Is there any point in keeping NATO around?

[Timsup2nothin]

I think Ukraine will always carry the stigma of 'if we let them join they expect us to get Crimea back for them', and that should be sufficient to keep them out of NATO. Might not keep them out of the EU, but the US in particular is going to insist that any NATO membership has to involve openly disclaiming Crimea. Even the lunatic war party in the US is really only interested in swatting down third world countries that can't even begin to fight back.

 

[red_elk]

They won't thrive in isolation, but we aren't dealing with a middle east dictatorship that has to trade oil for guns to maintain order.

The main problem with sanctions is that they actually never work in terms of achieving political goals. Even with Middle East dictatorships. In case of Russia, embargo on gas and oil trade would cause more serious damage than current half-hearted sanctions, but EU can't afford to do this without breaking its own economy.

Russia would treat them like it already does Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The rest of Ukraine is likely to join NATO

Unresolved territorial disputes, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia is what still prevents Georgia from joining NATO. Ukraine is apparently having more serious troubles with this.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

The main problem with sanctions is that they actually never work in terms of achieving political goals. Even with Middle East dictatorships.

Middle East dictatorships are totally dependent on imported weapon systems. If you successfully embargo them for a few years one of their neighbors will be able to overrun them. This worked for decades, until they caught on and stopped fighting among themselves. More currently we embargo them for a few years to soften them up and then overrun them ourselves.

No level of economic sanctions is going to turn Russia into a target that anyone can overrun, so that angle is completely off the table as far as I'm concerned.

As to stopping the oil and gas trade...the rest of Europe folds like a tent, and Russia starts developing industries to use its own oil and gas. Russia wins. That's something Russia might do as a sanction, but no one else is going to even think about it.

 

[Borachio]

Then it should be easier for you to trust official results.

Yeah. Let's go with the official results. Though it's still quite likely there was some massaging of the figures.

I'm getting impression that you just cannot imagine how people in their right mind can support a pro-Russian position, prefer it to pro-Western and vote accordingly. Instead, you are trying to explain it by their pragmatical (financial, security) interests. I have more simple and natural explanation - most of Russian people in Crimea just don't want to live in Ukraine and feel that their home is Russia. Better living standards is just additional bonus for them.

Oh. I don't think you quite understand me. I can totally understand how the majority Russian population of Crimea were in favour of annexation. But by themselves, that wouldn't take you to the 95% of 87% turnout in favour (whatever the official Kremlin figures were).

The ethnic makeup of the population comprised the following self-reported groups (2001 census):
Russians:1,450,000 (58.5%),
Ukrainians: 577,000 (24.0%),
Crimean Tatars: 245,000 (10.2%),
Belarusians: 35,000 (1.4%),
Volga Tatars: 13,500 (0.5%),
Armenians: 10,000 (0.4%),
Jews: 5,500 (0.2%).

A sizeable minority (41.5%) aren't Russian at all.

Now, the Crimean Tatar population boycotted the referendum. Which, by the official figures means that, excluding the boycotters, the turnout was... gah! what's 87% of 90?... let's call it 99%. That's suspiciously high, don't you think? More than 1% would have flu or couldn't be bothered, or were drunk, I'd say.

 

[Ajidica]

For what it is worth, many of the Ukrainians and Tatars boycotted the vote so, obviously, their votes weren't considered.

 

[Borachio]

They should have figured in the turnout percentages nonetheless. Or are you saying they were simply disenfranchised the moment they declared they wouldn't be voting?

Doesn't this seem like a fudge to everyone?

Still, I'm not bothered. I'll accept the official figures. Only 56% of the population are Russians.

 

[red_elk]

A sizeable minority (41.5%) aren't Russian at all.

From this list, only 10% of Tatars actually matters. People call themselves Ukrainians, Belorussians or Russians basing on where their ancestors came from. Some of my friends and relatives are considered Ukrainians just because their grandparents were born and lived in Soviet Ukraine - but culturally they are Russians no less than I am, and they have similarly pro-Russian political preferences. Ironically, from people who I know personally, there are several Ukrainians, but the only one who have pro-Ukrainian standpoint is ethnic Russian.

Now, the Crimean Tatar population boycotted the referendum. Which, by the official figures means that, excluding the boycotters, the turnout was... gah! what's 87% of 90?... let's call it 99%. That's suspiciously high, don't you think?

Well, that's oversimplification. Obviously not all of Tatars boycotted the referendum, just as not all of the Russians went to vote.

BTW, official turnout is 83%. Even if all Tatars boycotted referendum, the turnout excluding them is 83%/90% = 92.2% - still high, but much less suspicious than your 99%

 

[Borachio]

It's no good. I can't do arithmetic. I never could.

