Camikaze said:
Ehhhhh to return to my first point, the whole point of the Federation was to cement Britain's hold over Singapore as a naval base and ensure it didn't fall to the Barisan Socialis. Borneo was needed to assuage the Tungku and provide a necessary electoral counterbalance to this new infusion of Chinese. To an extent the British did intend to reduce its presence and that was flagged though this needs to be set against a situation where Britain was still in essence committed to Southeast Asia/Oceania hence the effort put into securing Singapore. Your lecturer is right in that limited sense, Australia was worried that Britain might be induced to withdraw in the longer run if it found the cost of defending its interests high enough. (This would happen with the Suez Crisis). But I'm not convinced that was the justification in of itself for entry into the conflict. Australia had a fair idea of what British intentions were - up to and including the rationale for the Federation...
aronnax said:
British attitudes towards independence always under Malaya varied. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, writing in 1956 was hostile: "Independence" for Singapore is a delusion. A trading centre and port, however important, at the mercy of world economics, with a large population and no natural resources, could have no viable place as a member of the Commonwealth or as a State of its own. The Colonial Office on the other hand was generally was willing to advance the constitutional debate with the results of the 1957 discussion for instance giving Singpaore internal-self government. The cost of that was an agreement to form an Internal Security Council (arranged as followed: 3 brits, 3 Singaporeans and 1 Malayan) which was given the power to tackle subversion and unrest, with decisions binding on the government. Moreover, the agreement still allowed the Brits to suspend the constitution if needed.
It was however recognised on the other hand the consequences of doing so would have been significant; alongside this was a huge amount of pressure by Singaporeans generally to push for still more independence, something which caused the - moderate, gradualist - PAP all kinds of electoral problems. The result was a careful attempt by the British to manage a staged independence that safeguarded British interests, while at the same placating the masses enough not to shaft the PAP. The other consideration that the Brits had to take into account were difficulties at home. 1959 in particular was a horrible year for Brit colonialism courtesy of the Hola Camp massacre in Kenya and the Delvin Report about Nyasaland. Force which would have been needed to stave of independence was possible but unsustainable in the long run.
There was a recognition therefore that Singaporean independence was in essence inevitable. All that needed to be set was the date and the nature of its exit. The hope was that it would be amicable under a 'responsible' i.e. non Socialist/Communist government and that this would be best achieved via merger with Malaya. This was motivated in part by the British realisation that PAP was the only viable vehicle for 'responsible' government available and that it was very close to electoral collapse. The result of an electoral loss would almost certainly have motivated a violent response from the Brits and PAP - lists had already been drawn up of BS members slated for arrest in the advent of a crisis for instance - though this wouldn't have changed the outcome just hurried it along. Had the BS won the Tungku had already agreed to receive Singapore provided the BS problem was dealt with first. The net result of this would have been Singaporean independence under Malayan tutelage with the PAP holding sway through moves of dubious legality.
Essentially, therefore there was not a hope in hell that Singapore could have become independent of the Federation. Maybe if PAP's situation hadn't been so hopeless, it would have been possible. But with the situation as it was and as Lee Kuan Yew himself realised, the situation was hopeless. Union become the only viable option under which Singapore could gain independence. Something that Lee Kuan Yew himself viewed with fear, he would have been happier with British bayonets to back up his rule; but couldn't manoeuvre his way out of a pro-independence position because of the tenor of public opinion at the time.
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