Ask a Philosopher!

[Plotinus]

Yes, but that supposes you are an outside arbiter, and that the results are known. It still seems tha if one could skew results in favor of the more emotional, without people being aware, this would be a moral action.

If that did lead to greater overall happiness, then yes, it would be, at least on act utilitarian principles. Is that a problem?

Now a rule utilitarian would say otherwise, since on rule utilitarianism one should follow the rules that, followed consistently, would maximise happiness, and it could be argued that the proposed action would violate the rule that one should perform only actions which, if they were known to the general public, would be approved of (a rule which can be justified because it maximises utility). Or something like that.

 

[ParkCungHee]

If that did lead to greater overall happiness, then yes, it would be, at least on act utilitarian principles. Is that a problem?

It certainly seems to be. I mean, there certainly seems to be a problem if unfairness ceases to be immoral if it is unknown.

 

[Plotinus]

Is it unfairness, though? It's just a matter of giving according to need. We don't think it unfair that (say) disabled people have special provisions for parking, building access, etc. It's just levelling the field. Similarly, if greater resources are devoted to increasing the happiness of the depressed than of the already happy, that seems to be in accordance with distributive justice and moral whether it's known or not. If people knowing about this causes further unhappiness, with the result that it's preferable for people not to know, then the difference in morality between the two cases lies not in the decision to distribute resources in this way but in the decision whether to tell the public about it or not. So the action itself is equally moral in the two cases. Now you may of course question whether it can be moral to do things and conceal them from the public, although of course, not only do governments do this all the time, but we seem to think that they are justified in not releasing information that would result in (say) panic and disorder. If that's so then we do think that a government is justified in not revealing information if it would have bad consequences; the only question is how bad the consequences would have to be in order to justify the secrecy.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

So your standard of truth is one in which even if one does not believe the argument, it is evidently true? I've seen skeptical nihilists that have a more forgiving standard of truth.

Believe it or not, there are some people in this world who don't believe things that are well founded even on evidence, so belief alone is no cause to take seriously.

But he wasn't asking why you think a tested hypothesis is better than untested one. He was asking why you seem to think that one kind of test (physical experimentation) is privileged over other kinds of test. In your posts you've implied that this is the only kind of test you recognise, and that claims that are not subjected to that kind of test are worthless because there is no other way of distinguishing between them. Which is obviously not true: for example, if I claim that all cats have exactly four legs and also all cats have exactly two legs, you can tell that that claim is false without having to go out and look at any cats, because it is self-contradictory.

There are levels of evidence and some are more convincing than others. I accept it because that's what science uses, and it seems to have worked out rather well, considering its discoveries over the years and the tangible benefits. I have seen far fewer tangible benefits with thousands of years of arguments. And by "far fewer" I am being generous.

 

[lovett]

I accept it because that's what science uses, and it seems to have worked out rather well, considering its discoveries over the years and the tangible benefits. I have seen far fewer tangible benefits with thousands of years of arguments. And by "far fewer" I am being generous.

How about scientific method?

 

[Orange Seeds]

There are levels of evidence and some are more convincing than others. I accept it because that's what science uses, and it seems to have worked out rather well, considering its discoveries over the years and the tangible benefits. I have seen far fewer tangible benefits with thousands of years of arguments. And by "far fewer" I am being generous.

The tangible benefits of ethics are far more apparent to me than the tangible benefits of science. Everyday I see people who act justly, virtuously etc. under the direction of some carefully constructed system of ethics. They act beneficially for humanity. I have yet to see a TV do so, nor asphalt, nor the internal combustion engine, nor an atom bomb. I don't see how the invention of anesthetics has been beneficial at all without someone's carefully reasoned argument for its use in healthcare. So it seems that ethics are both necessary and sufficient for benefit to the world. Scientific discovery is neither.

If by benefits you more carefully mean influence, it seems to me that the laws, actions, words, decisions etc. of millions of people for the last few millenia that have been influenced by some argument for 'right-ness' has had far more influence than scientific progress.

Because it has more validity over mere hypothesis, even hypotheses that are well reasoned. That's the way of science. Otherwise, all sorts of untested hypotheses will linger and it will be nothing more than a matter of which argument one believes.

Hypothesis are tested by counterarguments. Evidence forms a possible counterargument. There is no such thing in philosophy as an argument that has not been tested. I've brought up an example of one already which you completely ignored.

I'll bring up a new one:
H.L.A. Hart argued that if we hold that any general rights exists, they necessitate the existence of at least one natural right since a right is a means to restrict the liberty of other people or institutions(you cannot do action a to person p if person p has a right not to be a-ed). That is, a right is a justification for restricting liberty. If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right.

How would you challenge that with a 'real-word example' or something that you consider substantive? Note that the statement is conditional.

If you think that discussion of rights is arbitrary, then what do you think law should be? How should i examine questions of legality if we should not discuss rights? Law has to be created and challenged by people remember. People who argue.

There are qualitative differences in arguments:
A>B
B>C
C____
A
is an incorrect argument. There are many incorrect arguments. Sometimes we can determine whether something is incorrect by challenging premises, sometimes we challenge validity. In philosophy we do both. I think you assume we do only the latter. even still, doing the latter does not make it any less worth the action of disproving.

