Ask a Philosopher!

[lovett]

All this implies that philosophy is nothing more than a casual entertaining discussion with no useful outcome.

In reference to ethical theory, let's say you're right; it has no effect on the external world. Couldn't it still tell you how to behave? Couldn't it tell you whether to take account of ethivcs, or what ethics to take account of? That seems like a rather useful outcome. Indeed, I can think of few things more useful.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

Yet your supposedly complete education (you've mentioned yourself you've read only a few ancient and pre-modern philosphical writers) does not show in your reasoning, which is full of generalisations, as pointed out by Plotinus, and me here:

Yes, because generalizations are generally true.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

In reference to ethical theory, let's say you're right; it has no effect on the external world. Couldn't it still tell you how to behave? Couldn't it tell you whether to take account of ethivcs, or what ethics to take account of? That seems like a rather useful outcome. Indeed, I can think of few things more useful.

In this scenario, it appears to be a system looking for a function.

 

[Agent327]

Yes, because generalizations are generally true.

Clichés may be true, but generalizations such as the ones employed just show flawed reasoning - which was the point.

In reference to ethical theory, let's say you're right; it has no effect on the external world. Couldn't it still tell you how to behave? Couldn't it tell you whether to take account of ethivcs, or what ethics to take account of? That seems like a rather useful outcome. Indeed, I can think of few things more useful.

In this scenario, it appears to be a system looking for a function.

Which is a generalization - and what appears to be doesn't equal truth.

Someone proposes something specific and the response is simply generic. That may be fine in a debate, but as concerns reasoning it is flawed. You don't appear to take someone's else's words seriously, nevertheless expect to be taken seriously yourself. Which can't really be expected if you don't take objections to your personal view on philosophy seriously by at least considering any merit in them. Instead of responding to specific points of criticism, you appear simply to post what comes to mind. Apart from that suggesting a certain condescendence on your part, it also seems to imply that what you've learned from philosophy is lacking. You also appear not to be interested in correcting your personal view on philosophy - and it has been remarked that it is inconsistent with what philosophy is today. The arguments you present, as already pointed out, are simply rather weak and what you present as a true view of philosophy simply conforms to a general misconception of this particular discipline.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Yes, because generalizations are generally true.

All Frenchmen wear Balaclavas to work.
Most people in New Jersey are polite.
New Yorkers tend to be lax, and laid back.
Most cars are lime green and play 'la cucaracha' when you blow the horn.
Space Shuttles generally make for an cheaper and easier intercity commute then Subways.
Cats are all about 60 feet tall.
Smokers live extremely long and healthy lives.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

Isn't philosophy and religion are merely different ways of reaching the same truth?

I guess this question can also be forward to that other thread "Ask a Theologian", but I wanted it to be here.

Note: This is a famous question from a famous dude who had once lived in Islamic Spain.

 

[lovett]

In this scenario, it appears to be a system looking for a function.

I think I made the function quite clear; telling you how to behave. If ethical theory convinced me to disregard ethical consideration then that has an enormous influence on my behaviour. If it convinces me to be a strict Kantian similarly.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

Clichés may be true, but generalizations such as the ones employed just show flawed reasoning - which was the point.

I think you have that backwards.

Someone proposes something specific and the response is simply generic. That may be fine in a debate, but as concerns reasoning it is flawed. You don't appear to take someone's else's words seriously, nevertheless expect to be taken seriously yourself.

Hard to take this seriously when it is admitted to be nothing more than a set of arguments and counter-arguments, even when "rigorous". What I hold out for is that some philosophers out there are making sense, and for this reason I keep an open mind. You seem to believe that you deserve special consideration simply because you fancy yourself the philosophical scholar. I don't even respect the opinions of certain supposed experts in my profession (although publicly I don't let this on...prevailing social attitudes, remember?), so what makes you think I should take you seriously so automatically? If I seem nonchalant and terse at times, and lacking in more proper retort, perhaps it is because I do not waste my energy in what I feel to be parlor tricks.

