What is the idea behind the difference between Officers and NCOs??

[Tarquelne]

Aelf: Was your "not making the cut" comment meant to describe the way you see NCOs, or the way you think they're often perceived by others?

I don't think the latter is correct - but what others think is hard to pin down, so maybe.
Or perhaps it's just that "make the cut" means different things to different people. It's hardly a technical term.

But what I got from your posts is that your just dead wrong. Almost by definition NCOs are the ones who *have* made the cut. To work your way up to Sgt. you have to prove yourself much more than a low level officer. It's like the difference between someone in a successful career and someone who graduated a somewhat-selective school. Actually, not "like." Is.


Flying Pig's put forth why the distinction still exists, but historically it was clear cut: You more or less had to be a (relatively) rich nob to be an officer. "Rich" perhaps being the most important point in some periods, in that you'd be expected to provide a significant amount of equipment and maybe even buy your commission. But "nob" is important too, in that you're supposed to be an authority and back then blood considered important. (Imagine the Great War without the local baronet to command the charge. The whole thing might have been a shambles.)

An NCO-type might have known as much as an officer, but without the money or social position he was *not* officer material.

 

[Dachs]

Flying Pig's put forth why the distinction still exists, but historically it was clear cut: You more or less had to be a (relatively) rich nob to be an officer. "Rich" perhaps being the most important point in some periods, in that you'd be expected to provide a significant amount of equipment and maybe even buy your commission. But "nob" is important too, in that you're supposed to be an authority and back then blood considered important. (Imagine the Great War without the local baronet to command the charge. The whole thing might have been a shambles.)

An NCO-type might have known as much as an officer, but without the money or social position he was *not* officer material.

Christ on a stick, you are such a Brit.

That said, I think most of aelf's weird opinion about NCOs comes from the experience of the Singaporean military. I imagine it's similar to what the old Red Army's conscripts thought about their NCOs.

 

[wcbarney]

... An NCO-type might have known as much as an officer, but without the money or social position he was *not* officer material.

The usual path to become a commissioned officer in the U.S. armed forces it to attend one of the service academies (i.e., West Point, Annapolis, ...) or sign up for R.O.T.C. training in college. Both service academy and R.O.T.C. graduates incur an obligation to serve in the military for a minimum of 4 years. Thus, generally, commissioned officers have college degrees and are considered better educated than enlisted personnel.

This distinction can be a little fuzzy, however. I have known many very intelligent and capable enlisted men and women with college degrees. Most of these personnel could have applied for (and been accepted into) Officer Candidate School (O.C.S.), but many wouldn't do so because they didn't want the responsibilities that come with being a commissioned officer.

One more thing: In the United States you don't have to be "rich" to attend one of the service adademies or to become a commissioned officer by some other path. Being intelligent and capable are much more important than wealth.

 

[Flying Pig]

But what I got from your posts is that your just dead wrong. Almost by definition NCOs are the ones who *have* made the cut. To work your way up to Sgt. you have to prove yourself much more than a low level officer. It's like the difference between someone in a successful career and someone who graduated a somewhat-selective school. Actually, not "like." Is.

Agreed. There's an old American joke which goes 'what's the difference between a PFC and his platoon leader? The PFC's been promoted'.

Flying Pig's put forth why the distinction still exists, but historically it was clear cut: You more or less had to be a (relatively) rich nob to be an officer. "Rich" perhaps being the most important point in some periods, in that you'd be expected to provide a significant amount of equipment and maybe even buy your commission. But "nob" is important too, in that you're supposed to be an authority and back then blood considered important.

It's actually for a slightly different reason post-Cardwell (ie; since about the Light Brigade) - most people with the education, skills and inclination to be officers are reasonably well-off, and it's essential for an officer or any member of any team that he fits in with the rest. If you come into the Life Guards officers' mess from a council estate in Peckham, they'll probably try and make you feel welcome - ie; offer you a glass of port and ask if you fancy coming to the polo game that afternoon. If you spend a month going to the pub instead because you don't think it's your scene, it's no wonder if the other officers don't treat you as one of them. That's actually the root of 99% of the so-called 'prejudice' in the Army.

(Imagine the Great War without the local baronet to command the charge. The whole thing might have been a shambles.)

Or the next one.

