Ask a Philosopher!

[The Imp]

Fine, I'll rephrase my question: Why is philosophy so wrong and science is so right?

Both are "right".

 

[stormbind]

Personally, (and I'm drawing on Vedic thought here), I find the argument that external and internal stimulii are both illusions quite convincing, with the entailed destruction of the self. The only way I can see around it is the existence of a non-phenomonological self, I.E. a soul.

Philosophy aims to explain the unexplainable and gave rise to the sciences. Given the philosophical foundation for non-phenomenological self, why do you think that so many people reject the existence of a soul?

 

[Nerowannabe]

My question is, "Why"?

 

[The Imp]

My question is, "Why"?

Futurama new episodes on Comedy Central... just letting you know.

 

[PeteAtoms]

My question is, "Why"?

"Because".

 

[Elrohir]

Personally, (and I'm drawing on Vedic thought here), I find the argument that external and internal stimulii are both illusions quite convincing, with the entailed destruction of the self. The only way I can see around it is the existence of a non-phenomonological self, I.E. a soul.

Could you explain that argument for us?

 

[Nerowannabe]

Futurama new episodes on Comedy Central... just letting you know.

Oh, thanks I forgot about that. I can't believe I did to. I was looking forward to them since 2008.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Philosophy aims to explain the unexplainable and gave rise to the sciences. Given the philosophical foundation for non-phenomenological self, why do you think that so many people reject the existence of a soul?

I would say because most people don't find Vedic thought very convincing, and for reasons I find unimaginable, find material existance to be convincing. From there, they work through the means of material existance, to conclude that the Soul does not exist, because there is no material basis for it.

Could you explain that argument for us?

It is late, and I have a bit of a headache, so I'll start with the most simple argument and still probably mess it up, the argument of the self.
Imagine if you would a chariot. Now we know what a chariot is in total. Wheels, axles, reins, maybe even tthe horses. But it is very hard to pin down what makes the 'chariotness'. If a chariot is missing a wheel, it does not cease to be a chariot, it becomes a chariot with one wheel. In fact, you can take away any single part and it's still a chariot. However there is a certain point, you will agree that if you pull enough apart, it is no longer a chariot. However, there doesn't seem to be a certain absolute number of pieces that once removed the Chariot ceases to be. Is it 4? 5? 6? 13? You may fairly object that there is no chariot, that 'chariot' is just a shorthand term used to describe a collection of things, and is an entirely arbitrary concept. And the vedic will agree with you.

So it is with the mind/self. We can attribute many things which make up 'myself'. There is my reason, my emotional temperment, my memories, my body, and any of a million things we care to name. Now, I am not the sum total of these things, because you can remove anyone of these things and I am me. Nor is there any one piece of me that is of vital essence to me exisiting. That is, in short, you can't really define what makes me. Now we may feel justified in saying that 'myself' is much like 'a chariot'. It is a term used to describe many things, operating independently of eachother, that is convenient to use but ultimately meaningless.

This should sound like a familiar problem, and one that Plato solved through the 'Platonic Ideal'. What I'm suggesting is there must be a 'platonic ideal' of you that is seperate from your reason, personality, emotions, etc. otherwise, I am not convinced there can be such a thing as yourself.

 

[Mise]

Fine, I'll rephrase my question: Why is philosophy so wrong and science is so right?

FWIW, I'm a science guy, not a philosophy guy, but it's clear to me that as long as a discipline employs an intellectually rigorous method of analysis, it can produce meaningful and "true" statements (or something - I won't spend time trying to articulate arguments that Plotinus has already made so well!). Scientific method is merely one type of intellectually rigorous methods of analysis, which characterises scientific disciplines. Philosophy, as done by modern, academic philosophers (and their students), clearly employs a great deal of intellectual rigour. That doesn't mean their conclusions (or even their reasoning) can't be wrong, but just because they can be wrong doesn't mean they are wrong, which is what "some people" seem to think...

I don't see what the big deal is tbh. Just because some philosophy might seem too abstract doesn't mean it's worthless, and just because some philosophy is highly debatable doesn't mean that all sides of the debate are equally wrong. It doesn't produce produce results verifiable by scientific method; but that doesn't mean that philosophy is wrong, it just means that scientific method is inadequate to answer certain questions! Dunno why that's so controversial.