I think I made the function quite clear; telling you how to behave. If ethical theory convinced me to disregard ethical consideration then that has an enormous influence on my behaviour. If it convinces me to be a strict Kantian similarly.

I am eager to know what can be convincing. Would it be convincing because of its advantage to you materially? Would it be convincing to you because of fear in disobeying it?

What is of notice to me is the way in which ethical systems have changed over time. Of note, ancient morality was very deliberate, pragmatic, and obvious. Some authorities call it externalized. At some point, between late antiquity and the early middle ages, morality became very internalized, with its notions perceived based on "what is right". However, few of the actual practices changed. What this suggests is that society became ever more efficient at widespread social control, so that people followed strict social guidelines without hesitation. It is notable that governments became more centralized and intrusive, with regulations even on (religious) belief itself that was unprecedented in an ancient society of pluralist gods.

So, to me, ethics merely reflects the concern for social stability by ensuring that everyone behaves in a manner consistent with their expected roles.

 

[GoodGame]

So anyways, if philosophy is "the love of wisdom", and a pragmatist criticizes the wisdom as useless, the end result is....?

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

So anyways, if philosophy is "the love of wisdom", and a pragmatist criticizes the wisdom as useless, the end result is....?

Are you arguing the definition of a word here?

 

[Orange Seeds]

Hard to take this seriously when it is admitted to be nothing more than a set of arguments and counter-arguments, even when "rigorous". What I hold out for is that some philosophers out there are making sense, and for this reason I keep an open mind.

Are you saying that testing hypotheses with counterexamples is not a useful method of garnering knowledge? Do you have any idea what sort of epistemic destruction your are allowing?

I really think you have failed to articulate what 'sense-making' you are looking out for. I think you have trouble articulating because you don't know what you yourself mean. Perhaps you can show me to be wrong?

I am eager to know what can be convincing. Would it be convincing because of its advantage to you materially? Would it be convincing to you because of fear in disobeying it?

What is of notice to me is the way in which ethical systems have changed over time. Of note, ancient morality was very deliberate, pragmatic, and obvious. Some authorities call it externalized. At some point, between late antiquity and the early middle ages, morality became very internalized, with its notions perceived based on "what is right". However, few of the actual practices changed. What this suggests is that society became ever more efficient at widespread social control, so that people followed strict social guidelines without hesitation. It is notable that governments became more centralized and intrusive, with regulations even on (religious) belief itself that was unprecedented in an ancient society of pluralist gods.

So, to me, ethics merely reflects the concern for social stability by ensuring that everyone behaves in a manner consistent with their expected roles.

What?

1. ancient morality was externalized(whatever that means)
2. early modern morality was internalized(whatever that means)
3. Though morality was practiced the same(whatever that means)
4. Therefore society became more efficient at social control(however that follows)

C. Therefore ethics only reflects concern for social stability(however that follows)

None of this makes sense.

 

[Agent327]

I think you have that backwards.

I think you missed another comment.

Hard to take this seriously when it is admitted to be nothing more than a set of arguments and counter-arguments, even when "rigorous". What I hold out for is that some philosophers out there are making sense, and for this reason I keep an open mind. You seem to believe that you deserve special consideration simply because you fancy yourself the philosophical scholar. I don't even respect the opinions of certain supposed experts in my profession (although publicly I don't let this on...prevailing social attitudes, remember?), so what makes you think I should take you seriously so automatically? If I seem nonchalant and terse at times, and lacking in more proper retort, perhaps it is because I do not waste my energy in what I feel to be parlor tricks.

I seem to recall a quote of all of us being condescending to you. I don't know know where you could have gotten that, but it sums up rather nicely how you treat poster's comments. Since we're now well away from the topic of philosophy (parlor tricks and all that), I think I'll leave it be. I've made it clear that you don't take comments seriously, you don't comment on that except by generalizations, so I'm done here. Thank you.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

Are you saying that testing hypotheses with counterexamples is not a useful method of garnering knowledge? Do you have any idea what sort of epistemic destruction your are allowing?

