Ask a Philosopher

[Ajidica]

How would a philosopher approach the question "How many boards could the Mongols hoard if the Mongol Horde got bored"?

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I think if this were the aim of philosophy we would be better off doing biochemistry, and inventing some sort of pill that prevented our confusions directly.

That statement plainly confuses me. The confusion (the one you refer to) seems very much inherited in perceiving stuff. In experiencing stuff. What kind of pills would help with that kind of condition?

 

[Ayatollah So]

I mean, the concept of "demand" necessarily admits that humans have preferences that are not always perfectly rational; how can there be such a broad range of "private values" for goods, if we all act perfectly rationally?

If I like cilantro and you don't, it makes sense for me to demand cilantro at a moderate price and you to demand it only if there's nothing else to eat. I don't see the problem?

Secondly, even if homo economicus doesn't exist in reality, describing how a perfectly rational actor would act is nonetheless a valuable pursuit: it informs businesses and individuals on how to make decisions about money rationally

That all depends which model of rational choice is being used. The usual Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility theory strikes me as unjustified. None of the arguments for it have managed to Allais my doubts. Of course there's a lot of economics work done with weaker premises about rational choice: and more power to them.

 

[Mise]

If I like cilantro and you don't, it makes sense for me to demand cilantro at a moderate price and you to demand it only if there's nothing else to eat. I don't see the problem?

Yes it makes sense for you to choose X at that price given that some thing in your brain has given you a taste for X. But the fact that you like X and I don't like X means that liking X in the first place isn't part of a rational process, but a matter of taste that lies outside the bounds of rationality. If, on the other hand, the process of deciding whether to like X in the first place was rational, then you would expect a much narrower range of private values for X: the demand curve would be a lot shorter and we wouldn't be able to do a whole lot with it. The assertion that economics demands mindless, cold, calculating automatons in order to work is plainly false; if it did, we wouldn't be able to have a demand curve for cilantro in the first place.

That all depends which model of rational choice is being used. The usual Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility theory strikes me as unjustified. None of the arguments for it have managed to Allais my doubts. Of course there's a lot of economics work done with weaker premises about rational choice: and more power to them.

Yeah, that link says that people act irrationally. So what? I'm saying that, if people were perfectly rational about money, then they would make better choices about money. Just thinking about the problem in terms of expected utility -- calculating the probabilities and looking at the expectation value -- helps people to make more money, and avoid foolish bets.

 

[lovett]

Are you at all familiar with the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, if so, what are your opinions on him?

No, i'm afraid i'm not. Happy to learn.

That statement plainly confuses me. The confusion (the one you refer to) seems very much inherited in perceiving stuff. In experiencing stuff. What kind of pills would help with that kind of condition?

My purpose with that comment was to highlight the fact that even if the (later) Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy does leave something for philosophy to do (actually, he thought of his thought as a new discipline, a successor to philosophy) it also leaves a hell of a lot out. Namely, if the object is just to 'clear away our confusions' then if we could replace philosophy with a pill that achieved as much doing so would be perfectly advisory. In short, we could realize all the goals of philosophy via purely biochemical means.

 

[Ayatollah So]

But the fact that you like X and I don't like X means that liking X in the first place isn't part of a rational process

That seems trivial. Lots of things are obviously not part of a rational process, like the fact that I can walk under my own power but can't thus fly. My transportation decisions will have to take that as a given, just like I take my food likes and dislikes as (largely) given. Indeed, the very idea of evaluating decisions as rational or irrational presupposes that something must a given, independent of the reasoning process itself; otherwise there would be no constraint, hence no possibility of error.

Yeah, that link says that people act irrationally.

The link says

Allais argues that it is not possible to evaluate portions of gambles or choices independently of the other choices presented, as the independence axiom requires, and thus is a poor judge of our rational action (1B cannot be valued independently of 1A as the independence or sure thing principle requires of us). We don't act irrationally when choosing 1A and 2B; rather expected utility theory is not robust enough

Allais is right, I suspect: expected utility theory is too strong. It's not a requirement of rationality to obey its axioms.

 

[Mise]

I see, I misunderstood your point. However:

It's not a requirement of rationality to obey its axioms.

This isn't sufficient to prove that economics has a problem with rationality. You would have to prove further that it is a requirement of rationality to not obey its axioms. That is, it may be rational to pick 1A and 2B or whatever, but it may also be rational to pick 2A if one has previously picked 1A. I can accept that it is rational to pick 2B; Allias gives a decent account for why it might be rational to pick 2B in terms of expected disappointment. That's all well and good. But if picking 2A is also perfectly rational, then that doesn't pose any problems for economics: it still gives us a rational option to follow, just not every single rational option. I'm fine with that. The reasoning behind picking 1A and 2A over 1A and 2B seems perfectly rational to me.

Secondly, I later clarified that my assertion was that, if you want to make a lot of money, then economics tells you how to do that rationally. It might be rational to avoid disappointment or whatever by picking options inconsistent with making the most money, but that doesn't mean that economics doesn't tell us how to make a lot of money. My second point that you quoted was to do with that: engineering tells us how to make bridges, glass blowing courses tell us how to blow glass, and economics tells us how to make money.

