Jordan Peterson

[Mouthwash]

Damn it, Mouthwash; get off your phone

Tough to do when your laptop is over two thousand kilometers away.

"At any rate, Peterson does seem to be attaching (due to personal reason) way too much importance to his brand of sexism. Eg in how he is so invested in arguing that you can't carry a discussion with women. His argument is not bright either; i mean he even mentions 'getting physical' as a last resort with a male debater -- seriously? that is there in theory, but no one cares about your physical strength and wouldn't debate you with that in mind.

For Peterson's own video, where he speaks of the issues (about physical strength etc) : start the vid at min 1.

Peterson is saying precisely none of what you claimed he said. He's talking about women who are acting in an over-the-top manner. There's no claim that females are more likely to behave that way. And his talk about getting physical with a male debater isn't a boast, it's simply what he would do if a man was highly confrontational or violent towards him. Did you watch the same video I did?

 

[Chose]

Yeah but "belief" is one of those words that can mean different things, much like "faith". He was talking about "belief" as in whether or not you hold an (ostensibly) factual statement to be true or not, like "I believe that there is a coin in your left hand". This is clearly a very different kettle of fish to the sort of "belief" that is about how you think you should live your life to be a morally good person.

Bleh, don't make me go back and quote the actual words, but he definitely said a belief that is contradicted by empirical evidence. Again, that's a very different statement to one that is just not founded on empirical evidence. And yes, I've already said that I have no idea why that is non-moral (by which I mean immoral or amoral) or how morality even (necessarily) comes into it, but before even tackling that it would be good to get what he actually said straight.

Yes, it would be good to get clarification on what he meant. And yes, he did say 'contradicted' at first, but he followed up with "Beliefs founded outside reality are not necessarily harmful, there's no credible reason to assign them any moral value whatsoever over any other arbitrary belief without evidence."

So the first thing to note is that he is very much not talking about "belief" in only the factual sense, as you claim. He is specifically talking about beliefs "outside reality" and "without evidence". So I gave one such example that meets his criteria. Depending on what exactly he means by outside reality I might be able to concede the former, but the latter type of beliefs certainly can be moral. A second issue is that he seems to be using "scientific evidence" and "reality" interchangeably, which is a big problem if true.

Overall he is failing to see how fundamental values and emotions, and even rationality, are compared to merely scientific evidence. Other have pointed out already, but even the insistence that beliefs should be backed by empirical evidence is ultimately nothing more than a value judgment.

 

[aelf]

No. Such a stance is straight up either amoral or immoral when beliefs conflict with empirical data. The context of this thread makes an unpopular assertion that is testable with empirical data. The outcome of testing that is >> anybody's feelings about it. Even if one doesn't find it interesting. Even if it conflicts with beliefs not based on evidence.

You're missing the point. We're not talking about some established fact, which would be in a different category altogether. We're talking about a hypothesis that is yet to be proven. That does not sit in a separate category from opinion and is not magically free from social reprobation.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

There is no more reason to value evidence than just raw emotion

That is not a coherent position. Person X could claim you scare them, walk up to you and cause permanent blunt trauma on the basis of their raw emotion. By your argument, there's no reason to consider their position any less valid than yours or that of evidence.

I do not want to live in a society where this is an acceptable chain of events, to the point of holding the notion in disdain. And you should value that disdain too, because it's emotion lololol.

Let's not.

There is more than one way in which to validly interpret "reality," which is a thing that humans can only access via the flawed mediums we use to transmit and create ideas.

There are millions of conceivable ways if you don't require any coherent process for interpretation.

Few ways actually allow accurate predictions of future anticipated experience. Gravity is a more valid reason for you falling than my god hand pushing you down from the hidden planet of Tyuop. Both are interpretations of reality, but one of them works a lot better when you use it to anticipate future outcomes.

I don’t think so, no. That’s about the extent to which I’m able to argue for it, really. Team’s right that morality is subjective it just doesn’t help his case at all, is what I’m saying.

My case from the start is that "if evidence supports unpopular hypothesis X, it's nevertheless immoral to reject the evidence". We moved past the point where we concluded it's pretty likely the 80 IQ proposition was wrong. The distinction of a testable hypothesis and the value of the results when compared to opinion stands.

And yes, I've already said that I have no idea why that is non-moral (by which I mean immoral or amoral) or how morality even (necessarily) comes into it, but before even tackling that it would be good to get what he actually said straight.