What really set aristocratic officers apart from the rest wasn't so much that they automatically commanded respect by their station, but that their upbringing instilled in them certain qualities that made them ideally suited to leading at junior level in the war - chief among these being a complete belief that they were invincible and there was no German in hell that could shoot straight enough to hit them. The men took their cues from these mindlessly heroic leaders - who generally didn't die as often as you'd expect because the enemy's training and equipment was too poor to ensure that they'd be shot straight away if their own side was putting down enough fire - and then themselves went on to do great things. The link is to a particular hero of mine, but there are so many others - Major Digby Tatham-Warter, of 1 PARA, springs to mind.

An NCO-type might have known as much as an officer, but without the money or social position he was *not* officer material.[/QUOTE]

 

[Tarquelne]

That said, I think most of aelf's weird opinion about NCOs comes from the experience of the Singaporean military.

I can believe that. Any given military might be screwed up. Especially one as bijou as Singapore's.


I'm a born and bred US Midwesterner, btw.
The word "nob" maybe? It just seemed appropriate.

One more thing: In the United States you don't have to be "rich" to attend one of the service adademies or to become a commissioned officer by some other path.

Just in case: By "historically" I was talking about how the system came to be, back in the Bad Old Days when uniforms were bright and had more shiny bits.

but that their upbringing instilled in them certain qualities that made them ideally suited to leading at junior level in the war

As a general rule: True, good point.

- chief among these being a complete belief that they were invincible and there was no German in hell that could shoot straight enough to hit them.

Would you happen to know if the German officer training/selection was significantly different? I seem to remember that the Prussians were significantly different from most of the rest of Europe when Prussia was a big deal. Though I don't remember the details, or how long that lasted.

That's actually the root of 99% of the so-called 'prejudice' in the Army.

What do they want to do these days rather than polo and port? ...tell me it isn't still polo and port. I've got no clue what the demographics are like. (I guess I've assumed they're like those of American officers.)

 

[aelf]

That said, I think most of aelf's weird opinion about NCOs comes from the experience of the Singaporean military. I imagine it's similar to what the old Red Army's conscripts thought about their NCOs.

I was going to be made an NCO (heck, some people here might consider me one as it is), but I was saved from that by an injury. Spent the rest of my army days in relative safety hassling higher-ups with my intolerant demands for greater competence

Yeah, that said, I didn't make the cut to be an officer

 

[Dachs]

I'm a born and bred US Midwesterner, btw.
The word "nob" maybe? It just seemed appropriate.

It's exceedingly weird to see somebody talk about money and social position being (or "having been") key to distinguish commissioned officer quality soldiers from NCOs like that and not be British.

Would you happen to know if the German officer training/selection was significantly different? I seem to remember that the Prussians were significantly different from most of the rest of Europe when Prussia was a big deal. Though I don't remember the details, or how long that lasted.

Well, there he was talking about the Second World War, really, when Preußentum was still relevant, but nowhere near the kind of resume booster that nobility was in the UK. But in the First World War, by and large, the nobility of all German states (wasn't a Prussian thing exclusively) dominated the ranks of general officers, but lieutenancies were (relatively) easy for anybody to come by (not quite regardless of social standing, but much more disassociated from it than were the higher grades) and even the General Staff had its Ludendorffs and its Groeners. In the First World War, even the French had nobility running the show in part, and France was a republic; only the United States really evaded that issue.

Of course, the belief that you're invincible and that there's no [insert enemy] that can shoot straight enough to hit you is far from the province of titled nobility, even when you're not drunk.

 

[Tarquelne]

It's exceedingly weird to see somebody talk about money and social position being (or "having been") key to distinguish commissioned officer quality soldiers from NCOs like that and not be British.

Really? It's just a matter of history. (So, yeah, "having been.")
I'm not saying it was good, but I do think it's worth noting because it helps explain a lot of the cultural baggage. And the basic discontinuity between NCOs and COs.

but lieutenancies were (relatively) easy for anybody to come by (not quite regardless of social standing, but much more disassociated from it than were the higher grades) and even the General Staff had its Ludendorffs and its Groeners. In the First World War, even the French had nobility running the show in part, and France was a republic; only the United States really evaded that issue.

Thanks.

 

[Flying Pig]

Just in case: By "historically" I was talking about how the system came to be, back in the Bad Old Days when uniforms were bright and had more shiny bits.

...which was a very good thing for the time, but I've shouted that one enough that I can't be bothered writing it out again.

What do they want to do these days rather than polo and port? ...tell me it isn't still polo and port. I've got no clue what the demographics are like. (I guess I've assumed they're like those of American officers.)