When we are capable of disproving something we discard it. Many people still use arguments nominally despite the fact they they actually hold a carefully adapted position. I call myself a Kantian deontologist, for example, but there are many aspects of Kant's original theory that I had to discard because they were subject to strong counterarguments.

Some outlier philodoxers might still try and argue for a disproven claim. This does not discredit the discipline any more than does some 'scientist' claiming the earth is 4000 years old.

Scientific review papers will often refer to levels of evidence and experiment is at the top, while others, such as anecdotes, are lower down. They still have some strength, but not enough to be convincing. They could, for example, be used to lead to more convincing evidence.

We don't use anecdotes in philosophy.

For the most part, you can't. At best, you can try to cite past events as a historic experiment.

I asked you already and you ignored the question: How is that at all useful? How can it be done? What would it look like? You've failed to answer any of those vital questions. I've given you another opportunity above. If you can't answer to it this time, I'll assume the impossibility of the task and therefore assume that you have been disproven.

It's rather common knowledge, but if you want more details, you can read some representative books. One is the "History of Private Life" series.

I'm not going to do your work for you. You brought it up as a counterargument. You failed to show how it applies. In so-doing you make it redundant and the original point you tried to contest still stands.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

How about scientific method?

"That's what she said."

The tangible benefits of ethics are far more apparent to me than the tangible benefits of science. Everyday I see people who act justly, virtuously etc. under the direction of some carefully constructed system of ethics.

That's your opinion, for which you will find many in conflict.

If you want to challenge something concrete, how about the ethical issue now facing the United States, where healthcare is considered a right by some, and a priviledge by others? Who is pleading the more ethical case? And would that imply that the opposing party is unethical?

They act beneficially for humanity. I have yet to see a TV do so, nor asphalt, nor the internal combustion engine, nor an atom bomb. I don't see how the invention of anesthetics has been beneficial at all without someone's carefully reasoned argument for its use in healthcare. So it seems that ethics are both necessary and sufficient for benefit to the world. Scientific discovery is neither.

Science makes no claims on ethical guidance, nor do I.

If by benefits you more carefully mean influence, it seems to me that the laws, actions, words, decisions etc. of millions of people for the last few millenia that have been influenced by some argument for 'right-ness' has had far more influence than scientific progress.

No, I meant tangible benefits to life, not influence. You seem to be under the misguided notion that civilization has been striving inexorably towards progress, but in fact, there have been rises and falls. There is no guarantee that much of our currently cherished notions will not be discarded the same way as many ancient ones have been.

Hypothesis are tested by counterarguments. Evidence forms a possible counterargument. There is no such thing in philosophy as an argument that has not been tested. I've brought up an example of one already which you completely ignored.

And those counterarguments are followed by more counterarguments. You can keep arguing a point but what will decide it are the consequences of the material world on your decision in the matter.

Just to demonstrate that endless debate can produce some bizarre outcomes, witness the many debates of creationists against evolutionists. In the overwhelming majority of them, the creationists win!

I'll bring up a new one:
H.L.A. Hart argued that if we hold that any general rights exists, they necessitate the existence of at least one natural right since a right is a means to restrict the liberty of other people or institutions(you cannot do action a to person p if person p has a right not to be a-ed). That is, a right is a justification for restricting liberty. If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right.

That's nice.

How would you challenge that with a 'real-word example' or something that you consider substantive? Note that the statement is conditional.

These are all legal and constitutional concepts written by man, so "rights" can mean whatever they wanted it to mean, and, where allowed, whatever court precedent and newer laws defined it. There have been some regimes, such as the former USSR, in which the laws, whether they held anything that could be called "rights" or not, were completely irrelevant, because the state was essentially a coercive institution that could do whatever it wanted to anyone it wanted for its own benefit. Just for show, they may even contort a violation of some law that really exists.

If you think that discussion of rights is arbitrary, then what do you think law should be? How should i examine questions of legality if we should not discuss rights? Law has to be created and challenged by people remember. People who argue

I bolded that for your benefit.

I don't view one code of laws as being better than any other. It really depends on the circumstances of a particular state.

Some outlier philodoxers might still try and argue for a disproven claim. This does not discredit the discipline any more than does some 'scientist' claiming the earth is 4000 years old.

It would discredit the scientist to claim such things.

I asked you already and you ignored the question: How is that at all useful? How can it be done? What would it look like? You've failed to answer any of those vital questions. I've given you another opportunity above. If you can't answer to it this time, I'll assume the impossibility of the task and therefore assume that you have been disproven.

If you have historical data on, say, exposure to a certain disease, where a population of people were exposed and had certain symptoms and signs, you could ascertain the mechanism of disease to some degree. And you can do it without actually taking real people and exposing them to disease to see what unfolds, which would be contrary to the goals of medicine. (Dare I say it: unethical!)

I'm not going to do your work for you. You brought it up as a counterargument. You failed to show how it applies. In so-doing you make it redundant and the original point you tried to contest still stands.