It's not useful if you're just imagining examples. I would prefer a test of a hypothesis through experimentation, but where that is not possible, at least a reference to actual events, and not imagined ones that "could" happen. Otherwise, there will always be yet more counterexamples.

What?

1. ancient morality was externalized(whatever that means)
2. early modern morality was internalized(whatever that means)
3. Though morality was practiced the same(whatever that means)
4. Therefore society became more efficient at social control(however that follows)

C. Therefore ethics only reflects concern for social stability(however that follows)

None of this makes sense.

This is not a landmark discovery. What I am citing is old news. I skipped a lot but it's all widely available.

 

[Orange Seeds]

It's not useful if you're just imagining examples. I would prefer a test of a hypothesis through experimentation, but where that is not possible, at least a reference to actual events, and not imagined ones that "could" happen. Otherwise, there will always be yet more counterexamples.

Why is physical experimentation privileged over any other sort of test? How can you have a physical experiment on proper moral behaviour? proper human rights? laws? truth tables? the existence of a priori knowledge? How is a reference to actual events useful? Example:

Hedonistic utilitarianism believes that good is a matter of aggregate pleasure subtracted by aggregate pain. A primary objection to this is the problem of distributive justice. Imagine we have four people (a, b, c, d) and two situations (1, 2) each person received a degree of pleasure a(x):
1. a(1), b(1), c(1), d(1) = total of four
2. a(2), b(2), c(2), d(-2) = total of four
The utilitarian would say that these are equally acceptable, but this conflicts with the intuitive appeal of fairness.

Looking for a real world reply: Bob was once person d, for situation 1, 2, therefore there is nothing wrong here. Hooray what a useful real world reply! Think of all the problems we could solve this way. It's like we could solve centuries of philosophical problems with this genuine insight!

Fundamentally, how can we refer to actual occurrences when the question is: 'what should happen here?'

We're not even discussing other major areas of philosophy such as logic, epistemology and metaphysics which might lead to some key insights on your part.

This is not a landmark discovery. What I am citing is old news. I skipped a lot but it's all widely available.

So you're not going to explain how the series of premises you listed is valid, much less sound? So you yourself have no idea how the argument you cited against nominal ethics actually proves anything, much less if it is true? Why should anyone waste any more time trying to convince you of anything when you only respond with non sequiturs and don't pay attention to the arguments that everyone is making?

 

[Plotinus]

Hedonistic utilitarianism believes that good is a matter of aggregate pleasure subtracted by aggregate pain. A primary objection to this is the problem of distributive justice. Imagine we have four people (a, b, c, d) and two situations (1, 2) each person received a degree of pleasure a(x):
1. a(1), b(1), c(1), d(1) = total of four
2. a(2), b(2), c(2), d(-2) = total of four
The utilitarian would say that these are equally acceptable, but this conflicts with the intuitive appeal of fairness.

Of course the hedonistic utilitarian has an answer to this, namely the law of diminishing returns. A unit of pleasure (however one conceives of that) is more valuable to someone who has less than it is to someone who has more, just as a hundred pounds is more valuable to someone with no money than it is to someone who already has a hundred pounds. So it would follow that you maximise utility not only by maximising the amount of pleasure but also by distributing it as evenly as possible. That way you get the most happiness. And your situation (1) would therefore be preferable to situation (2), even on purely utilitarian grounds. Presumably these two considerations - sheer quantity and equitable distribution - may sometimes clash, in which case you would have to decide whether to sacrifice an amount of pleasure in order to get a more even distribution, or vice versa. But I don't see any theoretical problems with that (leaving aside the practical problems of applying all this in real life, which are of course legion).

 

[ParkCungHee]

A question about hedonistic utilitarianism. It always seemed to me that one of the primary problems of it is that it's actually based on the perspective of the persons involved, rather then a standard value. For example, if the goal is to create the highest level of net happiness, one would necessarily have to treat someone prone to greater mood fluctuations better then someone who tends to be more stoic.

