History questions not worth their own thread IV

[ParkCungHee]

Okay so from the Machiavellian school of thought, he was a decent king. I was moreso evaluating him from a moral, statesmanly standpoint.

By that standard, all kings are awful and should be gotten rid of, some more urgently than others. That rarely makes for useful discussion.

Edit: Except maybe Norton I. Only moral, statesmanly monarch I can think of.

 

[LightSpectra]

I don't think monarchy is an inherently immoral form of government. But since there's clearly some ideological obelisk here I don't suppose there's much point in going any further in our counter-point evaluation.

 

[sophie]

Oh, don't forget the several major uprisings such as the Pilgrimage of Grace.

 

[Dachs]

Not really. Neither side wanted a war with the other, so that wasn't going to happen, but both sides saw the other as harassing them in assorted ways. Most notably, the Americans were fairly furious that the CSA's navy had largely been constructed in the UK, whereas the US was busily denouncing the UK before and during the war. I believe it was Seward who wanted to start a war with the UK to distract the nation from the whole slavery thing.

I know Seward planned to fight Spain over its invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1860-1, but by the time he was actually in office, the Fort Sumter siege had begun and he could do nothing to get the nascent Confederacy back on-side. Had he been Secretary of State during the fall of 1860 and crafted that policy then, there's actually a non-negligible chance that intervention against Spain would've isolated South Carolina like in the nullification crisis.

 

[Lord Baal]

Yeah so I don't want to make a new thread quite yet but I was considering making an 'archive of historical misconceptions' for this forum. It would essentially consist of a commonly believed trope, followed by a short rebuttal and links to threads in the past two years or so that had long discussions about the issue.

It wouldn't be for very simple matters (e.g. that it was believed in the middle ages that the Earth is flat), but rather mostly historiographical lunacies that haven't quite faded away in the popular imagination. A short list of ones that come to mind below, in no particular order:

1. The Huns were probably the Xiong-nu people.
2. The Battle of Britain could have been won by the Axis had it not been for strategical blunders as a result of Hitler's micromanagement.
3. Operation Barbarossa failed because it was launched in the wrong month/because the Japanese did not assist against the Soviets/other often attributed reasons that are basically nonsense.
4. The Confederates seceded from the United States because of tariffs/'states' rights'/a matter of honor and not to preserve the institution of slavery. / The United States government was the aggressor that caused the American Civil War.
5. Napoleon Bonaparte was a brilliant politician and statesman whose ultimate goal was to unify Europe and/or liberate the oppressed lower classes from aristocratic oppression, but was never accepted by politicians outside of France because Bonaparte himself was not from a traditional dynasty or 'blue-blooded' high-society aristocratic family.
6. Herbert Hoover was a 'laissez-faire' ideologue that opposed government regulation and intervention in the U.S. economy before and during the Great Depression.
7. The Roman Empire was destroyed by Germanic barbarian hordes that flooded across the borders and systematically conquered imperial provinces.
8. History, particularly technology and scientific innovation, are inherently 'progressive' (i.e. the Whig historiography).
9. After the 'fall of Rome', western Europe fell into a 'Dark Age', where intellectual oppression on behalf of the Catholic Church resulted in the destruction of old knowledge and inhibitions on new discoveries.
10. The Crusades had a singular motive on 'both' sides of the conflict.
11. The Hundred Years' War was some sort of nationalistic conflict between England and France.
12. World War I was caused by the German 'blank cheque' to Austria-Hungary / a German grab for world power, through an operational necessity by Germany to occupy Paris by M-42, known as the 'Schlieffen Plan'. Also, the U.K. intervened in the war as a result of their moralistic benefaction to Belgium.
13. Sonderweg; i.e. that Germany's path in the 19th and 20th centuries were basically inevitable due to the social and political groundings for Germany that stretched all the way back to the middle ages.

Thoughts, comments, additions?

I recall you and I discussed something like this a while back, but fatherhood leaves me with approximately enough time to quickly jump on CFC while my boss is on his lunch break, which isn't exactly conducive to the time and effort something like this would entail. The same reason I had to abandon my plans for a Charles De Gaulle article, incidentally. I'd love to see this, as long as you don't give yourself an embolism in the process.

 

[Louis XXIV]

I know Seward planned to fight Spain over its invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1860-1, but by the time he was actually in office, the Fort Sumter siege had begun and he could do nothing to get the nascent Confederacy back on-side. Had he been Secretary of State during the fall of 1860 and crafted that policy then, there's actually a non-negligible chance that intervention against Spain would've isolated South Carolina like in the nullification crisis.