Let me give you a hint: collapses of civilizations are no longer ascribed to moral (or ethical) degradation. They are ascribed to materialistic changes, such as the environment and economics.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Is it unfairness, though? It's just a matter of giving according to need. We don't think it unfair that (say) disabled people have special provisions for parking, building access, etc. It's just levelling the field. Similarly, if greater resources are devoted to increasing the happiness of the depressed than of the already happy.

Ah but this would lead to quite the opposite. A depressed man may well have his lot improved by a fortuitous outcome, but even if it makes him happier, it will likely have a muted effect on him. So it shall be with the stoic: He faces positive and negative outcomes with limited change in happiness. However, if we then brought about the favored outcome to the Manic person, someone capable of feeling disproportionate sense of hapiness, it would create a greater net increase of happiness, even perhaps enough to offset the diminishing returns.

 

[Orange Seeds]

"That's what she said."

I think you seriously misunderstood his point. The scientific method is a philosophical development.

That's your opinion, for which you will find many in conflict.

If you want to challenge something concrete, how about the ethical issue now facing the United States, where healthcare is considered a right by some, and a priviledge by others? Who is pleading the more ethical case? And would that imply that the opposing party is unethical?

It is not an opinion. It is a position with defending arguments. It can be challenged in the light of facts and counterarguments. If people have conflicting arguments then I can adapt my position to theirs if they prove theirs superior. Otherwise I expect the same from them. An argumentative 'end-state' is not something that should be expected. It is not expected in the sciences either. Everything is always open to the discovery of new evidence. That does not mean that positions cannot beome settled. The existence of counterarguments does not mean anything if they prove weak, though they will always exist. The same is true in the sciences.

Some people don't adapt their positions in the face of strong counterarguments. Is it any any wonder 'philosophers' come off as arrogant?

I have an unsettled position on the American healthcare debate. This is not the place to discuss my position.

Science makes no claims on ethical guidance, nor do I.

You had said 'benefit to life.' Are you seriously that unconscious of your incoherence? What is 'benefit to life' other than an ethical position?

No, I meant tangible benefits to life, not influence. You seem to be under the misguided notion that civilization has been striving inexorably towards progress, but in fact, there have been rises and falls. There is no guarantee that much of our currently cherished notions will not be discarded the same way as many ancient ones have been.

I never made any claims to that, nor do I think I ever implied it. I'll leave any observers to judge whether I did.

And those counterarguments are followed by more counterarguments. You can keep arguing a point but what will decide it are the consequences of the material world on your decision in the matter.

Just to demonstrate that endless debate can produce some bizarre outcomes, witness the many debates of creationists against evolutionists. In the overwhelming majority of them, the creationists win!

explain how 'creationists win.'

That's nice.

So you are incapable of defending anything you have said so far?

These are all legal and constitutional concepts written by man, so "rights" can mean whatever they wanted it to mean, and, where allowed, whatever court precedent and newer laws defined it. There have been some regimes, such as the former USSR, in which the laws, whether they held anything that could be called "rights" or not, were completely irrelevant, because the state was essentially a coercive institution that could do whatever it wanted to anyone it wanted for its own benefit. Just for show, they may even contort a violation of some law that really exists.

So you are incapable of demonstrating how question of law can be answered with 'real world evidence.'

There is no magic box where legal doctrine emerges from. You cited a case where ethical/philosophical arguments have had severe repercussions on the people under them. The USSR had very powerful ethical and argumentatively defended positions that made their legal system so different from ours.

I don't view one code of laws as being better than any other. It really depends on the circumstances of a particular state.

So you do view an ethical position as better than others so long as it suits the situation? Shouldn't there be an argument as to whether some position does suit the circumstance or is there some magic, intuitive box where these issues are resolved?

It would discredit the scientist to claim such things.

So it would with the philosopher.

If you have historical data on, say, exposure to a certain disease, where a population of people were exposed and had certain symptoms and signs, you could ascertain the mechanism of disease to some degree. And you can do it without actually taking real people and exposing them to disease to see what unfolds, which would be contrary to the goals of medicine. (Dare I say it: unethical!)

Your position is null. You couldn't demonstrate how I could test Hart's thesis with real world evidence.

Let me give you a hint: collapses of civilizations are no longer ascribed to moral (or ethical) degradation. They are ascribed to materialistic changes, such as the environment and economics.

Again(...again, again, again), you have failed to how this argument defends your position. I strongly suspect that you simply don't even know what you're arguing on this point. I don't see how:

If "collapses of civilizations are no longer ascribed to moral (or ethical) degradation[, and] are ascribed to materialistic changes, such as the environment and economics" then "ethics merely reflects the concern for social stability."

means anything.

 

[Orange Seeds]

Ah but this would lead to quite the opposite. A depressed man may well have his lot improved by a fortuitous outcome, but even if it makes him happier, it will likely have a muted effect on him. So it shall be with the stoic: He faces positive and negative outcomes with limited change in happiness. However, if we then brought about the favored outcome to the Manic person, someone capable of feeling disproportionate sense of hapiness, it would create a greater net increase of happiness, even perhaps enough to offset the diminishing returns.