 

[Neonanocyborgasm]

Why is physical experimentation privileged over any other sort of test?

Because it has more validity over mere hypothesis, even hypotheses that are well reasoned. That's the way of science. Otherwise, all sorts of untested hypotheses will linger and it will be nothing more than a matter of which argument one believes.

Scientific review papers will often refer to levels of evidence and experiment is at the top, while others, such as anecdotes, are lower down. They still have some strength, but not enough to be convincing. They could, for example, be used to lead to more convincing evidence.

How can you have a physical experiment on proper moral behaviour? proper human rights? laws? truth tables? the existence of a priori knowledge? How is a reference to actual events useful?

For the most part, you can't. At best, you can try to cite past events as a historic experiment.

For my part, I don't even believe there is such a thing as "proper" rights or laws, as each society and time have their own conditions for which some things are more appropriate and advantageous than others. Just look at recent events of the American attempt to export democracy to nations that hardly welcome it-- complete disorder!

So you're not going to explain how the series of premises you listed is valid, much less sound? So you yourself have no idea how the argument you cited against nominal ethics actually proves anything, much less if it is true? Why should anyone waste any more time trying to convince you of anything when you only respond with non sequiturs and don't pay attention to the arguments that everyone is making?

It's rather common knowledge, but if you want more details, you can read some representative books. One is the "History of Private Life" series.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Because it has more validity over mere hypothesis, even hypotheses that are well reasoned. That's the way of science. Otherwise, all sorts of untested hypotheses will linger and it will be nothing more than a matter of which argument one believes.

So your standard of truth is one in which even if one does not believe the argument, it is evidently true? I've seen skeptical nihilists that have a more forgiving standard of truth.

 

[Plotinus]

A question about hedonistic utilitarianism. It always seemed to me that one of the primary problems of it is that it's actually based on the perspective of the persons involved, rather then a standard value. For example, if the goal is to create the highest level of net happiness, one would necessarily have to treat someone prone to greater mood fluctuations better then someone who tends to be more stoic.

Of course. But then another factor comes into play, which is that if people are perceived to be treated differently, then that can itself bring about unhappiness. So again you would have to balance these different factors. That doesn't invalidate utilitarianism, which states only that you should try to maximise the good, not bring about a perfect amount of it.

Because it has more validity over mere hypothesis, even hypotheses that are well reasoned. That's the way of science. Otherwise, all sorts of untested hypotheses will linger and it will be nothing more than a matter of which argument one believes.

But he wasn't asking why you think a tested hypothesis is better than untested one. He was asking why you seem to think that one kind of test (physical experimentation) is privileged over other kinds of test. In your posts you've implied that this is the only kind of test you recognise, and that claims that are not subjected to that kind of test are worthless because there is no other way of distinguishing between them. Which is obviously not true: for example, if I claim that all cats have exactly four legs and also all cats have exactly two legs, you can tell that that claim is false without having to go out and look at any cats, because it is self-contradictory. Whereas if I claim only that all cats have two legs, you must go and look at actual cats to determine whether that's true or not, so it is a better hypothesis (although still a false one in the final analysis). So there's a test for claims right off that doesn't involve physical experimentation - if they're self-contradictory, they're certainly false, and a self-contradictory claim is inferior to one that is not self-contradictory. One of the tasks of philosophy is to evaluate and rank the different ways of evaluating claims (including, but not limited to, scientific experimentation) and assess their different levels of certainty.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Of course. But then another factor comes into play, which is that if people are perceived to be treated differently, then that can itself bring about unhappiness. So again you would have to balance these different factors. That doesn't invalidate utilitarianism, which states only that you should try to maximise the good, not bring about a perfect amount.

Yes, but that supposes you are an outside arbiter, and that the results are known. It still seems tha if one could skew results in favor of the more emotional, without people being aware, this would be a moral action.