History questions not worth their own thread III

[Ajidica]

God I love European royalty, everyone is related to someone else leaving you in the unenviable position of explaining to your mother-in-law why you are going to war with one of her daughters.

 

[Camikaze]

Was Australia's response to Konfrontasi more about the security of Malaya, retaining British involvement, or not pissing Indonesia off?

 

[Masada]

Ehhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh complex. The simplest answer is that Australia was concerned with keeping the British involved in Asia/Oceania for as long as possible. There's some truth to it. However there's still lots wrong with the 'East of Suez' approach to Konfrontasi. The key point to stress is that the matter was still under consideration; the best evidence for this was that the whole merger was premised on the notion of saving Singapore from the Barisan Sosialis and in doing so safeguard Malaya/Borneo from Communist influence (woooo domino theory) and provide a stable long-term naval base for future British operations.

The problem for the Tengku was that inclusion of Singapore would shift the racial balance in Malaya in favour of the Chinese and potentially give it a bad case of Communism. The British weighed the benefits, looked at the costs and decided that the best option was to shoe-horn non-Chinese Borneo1 into the Federation as a counter-balance to Chinese Singapore. This was to be achieved whatever the costs; incorporation had to be rail-roaded in Singapore despite the best efforts of the PAP and was outright forced on Borneo.

Sukarno took up a position that the Federation was in poor form as a result of this and had some serious evidence to back his contentions up. It isn't quite clear what he wanted; frustrating the formation of Malaya was probably part of it, acquisition in the distant future of all of Borneo was also part of it, as was a desire to keep a British client at arms length and an element of foreign policy for domestic consumption going on. But in typical fashion Sukarno swung with the wind and doesn't seem to have been capable of holding to a clear position.

Australia itself opposed in philosophical terms the nature of the Federation; it was profoundly undemocratic for one. But in practical terms Australia policy was still very much bonded to British policy in Asia. Accordingly, moral and ethical considerations aside, Australia felt obliged to support Britain.2 It however seems to have pulled its punches and also ran something of a double-game trying, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that while it supported Britain in the matter it wasn't intrinsically hostile to Indonesia. That failed... because Sukarno was nothing if not a poor diplomat and Australia's position was, in any case, nonsensical.

1: Used as a short-hand for the three British colonies in Borneo.
2: There actually seems to have been little thought as to why Australia was doing what it was doing. The precise factors influencing it are vague and often contradictory. The best explanation is that Australia wanted to assist the British in maintaining a position they felt was under threat in Asia, stop a potential Communist eruption and who knows...? You honestly need to be a little more specific; the question is really broad.

 

[sydhe]

Edward III and Philip Augustus were both descendants of Geoffrey of Anjou and the Empress Mathilda. The French kings were Angevins in the female line (through Geoffrey's daughter Eleanor) at this point.

Sure, but Katherine would have been considered a Capetian, not a Plantagenet, because of the Salic Law.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

How would uniting the Yorkists and Lancastrians allow him to inherit the throne of France?

Your assuming that there would be a dynastic struggle even after the continuation of the Dual monarchy, but the dynastic struggles in England only started after Henry VI lost most of the English lands in France and couldn't control the debt crisis in London. These problems would have turned out differently if Henry V survived to consolidate his gains after the treaty of Troyes

 

[Lord Baal]

Ehhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh complex. The simplest answer is that Australia was concerned with keeping the British involved in Asia/Oceania for as long as possible. There's some truth to it. However there's still lots wrong with the 'East of Suez' approach to Konfrontasi. The key point to stress is that the matter was still under consideration; the best evidence for this was that the whole merger was premised on the notion of saving Singapore from the Barisan Sosialis and in doing so safeguard Malaya/Borneo from Communist influence (woooo domino theory) and provide a stable long-term naval base for future British operations.

The problem for the Tengku was that inclusion of Singapore would shift the racial balance in Malaya in favour of the Chinese and potentially give it a bad case of Communism. The British weighed the benefits, looked at the costs and decided that the best option was to shoe-horn non-Chinese Borneo1 into the Federation as a counter-balance to Chinese Singapore. This was to be achieved whatever the costs; incorporation had to be rail-roaded in Singapore despite the best efforts of the PAP and was outright forced on Borneo.