 

[Ayatollah So]

economics tells us how to make money.

I'm not going to dispute that economics can tell us that. As long as we don't go around expecting Homo sapiens to act like Homo economicus - in which case we are likely to lose money.

 

[ParkCungHee]

I'm not going to dispute that economics can tell us that.

I will. Economics has a abysmal testing rate for improving someones ability to make money.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I will too. The benefit of economics to making money seems to be entirely tautological. I.e. it gives us a set of tools to categorize/describe certain phenomenas. It does not say a word about how to actually use them to make money. Because that, oh wonder, entirely depends on my historic position in a historic market with a historic product. What actually decides over my success or failure is out of reach for some kind of a general theory of making money.

In short, we could realize all the goals of philosophy via purely biochemical means.

I still don't see your point. Let's pretend that we could in deed do so. That we could infuse the totality of philosophical wisdom into people. We would still need philosophy to know what to infuse.

 

[Tahuti]

I will. Economics has a abysmal testing rate for improving someones ability to make money.

Unless Bill Gates is an economist.

 

[lovett]

I still don't see your point. Let's pretend that we could in deed do so. That we could infuse the totality of philosophical wisdom into people. We would still need philosophy to know what to infuse.

Well, no. I don't think a pill could ever 'infuse the totality of philosophical wisdom into people'. I say that because I think there is philosophical knowledge. One cannot get knowledge by taking a pill. Suppose you take a pill and come to the belief that the next thirty years will contain an unprecedented period of economic growth in Luxembourg. Suppose further that this actually does happen. Did you know Luxembourg would go through this golden age? I beg to differ if you think you did... You had a true belief, but not knowledge. This is just the (very old) point that knowledge is more than mere true belief. It requires something like justification*. So, necessarily, one could not gain philosophical knowledge by taking a pill.

But if philosophy is just about removing one's confusions? One could gain that by taking a pill. There's nothing about being free of confusions which requires the particular conditions we need for knowledge. So the point of the the pill hypothetical is to bring out this difference: the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy leaves an awful lot out of the normal conception of philosophy. Namely, it leaves out the notion that there is any philosophical knowledge. That is why one could achieve the clarity at which Wittgenstein aims through biochemical means. I am tempted to believe it also leaves out crucial positive notions of understanding, but this is more complex. This is not an argument against the later Wittgenstein's conception, of course. What I mean to do is show how deflationary it really is. It is a radically deflationary view of philosophy.

*Certainly not justification itself. But something closely connected to the genesis of one's belief. I can talk at length about this, if you'd like.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I am no expert at all on Wittgenstein. I just read the article linked to and combined that with my own thoughts. So perhaps I am misrepresentating what Wittgenstein is saying, but it is my understanding that the reduction of philosophy to the art of demystification/clarification does not actually preclude the creation of knowledge. Rather, philosophy would simply acknowledge that it only creates knowledge in so far as it makes clear what knowledge is actually there and what that actually means. But it would still create knowledge, in a sense. Just in a less spectacular fashion than if philosophy created knowledge all by itself.
Why still knowledge? Because to know what one knows and to know what one does not know is also a knowledge I would think. Less spectacular, but still important, complex and potentially challenging. Hence my confusion why a pill could replace that, as IMO this "lesser" philosophical knowledge or meta-knowledge as perhaps the proper term is would need to be delivered to the brain in the same way historical or mathematical knowledge would. Just as the knowledge of math is not just hidden to us due to some mental confusion, but a way of thinking with a specific subject that needs to be externally introduced to us, philosophy as mere meta-knowledge would still need to be externally introduced to us as its own way of thinking with its own specific topic. And not entirely unlike historic knowledge, philosophy would still require empirical facts to do its job. Just that they would be made use of with a different agenda in mind than if your agenda is to uncover genuinely knew knowledge rather than the knowledge of knowledge.

 

[Angst]

Funny, that's basically what Chomsky said about him as well:

http://www.civitatedei.com/2011/11/noam-chomsky-is-no-fan-of-derrida-or-postmodernism/

Hi, I know this post might be kind of old by now.

I was kind of dumbstruck by this post as Chomsky is someone I actually respect.

I've read a little up on it though, and I just want to put forth that Chomsky, while being good in some areas, is next to useless when it comes to understanding what is assumed as being "continental" philosophy. This is true for a number of analyticists.

The position is summed up well in this article, which is sadly in Danish, but written by a number of Danish philosophers of a think-tank:

http://www.information.dk/comment/733355

I'm going to google translate an important part of it, followed by a quick cleanup by myself, not sure how clear the point will be tho. Let's try:

The unusual thing about [the position of denouncing the Continental style], argumentation theory considered, is that one's own ignorance can be directly used as an argument against the other, "I can not find any content ... This proves that you are a charlatan." It is in fact a radical position of authority that one assumes when talking this way. If it is an argument against B that A does not understand what he says, it can only be based on the assumption that A's knowledge and ability to understand from the start is unassailable. This corresponds to reject a foreign culture's poetry without being able to read it or rejecting new music because it just a moment pops up on your radio station. Thomas Blachman [Danish television/cultural figure] had the consistency just right when he once during a television interview was furious that the journalist instead of asking or sharing his own considerations just said he did not understand what [Blachman] said. "That's an extremely arrogant thing to say," as Blachman protested - and understandably so.