 

[lovett]

So it is with the mind/self. We can attribute many things which make up 'myself'. There is my reason, my emotional temperment, my memories, my body, and any of a million things we care to name. Now, I am not the sum total of these things, because you can remove anyone of these things and I am me. Nor is there any one piece of me that is of vital essence to me exisiting. That is, in short, you can't really define what makes me. Now we may feel justified in saying that 'myself' is much like 'a chariot'. It is a term used to describe many things, operating independently of eachother, that is convenient to use but ultimately meaningless.

This should sound like a familiar problem, and one that Plato solved through the 'Platonic Ideal'. What I'm suggesting is there must be a 'platonic ideal' of you that is seperate from your reason, personality, emotions, etc. otherwise, I am not convinced there can be such a thing as yourself.

This seems like a consequent of rule following paradoxes to me; a word can not be a committed representation of an object (it cannot have a solid 'meaning') broadly because we have no way to formulate rules about what a word means. Each new use of the word 'me' is a leap into the dark.

We don't get round this by invoking platonic forms (I can't think of anyone who actually believe in that stuff...), least of all a personal form of the self. This puts us in even more of a bind! Something personal like that can't possibly have a solid meaning because we would never be able to tell if we were using it wrong. If we can get round such a paradox we do so by declaring meaning is a public, communal activity. The meaning of the word 'me' only exists in a public way and doesn't represent any actual 'self'. At a best it represents a set of behaviours with family resemblance.

 

[ParkCungHee]

That's precisely what the argument is, and they take it to it's most extreme and reasonable conclusion: That there is no such thing as a self.

 

[Mark1031]

The problem I think with philosophy vs science is that “it’s the premises stupid”. What I find in the discussions we have here is that the philosolovers will start with a few premises that sound reasonable on their face but are not verifiable/testable and on closer examination are not true-or at least too absolute to be always true. From these premises one can usually apply logic quite accurately to come to a “conclusion” but based on false premises. Take Hobbes vs Rousseau on the view of the “natural state of man”- essentially all evil vs all good. They have diametrically opposed premises both of which are too absolute and simplistic. What is the point of arguing or “reasoning” about an optimal government structure based on these ridiculous premises. In the end the “natural state of man” is a complex biological question. Thus, the premise becomes a scientific question and in the end I think that is the trajectory for all questions.

So if I just glance at the most recent arguments I see this.

So it is with the mind/self. We can attribute many things which make up 'myself'. There is my reason, my emotional temperment, my memories, my body, and any of a million things we care to name. Now, I am not the sum total of these things, because you can remove anyone of these things and I am me. Nor is there any one piece of me that is of vital essence to me exisiting.

Here is the flawed premise. If I take away your memories you will not be you by my definition of self. So now we get into a definitional argument of me or self and in the end we might agree to redefine a word rather than uncover a natural truth. This causes the average philosohater to ridicule the whole endeavor.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Here is the flawed premise. If I take away your memories you will not be you by my definition of self. So now we get into a definitional argument of me or self and in the end we might agree to redefine a word rather than uncover a natural truth. This causes the average philosohater to ridicule the whole endeavor.

Really? So if your mother was to get Alzheimer's she would cease to be your mother? Or if you brother got Amnesia? Not to mention the equally complicated matter of trying to pin down what exactly your memories are, always a very fluid concept, you likely go through several sets of them in your lifetime.

 

[Mark1031]

Really? So if your mother was to get Alzheimer's she would cease to be your mother? Or if you brother got Amnesia? Not to mention the equally complicated matter of trying to pin down what exactly your memories are, always a very fluid concept, you likely go through several sets of them in your lifetime.

Yes I'm aware of those oh-so anticipated counter-points that might seem to uncover some profound insight. They do not. By some definitions of me a brain dead me is still me. By other definitions it is not, simple as that.

 

[lovett]

Yes I'm aware of those oh-so anticipated counter-points that might seem to uncover some profound insight. They do not. By some definitions of me a brain dead me is still me. By other definitions it is not, simple as that.

So by 'take away your memories' do you mean all your memories, half your memories, or would one memory be enough?

 

[ParkCungHee]

Yes I'm aware of those oh-so anticipated counter-points that might seem to uncover some profound insight. They do not. By some definitions of me a brain dead me is still me. By other definitions it is not, simple as that.