I find this thought very intriguing. I have never seen this brought up to counter utilitarianism before, but it seems quite convincing at the moment.

 

[Plotinus]

There are levels of evidence and some are more convincing than others. I accept it because that's what science uses, and it seems to have worked out rather well, considering its discoveries over the years and the tangible benefits. I have seen far fewer tangible benefits with thousands of years of arguments. And by "far fewer" I am being generous.

It depends on what you count as arguments and philosophy, doesn't it? You mentioned slavery before. Don't you think that the abolition of slavery was rather a tangible benefit to quite a lot of people? And yet why did people abolish slavery? Wasn't it because they believed that slavery was wrong? And didn't they arrive at that view through reason, and convince others of it through reason, and make a rational and economic case for its abolition? Or do you think it just happened because people changed their minds arbitrarily? One could make a parallel case for the advance of women's rights, gay rights, etc. People have changed their minds about these issues not because of some magic force that erupts spontaneously in society but because they reason about them. I don't see why that can't be considered philosophy, unless of course you've already decided that anything that brings about tangible benefits must, by definition, not be philosophy.

"That's what she said."

As Orange Seeds pointed out, the point here is that the much celebrated scientific method, which has brought us all of the tangible benefits whose existence you do accept, was a product of philosophy. It came about basically because a bunch of people used their heads and worked out that if you want to know how the world works you should do tests on it rather than hope to find all the answers in Aristotle. That was rational thinking and it gave us the scientific method, but it was not itself the scientific method, of course - obviously the scientific method could not be a cause of itself. As I have said before, the scientific method is nothing other than a certain kind of philosophy, employing certain kinds of arguments, and what we call philosophy is exactly the same thing but dealing with subjects where the scientific method doesn't work.

If you want to challenge something concrete, how about the ethical issue now facing the United States, where healthcare is considered a right by some, and a priviledge by others? Who is pleading the more ethical case? And would that imply that the opposing party is unethical?

Why is this relevant? The fact that people disagree about ethics is plain, but what does it have to do with the point at hand? Are you saying that because people disagree, there can be no rational evaluation of the subject? Why would anyone think that?

Science makes no claims on ethical guidance, nor do I.

This does not address the point either. He pointed out that thinking rationally about ethical matters has practical value, and moreover this is a kind of practical value that science doesn't give us. The fact that you agree with the latter point doesn't address the former. Do you agree with it or not? If not, why not? Just ignoring the point and picking up on the secondary issue is obfuscation.

And those counterarguments are followed by more counterarguments. You can keep arguing a point but what will decide it are the consequences of the material world on your decision in the matter.

Just to demonstrate that endless debate can produce some bizarre outcomes, witness the many debates of creationists against evolutionists. In the overwhelming majority of them, the creationists win!

But what does that prove, except that a lot of people are irrational? Does that mean that we shouldn't try to be rational?

These are all legal and constitutional concepts written by man, so "rights" can mean whatever they wanted it to mean, and, where allowed, whatever court precedent and newer laws defined it. There have been some regimes, such as the former USSR, in which the laws, whether they held anything that could be called "rights" or not, were completely irrelevant, because the state was essentially a coercive institution that could do whatever it wanted to anyone it wanted for its own benefit. Just for show, they may even contort a violation of some law that really exists.

Again, you have completely missed the point. The argument that Orange Seeds summarised was intended to demonstrate that "If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right." What you have said does not address that claim at all. It is a claim in form of "If P, then Q." What you have basically said is that there are no justifications, at least not rational ones, for the ascription of rights. You are in effect denying that we require a justification for restricting liberty. So you are denying P. But even if P isn't true, it could still be the case that "If P, then Q" is true. The reason Orange Seeds cited this argument is that you can't address its conclusion through the scientific method, narrowly conceived. It's not about practical effects, it's about the truth - or otherwise - of a conditional statement. If you want to question the truth of that conditional statement you can't do it by producing evidence. Or if you think you can, then what sort of evidence would count against it? Nothing you have said is relevant.

I do sometimes think that threads of this kind would be a lot more edifying, and a lot shorter, if people bothered to take a few seconds to think about what other people are saying and why they are saying it rather than reacting to a few key words.

I don't view one code of laws as being better than any other. It really depends on the circumstances of a particular state.

At the risk of invoking the wrath of the Internet discussion gods, would you then say that the laws of the Third Reich were no worse than those of the US today? Do you really think that there is no moral distinction between them? Do you really think that a transition from a Nazi legal system to a democratic legal system shouldn't be celebrated any more than a transition from a democratic legal system to a Nazi legal system, and that both transitions are morally equal? Should we feel the same way, morally speaking, when we observe South Africa under Mandela and Zimbabwe under Mugabe? Both are transitions from one legal and political system to another, but in opposite directions, to put it simplistically. Does that make them morally indistinguishable, in your opinion? Of course not, and if asked why they prefer one such system to another, most people could give an explanation and wouldn't be reduced to saying it's just a matter of irrational preference. That indicates that we can think rationally about these things.