Army-wide, the demographics are still in favour of university-educated white Christian Englishmen, but nothing like they were even fifty years ago; when I joined up every officer had a BBC accent (we later learned that many of them had affected this accent in order to fit in at Sandhurst and in the mess) whereas they're not common at all nowadays. The biggest variation is across regiments; to give you a few examples the 'stereotype' artillery officer is from a council house and has a chip on his shoulder about it, while the stereotypical Household Division officer's father owns most of Surrey. The Life Guards are the boys you see in red atop horses outside the Queen's residencies; their officers often are port-and-polo types.

only the United States really evaded that issue.

However nowadays they manage to make up for that (the US Army at least, the USMC are the opposite) by being incredibly detached from the men they lead. I should point out that that's a stereotype based on the observations of a few individual people; I don't doubt htat there are American officers who are best mates with their men.

Of course, the belief that you're invincible and that there's no [insert enemy] that can shoot straight enough to hit you is far from the province of titled nobility, even when you're not drunk.

True, but aristocratic officers got a name for acting on it, to the point that Lord Lovat walked through German fire carrying his sword at least once, and Tatham-Warter from 1 PARA famously told a soldier collecting rounds to 'get back to your post, we're under sniper fire' - while standing in the open, maroon beret on head... and umbrella in hand. It was the belief in immortality coupled with a very British education of showing no fear and always fronting up that made them into completely insane but absolutely excellent subalterns. Of course, men like Lovat occasionally had difficulties when given higher command; his initial attack on Pegasus Bridge had to be halted for his men to put on helmets as he'd had them attack in their commando berets to raise morale - of course the German machine-guns were having a field day with all the unprotected heads around.

 

[Dachs]

Really? It's just a matter of history. (So, yeah, "having been.")
I'm not saying it was good, but I do think it's worth noting because it helps explain a lot of the cultural baggage. And the basic discontinuity between NCOs and COs.

Well, I mean, it's not a very good generalization.

True, but aristocratic officers got a name for acting on it, to the point that Lord Lovat walked through German fire carrying his sword at least once, and Tatham-Warter from 1 PARA famously told a soldier collecting rounds to 'get back to your post, we're under sniper fire' - while standing in the open, maroon beret on head... and umbrella in hand. It was the belief in immortality coupled with a very British education of showing no fear and always fronting up that made them into completely insane but absolutely excellent subalterns. Of course, men like Lovat occasionally had difficulties when given higher command; his initial attack on Pegasus Bridge had to be halted for his men to put on helmets as he'd had them attack in their commando berets to raise morale - of course the German machine-guns were having a field day with all the unprotected heads around.

Sure, there are those stories, and there are stories like that of the notably non-aristocratic and non-British Ludendorff walking up to the gates of Liège, rapping on the door with his sword, and demanding the fort's surrender (and getting it). The plural of anecdote is not data.

 

[Tarquelne]

Well, I mean, it's not a very good generalization.

Armies - at least so far back as anybody talked of "officers - used to be just about as egalitarian as they are now?

The plural of anecdote is not data.

The plural of anecdote is the claim "They got a name for acting on it."

 

[aelf]

Aelf: Was your "not making the cut" comment meant to describe the way you see NCOs, or the way you think they're often perceived by others?

I don't think the latter is correct - but what others think is hard to pin down, so maybe.
Or perhaps it's just that "make the cut" means different things to different people. It's hardly a technical term.

But what I got from your posts is that your just dead wrong. Almost by definition NCOs are the ones who *have* made the cut. To work your way up to Sgt. you have to prove yourself much more than a low level officer. It's like the difference between someone in a successful career and someone who graduated a somewhat-selective school. Actually, not "like." Is.

I was going to be a Sgt. at the end of two 11-week training courses following from 10 weeks of basic military training. Officers had to go through 9 months of officer training school, at the end of which they got to be commissioned by the president and saluted by everybody except other officers of the same or higher rank. Officer training was more intensive and involved more tests. Officer cadets also had a much better mess and got paid a lot more (and, really, what else mattered?). You decide which trainee had to prove himself more and was regarded more highly by pretty much everybody.

I'll paint you the picture: You had a batch of 18-year-old conscripted kids, from among which some were selected to undergo more intensive training and were actually paid something like a wage. Others got about half the monthly allowance at best, and at the end of the respective trainings, one group had to salute and take orders from the other bunch of same-age kids. There's a clear hierarchy and an elite group. I don't see how anyone could be expected to see it differently in that position. All the rubbish about NCO pride was just that - rubbish. Obviously, the kids who got to become NCOs were somehow not as good as the kids who got to become officers, such that they were deserving of lower pay and prestige. That's how schools and society had worked thus far in their lives and that's how this round of selection was going to perceived - as another instance of isolating kids who were the best from the rest.