Well, technically, I can do it. I just never get the right answers.

 

[Ajidica]

They should have figured in the turnout percentages nonetheless. Or are you saying they were simply disenfranchised the moment they declared they wouldn't be voting?

Doesn't this seem like a fudge to everyone?

Still, I'm not bothered. I'll accept the official figures. Only 56% of the population are Russians.

It doesn't feel like a fudge to me. I don't know of any election that adjusts the reported result based on those who didn't vote.

 

[Borachio]

You're missing my point. I was referring to the turnout figures clearly not taking account of all those not voting. Assuming that more than 10% didn't vote.

Still, it's all debatable, I guess.

 

[Agent327]

My best guess is that something of this nature will still be the final outcome in Ukraine, with Crimea an internationally unrecognized part of Russia, and unrecognized frozen conflict zones holding in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. Ukraine could grant them some sort of "autonomous republic" status and still claim their territory (along with Crimea) even though everybody knows they don't actually control them. Russia would treat them like it already does Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The rest of Ukraine is likely to join NATO

No, it would not, as Ukraine still would have claims on these occupied territories. So, in any case, whatever the outcome, Ukraine can't join NATO (let alone a part of Ukraine).

 

[Bootstoots]

I hope that's correct - having territory occupied by Russia should very much disqualify a country from being a NATO member, as it would be hard to prevent the mutual defense clause from being activated and obviously a NATO war with Russia would be a terrible disaster for all involved. I'm still somewhat concerned that Ukraine could be admitted anyway in the next few years if certain ideologues prevail, although hopefully they don't.

As for EU membership, Ukraine is extremely poor even relative to Romania and Bulgaria, and with a population of 44 million it would dwarf both of those countries. There would be very serious opposition to it being allowed to join, given that this would certainly result in a large and perfectly legal wave of migrants considerably poorer than the EU has yet experienced. Whether or not it would be right to let it join, I doubt EU governments would be keen on taking the popularity hit this would entail.

 

[FriendlyFire]

The main problem with sanctions is that they actually never work in terms of achieving political goals. Even with Middle East dictatorships. In case of Russia, embargo on gas and oil trade would cause more serious damage than current half-hearted sanctions, but EU can't afford to do this without breaking its own economy.

You were saying comrade ? (poor Finland)
Given the size of EU economy vs Russian economy which is much smaller, whom do you think is going to "break" first.

The old Soviet Union played the sanctions game as well – for example, against China, Albania, and Yugoslavia. It, too, did not have much success, except perhaps in the case of Finland, which ultimately bent its policies to gain relief from sanctions imposed in 1958.

Most modern cases of sanctions pit a large country against a small country, though there are a few cases involving countries of equal size, such as the long quarrel, from the 1950s to the 1980s, between the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar.

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/co...-by-kenneth-rogoff-2015-1#kgdXXcIom1YOQZEE.99

 

[Phrossack]

The situation could be improved if Russia paid Ukraine a massive fee for illegally annexing Ukrainian territory without Ukrainian permission while using an illegally un-uniformed army and then lying about it. If the Russians are really wringing their hands over the destruction in the east, then surely they'd be happy to pay for stolen goods and help make up for the destruction. And if you want Whataboutism, the United States did pay Mexico for its rather absurd invasion and annexation of that nation's territory, and that was with the moral system of 170 years ago! Surely the more modern and enlightened Russians of 2015 would be willing to be as moral as their hated American rivals of the mid-19th century.

Then Ukraine could recognize the annexation and have no territorial disputes left, at least until another un-uniformed army arrived to "persuade" Ukrainian forces to give up the east...

Not that anyone in the EU wants Ukraine to join, but it would help resolve both a territorial dispute and pay for reconstruction.

 

[Verbose]

As to stopping the oil and gas trade...the rest of Europe folds like a tent, and Russia starts developing industries to use its own oil and gas. Russia wins. That's something Russia might do as a sanction, but no one else is going to even think about it.

The EU isn't monolithic. Most of it doesn't run on Russian gas. That mostly just hurts Eastern Europe and the Balkans + Germany.

To be brutally crass about it, Eastern Europe and the Balkan make up too small a part of the EU's aggregate economy to really hurt it. Germany is a different matter but if there's a country in Europe with sheer economic strength to handle this, it's Germany.

There's already connecting pipelines in place and reverse pumping outfits to make the EU gas supply more resilient.