I find it odd that someone should be championing the scientific method and yet arguing in favour of irrationality. The scientific method is nothing other than being rational about stuff. Philosophy, including ethical and political philosophy, is just being rational about other stuff. I don't know why you think one should try to be rational only about some stuff. I certainly don't see why one should make practical benefit the only goal of rational thinking. After all, without being rational, how could one even tell what sort of thinking is likely to have a practical benefit at all? The goal of philosophy is the same as the goal of science: to find out about stuff because it is intrinsically worthwhile to do so. The fact that the natural sciences have yielded all sorts of practical benefits is very wonderful, but it is not the purpose of science. The first members of the Royal Society did not get together with the aim of finding practical benefits, they got together with the aim of learning about the world because they were interested in it. That is the spirit of science and philosophy alike.

Ah but this would lead to quite the opposite. A depressed man may well have his lot improved by a fortuitous outcome, but even if it makes him happier, it will likely have a muted effect on him. So it shall be with the stoic: He faces positive and negative outcomes with limited change in happiness. However, if we then brought about the favored outcome to the Manic person, someone capable of feeling disproportionate sense of hapiness, it would create a greater net increase of happiness, even perhaps enough to offset the diminishing returns.

I see: but still, why is this an objection to hedonistic utilitarianism? It's still basically saying that we should weight how we distribute goods in favour of those who will benefit from them more. Now this might seem unfair if that were the only criterion we followed. If we distributed all the pleasure to manic depressives on the grounds that they would appreciate it more, then this would be obviously unfair. But of course we would balance this criterion against others, such as the principle of favouring those who need it more or those who have less. I don't see any real objection to having criteria such as these - the issue is how much weight one gives them. And if one thinks that a given criterion shouldn't be given any weight at all, or only a very small amount, then surely that can always be justified on utilitarian grounds. For example, if one thinks that one shouldn't favour those who appreciate pleasure more, such as the manic depressives, then I'd say that this isn't only because it would annoy other people, but because one wouldn't think that the manic depressives would appreciate the extra pleasure so much more that this would override the principle of favouring those who have less, because of the law of diminishing returns. What I mean is: if we really think there's a moral problem with favouring the manic depressives, then I'd say that this is because we don't really think that doing so would maximise the good.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

I think you seriously misunderstood his point. The scientific method is a philosophical development.

And I think I've been misunderstood. I don't dismiss philosophy entirely, or else I wouldn't even bother writing any of this, nor would I bother reading any, as I am now. I've simply been dismissive about certain parts-- namely ethics --because I don't see a practical benefit. This conversation started when I dismissed ethics as sermonizing. Suffice it to say that since then, due to conversations with a philosopher friend of mine, I have reconsidered that. It wasn't because of anything written on this forum, which I find to be often misguided. My view now is that ethics can at least describe the underlying assumptions in a given ethical system, and that they have consequences, even if they are outside of a person's control.

It is not an opinion. It is a position with defending arguments. It can be challenged in the light of facts and counterarguments. If people have conflicting arguments then I can adapt my position to theirs if they prove theirs superior. Otherwise I expect the same from them. An argumentative 'end-state' is not something that should be expected. It is not expected in the sciences either. Everything is always open to the discovery of new evidence. That does not mean that positions cannot beome settled. The existence of counterarguments does not mean anything if they prove weak, though they will always exist. The same is true in the sciences.

I can agree to that, although I think argument alone is but a step towards a greater level of proof.

Some people don't adapt their positions in the face of strong counterarguments. Is it any any wonder 'philosophers' come off as arrogant?

And not just philosophers...

You had said 'benefit to life.' Are you seriously that unconscious of your incoherence? What is 'benefit to life' other than an ethical position?

Perhaps you're unaware of all the medical discoveries that have increased both quality and quantity of life. That's the benefit. It's not the warm fuzzy feeling of believing you are morally superior.

I never made any claims to that, nor do I think I ever implied it. I'll leave any observers to judge whether I did.

"Argumentum ad populum"?

explain how 'creationists win.'

There are judges at these contests and they decide on a winner. Sometimes the audience votes for the winner. Even if you dismiss their results as unfounded, you have to admit that the consistency of the creationists winning so often is uncanny. That's the point of creationism, btw. They want to appeal to public opinion knowing that most people are ignorant of science and will make "the weaker argument the stronger."

There is no magic box where legal doctrine emerges from. You cited a case where ethical/philosophical arguments have had severe repercussions on the people under them. The USSR had very powerful ethical and argumentatively defended positions that made their legal system so different from ours.

No, they had no rule of law. The law was written down but it was meaningless. It was just for show. The State would enforce whatever will it deemed necessary. That's how totalitarian regimes operate.

Indeed, there is no magic box for legal doctrine because laws are written by man, and they can say whatever man wants. That's why I am so dismissive about them.

So you do view an ethical position as better than others so long as it suits the situation? Shouldn't there be an argument as to whether some position does suit the circumstance or is there some magic, intuitive box where these issues are resolved?

Ethics emerge as an epiphenomenon from the society, spontaneously. Just like no one had to sit down in a grand committee and design a language, no one sat down and exhaustively hammered out the entire ethical code of a society. If you examine ancient societies, you will see that laws are merely the codified versions of that society's ethics, customs, and traditions that had already long existed. Of course, one is free to have arguments over their merits, but those arguments are after the fact.

