I disagree. Goodness, I would argue, necessarily consists in freedom (for various quasi-Aristotelian reasons that I won't get into) and can not be found outside of freedom. If what appears to be freedom is not good, it is because it does not represent real freedom.
Now, that sounds rather tautological, so let me explain. Freedom, properly understood, is a positive capacity for action; it consists in the ability to do what you want to do. It isn't merely the absence of restraints, what some have dubbed "negative liberty", because that only takes on meaning in reference to this capacity. If the British state were to criminalise turning yourself into a rainbow, it would mean nothing at all, and if the North Korean state were to expressly permit it, it would be similarly meaningless, because in neither case is this something that anyone ever had the option to do in the first place. Individual freedom is not increased or decreased one way or the other. This means that a conception of freedom only in terms of the presence or absence of restrictions is an entirely insufficient basis for a genuinely libertarian politics, and so a mechanical rejection of every item of legislation, of every state program, is not only unwarranted, but even be ultimately counter-libertarian, to the extent that it diminishes the practical capacities of a greater number of people by a greater degree. The superficial freedom of abolishing this or that legislation does not mean the amount of concrete freedom in the world will actually increase, and may well, as it so often does, mean the very opposite. Hence we say that "freedom is not always good", but in reality what we are saying is "net unfreedom is not good".