an infinite* God is impossible.
or:
1) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely wide.
2) If God is infinite*, then he is infinitely narrow.
3) Infinitely wide and infinitely narrow are mutually contradictory properties.
4) It is logically impossible for something to possess mutually contradictory properties.
5) So an infinite* God is impossible.
Given my understanding of your view on the relationship between God and logic/reason, I don't think you would be inclined here to say something about how God really can possess mutually contradictory properties.
Right, this all makes sense. The standard answer would of course be that God doesn't possess
every property to a certain degree, but only certain ones. Which ones? An obvious answer is all
positive properties. In each of the pairs you listed, there's one positive property and one negative one, such that the negative one is just an absence of the positive one. Evil is a lack of goodness, arrogance is a lack of humility, and narrowness is a lack of width. God possess the positive properties to an infinite degree. We can say the same thing in another way by defining the negative properties as limits: to be evil is to be limited in goodness, etc. But God's infinity means he lacks all limits, so he lacks these supposed properties altogether.
This would tie in with the traditional arguments for God's infinity. Bear in mind that no-one thought God was infinite until the fourth century AD; before then, it was usual to think of God as limited (Origen, for example, was fairly clear on this). The first person to argue for God's infinity was Gregory of Nyssa (in his
Life of Moses, but I don't have more specific references to hand). He said that if God is limited then there must be something limiting him, in which case this other thing would be greater than him. That is impossible, so God must be limitless and thus infinite. Scotus (at some points) uses a similar argument: what is finite could (in principle) be excelled. But God is defined as the most perfect being
that there could be. So he cannot be finite.
However, Scotus later develops a notion of finitude/infinity that doesn't allow this argument. He points out that while it may be true that being limited by something else entails that you are finite, it doesn't follow that
not being limited by something else entails that you are
not finite (it's like saying that being painted red entails that you're red; therefore not being painted red entails that you're not red - but blood isn't painted red, yet it is still red). So Scotus develops an alternative understanding of what infinity is. For him, it is not relational, as it is for Aquinas; it is an intrinsic property. He thinks that to say that God is infinite is to say that he has each of his properties to a superlative degree.
Scotus thinks that God's infinity is his
primary characteristic. It is
because God is infinite that we can know that he has the other perfections. Aquinas, of course, takes a different view. He thinks that God's primary characteristic is his simplicity, and he derives God's other characteristics from that. This includes infinity. A perfectly simple being will have each property that he has in the simplest possible way. But the simplest way to have knowledge, power, etc is to have them to an infinite degree (to have them to a finite degree would require further explanation - why
that degree?).
All of this is important because it shows that you need to be very careful about what you mean by "infinite" - not only
which properties God has in an infinite way, but what it even means to say that something has a property in an infinite way in the first place.
Another thing, going back to the point about God having only the positive qualities. You can use this definition as the basis for an argument for God's possibility. Leibniz constructed a proof along these lines. The idea is that we define God as a perfectly simple being that possesses every perfection. This means that he possesses every
simple property to a perfect degree. But by definition, perfectly simple properties are compatible with each other: they can be instantiated in the same individual. This is because, for two properties to be incompatible, there must be some simpler property such that one of them contains it and the other contains its negation. For example, the property of being arrogant involves the property of thinking that you're really great. But the property of being humble involves the property of
not thinking that you're really great. So once you unpack these properties a bit, you find an explicit contradiction. But simple properties, by definition, can't be unpacked in this way. They don't consist of
simpler properties at all. So a being which exemplifies all, and only, simple properties must be possible - its definition contains no contradiction, either explicit or implicit. This remains the case even if those properties are all exemplified to an infinite degree. So such a being is possible.
Whether or not this proof works, I'm not sure. Leibniz thought that the ontological argument would work
if you could show that God is possible, which Descartes never did; he thought that by supplying the proof outlined above he had made good the deficiency and that the ontological argument could now be defended as a deductive argument for God's existence. I'm pretty sure he was wrong about that part.