I've heard this story framed slightly differently. I heard Seward proposed an invasion of Spanish Cuba as a way to prevent secession, but Lincoln rejected the idea as far fetched.

 

[Dachs]

I've heard this story framed slightly differently. I heard Seward proposed an invasion of Spanish Cuba as a way to prevent secession, but Lincoln rejected the idea as far fetched.

By the time Lincoln was inaugurated, it was far-fetched.

 

[Lord Baal]

I've heard this story framed slightly differently. I heard Seward proposed an invasion of Spanish Cuba as a way to prevent secession, but Lincoln rejected the idea as far fetched.

It would have been pretty difficult for Lincoln to launch an invasion of Cuba when the nearest Union state was Delaware.

 

[Dachs]

It would have been pretty difficult for Lincoln to launch an invasion of Cuba when the nearest Union state was Delaware.

Not really. Cuba was closer than New Orleans, and that was taken via amphibious invasion in the spring of 1862 despite no nearby Federal-held territory.

 

[Ajidica]

Not really. Cuba was closer than New Orleans, and that was taken via amphibious invasion in the spring of 1862 despite no nearby Federal-held territory.

On a related note, how would an amphibious landing occur during the civil war?

 

[Cutlass]

On a related note, how would an amphibious landing occur during the civil war?

Badly But amphibious landings have been happening throughout the history of wars. You load your troops and equipment on to small boats and hit the beach. And then try and take or build some piers for the ships to offload the heavier stuff.

 

[Dachs]

On a related note, how would an amphibious landing occur during the civil war?

Same way they did for the rest of the age of sail. Troop transports get close, shallow-draft boats get the landing parties in the rest of the way. There'd be some direct-fire support from nearby vessels if necessary, although that was usually directed towards any nearby forts to silence their guns.

Rarely, if ever, did anybody encounter fixed fortifications on the beach like the Atlantic Wall during D-Day. This was not because they were not there - there was quite the proliferation of large forts along the coast of the Confederacy, designed in significant part by Lee during the 1830s and 1840s - but because it wasn't particularly difficult to land out of their range and then attack them on foot. Frequently, the Federals would land near a major fort to capture it specifically, such as Fort Pulaski near Savannah (1862) or Fort Wagner at Charleston (1863) in order to occupy them to have outposts of their own along the coast. Generally, if Federal forces encountered any defenses on the beach itself, they would consist of breastworks at most, and they would not be defended close to the waterline. The South simply lacked the manpower to cover its immense coastline with such things, and they had effectively no warning of most major Union amphibious offensives.

Probably the most successful amphibious operations of the war were the aforementioned capture of New Orleans and Ambrose Burnside's capture of New Bern, North Carolina, both in the spring of 1862. Both had strategic relevance - New Orleans being the South's largest city and premiere port, and an entrance to the Mississippi, and New Bern, a significant port in its own right, applying serious pressure to traitor defenses in North Carolina for the entirety of the war, which sapped the fighting strength of the Army of Northern Virginia (which frequently dispatched individual divisions, sometimes even corps, to try and fail to probe the defenses around New Bern).

There were also numerous riverine amphibious operations during the war, although they were more common in the first few years when the Federals were employing the vast western water system to smash Confederate defenses in the Mississippi. Grant's raid at Belmont, Pope's capture of Island No. 10, and the assault on Port Gibson during Grant's Vicksburg campaign were all brown-water landings. (Notably, Grant elected to shift operations to Port Gibson when his initial target, Grand Gulf, turned out to be defended by artillery and breastworks. He later marched back north and reduced Grand Gulf from both land and water before continuing inland to Jackson.)

 

[Glassfan]

On a related note, how would an amphibious landing occur during the civil war?

Badly But amphibious landings have been happening throughout the history of wars. You load your troops and equipment on to small boats and hit the beach. And then try and take or build some piers for the ships to offload the heavier stuff.

Prior to WWII, in American operations, troops would land on some safe, undefended shoreline, organize themselves, and then march-off to fight. Examples might be Washington crossing the Delaware River secretly in the middle of the night; or Scott landing his force below Veracruz ("...the first major amphibious landing in US history" - often cited) and then moving on that city; or even Grant landing below Vicksburg (away from any defenses).

By WWII, however, while the first kind of landing was still employed when convenient (i.e., Torch); distinctive tactics, equipment and necessity often resulted in the direct assault of defended beaches by specialized (Marines) or specially-trained troops (i.e., Big Red One). This direct amphibious assault usually required naval bombardment and aerial attack to soften-up defenses, sometimes lasting days; and then a forced landing utilizing massed shock troops in purpose-built craft.