And, as an NCOs, they had greater responsibilities than the men. Would they regard this as a good thing? Some of them did, but others couldn't care less. They weren't getting the decent pay or the prestige the officers had and didn't want the responsibilities. I remember there was a very sombre mood in the whole camp during the first days of NCO leadership training. Everyone had the same thoughts in mind - they were not selected for the best class of jobs, yet they were saddled nonetheless with responsibilities they did not want. Even if you didn't like being an officer, they were at least some pretty good perks, so to speak, to being one. The NCOs didn't really have those.

Flying Pig's put forth why the distinction still exists, but historically it was clear cut: You more or less had to be a (relatively) rich nob to be an officer. "Rich" perhaps being the most important point in some periods, in that you'd be expected to provide a significant amount of equipment and maybe even buy your commission. But "nob" is important too, in that you're supposed to be an authority and back then blood considered important. (Imagine the Great War without the local baronet to command the charge. The whole thing might have been a shambles.)

An NCO-type might have known as much as an officer, but without the money or social position he was *not* officer material.

Coming from an elite school and having good academic results was a very strong factor in deciding whether you were selected to go for officer training or not. Of course, especially if you're competing with other people of similar background, other factors counted too, but we have no idea what they were exactly.

 

[Singularity]

I guess Cheetah made the thread because there is a bit of a stir in norwegian military about retirement age for non-officers. Today it is around 38 years, and there's been a lot of debate about wether we should introduce a US style NCO system where people can continue serving if they feel like it and contribute to bring different experience points to new recruits that younger sergeants and fresh officers can't give them.

A point here is the fact that we've been much more engaged in wartime activities for the last 10 years, like the rest of NATO.

After having watched Band of Brothers and Generation Kill I get the sense that NCO's fill a vital role in any military unit going into harms way.

 

[ParkCungHee]

The plural of anecdote is the claim "They got a name for acting on it."

No, you can get a name for something without ever doing it. Citing evidence that they had a reputation for it is something entirely different.

 

[Tarquelne]

No, you can get a name for something without ever doing it.

Yes, though it's hard unless you somehow develop a rep. for it despite never doing it. Perhaps by way of anecdotes.

Citing evidence that they had a reputation for it is something entirely different.

A single anecdote is an amount of evidence equal to one anecdote.

The idea that British officers were brave to the point of foolishness is, in my experience (yours of course may be different), common enough that I'm not interested in debating how common it is. Not as common as "The French suck at war." (A favorite among those who think history started when black and white movies were invented.), but more common than "Russia used rodents as anti-tank ammunition in WWII."

OTOH, if the anecodote is good I'm intersting in hearing another. Which is basically the legitimate use of anecdotes: To illustrate a point you think don't think needs to be argued. Or isn't worth arguing.

Whether or not their men were in reality just as foolish seems a much more interesting question. (Another question I think interesting: Is the reputation for foolish bravery among WWI officers worst in the US and Britian?)

 

[Flying Pig]

Sure, there are those stories, and there are stories like that of the notably non-aristocratic and non-British Ludendorff walking up to the gates of Liège, rapping on the door with his sword, and demanding the fort's surrender (and getting it). The plural of anecdote is not data.

Ludendorff was born in Kruszewnia near Posen, Province of Posen (now Poznań County, Poland), the third of six children of August Wilhelm Ludendorff (1833–1905), descended from Pomeranian merchants, who had become a landowner in a modest sort of way, and who held a commission in the reserve cavalry. Erich's mother, Klara Jeanette Henriette von Tempelhoff (1840–1914), was the daughter of the noble but impoverished Friedrich August Napoleon von Tempelhoff (1804–1868), and his wife Jeannette Wilhelmine von Dziembowska (1816–1854) — she from a Germanised Polish landed family on her father's side, and through whom Erich was a remote descendant of the Dukes of Silesia and the Marquesses and Electors of Brandenburg. He is said[by whom?] to have had a stable and comfortable childhood, growing up on a small family farm. He received his early schooling from his maternal aunt and had a flair for mathematics.
His acceptance into the Cadet School at Plön was largely due to his proficiency in mathematics and the adherence to the work ethic that he would carry with him throughout his life. Passing his Entrance Exam with Distinction,[citation needed] he was put in a class two years ahead of his actual age group, and thereafter was consistently first in his class. Heinz Guderian attended the same Cadet School, which produced many well-trained German officers.
Despite Ludendorff's maternal noble origins, however, he married outside them, to Margarete née Schmidt (1875–1936)

OK, not exactly Clan Chief, but far from a miner's son. However I guess the real point is that being a Lord Lovat was not common enough amongst officers of his class to give the whole group a name for it; it was common enough among British aristocratic officers that it became expected of them.