Perhaps next time you should read those Counter-Points rather then anticipating them. So your idea of "braindead" involves not only people who have dementia, but people who have no loss of brain function whatsoever, except for their lack of memories, and even every human being in existence due to the nature of memory.
Congratulations, you've replaced the Vedic argument that there is no such thing as a self, with the claim that there is no such thing as a living self.

 

[Mark1031]

people who have no loss of brain function whatsoever, except for their lack of memories.

Some would consider that a fairly profound loss.

Now I am more interested in the style than the substance of this argument. As first stated:

There is my reason, my emotional temperment, my memories, my body, and any of a million things we care to name. Now, I am not the sum total of these things, because you can remove anyone of these things and I am me.

By my reading of that sentence it would be all memories. There were no qualifiers and it was just thrown in there as one premise. However when probed it becomes:

Not to mention the equally complicated matter of trying to pin down what exactly your memories are, always a very fluid concept, you likely go through several sets of them in your lifetime.

And

So by 'take away your memories' do you mean all your memories, half your memories, or would one memory be enough?

And

every human being in existence due to the nature of memory.

So suddenly if you don’t let the simple statement go it becomes an infinitely complex point to elaborate on. And one could go on and on for pages on this complexity.

Now for the substance:
Here is the list of 4 stated and 1 million postulated things that make up the self.

my reason, my emotional temperment, my memories, my body, and any of a million things we care to name.

Reason and temperament and body are general features common among humans and so not great indicators of the individual.

My memories are very specific to the individual and thus taking them away in total or replacing them would change self –the mental self. OTOH my presumed brain dead mother is still my mother by one definition but not by the mental definition we are talking about.

Now the philosolover might come back with. OK well if you define memory as so important to self do we become a different person when we learn something new? How about if we forget 1 thing? 2 things? Where is the point at which we cease to be ourselves by your definition ha ha- cat got your tongue? If you can’t define that point then it proves there is no self!

To which the Philosohater replies: Whatever dude.

 

[aelf]

I'm not sure I'm getting my question across. I'm asking why philosophy is wrong and science is right, not whether philosophy is wrong.

Any attempt to argue that philosophy is right would invariably involve the premise "if philosophy is not nonsense", and we all know that is an unverifiable premise.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Imagine if you would a chariot. Now we know what a chariot is in total. Wheels, axles, reins, maybe even tthe horses. But it is very hard to pin down what makes the 'chariotness'. If a chariot is missing a wheel, it does not cease to be a chariot, it becomes a chariot with one wheel. In fact, you can take away any single part and it's still a chariot. However there is a certain point, you will agree that if you pull enough apart, it is no longer a chariot. However, there doesn't seem to be a certain absolute number of pieces that once removed the Chariot ceases to be.

This is why Fuzzy Logic was invented.

I'd rather say that there is no Chariot (capital C), but there is a chariot. Similarly there is no Self, but there is a self. The latter point comes as a surprise, or even unacceptable conclusion, to some people, but I don't see why we can't throw out the bathwater (souls) while keeping the baby (persons).

Reason and temperament and body are general features common among humans and so not great indicators of the individual.

??? Fingerprints uniquely ID an individual; retinal patterns likewise. If memory is more important, that's because people care about it more, not because of its power to identify a single individual.

 

[lovett]

Now the philosolover might come back with. OK well if you define memory as so important to self do we become a different person when we learn something new? How about if we forget 1 thing? 2 things? Where is the point at which we cease to be ourselves by your definition ha ha- cat got your tongue? If you can’t define that point then it proves there is no self!

To which the Philosohater replies: Whatever dude.

And if your identifying with the 'philosohater' you've shown a complete inability to understand or engage the issue! If you can't form a coherent idea of what the 'self' really is anything you say about the self is meaningless. Given we base quite a lot of our lives around our conception of self that's rather important.

Incidentally, if you had a more open approach towards philosophy you might realise that there is a load of ways in which to respond to "Where is the point at which we cease to be ourselves by your definition?" that make an idea of self maintainable, far better then just dumb silence. It's a basic sorites paradox of the 'How many grains is a heap of sand' type, and answering it would actually tell you something interesting about what we mean by the self.