Sukarno took up a position that the Federation was in poor form as a result of this and had some serious evidence to back his contentions up. It isn't quite clear what he wanted; frustrating the formation of Malaya was probably part of it, acquisition in the distant future of all of Borneo was also part of it, as was a desire to keep a British client at arms length and an element of foreign policy for domestic consumption going on. But in typical fashion Sukarno swung with the wind and doesn't seem to have been capable of holding to a clear position.

Australia itself opposed in philosophical terms the nature of the Federation; it was profoundly undemocratic for one. But in practical terms Australia policy was still very much bonded to British policy in Asia. Accordingly, moral and ethical considerations aside, Australia felt obliged to support Britain.2 It however seems to have pulled its punches and also ran something of a double-game trying, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that while it supported Britain in the matter it wasn't intrinsically hostile to Indonesia. That failed... because Sukarno was nothing if not a poor diplomat and Australia's position was, in any case, nonsensical.

1: Used as a short-hand for the three British colonies in Borneo.
2: There actually seems to have been little thought as to why Australia was doing what it was doing. The precise factors influencing it are vague and often contradictory. The best explanation is that Australia wanted to assist the British in maintaining a position they felt was under threat in Asia, stop a potential Communist eruption and who knows...? You honestly need to be a little more specific; the question is really broad.

Weren't the Australian embassies and consulates spared from attacks during the disturbances in Indonesia following the announcement of the Federation, due to Australia's opposition to the Federation initially? Or is that just an old wives' tale propagated by Paul "Indonesia and Australia are like, total homies bro" Keating?

 

[sydhe]

Your assuming that there would be a dynastic struggle even after the continuation of the Dual monarchy, but the dynastic struggles in England only started after Henry VI lost most of the English lands in France and couldn't control the debt crisis in London. These problems would have turned out differently if Henry V survived to consolidate his gains after the treaty of Troyes

No, I was being a bit facetious.

Henry V's claim to the French throne didn't have to do with the Planagenets at all (since they weren't the royal family of France to begin with), but because he was descended from Isabella the She-Wolf, the daughter of Philip IV of France and the mother of Edward III. In other words, his claim was the same as Edward III's (ignoring the Yorkists, who also had a claim, but really didn't press it till later). This means Henry V was the senior member of the senior Capetian line (if you ignore the Salic Law and the Yorkists), and Katherine of Valois was the senior member of the Valois branch of the Capetians (ignoring Salic Law and assuming the Dauphin illegitimate).

So the marriage united the two most senior branches of the Capetians.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Ok, I guess after my debate with the last guy I was being a little too serious. And well done with your last post. I personally like to believe that Charlie VII didn't have a true claim because he was striped of his titles by his own mother and a French court in the early 1420's.

 

[Camikaze]

Thanks for the answer, Masada!

A couple of things:

Sukarno took up a position that the Federation was in poor form as a result of this and had some serious evidence to back his contentions up. It isn't quite clear what he wanted; frustrating the formation of Malaya was probably part of it, acquisition in the distant future of all of Borneo was also part of it, as was a desire to keep a British client at arms length and an element of foreign policy for domestic consumption going on. But in typical fashion Sukarno swung with the wind and doesn't seem to have been capable of holding to a clear position.

What I've been reading is stuff more related to ANZAM and the Strategic Reserve and such, so it doesn't go into detail on this, but something I read suggested that it was Sukarno wanting to drum up another nationalist cause given the West Papua issue was coming to an end. Is that remotely true?

2: There actually seems to have been little thought as to why Australia was doing what it was doing. The precise factors influencing it are vague and often contradictory. The best explanation is that Australia wanted to assist the British in maintaining a position they felt was under threat in Asia, stop a potential Communist eruption and who knows...? You honestly need to be a little more specific; the question is really broad.

My understanding of it was that Australia was more concerned about keeping Indonesia vaguely on side than helping out Britain (when leaving it up to them rather than taking over the responsibility was kinda beneficial anyway). How successful was Australia at avoiding pissing off Indonesia too much?

 

[Masada]

I'm going to need to check this tomorrow. I've got no idea if it makes sense.

