1. INTRODUCTION
THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONS in explaining contemporary underdevelopment
has generated significant debate in recent years.2 Studies find quantitative
support for an impact of history on current economic outcomes (Nunn
(2008), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,
2002), Hall and Jones (1999)), but have not focused on channels of persistence.
Existing empirical evidence offers little guidance in distinguishing a variety of
potential mechanisms, such as property rights enforcement, inequality, ethnic
fractionalization, barriers to entry, and public goods. This paper uses variation
in the assignment of an historical institution in Peru to identify land tenure and
public goods as channels through which its effects persist.
Specifically, I examine the long-run impacts of the mining mita, a forced
labor system instituted by the Spanish government in Peru and Bolivia in 1573
and abolished in 1812. The mita required over 200 indigenous communities to
send one-seventh of their adult male population to work in the Potosí silver and
Huancavelica mercury mines (Figure 1). The contribution of mita conscripts
changed discretely at the boundary of the subjected region: on one side, all
communities sent the same percentage of their population, while on the other
side, all communities were exempt.
This discrete change suggests a regression discontinuity (RD) approach for
evaluating the long-term effects of the mita, with the mita boundary forming
a multidimensional discontinuity in longitude–latitude space. Because validity
of the RD design requires all relevant factors besides treatment to vary
smoothly at the mita boundary, I focus exclusively on the portion that transects
the Andean range in southern Peru. Much of the boundary tightly follows the
steep Andean precipice, and hence has elevation and the ethnic distribution of
the population changing discretely at the boundary. In contrast, elevation, the
ethnic distribution, and other observables are statistically identical across the
segment of the boundary on which this study focuses. Moreover, specification
checks using detailed census data on local tribute (tax) rates, the allocation of
tribute revenue, and demography—collected just prior to the mita’s institution
in 1573—do not find differences across this segment. The multidimensional
nature of the discontinuity raises interesting and important questions about
how to specify the RD polynomial, which will be explored in detail.
Using the RD approach and household survey data, I estimate that a longrun
mita effect lowers equivalent household consumption by around 25% in
subjected districts today. Although the household survey provides little power
for estimating relatively flexible models, the magnitude of the estimated mita
effect is robust to a number of alternative specifications. Moreover, data from
a national height census of school children provide robust evidence that the
mita’s persistent impact increases childhood stunting by around 6 percentage
points in subjected districts today. These baseline results support the well
known hypothesis that extractive historical institutions influence long-run economic
prosperity (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002)). More generally,
they provide microeconomic evidence consistent with studies establishing
a relationship between historical institutions and contemporary economic outcomes
using aggregate data (Nunn (2008), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Glaeser
and Shleifer (2002)).
After examining contemporary living standards, I use data from the Spanish
Empire and Peruvian Republic, combined with the RD approach, to investigate
channels of persistence. Although a number of channels may be relevant,
to provide a parsimonious yet informative picture, I focus on three that the
historical literature and fieldwork highlight as important. First, using districtlevel
data collected in 1689, I document that haciendas—rural estates with
an attached labor force—developed primarily outside the mita catchment. At
the time of the mita’s enactment, a landed elite had not yet formed. To minimize
the competition the state faced in accessing scarce mita labor, colonial
policy restricted the formation of haciendas in mita districts, promoting communal
land tenure instead (Garrett (2005), Larson (1988)). The mita’s effect
on hacienda concentration remained negative and significant in 1940. Second,
econometric evidence indicates that a mita effect lowered education historically,
and today mita districts remain less integrated into road networks. Finally,
data from the most recent agricultural census provide evidence that a
long-run mita impact increases the prevalence of subsistence farming.
Based on the quantitative and historical evidence, I hypothesize that the
long-term presence of large landowners in non-mita districts provided a stable
land tenure system that encouraged public goods provision. The property
rights of large landowners remained secure from the 17th century onward.
In contrast, the Peruvian government abolished the communal land tenure
that had predominated in mita districts soon after the mita ended, but did
not replace it with a system of enforceable peasant titling (Jacobsen (1993),
Dancuart and Rodriguez (1902, Vol. 2, p. 136)). As a result, extensive confiscation
of peasant lands, numerous responding peasant rebellions as well as banditry
and livestock rustling were concentrated in mita districts during the late
19th and 20th centuries (Jacobsen (1993), Bustamante Otero (1987, pp. 126–
130), Flores Galindo (1987, p. 240), Ramos Zambrano (1984, pp. 29–34)). Because
established landowners in non-mita districts enjoyed more secure title to
their property, it is probable that they received higher returns from investing
in public goods. Moreover, historical evidence indicates that well established
landowners possessed the political connections required to secure public goods
(Stein (1980)). For example, the hacienda elite lobbied successfully for roads,
obtaining government funds for engineering expertise and equipment, and organizing
labor provided by local citizens and hacienda peons (Stein (1980,
p. 59)). These roads remain and allow small-scale agricultural producers to
access markets today, although haciendas were subdivided in the 1970s.
The positive association between historical haciendas and contemporary
economic development contrasts with the well known hypothesis that historically
high land inequality is the fundamental cause of Latin America’s poor
long-run growth performance (Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)). Engerman
and Sokoloff argued that high historical inequality lowered subsequent investments
in public goods, leading to worse outcomes in areas of the Americas
that developed high land inequality during the colonial period. This theory’s
implicit counterfactual to large landowners is secure, enfranchised smallholders
of the sort that predominated in some parts of North America. This is not
an appropriate counterfactual for Peru or many other places in Latin America,
because institutional structures largely in place before the formation of the
landed elite did not provide secure property rights, protection from exploitation,
or a host of other guarantees to potential smallholders.3 The evidence in
this study indicates that large landowners—while they did not aim to promote
economic prosperity for the masses—did shield individuals from exploitation
by a highly extractive state and ensure public goods. Thus, it is unclear whether
the Peruvian masses would have been better off if initial land inequality had
been lower, and it is doubtful that initial land inequality is the most useful foundation
for a theory of long-run growth. Rather, the Peruvian example suggests
that exploring constraints on how the state can be used to shape economic interactions,
for example, the extent to which elites can employ state machinery
to coerce labor or citizens can use state guarantees to protect their property,
could provide a particularly useful starting point for modeling Latin America’s
long-run growth trajectory.
In the next section, I provide an overview of the mita. Section 3 discusses
identification and tests whether the mita affects contemporary living standards.
Section 4 examines channels empirically. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.