So it would with the philosopher.

Which is it? First you say that it wouldn't denigrate philosophy to argue a discredited point, then you say it would.

Your position is null. You couldn't demonstrate how I could test Hart's thesis with real world evidence.

I'm not going to argue in favor of points I disagree with.

Again(...again, again, again), you have failed to how this argument defends your position. I strongly suspect that you simply don't even know what you're arguing on this point. I don't see how:

I am arguing from the historical perspective, which I find more satisfying. I just don't have the patience to draw it out for you. Suffice it to say, I didn't invent any of this.

It depends on what you count as arguments and philosophy, doesn't it? You mentioned slavery before. Don't you think that the abolition of slavery was rather a tangible benefit to quite a lot of people? And yet why did people abolish slavery? Wasn't it because they believed that slavery was wrong? And didn't they arrive at that view through reason, and convince others of it through reason, and make a rational and economic case for its abolition? Or do you think it just happened because people changed their minds arbitrarily? One could make a parallel case for the advance of women's rights, gay rights, etc. People have changed their minds about these issues not because of some magic force that erupts spontaneously in society but because they reason about them. I don't see why that can't be considered philosophy, unless of course you've already decided that anything that brings about tangible benefits must, by definition, not be philosophy.

That's a common fallacy to believe that prevailing ethical opinions changed out of reasoning. If that is the case, it means that people were damned stupid up until the 19th century and then, suddenly, everyone around the world, at nearly the same time, had a stroke of genius and decided that slavery was cruel and inhumane, and banned it.

Abolition of slavery occurred because keeping slaves was no longer economically advantageous. Among other reasons, the industrial revolution made labor saving devices a more worthwhile investment than slaves. As a consequence, those who argued in favor of slavery for economic benefits, but who often used moral arguments as disguise, found themselves in fewer and fewer numbers. That left fewer to defend slavery and it was ultimately abolished.

As Orange Seeds pointed out, the point here is that the much celebrated scientific method, which has brought us all of the tangible benefits whose existence you do accept, was a product of philosophy. It came about basically because a bunch of people used their heads and worked out that if you want to know how the world works you should do tests on it rather than hope to find all the answers in Aristotle.

I thought it was because Bacon was preferred for breakfast over Sausage.

But seriously, it's not that I dismiss all philosophy out of hand. Just those I see as having little evidentiary ground.

Why is this relevant? The fact that people disagree about ethics is plain, but what does it have to do with the point at hand? Are you saying that because people disagree, there can be no rational evaluation of the subject? Why would anyone think that?

I'm saying that ethics will change and not because of discussions about them. They are not based on rational justice.

This does not address the point either. He pointed out that thinking rationally about ethical matters has practical value, and moreover this is a kind of practical value that science doesn't give us. The fact that you agree with the latter point doesn't address the former. Do you agree with it or not? If not, why not? Just ignoring the point and picking up on the secondary issue is obfuscation.

I don't think that ethics are necessarily just. You may like to improve them with reason, but it won't help. Your conclusions, even while well grounded, will not change anything. At best, they will simply describe what already exists, which itself may gain you insight, but will not change anything by opinion alone.

But what does that prove, except that a lot of people are irrational? Does that mean that we shouldn't try to be rational?

That argument alone isn't sufficient.

Again, you have completely missed the point. The argument that Orange Seeds summarised was intended to demonstrate that "If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right." What you have said does not address that claim at all. It is a claim in form of "If P, then Q."

My argument is this:

If laws and rights are codified by man, then we can change them. And if they are so readily changed, then discussions about them are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them.

Sound reasonable?

At the risk of invoking the wrath of the Internet discussion gods, would you then say that the laws of the Third Reich were no worse than those of the US today?

You lost. I invoke Godwynn's law.

I don't view laws as "better" or "worse". The Nazis thought they had a good thing when they made them. The fact that it demonstrably turned out badly for them indicates that they were incorrect. Even so, doesn't it strike you that Adolph Hitler managed to transform what was a fairly tolerant, culturally sophisticated, and highly educated society, including eminent philosophers, into a bigoted and cruel one in the space of a few years? The Nazis managed to completely transform prevailing German ethics by transforming the society using techniques of government coercion. That should give you an object lesson on what can truly alter ethical behavior.

Do you really think that there is no moral distinction between them?

There most certainly is.

Do you really think that a transition from a Nazi legal system to a democratic legal system shouldn't be celebrated any more than a transition from a democratic legal system to a Nazi legal system, and that both transitions are morally equal?

I would not want to live in one, if that's what you mean, but that is not the same as saying it is fundamentally unsound. (It is unsustainable, I would argue, but for completely different reasons.)

Should we feel the same way, morally speaking, when we observe South Africa under Mandela and Zimbabwe under Mugabe? Both are transitions from one legal and political system to another, but in opposite directions, to put it simplistically. Does that make them morally indistinguishable, in your opinion? Of course not, and if asked why they prefer one such system to another, most people could give an explanation and wouldn't be reduced to saying it's just a matter of irrational preference. That indicates that we can think rationally about these things.

