Because a defensive alliance that does not include world's foremost military power is so much more useful than one that does. Indeed, exclusively European setup makes infinitely more sense. Why drag this dead weight called the US along?
Russia doesn't need them, it's not XIX century.As for Latvia-Estonia, meh, sell them to Russia(Finland too).
What do you think about Turkey? I am somewhat worried about its commitement to alliance lately.
Some commentators say that there is possibility of coup or even civil war. Erdogan seems as another bad guy. And Turkish role on war againist islamic state is dubious.
Can we and should we alienate Turkey?
I think that Nato will at some time be replaced with some other alliance featuring nuclear powers too. It would make more sense by now to be a european alliance, and actually that one might be able to keep the more invasion-happy nations in line (particularly England, but afaik France is quite involved in its x-colonies' wars/issues).
At any rate if that new alliance has nukes it won't go to war with other nuclear powers, which means it won't have enemies that can actually threaten it in the context of a war. Which is pretty much all that America-led Nato was good for in the years after ww2.
As for Latvia-Estonia, meh, sell them to Russia(Finland too).
Turkey's NATO membership has survived past military coups. It's in an oddball position. We need them enough to not kick them out, even though we don't like the coups. But the reason for the coups is that sectarian leaders keep winning elections, and we like them even less.
In order to join the alliance, candidates must fulfill a series of military, political, economic, and legal criteria that have been outlined by NATO in separate membership action plans, or MAPs.
Candidates are currently stepping up efforts to complete the conditions set forth in their individual MAPs, just as alliance experts are working on their final assessments of each country's progress.
However, some analysts point out that judging to what extent a country will be able to fulfill NATO's conditions is difficult, since many of the admission criteria -- barring the military conditions -- are hard to quantify, and a country's strategic importance may at times be considered ahead of its democratic and economic development.
The first chapter -- political and economic issues -- requires candidates to have stable democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbors, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy.
The defense chapter provides for candidates to reform their armed forces and to contribute militarily to the collective defense, while the resource chapter deals mainly with allocating sufficient funds to defense.
The last two chapters, security and legal issues, require aspirant countries to ensure the proper security of sensitive information according to NATO standards and bring national legislation into line with that of the alliance.
But analysts say it is hard to make objective assessments of aspects such as the quality of a country's democracy.
NATO in the past did give priority to geostrategic considerations and did admit countries with both border problems and insufficiently consolidated democracies, such as Turkey.
Gedmin said, however, that by admitting quarreling neighbors Turkey and Greece into the alliance, NATO managed to contain and reduce the intensity of territorial disputes over a number of islands in the Aegean Sea.
Gedmin said that, in the runup to NATO's expected second wave of enlargement later in 2002, geostrategic considerations might once again counterbalance other criteria.
He pointed to the three Baltic states -- Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia -- which he said NATO is contemplating admitting as a group into the alliance, even though some of them lag behind others in fulfilling what he called "narrow admission criteria."
Gedmin stressed that, in the end, NATO will admit those countries that, on balance, bring more benefits to the alliance and to regional security than they bring costs or risks.
Perhaps "we" should trying minding our own business for a welcome change, instead of incessantly meddling in the affairs of others.Turkey's NATO membership has survived past military coups. It's in an oddball position. We need them enough to not kick them out, even though we don't like the coups. But the reason for the coups is that sectarian leaders keep winning elections, and we like them even less.
Because a defensive alliance that does not include world's foremost military power is so much more useful than one that does. Indeed, exclusively European setup makes infinitely more sense. Why drag this dead weight called the US along?
Every single day a Soviet general met and informed the Supreme Soviet whether the Soviet army thought they could defeat NATO and capture West Germany to the Rhine if they invaded that day. There never was any discussion on the NATO side of attacking the Warsaw Pact. That would have been ludicrous. Everyone knew what was what, I certainly did.
I think, post-1990, we've found that both sides were in the same boat - neither wanting a war, but each terrified that the other would start one.
That includes the Germans who already had a portion of their country occupied by the Soviets. Unlike East Germany in the Warsaw Pact, West Germany was a voluntary member of NATO, making decisions for themselves. In the time I was there I learned that the only Germans who understood their mess were the ones on the border. The ones away from the border but no less under threat were oblivious, but no less than their government which seemed eager to lose.
Only the US and Europe obviously weren't "terrified" at all of a Soviet first strike. If they had been, they would have been practicing civil defense drills like the Soviet Union did right up to the time of their downfall.The problem during the Cold War, though, was that neither side knew how warlike the other was, so had to act as if the 3rd Shock Army would be rolling across the border tomorrow. I think, post-1990, we've found that both sides were in the same boat - neither wanting a war, but each terrified that the other would start one.
Because it is obviously not true.Really? I've never heard that.
Only the US and Europe obviously weren't "terrified" at all of a Soviet first strike. If they had been, they would have been practicing civil defense drills like the Soviet Union did right up to the time of their downfall.
Because it is obviously not true.