If the Qantas revenue figures for the previous financial year are a guide, its enacting of a plan to lock out its customers as well as three groups of union workers from late yesterday afternoon will cost it at least $30 million a day.
And it had over $3 billion in cash in hand at 30 June this year.
However it also has a fleet of around 140 aircraft, with 108 of them flying for the mainline Qantas operations and thus grounded, while the others continue flying for Qantaslink, or as the Jetconnect NZ based trans Tasman 737 operation.
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Added to obligations to stranded customers, and the thousands of hotel rooms the pilot union alleges that Qantas had pre-booked in preparation for yesterday’s ambush, losses of $40 million per day are not implausible, although reliable information on this and other topics has not yet been provided by management.
What Qantas did confirm, to the ASX on Friday prior to the AGM, was that the loss of revenue attributable to uncertainty over the industrial situation at Qantas was costing $15 million a week, which it described as unsustainable.
That figure may now be somewhere between $210-280 million a week, suggesting that there is much about the state of mind of the board and senior management that remains cause for concern as the hours tick down to the 2 pm resumption of the hearing by Fair Work Australia of an Australian government application for its intervention in the dispute because of the damage it is doing to the national economy.
The evidence given by the Department of Transport and Infrastructure to FWA late last night about the importance of tourism specifically and air travel more generally to the national economy is compelling.
But the Qantas involvement with that contribution is in fact, much less compelling. As the airline often points out, almost with pride it seems, it is also so uncompetitive at the international level that it only carries 18% of the carriage, as flown by Australians and foreign visitors combined.
In aggregate it is the likes of Singapore Airlines, Emirates, Cathay Pacific and Thai International that do the heavy longer haul lifting, which excludes some of the nearer destinations apart from trans Tasman services, across which Emirated punts otherwise idle A380s and 777s that have time to spare between arriving from and departing to its Dubai hub at Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.
It is important not to allow history to be rewritten by Qantas in relation to the rise of its foreign competitors. They didn’t force Qantas off routes to what have now become enormously important ‘secondary’ cities in Europe, or the more recently emerging routes to central Asia, northern Africa or ex Soviet era eastern Europe.
Qantas failed serve those routes, except via London, and its competitors filled the gap. If Emirates and Thai International and Singapore Airlines in particular had not demonstrated business acumen in flying one-stop to those destinations from Australia, the really valuable contribution Germany and the continent in general makes to Australian tourism would not have occurred as quickly or efficiently.
That growth has very little to do with the tired old anglo-centric view of the world that has seen Qantas struggle to understand new sources of long haul growth and persist with its ghastly reliance on transferring passengers to British Airways at London Heathrow, or for those who have been especially bad, via London Gatwick.
Emirates, Singapore Airlines and Thai International have been the future of Australian long haul tourism for some time, and now Etihad, in association with Virgin Australia, is also staking its claim in the void that Qantas still fails to address even if it finally understands it.
From next March Qantas actually halves its direct participation in the London market by seeking to hand the completion of two out of four daily flights to Heathrow to British Airways, a clever move that will undoubtedly persuade even more of its customers to switch instead to all-the-way carriers like Emirates or Singapore Airlines.
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Inbound tourism to Australia has been severely impacted by the strong Australian dollar. In fact if the cost differential between Qantas and its most successful foreign carriers is only the 25% its CEO Alan Joyce referred to in public addresses and announcements in May and August is correct it would disappear if the Australian dollar went even halfway down to its lows against the USD, euro, pound sterling and yen in the first decade of this century.
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It can be argued that the problems that Qantas claim to be experiencing are self inflicted, in that it chose not to address its major cost problem, fuel, with an appropriate investment in more fuel efficient airliners, such as the 777, and is now cutting back on its A380 orders, which is even more fuel efficient on trunk routes where slots or demand make a nonsense of services in anything but the biggest jet available.
That is not to avoid taking issue with union demands for ‘job security’. Those demands are way beyond the pale whether the company involved is supremely well run, or being managed poorly.
However there are critical political or public/national policy issues bound up in those demands as they apply to excellence in piloting and maintenance in not just old aircraft, but new more efficient designs.