What I've been reading is stuff more related to ANZAM and the Strategic Reserve and such, so it doesn't go into detail on this, but something I read suggested that it was Sukarno wanting to drum up another nationalist cause given the West Papua issue was coming to an end. Is that remotely true?

That's part of it but Sukarno was juggling lots of factors at this stage. So the answer is somewhat more complex than that. The biggest mistake that most people make is reducing West Papua to being just a nationalist cause célèbre. It was more than that - and so for that matter was Konfrontasi. In examining the one we shed light on the other, so I'll start with West Papua and then move onto Konfrontasi.

West Papua did appeal to domestic nationalist sentiment. It was something that Sukarno himself had been using as a lever in his domestic political manoeuvrings for quite a while. Most as a result of the fact that he was allowed it - the Liberal Democratic President Sukarno was meant to be seen and not heard - because foreign adventurism wasn't high on the parties' list of things to be done. The problem with stirring up nationalist sentiments on an issue is that it's a rather hard thing to put them away. Thus when Sukarno inaugurated Guided Democracy and put himself in the driving seat, he couldn't and to an extent wouldn't put the issue to rest. So he decided to farm it for all the domestic prestige it was worth; the intention not being to fight for it but force the Dutch through domestic pressure to hand it over. When the initial round of negotiations failed, Sukarno decided to bring bigger literal guns to bear...

The happy consequence of bringing his military to bear against the Dutch was that it kept the military busy with military rather than political matters. Something of prime concern for Sukarno who was wary of the threat that the military posed to him. In large part he overestimated the threat, Nasution a key figure in the military of the time was a committed Sukarnoist, as was most of the senior command, but he was justified in seeing the military as a potential future threat. The net result of all this positioning was a limited commitment of Indonesian troops, the chief aim of which was never to 'win' but to signal how 'serious' Indonesia was about the whole business. The thinking being, partially correctly as it turns out, that the Dutch weren't going to risk a major war a half a world away for the last scraps of a now defunct empire. (The Dutch would have fought back if the United States hadn't taken a harder line under Kennedy in an attempt to reconcile with Indonesia, something that happened... for a while at least; as it was with no American help, they backed down and gave up).

The problem with this kind of analysis is that it ignores just how influential Sukarno was. He made the West Papua his own. There's little doubt in my mind that in his absence it wouldn't have been as significant a factor as it was. That it grew its own legs and forced him to take up the cause again is a testament to just how influential he was. It was his child; his creation. He was the one who took it seriously enough to make it as a major plank of his policies as President and he was the one who kept at it till he improbably got what he wanted.

Konfrontasi operated under the same terms: it was to an extent a substitute for West Papua. But it needs to be stressed that Sukarno took up the Borneo cause only after the suppression and arrival of activists from Brunei as a result of the failure of the Brunei Revolt. This was what turned his attention northwards. Similar efforts in the other two states fizzled, generating another influx of political activists. Hot on the heels of this political activism came the Federation debate; which Sukarno at least initially had been supportive, in a broad sense, of. What added insult to the injury of having a legitimately popular revolution being crushed by British - imperialists - was the lack of consultation and the outright rail-roading of the three into the Federation to counter-balance Singapore. Combine with Sukarno's dislike of Malaysia and the Tengku and the mix was positively toxic.

Initial Indonesian efforts were confined to diplomatic inquiries and support for the independence of the three states. The main thrust of Indonesia diplomacy focused on moderating the terms of the Federation, aiming to either a frustrate them outright or at least modify them by making including allowances for such annoying impediments as a vote on universal suffrage. Incidentally, this was not out of step with what the local British Civil Servants and parts of the Colonial Office wanted. This was refused, partly because it wasn't a Done Thing to bow to Sukarno and because the situation in Singapore kept deteriorating correspondingly increasing the threat of a lolCommunist takeover and a destruction of the British position in Asia. When the diplomatic offensive spluttered...