No, they are not morally equivalent. A racist regime takes a given race as being unequal and can be abused on a whim. But that doesn't make one regime "better". You would be hard pressed to convince an ancient Roman, for example, that equality before the law is a good thing. If that were true, he would be forced to free his slaves, and then who would work the fields?

Mind you, I'm not defending any position. I'm simply saying that questions of moral superiority are unfounded.

I find it odd that someone should be championing the scientific method and yet arguing in favour of irrationality.

It is more that I argue against making value judgements of ethics.

 

[Orange Seeds]

I'm happy to see we have managed to clarify your position.

Perhaps you're unaware of all the medical discoveries that have increased both quality and quantity of life. That's the benefit. It's not the warm fuzzy feeling of believing you are morally superior.

A belief that something has increased 'quality of life' is unavoidably ethical position. So is the belief that anything gives "benefit." So long as you consider anything beneficial you are making an ethical judgement.

Indeed, there is no magic box for legal doctrine because laws are written by man, and they can say whatever man wants. That's why I am so dismissive about them.

Ethics emerge as an epiphenomenon from the society, spontaneously. Just like no one had to sit down in a grand committee and design a language, no one sat down and exhaustively hammered out the entire ethical code of a society. If you examine ancient societies, you will see that laws are merely the codified versions of that society's ethics, customs, and traditions that had already long existed. Of course, one is free to have arguments over their merits, but those arguments are after the fact.

Yet you cannot avoid the counterexample that some people do run their lives according to strict moral rationales. The ethical system that a society lays for itself is a product of many things, one of which is the reasoned ethical positions of denizens. Some of these may be due to social or material factors; others will be based on questions of universal good. You are setting the burden on yourself to prove that all people run their lives in accordance with something anti-ethical or unreasoned. You have yet to fulfill the needs of that burden.

I don't think that ethics are necessarily just. You may like to improve them with reason, but it won't help. Your conclusions, even while well grounded, will not change anything. At best, they will simply describe what already exists, which itself may gain you insight, but will not change anything by opinion alone.

I'd like to see you defend any and each of these assertions.

My argument is this:

If laws and rights are codified by man, then we can change them. And if they are so readily changed, then discussions about them are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them.

This is an incredible and unwarranted induction. Just because laws can be easily changed does no mean that they are mere interpretations of our own interests (where i take interests to mean self-interests exclusive of other-interests). You have not demonstrated how this is the case.

While I now know that you are not arguing in explicit support of the scientific method at the expense of all other knowledge granting disciplines, I find your position on ethics to be confused. You seem to be arguing for multiple contradictory things.

It both exists and does not exist
It both has real world effects and does not
There are qualitative differences in moral positions and there are not

 

[Plotinus]

I don't really have time to engage with all of this, but I'll pick up on this point at least:

My argument is this:

If laws and rights are codified by man, then we can change them. And if they are so readily changed, then discussions about them are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them.

Sound reasonable?

I don't think you can infer "we can change them" from "they are codified by man". You said yourself that ethical standards are an "epiphenomenon" upon society. If that is so, then to change ethical standards one must change society, and that is not easy. To make this inference, you're relying upon a hidden premise, namely that whatever is codified by man can be changed. And you would require further argumentation to support that premise.

The second part of your argument - that if they are changeable, then discussions about them are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them - I'm not sure I even understand, let alone see how it follows from the first point. If you're saying that we change whatever is changeable only out of self-interest, then that is at least very contentious and probably false. How can you go from the changeability of something to an assertion that any change of that thing must come from self-interest? What's the connection?

Even more importantly, however, I don't see how any of this addresses the original point. Even if your argument were sound, I don't see how its conclusion contradicts, or indeed engages with at all, with the claim "If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right." It seems to me that you are again just denying that we do require a justification for restricting liberty. But that doesn't address the claim that if we require such a justification then that would mean that liberty is a natural right.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

I don't think you can infer "we can change them" from "they are codified by man". You said yourself that ethical standards are an "epiphenomenon" upon society. If that is so, then to change ethical standards one must change society, and that is not easy. To make this inference, you're relying upon a hidden premise, namely that whatever is codified by man can be changed. And you would require further argumentation to support that premise.

It's quite easy. You just change the law and force the society to accomodate it. It's been done. Common law began as common customs and traditions, because it's impossible to codify every social practice in an instant. Over time, more of it was written into law. Once written, it can be rewritten. Hence, custom can be changed, albeit not so easily.

The second part of your argument - that if they are changeable, then discussions about them are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them - I'm not sure I even understand, let alone see how it follows from the first point. If you're saying that we change whatever is changeable only out of self-interest, then that is at least very contentious and probably false. How can you go from the changeability of something to an assertion that any change of that thing must come from self-interest? What's the connection?

See above.

Even more importantly, however, I don't see how any of this addresses the original point. Even if your argument were sound, I don't see how its conclusion contradicts, or indeed engages with at all, with the claim "If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right." It seems to me that you are again just denying that we do require a justification for restricting liberty. But that doesn't address the claim that if we require such a justification then that would mean that liberty is a natural right.

