From what point was Germany doomed during WWII?

[Lord Baal]

So, this thread is in acceptable territory at the moment, but I'd like to hear what Lord Baal was talking about a couple pages back when he said that de Gaulle had a brilliant plan for a redoubt in continental France in 1940, rather than evacuating entirely to the colonies or surrendering.

When it became obvious that Paris was going to fall, De Gaulle worked up a plan which he presented to Weygand, the new commander-in-chief of the French Army, for the government to be evacuated to Quimper, in Bretogne. All French forces remaining in Continental France were to fall back to Bretogne, where existing fortifications - built in case of a British attack during the inter-war period - were to be hastily extended. Simultaneously, the French Fleet was to be sent, not to Bordeaux, but to London to assist in evacuating the French and British troops cut off by Guderian. Once that evacuation had taken place, some troops would be sent to reinforce those currently holding out in Bretogne while the rest were to be used in an amphibious counterattack. De Gaulle never worked out a plan of where exactly to counterattack, since Weygand scuttled his plan.

I'll check my sources before I post anything more specific on this, but that's the gist of it.

 

[Domen]

Yeah, defence of the Bretognian Bridgehead. A quite similar plan to Polish plan of defending the so called Romanian Bridgehead in 1939.

 

[LightSpectra]

Wouldn't that have been encircled easily? That's why defenses are placed in lines rather than to individual points.

 

[ParkCungHee]

This also sounds like MacArthur's plan to hold Bataan.

 

[Lord Baal]

This also sounds like MacArthur's plan to hold Bataan.

Except that MacArthur's plan had the same problem as the Romanian Bridgehead; it was easy to encircle, as LightSpectra said. This actually happened in Bataan. A redoubt in Bretogne would be impregnable to encirclement by the Germans, who simply didn't have the naval capacity to encircle it. They could potentially starve it into submission, but with Britain being the larger threat it is unlikely that Hitler would devote the forces necessary to starve out Bretogne. For that matter, even starving it out wouldn't necessarily solve the problem, as De Gaulle's whole purpose was to keep the Germans busy while preparing a counterattack. If Bretogne held out long enough said counterattack could take place, and it wouldn't matter how depleted the Bretognian Bridgehead was by that point anyway.

Thanks to Domen for reminding me of the scholarly name for the Bridgehead, by the way. I always call it a redoubt, so I had forgotten that others called it a bridgehead (largely because it really wasn't a bridgehead, but what the hell).

 

[LightSpectra]

Ah, well, I know literally nothing about that plan except what you've told me, but I'm skeptical about it. Not that I think it was a better idea to surrender, though.

 

[Lord Baal]

I have found one of my sources for it, which is Allies at War: The Bitter Rivalry between Churchill, Roosevelt and De Gaulle, by Simon Berthon. I'm looking for the rest, but if they're at my parents' place I may not be able to find them until next month.

The point behind the Bretognian Bridgehead was always to buy time for a counterattack. Once Weygand vetoed the plan it was essentially past the point of no return, since forces would need to start pulling back to Quimper before the fall of Paris. By the time Reynaud came around to De Gaulle's idea of staying in France rather than fleeing to Algiers or London the Germans had already cut the bulk of the French forces off, leaving the government little choice but to move South, to Lyons and later Bordeaux, rather than west to Quimper.

Still, everything I've seen about the Bridgehead implies that it should have worked, provided Weygand issued the orders within a few days of when De Gaulle suggested it. By the time Paris fell the French were already doomed to being pushed off the Continent, unfortunately. A smaller-scale redoubt may have been enough to evacuate more troops to Britain or North Africa, but that sounds eerily similar to Operation: Sledgehammer, and I've never thought very highly of that.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Again, the more I hear of it the more it reminds me of some very bad plans. The latest being the time the Germans tried it. MacArthur might have failed because he lacked supplies, but he also had the advantage of fortifications designed to protect against attacks from Luzon, and while there's not much that suggests the plan would have failed, excepting crackpot-German-theoretical-plans, most military plans don't.
Anything that relies on the expectation of a soon to arrive counteroffensive seems also unlikely given the British did at least have their hands full with the Italians for a year. In fact, I can just as easily see this working in the Germans favor, as it's likely to be a costly, divisive distraction to a British war effort already fighting all over Europe. The combined weight of maintaining the forces in Brittany, and building up forces in England for a counter-offensive seems like it would by definition cost the British on other fronts.