Armies - at least so far back as anybody talked of "officers - used to be just about as egalitarian as they are now?

There was one Chief of the Imperial General Staff who started out as a private soldier, but I'm almost certain he was a 'gentleman ranker' and he was a Victoria Cross winner.

I'll paint you the picture: You had a batch of 18-year-old conscripted kids, from among which some were selected to undergo more intensive training and were actually paid something like a wage. Others got about half the monthly allowance at best, and at the end of the respective trainings, one group had to salute and take orders from the other bunch of same-age kids. There's a clear hierarchy and an elite group. I don't see how anyone could be expected to see it differently in that position. All the rubbish about NCO pride was just that - rubbish. Obviously, the kids who got to become NCOs were somehow not as good as the kids who got to become officers, such that they were deserving of lower pay and prestige. That's how schools and society had worked thus far in their lives and that's how this round of selection was going to perceived - as another instance of isolating kids who were the best from the rest.

That's massively different to the selection process in almost any other country. Normally, you decide whether you want to be an officer or an OR before taking your oath, and then train as one or the other from the start, rather than being told which you're going to be. But I can understand where your opinions come from - they just don't translate at all to a volunteer army.

Whether or not their men were in reality just as foolish seems a much more interesting question. (Another question I think interesting: Is the reputation for foolish bravery among WWI officers worst in the US and Britian?)

Not foolish bravery - officers attacked when they were told because they were loyal enough to King and Country that they could put aside their fear, and influence their men to do the same. I'll leave Dachs' massively superior historical knowledge to make this point properly, but the War wasn't a constant attack from which nobody returned; attacks were on a huge scale, planned for a while, and there was never a general feeling of 'what's teh point, we're going to die anyway' that sometimes we associate with them.

After having watched Band of Brothers and Generation Kill I get the sense that NCO's fill a vital role in any military unit going into harms way.

I'd reccommend that one straight away; it could be a textbook for both how to be a bad officer and how to be a great one.

 

[Hornblower]

I was going to be a Sgt. at the end of two 11-week training courses following from 10 weeks of basic military training. Officers had to go through 9 months of officer training school, at the end of which they got to be commissioned by the president and saluted by everybody except other officers of the same or higher rank. Officer training was more intensive and involved more tests. Officer cadets also had a much better mess and got paid a lot more (and, really, what else mattered?). You decide which trainee had to prove himself more and was regarded more highly by pretty much everybody.
I'll paint you the picture: You had a batch of 18-year-old conscripted kids, from among which some were selected to undergo more intensive training and were actually paid something like a wage. Others got about half the monthly allowance at best, and at the end of the respective trainings, one group had to salute and take orders from the other bunch of same-age kids. There's a clear hierarchy and an elite group. I don't see how anyone could be expected to see it differently in that position. All the rubbish about NCO pride was just that - rubbish. Obviously, the kids who got to become NCOs were somehow not as good as the kids who got to become officers, such that they were deserving of lower pay and prestige. That's how schools and society had worked thus far in their lives and that's how this round of selection was going to perceived - as another instance of isolating kids who were the best from the rest.

I can see what is motivating your opinions in this discussion. Your definition of NCO has been corrupted by the model that your country is using. In a first world volunteer military an NCO does not become an NCO after two 11 week training courses and a 10 week basic training component. That model you refer to is simply competency or primary qualification training and by no means represents the sort of training that represents what is required to become an NCO in a volunteer army. In most military organisations the competent men (OR's) are encouraged to undertake further training to become NCO's only after a number of years consolidating their skills. Some may not choose to progress as they don't want the added responsibility. Others will jump at the chance of career advancement. As such a Corporal (the mediocre NCO you refer to) is promoted to this rank on skill and merit. The rank of SGT (or Senior NCO in most other militaries) will not be reached until a few years consolidating and developing skills as an NCO. As such I think that you are a victim of circumstance in so much as your own military experience is coloured by an imperfect training system set up to cope with a rotating door of conscripts/national servicemen.