I disagree. I don't believe in this notion that "if he is, he must necessary". Chávez has been opposed from day one; once they even tried a coup against him.
I don't see why the order could not produce itself with more reasonable ruler. I actually agree that a country like Venezuela, much like Colombia or Brazil for that matter, has a latent social conflict that requires a certain degree of redistributionist policies. But if we just look at Colombia or Brazil we see that a violent clown like Chávez is not necessary for that.
Again, I'm not saying that Chavez is an absolute precondition of capitalism in Venezeula. I'm saying that actually-existing capitalism in Venezuela requires the mediation of the Chavist party to reproduce itself, because the alternative is uncontrollable popular revolt. Only by bringing popular dissent into official structures- or in the case of the Communal Councils, by bringing official structures into popular dissent- is this revolt made governable- and, in the tradition of classical social democracy, makes an appropriately-subsumed popular dissent the condition of government as represent by the Chavist project.
Certainly, he could be replaced, but doing so means bringing about circumstances in which he is no longer necessary. This can mean the construction of a "right-Chavism", the adoption of the social functions of Chavist project by the opposition, or by the de-necessitation of the Chavist project. But, as of yet, it has not succeeded in making any credible movement towards this end. And I don't simply mean that they haven't been elected- as you say, simply because Chavez
is doesn't mean that he
must be- but because there is no credible alternative. It's not like the US or the UK, where elections simply represent a choice between two (or more) different flavours of grey-faced managerialism, they're a choice between the Chavist project, and- what?
So long as the Chavist project remains the only credible mode for Venezuelan capitalism, and so long as the Chavist party remains the only credible vehicle for that project, I'd argue the Chavist party remains necessary for Venezuelan capitalism, and insofar as the Chavist party hinges on the personal charisma of Chavez himself, he remains necessary for Venezuelan capitalism.
Further, I don't think that it's simply a matter of "redistribution". The idea that popular revolt is a straightforward matter of material insufficiency, even subjective insufficiency, simply does not stand up to history; in 1848, the starving peasants of Ireland lay down in the fields and died rather than revolt, while in 1968, the well-fed workers of France conducted a wildcat general strike that brought the state to its knees and almost forced a military coup. What's important is practice: the extent to which popular dissent can practically exert itself outside of the complex of capital-and-state, and the extent to which it is forced to (and to a certain extent not insignificant extent, able to) exert itself within that complex. The success of social democracy is not simply material redistribution, but the integration of popular organisations into the capitalist complex. Without that, redistribution would be nothing but an extremely slow revolution, and as Blair demonstrated, it's possible in the right circumstances to uphold that essential order without the accompanying material redistribution.
And I don't think capital has a will of its own. Basically there are two categories of capitalists in Venezuela:
-The pre-Chávez capitalists who did not align themselves with the regime and are being driven out of business or out of the country.
-The "boligarchs", Ie, former cronies from Chávez's party who amassed huge fortunes by being granted monopolies and other privileges.
Capital doesn't have a will of its own- does not in fact exist in any form that could possess one, but as an organisational mode of human society- but it none the less makes demands of its functionaries. Most fundamental, the demand is its reproduction: capitalists do not simply chose but are compelled to reproduce capital by whatever means necessary; all other demands flow from this. In Venezuela, the reproduction of capital has necessitated the Chavist project, and if the Chavist project has necessitated the expulsion of the old bourgeoisie, then capital has demanded a purge of its own functionaries. Nothing new in that; Stalin did the same thing, turned up to 11, back in the '30s. Capital is like all great Lovecraftian horrors unburdened by even the most basic sentimentality.