Shades of Bataan, Sledgehammer, Romanian Bridgehead and Fortress cities does not inspire hope that it would survive contact with the enemy.

 

[Lord Baal]

You're forgetting that at the time this was proposed, Italy had not yet entered the war. And Sledgehammer itself would have worked out precisely as planned, it's just that it was never planned to actually accomplish much of anything.

 

[ParkCungHee]

You're forgetting that at the time this was proposed, Italy had not yet entered the war.

Well that's certainly a reason the plan wouldn't have worked.

And Sledgehammer itself would have worked out precisely as planned, it's just that it was never planned to actually accomplish much of anything.

And that's usually a bad sign of a military plan.

 

[Lord Baal]

I;'ve already mentioned my disdain for Sledgehammer. I happen to disapprove of sacrificing the lives of one's own men for a fleeting, temporary advantage, especially when it is entirely counterproductive to do so. Torch was a much better plan, though Roosevelt would have well-served to avoid neutering it by vetoing a landing at Bizerte and practically halving the forces attached to the operation. Avoiding Free French involvement was particularly stupid, as many Vichy troops switched sides when confronted by the Free French elsewhere.

 

[ParkCungHee]

The bigger problem was Eisenhower missed a golden opportunity to deploy his reserves to Sardinia.

 

[Lord Baal]

The bigger problem was Eisenhower missed a golden opportunity to deploy his reserves to Sardinia.

Controlling Sardinia wouldn't have stopped Axis forces from pouring into Tunisia, which was the real killer. It would certainly have made the eventual eliminiation of Italy easier, granted, but I've often thought that a beefed-up Torch, followed by landings in Italy - skipping Sicily entirely - would be more effective at that.

 

[ParkCungHee]

It might have actually. With Sardinia fallen, all of the western Mediterranean would look like a good target. Might actually get Hitler to think for a minute and not pour troops into the useless defense of Tunisia.
Though on second thought that might be a bad thing

 

[Racsoviale]

the new commander-in-chief of the French Army, for the government to be evacuated to Quimper, in Bretogne. All French forces remaining in Continental France were to fall back to Bretogne, where existing fortifications

So his plan was that the french would survive in a little village in northern France surrounded by imperialist enemies, who they would annoy to no end by being there...Awesome

I can already imagine Hitler walking around his palace like caesar cursing the name of THAT village and the poor wehrmacht of Terrarium running from severe beatings from huge french stone masons

 

[Tee Kay]

Rascoviale wins the internet.

 

[Domen]

Wouldn't that have been encircled easily? That's why defenses are placed in lines rather than to individual points.

How do you imagine encircling a peninsula?

 

[Domen]

So his plan was that the french would survive in a little village in northern France surrounded by imperialist enemies, who they would annoy to no end by being there...Awesome

No. You have just confused Bretognian Bridgehead with "Asterix & Obelix".

 

[Racsoviale]

SWOOSH

 

[Lone Wolf]

That discussion requires the assumption that so-called "WWII" existed - but, as we shall soon see, "WWII" was invented by finance propagandists of the so-called "Allies" and KGB. The holes and blatant contradictions in the official story of "WWII" are enormous. I would debunk this hoax, made-up by the finance capitalists of Britain and America, and by the tyrannical Communist regime of Russia myself, but thankfully, other people had already done that for me.

It is really sad that the whole world believes in a blatant falsehood, that masses of honest, but ignorant sheeple are continuously duped by the establishment-sponsored "historians". Think about it, there's a reason why most "WWII" historians are rather well off...