The Agnostic's Dilemma

[El_Machinae]

the English Owenite lecturer — who coined the term secularism — held that secularists should not be militant freethinkers but should instead take no interest at all in religious questions because they were irrelevant

How do you convince people that a question is irrelevant without thinking about it?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

Anyways, just because a question is irrelevant doesn't mean we shouldn't think about it.

 

[pboily]

Anyways, just because a question is irrelevant doesn't mean we shouldn't think about it.

True, that would put most mathematicians out of a job.

 

[Ayatollah So]

I didn't say that my disposition to believe my mother is standing in front of me when I see her means that I believe my vision is trustworthy; rather, my belief that my vision is trustworthy has led me to believe that my mother is standing in front of me when I see her there.

I think that, if even that much is true, then you're weird.

As I pointed out before, we start out as children just plain believing that mom is there, because we see her. We don't derive this from a "first principle" that "our senses are trustworthy" - a principle we wouldn't even understand - we just see, and then believe. But even a sophisticated adult, I suspect, doesn't normally go through the extra step of appealing to a first principle. We still just see, and then believe. Perhaps in the philosophy classroom, or soon after experimenting with hallucinogenic drugs, a person actually makes use of the thought "my senses are reliable" -- but in most circumstances that just seems too intellectualized.

Another reason to be suspicious of "first principles" is that sometimes, first principles don't last. They get revised, or discarded. In which case, they never really were (by some philosophers' standards, at least) first principles at all. And it's really hard (to put it mildly) to draw a limit and say, well OK, those principles over there were revisable, but these here aren't.

 

[Gothmog]

Ayatollah So,

a first principle is something we build upon not something we can prove. So even if it is later proved wrong (such as that evidence collected today can be used to predict things that will happen tomorrow), it can still be called a first principle in this context.

We should be suspicious of them, but we need them nonetheless.

Indeed, that part of the discussion is too intellectual for many people to care about.

 

[WillJ]

I think that, if even that much is true, then you're weird.

As I pointed out before, we start out as children just plain believing that mom is there, because we see her. We don't derive this from a "first principle" that "our senses are trustworthy" - a principle we wouldn't even understand - we just see, and then believe. But even a sophisticated adult, I suspect, doesn't normally go through the extra step of appealing to a first principle. We still just see, and then believe. Perhaps in the philosophy classroom, or soon after experimenting with hallucinogenic drugs, a person actually makes use of the thought "my senses are reliable" -- but in most circumstances that just seems too intellectualized.

Another reason to be suspicious of "first principles" is that sometimes, first principles don't last. They get revised, or discarded. In which case, they never really were (by some philosophers' standards, at least) first principles at all. And it's really hard (to put it mildly) to draw a limit and say, well OK, those principles over there were revisable, but these here aren't.

I suppose we have ourselves a question of meta-philosophy here? A question that can only be resolved by thinking without thinking!

Obviously most people don't ever bother to say "I trust my senses," and these people do just fine. But regardless of whether or not they actually verbalize it, their beliefs are still grounded on it. When philosophers bother to verbalize this principle and others, they're simply recognizing this fact. Others will go on building on assumptions without realizing it. Coming to grips with the fact that your beliefs rest on the aforementioned assumptions, as some philosophers try to do, is useful not in spite of but precisely because you may realize that you'd like to change the assumptions.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Coming to grips with the fact that your beliefs rest on the aforementioned assumptions [...]

Color me skeptical, still. How do beliefs rest on something that plays no part in the formation of the belief? And, along with some of the philosophers inspired by Karl Popper, I'd like to wonder what is this "resting" anyway - are beliefs subject to gravity? Do we really need to stick something under them, lest they fall down?

 

[warpus]

Color me skeptical, still. How do beliefs rest on something that plays no part in the formation of the belief? And, along with some of the philosophers inspired by Karl Popper, I'd like to wonder what is this "resting" anyway - are beliefs subject to gravity? Do we really need to stick something under them, lest they fall down?

A belief not resting on something solid could end up falling into something nasty.. like BS. This would result in every single idea based on that belief being covered in BS as well.

 

[CartesianFart]

Color me skeptical, still. How do beliefs rest on something that plays no part in the formation of the belief? And, along with some of the philosophers inspired by Karl Popper, I'd like to wonder what is this "resting" anyway - are beliefs subject to gravity? Do we really need to stick something under them, lest they fall down?

It is not that in the literal sense,it is just that sometimes philosophers have the tendencies to mix the metaphor with the facts.

 

[WillJ]

Color me skeptical, still. How do beliefs rest on something that plays no part in the formation of the belief? And, along with some of the philosophers inspired by Karl Popper, I'd like to wonder what is this "resting" anyway - are beliefs subject to gravity? Do we really need to stick something under them, lest they fall down?

It's not that we "need" to stick something under them lest they fall down, it's that they simply do have something stuck under them. If I say, "Hey, there's a fire! --- I better run!" my statement "There's a fire!" is only true if my sense of sight provides an accurate input of information. If my sense of sight does not provide an accurate input of information, the statement is not necessarily true---or do you somehow reject that idea?