The trick is to handle the loss of the 30% of EU gas use Russia currently provides. Essentially a infrastructure overhaul could reduced use by 10%, new LNG terminals and imports from North Africa might handle another 10%, and the Norwegians have indicated they can up production by the last 10% to make good the shortfall.

Problem? It is entirely possible for the EU to live without Russian has, but only provided some SERIOUS investments are made in that direction — and currently there's not the political will to spend money on that, most of all not in Germany apparently.

The part of Europe really set up to get it in the teeth is the former Eastern Bloc countries, who a quarter century after the demise of the Soviet Union still haven't really made any effort to diversify energy supply away from dependency on Russia.

Still, half the EU economy runs on no Russia gas at all. If Germany and Italy can handle it, what remains are the Poles and Finns that might struggle. But from there on the other EU economies over in the east amount between them to about 6,5% of the total EU economy. (With Poland and Finland included, it's about 11% potentially hurt. It's only if assuming Italy and Germany can't make up for a shortfall we get to 43% — but then Germany and Italy can be expected to handle such a situation.)

 

[Timsup2nothin]

The EU isn't monolithic. Most of it doesn't run on Russian gas. That mostly just hurts Eastern Europe and the Balkans + Germany.

To be brutally crass about it, Eastern Europe and the Balkan make up too small a part of the EU's aggregate economy to really hurt it. Germany is a different matter but if there's a country in Europe with sheer economic strength to handle this, it's Germany.

There's already connecting pipelines in place and reverse pumping outfits to make the EU gas supply more resilient.

The trick is to handle the loss of the 30% of EU gas use Russia currently provides. Essentially a infrastructure overhaul could reduced use by 10%, new LNG terminals and imports from North Africa might handle another 10%, and the Norwegians have indicated they can up production by the last 10% to make good the shortfall.

Problem? It is entirely possible for the EU to live without Russian has, but only provided some SERIOUS investments are made in that direction — and currently there's not the political will to spend money on that, most of all not in Germany apparently.

The part of Europe really set up to get it in the teeth is the former Eastern Bloc countries, who a quarter century after the demise of the Soviet Union still haven't really made any effort to diversify energy supply away from dependency on Russia.

Still, half the EU economy runs on no Russia gas at all. If Germany and Italy can handle it, what remains are the Poles and Finns that might struggle. But from there on the other EU economies over in the east amount between them to about 6,5% of the total EU economy. (With Poland and Finland included, it's about 11% potentially hurt. It's only if assuming Italy and Germany can't make up for a shortfall we get to 43% — but then Germany and Italy can be expected to handle such a situation.)

The problem the EU faces is actually illustrated by your response...which is a perfectly reasonable response.

The EU, economically, is far too powerful to really be hurt. But the EU has a vulnerability politically. What happens when an economic sanction 'only' hurts some members and not others? The members who are hurt want to do something, or at the very least talk about it. The other members reveal that since the problem is not their problem they frankly don't give a damn.

The EU frequently gives the impression that it is held together by spit and twigs anyway, without being subjected to major external pressures.

 

[Agent327]

The only major external pressure the EU is currently experiencing comes from the East. This may reveal political didvisons within the EU (if anyone was still unaware of these), but rather serves as a unifying force than a divisive one. I.e. pressure put by Russia on Ukraine drives it towards the West, not closer to Russia. Similarly, Russia's current adventurous foreign policy drives Eastern European countries towards the West, not closer to Russia. It's actually rather hard to see what Russia can possibly gain in this way - except for a short term gain that will do nothing to solve its long term problems.

 

[Mechanicalsalvation]

The situation could be improved if Russia paid Ukraine a massive fee for illegally annexing Ukrainian territory without Ukrainian permission while using an illegally un-uniformed army and then lying about it. If the Russians are really wringing their hands over the destruction in the east, then surely they'd be happy to pay for stolen goods and help make up for the destruction. And if you want Whataboutism, the United States did pay Mexico for its rather absurd invasion and annexation of that nation's territory...

Russia has been subsidizing Ukraine with cheaper gas prices for decades and its likely to continue that. So I guess that takes care of that...

 

[Yeekim]

What happens when an economic sanction 'only' hurts some members and not others? The members who are hurt want to do something, or at the very least talk about it. The other members reveal that since the problem is not their problem they frankly don't give a damn.

At least Poland and Baltic States definitely have ample political will to weather the impact of these sanctions... and then some.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

At least Poland and Baltic States definitely have ample political will to weather the impact of these sanctions... and then some.

I seem to recall a whole lot of whining coming out of German and Dutch agriculture...and Germany in particular seems to think the EU owes a very high level of concern to any problem it might have, whether it affects anyone else or not.