The article goes on to portrait analyticism's core problem, it's fundamental discourse: it supports itself and its style with a discourse that considers examplarily positivistic science more pure and good than philosophical literature. But seeing that the analyticists understand positivism as superior to other styles, they feel the necessity of "elevating" philosophy into scientific texts. Which merely "elevates" it into pseudoscience and skims over philosophical issues that have content beyond contemporary discussion. They feel a need of philosophical application trumps philosophical content (EDIT: I think lovett mentioned this directly before, by noting that the first analyticists believed that philosophy had made practically no progress the last 2000 years, basically because it was inapplicable). "Continental" writers do not distinguish the two styles as one being superior; they see no need for "elevation" of content through a different style because they actually understand and respect literature. Philosophy is within the humanities. It's not science and it does not need to be.

The article cites Løgstrup:

One can define statements as clear and intuitively correct that they can not be used for anything other than to confirm themselves.

This is directly in opposition to the problems outlined by lovett about the Foucaultian terminology of "governmentality".

The article's position boils down to:

"The widespread denouncing of the continental style is merely people with tunnel vision saying that if they don't understand something, it must be stupid. And this rhethoric is a problem."

And it's true.

 

[caketastydelish]

I have some training in philosophy. Ask me things about philosophy, and I will answer them.

I'm seriously not trying to sound like a jerk here, but would you mind elaborating on your training? A degree? A certificate? A class or two?

 

[Tahuti]

The article goes on to portrait analyticism's core problem, it's fundamental discourse: it supports itself and its style with a discourse that considers examplarily positivistic science more pure and good than philosophical literature.

That's a mischaractarization (and one Aelf makes often as well). Analytic Philosophy isn't necessarily positivist, and analytic philosophers such as W.V.O. Quine and Karl Popper are actually staunchly opposed to any such epistemology. Its style - which indeed resembles scientific articles - is more a result of history and it being seen as an extension of scientific research than any supposed superiority complex.

It tends to be highly self-referential on ethics though, and especially G.E. Moore and Russell are exemplary of that. Of course, self-referentiality is something philosophy is NOT about. Fortunately, analytic philosophy did produce ethicists like J.L. Mackie and Bernard Williams.

 

[Angst]

Well it was more a jab at its pure form of conception (this is the err of categorizing large influential communities with supposed core values, the err of generalization), but thanks for the information.

I still do not see why it's supposed to emulate science.

I know and understand this:

And that's all good and jolly, but it has nothing to do with philosophy.

edit: god damn it, picture wouldn't show. found another picture with the same gist.

 

[aelf]

That's a mischaractarization (and one Aelf makes often as well).

I don't ever recall saying that Analytical philosophy is necessarily positivist. In fact, my style of discourse is more Analytical than Continental

Just because I understand the Continental schools better than you doesn't make me anti-Analytical philosophy or something.

 

[Tahuti]

Well it was more a jab at its pure form of conception (this is the err of categorizing large influential communities with supposed core values, the err of generalization), but thanks for the information.

I still do not see why it's supposed to emulate science.

I know and understand this:

Spoiler :

And that's all good and jolly, but it has nothing to do with philosophy.

edit: god damn it, picture wouldn't show. found another picture with the same gist.

Lovett explained earlier: Analytic philosophy started with research to linguistic problems and them being linked to philosophy. Implicitly, early analytic philosophy suggested that many philosophical problems could be solved by solving issues in linguistics (read: WITTGENSTEIN!!). Then Maths got involved as well, as many analytic philosophers like Bertrand Russell were also mathematicians (IMO Russell is hot on epistemology, but sucks on ethics, go figure), and there is a general like for simplicity shared by all analytic philosophers.

Analyticism has a tendency towards supporting exact sciences because of it. That doesn't mean it's uncritically deferent towards it. However, because of that, and the love of simplicity (which is necessarily a part of analytic philosophy, by definition), most of analytic philosophy has a very down-to-earth view on epistemology, which explains why Pomo's like Derridda and Lacan are universally loathed within Analytic Philosophy.

I don't ever recall saying that Analytical philosophy is necessarily positivist. In fact, my style of discourse is more Analytical than Continental

Just because I understand the Continental schools better than you doesn't make me anti-Analytical philosophy or something.

You've once claimed there were insurmountable differences between Continental and Analytical philosophy. Which probably would only be true if analytical philosophy was indeed positivist. If there are any other ways this could be, these are exceedingly few. Of course, analytic philosophy is naturally in opposition to those who call themselves Postmodernists, that much is true.

 

[Angst]

Kaiserguard, I understood what lovett explained, but I do not see a counterpoint in your post in regards to analyticism makepretending a science.