Non sequitur.
A newborn contracts a muscle and for the first time, its foot zooms by its face where the newborn can see it. Having learned the association, the second foot-zooming can be voluntary, despite the lack of choice prior to that point. Little by little, the infant/child/teen adds more and more control to its repertoire. Unlike mass or energy, control is not a conserved quantity.
I disagree. Let us posit that control is equal to (some degree of) self determination. I fail to see at what point the baby in this scenario achieves the ability to directly determine it's own actions. Ie, act as a first cause for them. I can see how it's lack of control becomes more complex, but not how it disappears.
When the baby 'learns' this is a (given determinism) inevitable result of (superficially) 500 million years of evolution, genetics and enviroment. When the baby moves its foot again, this is naturally the result of some stimuli, it is not spontaneous. If it moves its foot thanks to stimuli, I fail to see where 'choice' comes in.
If we are going to talk about free will, we really ought to focus on things that have a will. Such as people.
A person has leeway, in the relevant sense, if what they do depends on their will. For example if you are standing at a cliff edge and someone stronger than you throws you off, you are forced to fall: that result is independent of your will. But in the normal circumstance, you are free to walk away, jump off, or continue standing there (among other things).
What is the fundemental difference between people and a ball? Ultimately arn't both made up of the same things, working under the same physical laws?
If so, then change the 'ball' in my analogy to a particle. Add a million 'balls' (particles) interacting and you still have an inevitable result. Scale that up, you have enough particles to form a person.
What fundamental differnce is there, on an order to change the individual inevitability of particle motion and interaction, between the particles making up a ball and those making up a person?
Thus to your example. Let us say the person walks away from the cliff face. He then claims he could have jumped. This sounds like a truly (to borrow the phrase) 'incredible ability' to have. He is claiming that he could have gone back in time and changed the factors that led him to walk away, rather then jump. I don't buy it.
It's not only possible in a deterministic Universe, it may be happening in this one. If Bohm, or Everett, or some such physicist is right about determinism, it is.
Only God, if there were one, could manage the knowledge and calculation skill to predict the course of our (possibly, for all we know) deterministic but (definitely) chaotic universe. But even if someOne could make such calculations and predictions, it remains true that what the future holds depends on us. Different choices would bring different results - which proves that they really are choices.
A prior reasoning.
You assume that such a thing as 'choice' exists, which naturally assumes free will. If an intellect were able to predict the progression of the universe, surely 'choice' would be impossible. If everything is fated then any choice would rely on aforementioned 'incredible abilities'. That is, someones ability to tweak the universe as they see fit, whithout being affected by the universe causally.
I will give that the future does 'depends on us', however that doesn't imply that we can change the future, just that we are a necessary cog in creating the future.
Any philosophical system of free will/justice/etc. that depends on whether particles act partially randomly or in a completely predetermined manner is pretty off-base if you ask me.
Who mentioned justice (etc)?
And assuming free will is related to the question of whether the universe is Deterministic/Indeterministic, which is best explained by actual (shock*horror

) physics, surely this is going to be pretty intergral to whether free will exists or not?
Ah, the '<
hidden variables> of gaps' is it?

But the <
orthodox QM> of gaps' is equally valid, some would argue.
In fact, theres an interesting
article on just this subject in the New Scientist this week. Isn't that convienient.