I'm not going to justify a quote I don't believe. You see my reasoning above. Law and rights are mutable, so when we interpret them, we are interpreting another person's opinion. We are not interpreting something transcendant.

A belief that something has increased 'quality of life' is unavoidably ethical position. So is the belief that anything gives "benefit." So long as you consider anything beneficial you are making an ethical judgement.

What's left for ethics not to entail?

Yet you cannot avoid the counterexample that some people do run their lives according to strict moral rationales.

I could care less. I'm only concerned with the broad picture in fact, not people who only claim to have rational morals. Perhaps you read some Socratic dialogues, where he made a bunch of people look stupid for claiming morals based on flimsy reasoning. I look upon people with such claims today in much the same way.

This is an incredible and unwarranted induction. Just because laws can be easily changed does no mean that they are mere interpretations of our own interests (where i take interests to mean self-interests exclusive of other-interests). You have not demonstrated how this is the case.

Easy. The law is changed and forces people to behave accordingly, whether they like it or not. Eventually it's ingrained as habit.

 

[Plotinus]

See above.

No, that won't do. Assume I'm thick and spell it out more explicitly. You said that the following claim:

(1) Ethical standards are changeable.

- proves the truth of this other claim:

(2) Discussions about ethical standards are merely interpretations of our own interests in the writing of them.

I don't see anything you've written "above" that proves (2), let alone that shows how (2) is derived from (1). You've said a great deal about how to go about changing moral attitudes from a practical point of view, but that's a different issue.

I'm not going to justify a quote I don't believe. You see my reasoning above. Law and rights are mutable, so when we interpret them, we are interpreting another person's opinion. We are not interpreting something transcendant.

So you keep on insisting - but again, this doesn't address the point. The point, if you remember, was that that conditional assertion can't be disproven by experimentation. Now again you've repeated your views about the nature of ethical beliefs (and I'd point out that in so doing you're surely doing philosophy, not science, but this is by the by) but that doesn't address that point, does it?

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

No, that won't do. Assume I'm thick and spell it out more explicitly. You said that the following claim:

You can continue to claim ignorance to avoid acknowledging what you don't wish to believe.

 

[Orange Seeds]

What's left for ethics not to entail?

Anything that is not a nominal statement. "The sky is blue," "2+2=4," If I have my head cut off I will die soon after," etc..

I could care less. I'm only concerned with the broad picture in fact, not people who only claim to have rational morals. Perhaps you read some Socratic dialogues, where he made a bunch of people look stupid for claiming morals based on flimsy reasoning. I look upon people with such claims today in much the same way.

So you are arguing against people being 'ethical elitists' by being an ethical elitist? I am so confused by this statement that I do not know what to do. You said all people do not run their lives according to ethical principles. I've shown you that at least one does. You can't avoid the counterexample by saying "I could care less."

Easy. The law is changed and forces people to behave accordingly, whether they like it or not. Eventually it's ingrained as habit.

So what? None of that means that law is the product of self-interest exclusively, regardless if I agree with the claim above.

You can continue to claim ignorance to avoid acknowledging what you don't wish to believe.

Look mate, you are the one trying to argue a point. You have made it so confused and contradictory (and we have shown how!), that it is impossible to understand what you are actually arguing for. You can't acknowledge anything that is not intelligible. We've asked you, and guided you, to clarify yet you refuse to do so.

Person A: "2+2=5 because grass grows upwards."
Person B: "Explain how this is so?"
Person A: "You can continue to claim ignorance to avoid acknowledging what you don't wish to believe."

 

[Mark1031]

I am hesitant to get into this as a diagnosed “philosohater” but Nano’s arguments seem plain as day to me. Ethics vary with the needs of society, our biology, environment, economy etc. as can be seen throughout history. This overwhelms any ordered set of internally consistent arguments you might make starting from some “natural rights” and he therefore finds it uninteresting and unproductive (I actually disagree as a matter of taste but he makes a good point).

So when Plotinus says:

I don't see how its conclusion contradicts, or indeed engages with at all, with the claim "If we require a justification for restricting liberty, then it means that liberty itself is a natural right." It seems to me that you are again just denying that we do require a justification for restricting liberty. But that doesn't address the claim that if we require such a justification then that would mean that liberty is a natural right.

It is quite clear to me that we do not need a justification for restricting liberty anymore than say we need a justification for eating. Moreover, from your phrasing you are trying to set up a logical formalism to handle premises that are not true, or at least not immutably true, and therefore the outcome of this endevor will not be of any benefit.

 

[Orange Seeds]

I am hesitant to get into this as a diagnosed “philosohater” but Nano’s arguments seem plain as day to me. Ethics vary with the needs of society, our biology, environment, economy etc. as can be seen throughout history. This overwhelms any ordered set of internally consistent arguments.

I'm still unclear as to what that means however.

Is that all ethics? Some ethics? Political ethics?
Is it a tendency to vary? necessary variance?
What does "needs" mean?
Explain "as can be seen through history?

these are all questions that remain unanswered and there is nothing to challenge until they are.

There are a whole host of things that Nano brought in that are not covered by the above statement as well.