 

[Ayatollah So]

If I say, "Hey, there's a fire! --- I better run!" my statement "There's a fire!" is only true if my sense of sight provides an accurate input of information. If my sense of sight does not provide an accurate input of information, the statement is not necessarily true---or do you somehow reject that idea?

It's not that I reject it, it's that I find it to be a distraction.

Let's go back to the origin of this whole "first principles" discussion in this thread, namely, FredLC's post #50. I agree in spirit with much of what FredLC says there (I reserve the right to quibble on a few of the letters). One thing that he says and I agree with, is that his type of atheism is consistent with having confidence in empirical findings broadly speaking, whereas agnosticism, at least in some of the brands being sold around here , is not. And this is where y'all interjected the "first principles" talk.

FredLC, if you feel that I misrepresented what you said, please correct me.

The way I see it, we have a choice between a ridiculously high standard of rational belief and disbelief, and a more modest one. The ridiculously high standard says that we have to rule out every conceivable possibility of not-X before we claim that X, and we have to rule out every conceivable possibility of X before we claim that not-X. The modest one says (oversimplifying a lot) that we can make all the claims implied by the best explanation of our experience, even if it is not the only conceivable explanation.

If you hold the ridiculously high standard, you won't say flat-out, "there is a computer in front of me," except as shorthand for "Assuming the first principle that my senses are reliable, there is a computer in front of me." If you hold the modest standard, you just say and just mean, "there is a computer in front of me." If you hold the extreme standard, you won't flat-out believe "there's no such thing as the Flying Spaghetti Monster." With the modest one, you will.

Note that the above is about rational belief and disbelief. It's not about reliable belief and disbelief. The accuracy of your sense of sight bears on the reliability of your beliefs about what you see, but doesn't necessarily bear on their rationality, especially if there are no signs in your experience which indicate that the accuracy is problematic. That's why this "first principles" talk strikes me as beside the point.

 

[WillJ]

It's not that I reject it, it's that I find it to be a distraction.

Let's go back to the origin of this whole "first principles" discussion in this thread, namely, FredLC's post #50. I agree in spirit with much of what FredLC says there (I reserve the right to quibble on a few of the letters). One thing that he says and I agree with, is that his type of atheism is consistent with having confidence in empirical findings broadly speaking, whereas agnosticism, at least in some of the brands being sold around here , is not. And this is where y'all interjected the "first principles" talk.

FredLC, if you feel that I misrepresented what you said, please correct me.

The way I see it, we have a choice between a ridiculously high standard of rational belief and disbelief, and a more modest one. The ridiculously high standard says that we have to rule out every conceivable possibility of not-X before we claim that X, and we have to rule out every conceivable possibility of X before we claim that not-X. The modest one says (oversimplifying a lot) that we can make all the claims implied by the best explanation of our experience, even if it is not the only conceivable explanation.

If you hold the ridiculously high standard, you won't say flat-out, "there is a computer in front of me," except as shorthand for "Assuming the first principle that my senses are reliable, there is a computer in front of me." If you hold the modest standard, you just say and just mean, "there is a computer in front of me." If you hold the extreme standard, you won't flat-out believe "there's no such thing as the Flying Spaghetti Monster." With the modest one, you will.

Note that the above is about rational belief and disbelief. It's not about reliable belief and disbelief. The accuracy of your sense of sight bears on the reliability of your beliefs about what you see, but doesn't necessarily bear on their rationality, especially if there are no signs in your experience which indicate that the accuracy is problematic. That's why this "first principles" talk strikes me as beside the point.

I agree with you that feeling the need to rule all out all non-X possibilities before being able to accept X, and vice versa, is having too high a standard---a practical person must realize that in some cases (make that all cases) he will have to act on X without being 100% sure of it. Now, what exactly does that have to do with first principles? Perhaps it's not supposed to directly have anything to do with it, and just the next paragraph is. In that case, I fully admit I have an "extreme standard" with regard to recognizing that my beliefs are built on a foundation of first principles (at least when the situation demands it, such as a philosophical discussion on a very fundamental topic, like the existence of God or the ethics of murder), and I don't see anything wrong with it or impractical about it, since I am perfectly willing to act on beliefs while admitting I am not 100% certain about them.

As for rationality and reliability, I agree that the accuracy of your senses doesn't have anything to do with the rationality of trusting them, but for different reasons, I think. Whether or not you have a basic faith in your senses is not a matter of rationality; it is a matter of what your first principles are, and rationality only deals with internal consistency (in the philosophical sense, anyway). In the sense that social scientists use the word, you can't evaluate the "rationality" of your trust of your senses by looking to see if there are "signs in your experience which indicate that the accuracy is problematic," as that would be using your senses! This, of course, is why I call the general reliability of the senses a "first principle" in the first place. Now, since my thoughts have strayed quite far from the issue of agnosticism (and I'm afraid to say that going back and looking at FredLC's post #50 doesn't exactly help), am I missing your point, or what?

 

[FredLC]

On First Principles:

Even though the debate strayed, as it is still an interesting one, and basically one originated by a post of mine, I think I can help here.