Sukarno drew on his experiences in West Papua and began to use the military as a diplomatic instrument. He figured that if the Brits weren't willing to listen to reason he'd force them to listen to their wallets. The initial efforts were confined to training locals for reinsertion, something that worked; but was frustrated by a lack of numbers and the general indifference of the rural population to the rebels. (Outright hostility to the Federation was a given; people just weren't interested enough in aiding rebels from the cities and/or risking their lives for the matter). This was then supplemented through volunteers and then through 'volunteers'. The problem for Sukarno this time around was that the British were willing to get into an expensive pissing match and were committed to forcing the Federation. So no matter what he did, he wasn't going to win...

In short, Sukarno made use of the prestige that Konfrontasi offered but seems to have been genuinely concerned with how the Federation was being formed. His actions were chiefly concerned with getting a satisfactory outcome in the latter. Even if his words suggest otherwise.

My understanding of it was that Australia was more concerned about keeping Indonesia vaguely on side than helping out Britain (when leaving it up to them rather than taking over the responsibility was kinda beneficial anyway). How successful was Australia at avoiding pissing off Indonesia too much?

Which was outright nonsensical. Australia might not have been a wholly willing partner (and made that abundantly clear) but it still sent troops that killed Indonesians. No amount of prevarication or reluctance was apt to change that simple fact. The Indonesians were at least initially willing to cut Australia some slack - Australia had refused to be a party to the Dutch military interventions and that was remembered - but that good will didn't survive the conflict.

 

[Civciv5]

How was the Great Mosque of Samarra destroyed?

 

[Linkman226]

How was the Great Library of Alexandria destroyed?

 

[Dachs]

How was the Great Library of Alexandria destroyed?

Lots of argument about that one. Best guess is that, during the civil war in Egypt in 48-7 BC, the place was burned down in the general conflagration that accompanied Caesar's legions' fighting against the partisans of Ptolemaios XIII. Some of the material may have been recovered and lost at a later date, but the majority of the place was certainly destroyed.

 

[Linkman226]

Has anyone watched the movie Agora?

How historically realistic is it?

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Has anyone watched the movie Agora?

How historically realistic is it?

About as realistic as Troy is to the Illiad, so not at all. The movie is just an excuse to beat up on early Christians. Her death and the riot in general had nothing to do in general.

 

[Linkman226]

How veracious are these accounts:

Yet even she fell a victim to the political jealousy, which at that time prevailed. For, as she had frequent interviews with Orestes, it was calumniously reported, among the Christian populace, that it was she who prevented Orestes from being reconciled to the bishop. Some of them, therefore, hurried away by a fierce and bigoted zeal, whose ringleader was a reader named Peter, waylaid her returning home, and, dragging her from her carriage, they took her to the church called Caesareum, where they completely stripped her, and then murdered her by scraping her skin off with tiles and bits of shell. After tearing her body in pieces, they took her mangled limbs to a place called Cinaron, and there burnt them.

And, in those days, there appeared in Alexandria a female philosopher, a pagan named Hypatia, and she was devoted at all times to magic, astrolabes, and instruments of music, and she beguiled many people through Satanic wiles . . . A multitude of believers in God arose under the guidance of Peter the Magistrate . . . and they proceeded to seek for the pagan woman who had beguiled the people of the city and the Prefect through her enchantments. And when they learnt the place where she was, they proceeded to her and found her . . . they dragged her along till they brought her to the great church, named Caesareum. Now this was in the days of the fast. And they tore off her clothing and dragged her . . . through the streets of the city till she died. And they carried her to a place named Cinaron, and they burned her body with fire.

 

[Leoreth]

We had a thread on Agora once either here or in A&E.

 

[Dachs]

useful blog post on the topic of Agora

 

[aronnax]

Masada - because this is your region of study.

What were British attitudes towards Singaporean independence if Singapore had opted to not join the Malayan Union?

 

[Camikaze]

@Masada- thanks for the answer again. I asked my lecturer today and he seemed to be of the opinion that aiming to prevent British withdrawal was a pretty big concern, but that avoiding antagonising Indonesia was more of one in the situation, and that Australia only did intervene when it was really getting out of hand (when there were landings on the Malaysian 'mainland'; the alternative being abandoning the idea of 'forward defence' centred on Malaysia), avoiding confrontation for as long as it possibly could. Isn't the position that that's nonsensical a bit too generous to Indonesia?