 

[Lord Baal]

Not really. Cuba was closer than New Orleans, and that was taken via amphibious invasion in the spring of 1862 despite no nearby Federal-held territory.

New Orleans also required a far smaller force than an invasion of Cuba. That means either a far more sizable contingent, or a closer jump off point, both for reasons of supply.

 

[Dachs]

New Orleans also required a far smaller force than an invasion of Cuba. That means either a far more sizable contingent, or a closer jump off point, both for reasons of supply.

Cuba wasn't that heavily garrisoned; initial forces deployed there could be as little as a single corps. (Which is all that the island required in 1898, although obviously the situations are not immediately comparable. Cuba was more heavily garrisoned by the Spanish in 1898, after all. A corps is roughly equivalent to the forces deployed for the capture of New Orleans, conveniently enough.) And they also didn't have to all go in one wave.

A closer jump-off point would obviously have been nice, but was similarly unnecessary.

 

[Glassfan]

Probably the most successful amphibious operations of the war were the aforementioned capture of New Orleans and Ambrose Burnside's capture of New Bern, North Carolina, both in the spring of 1862. Both had strategic relevance - New Orleans being the South's largest city and premiere port, and an entrance to the Mississippi, and New Bern, a significant port in its own right, applying serious pressure to traitor defenses in North Carolina for the entirety of the war, which sapped the fighting strength of the Army of Northern Virginia...

Dachs, I'd be interested in your opinion on Burnside. My wife's family is related and we often discuss him over Thanksgiving Turkey. They mostly think of him as a screwup because of Fredericksburg and the Crater, but I usually defend him with New Bern and Knoxville.

I've read in several sources that AB had considerable pressure from Lincoln to beat the ANV at Fredericksburg, hence his overcommitment. The telegrams to prove this don't seem to exist though, since AB wasn't the argumentative anal-retentive that GMcC was.

What's your opinion of Burnside's competence as a commander?

 

[Flying Pig]

Badly But amphibious landings have been happening throughout the history of wars. You load your troops and equipment on to small boats and hit the beach. And then try and take or build some piers for the ships to offload the heavier stuff.

Opposed beach landings have always been rather messy affairs; here's Caesar describing one near Dover:

The barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whom it is their practice to make great use in their battles, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavored to prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationed only in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight of armor, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amid the waves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, or advancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs in places thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weapons and spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode of battle, our men did not all exert the same vigor and eagerness which they had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground.

When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and the motion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationed toward the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off and driven away, with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of great service to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of our ships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, which was strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. And while our men were hesitating [whether they should advance to the shore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried the eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the matter might turn out favorably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellow soldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general." When he had said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceeded to bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one another that so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followed and approached the enemy.

The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another from another assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown into great confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all the shallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one by one, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; many surrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forces on their exposed flank.

 

[Dachs]

Dachs, I'd be interested in your opinion on Burnside. My wife's family is related and we often discuss him over Thanksgiving Turkey. They mostly think of him as a screwup because of Fredericksburg and the Crater, but I usually defend him with New Bern and Knoxville.

I've read in several sources that AB had considerable pressure from Lincoln to beat the ANV at Fredericksburg, hence his overcommitment. The telegrams to prove this don't seem to exist though, since AB wasn't the argumentative anal-retentive that GMcC was.

What's your opinion of Burnside's competence as a commander?

I think Burnside was a quality guy who got promoted over his competence in the fall of 1862 (and to his credit, recognized this). When in command of a detached corps-sized formation, or a corps as part of a larger unit (your New Bern and Knoxville examples are the best here, although Burnside's corps generally did good work in the Overland Campaign as well) he generally seemed to know what he was doing. Maybe he was also under serious political pressure at Fredericksburg, but I don't know if that's necessary to explain what he did.

As for the Crater, I don't really blame him for what happened there. It was more of a disastrous coincidence of several bad decisions. Using the USCT was inspired; defaulting to Ferrero's troops when Meade blocked that decision was not.

I'm not the kind of guy who tries to psychoanalyze a century and a half after the fact, though.

 

[Traitorfish]

More importantly, are sideburns really named after Burnside, or is that just a myth?

 

[Dachs]

I don't believe anybody's managed to make a serious dent in that story.

What isn't true is the claim that hookers were named after Burnside's successor as general commanding, Army of the Potomac, Joseph Hooker. Fighting Joe did have a reputation as a womanizer, but the term predates his fame by a few decades.