The dissent here, as I see, was originated by a divergence in the meaning of "first principles":

At post #50, when I mentioned that "there is no reason why first principles should be different", I was referring to a quite common definition of agnosticism as "the conviction that it is impossible to obtain knowledge regarding first principles".

I always interpreted "first principles", in that sentence, as "fundamentals of nature"; as the source dynamics of time and space, the ideas and informations necessary to decipher the reality in which we live.

Now, when Gothmog questioned it, I saw clearly that he used "first principles" as "basic analytical knowledge; as an "a priori" axiom, the point of reference from which other knowledge is built upon. Which would be my first principle, than? Possibly, my postulate "my senses are basically correct", even though it could be "there is a world out there to be felt".

As I have said before, Gothmog's meaning is that which is commonly held in philosophic books. I've seen it there several times. So I'll rend it to him that this is them meaning which we should use now and ever on, to avoid innacuracy and corruption of meaning - I mean, I hardly have the prestige and authority to alter the meaning of common philosophical terms and presets.

This, however, means to my opinion nothing but a re-arrangement of language.

Because in the sentence "Agnosticism is the idea that no knowledge can be obtained regarding first principles", neither meaning rescue it's accuracy.

If the meaning which I used in the post #50 remained, and a "first principle" was a factor both external and conditional of reality, than there is no reason to assume that it can't be investigated by empirical means and eventually deciphered, even if current technology levels have not managed to succeed at it;

If we correct the meaning of the term to what Gothmog correctly brought up, than "God" is not a first principle, for all knowledge of him is not "a priori", but derived from experience (either objective - which is faulty - or subjective - which is plenty but questionable).

Regards .

 

[Gothmog]

@Ayatollah So

As CartesianFart points out, 'resting' is a metaphor. But to extend it we can say that some beliefs 'rest' on faith. That is if we have no way of proving, or even strongly supporting, a belief then we say we have faith. Religious people speak this way of God, and philosophical types speak this way about first principles, though they often say 'given' rather than 'faith'.

Agnosticism has lots of faith in empirical findings, but it recognizes that the way in which we interpret those findings depends on our first principles. So my mention of paradigm shifts, these typically involve interpreting the same data in terms of a new theoretical model (usually including new first principles) and thus giving them different meaning.

In physics we construct whole worlds based on first principles that we know are wrong (e.g. the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, or the hard sphere approximation) because they are useful, or they give us insight into what 'reality' is.

IMO, the advantage of this system is a constant recognition that things you think are correct may not be, that a seemingly worthless hypothesis may actually give insight. This enables re-evaluation of 'facts' that otherwise become gospel. It helps one not become to emotionally attached to knowledge, as humans are want to do.

@FredLC

this may be the one area where we have an actual disagreement and not just a semantic one.

As you suggest, I have at least three a priori's that I believe are true and try not to think too much about: 1) that there exists an external reality which I share with other humans; 2) that my senses in some way reflect the character of that external reality; 3) that the character of that external reality does not change haphazardly. As far as I have been able to tell, I cannot prove - nor live without - these assumptions.

Note that in #2, I would not be so bold as to say 'my senses are basically correct'. That has not been my experience with my senses in their raw form, they need to be trained and constrained before I would even go half that far.

But there's another first principle that I sometimes think about, one which has very little practical use but one that I find myself returning to nonetheless.

In all the logical systems and empirical constructs I have been in contact with, or thought about, the issue of existence is always a first principle. The question of origin is a first principle, and though it may recede (as in Ayatolla's first principle that gets revised or discarded), it never disappears.

There are two basic forms for this question, the first has a subjective flavor.

"why me"

which IMO extends to mean 'why specifically this form of existence'

the second a more scientific flavor

"what's behind the I don't know"

which is a question my father used to ask me

In my conception of what humans mean by God, there is always the answer to this question. Sometimes referred to as the question of origins, or of first principles; but, I think, a question that all humans understand and relate to.

As far as I can see this is like infinity, no matter how many layers of 'I don't know' we peel away, we will never reach the end of them.

 

[Tank_Guy#3]

I am "agnostic" in a very real sense. I do not claim that it is possible through human knowledge anything certain about God - I just act as though I am certain.

And in another; I cannot disprove the claims of all other religions or philosophies than my own. Rather, I set them aside, and in the absence of compelling evidence that they are true, act as though they are not.

But did you not also say before the final paragraph that you didn't really have compelling evidence for the existence of your god?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

No, what I probably said (as it is what I always say) is that I have compelling evidence (but not, ultimately, proof) that God exists and has certain attributes, but that said evidence does not translate to other people.

 

[CartesianFart]

No, what I probably said (as it is what I always say) is that I have compelling evidence (but not, ultimately, proof) that God exists and has certain attributes, but that said evidence does not translate to other people.

So you are all alone of your proof?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

Well, there are others who have claimed to have undergone similar experiences (although they may end up with different results . . .)

 

[CartesianFart]

Well, there are others who have claimed to have undergone similar experiences (although they may end up with different results . . .)

Are you saying the results are merely the outward manifestation of the inner experience which are different according to each individuals?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

Well, in my view if people reach different results from me, they interpreted them wrong . . .

But that is just me saying, "my opinion is best".