Morality is constructed around some value system for outcomes. Necessarily so, without valuing some measurable outcome over other measurable outcomes I've yet to see anybody present it to have any meaning whatsoever. I don't mean that in some spiritual sense either, I mean that they literally can't dictionary-define the word even on their own terms without using the empirical evidence they claim they don't need to define it.

You are correct that I made the claim that "intuitions and values outside the scope of science" are necessarily either amoral or immoral under the condition that the conflicts with empirical evidence.

The reason for my assertion given above. You need evidence to make conclusions about your values and their outcomes.

 

[Manfred Belheim]

Ah well. I suppose I'd better let him explain himself then (@Chose)

 

[TheMeInTeam]

Other have pointed out already, but even the insistence that beliefs should be backed by empirical evidence is ultimately nothing more than a value judgment.

They are the only beliefs that allow proper anticipation of future experience. Out of an enormous possibility space of arbitrary beliefs (swiss knives are inverse dog cheese therefore charity is negative one third of the time), there is a reason we assign value to ones that anticipate future experience rather than ones with nothing to support holding them.

Put another way, in contrast to alternative beliefs using evidence allows you to actually make self-consistent value judgments, rather than concluding that roxnorf is a permafulgatory and using that as a "guiding principle" for whether you brush your teeth tomorrow.

You're missing the point. We're not talking about some established fact, which would be in a different category altogether. We're talking about a hypothesis that is yet to be proven. That does not sit in a separate category from opinion and is not magically free from social reprobation.

Okay, to be fair there should generally be a reason you're forming a hypothesis in the first place.

I don't hypothesize that dark matter is really comprised of clones of myself, and making such a hypothesis would reasonably be rejected unless I could demonstrate a reason for it.

So too with hypotheses in general, though if we're making one presumably there is a reason. If there isn't, then sure give social reprobation. It's still distinct from an opinion, even if it's inane.

 

[Kyriakos]

Tough to do when your laptop is over two thousand kilometers away.



Peterson is saying precisely none of what you claimed he said. He's talking about women who are acting in an over-the-top manner. There's no claim that females are more likely to behave that way. And his talk about getting physical with a male debater isn't a boast, it's simply what he would do if a man was highly confrontational or violent towards him. Did you watch the same video I did?

I did; do you understand english? ^^ Pet says "if you are talking to a man, who wouldn't fight with you under any circumstances whatsoever, then you are talking to someone to whom you have absolutely no respect". Did you miss the point we were referring to? It is at 2.10 in the video. Well? Do you agree with him?

'undermining the masculine power of the culture', lol. As if Pet himself is some paradigm of masculinity, in some parallel universe.

 

[Chose]

Put another way, in contrast to alternative beliefs using evidence allows you to actually make self-consistent value judgments, rather than concluding that roxnorf is a permafulgatory and using that as a "guiding principle" for whether you brush your teeth tomorrow.

Are you using evidence and reason as synonyms? Reasoning about value judgments can help you make them consistent, but neither rationality nor evidence is going to provide you the basis for moral value judgments.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

Are you using evidence and reason as synonyms? Reasoning about value judgments can help you make them consistent, but neither rationality nor evidence is going to provide you the basis for moral value judgments.

Evidence is literally the only basis for moral value judgments. I asked this earlier and never really got an answer:

How are you coming to a conclusion that anything is "good" without setting standards based on something in the real world and measuring whether an action actually gives that outcome?

or

If you are setting that standard and making value judgments on outcomes measured in reality, how is this process happening while not utilizing evidence?

 

[Chose]

Evidence is literally the only basis for moral value judgments. I asked this earlier and never really got an answer:

How are you coming to a conclusion that anything is "good" without setting standards based on something in the real world and measuring whether an action actually gives that outcome?

I start with the premise that an outcome is good, and then I can collect data to see if an action produces the outcome. I might call that action good, but it's resting on the premise that the outcome is good, and that premise is not based on the empirical data at all. Let me give you an example.

Lets say I think it's good to sacrifice my happiness in the short term by eating more vegetables for the sake of my future health.

Okay, there is certainly an empirical element to this. We can try to measure short term happiness of people while eating vegetables. We can measure long term future health, too. So we design some great studies, collect some fantastic data, and all the evidence supports the empirical assumptions I made, namely, eating vegetables does in fact make me unhappy in the short term, and it does in fact make me more healthy in the long term. Great.

Now I'm talking to my friend, and he says "I think it's good to increase short term happiness, even if you have to sacrifice long term health , because well who the hell cares about living long if you aren't happy."

How am I going to change his mind? Give him more data about the long term health benefits of eating vegetables? He already has all the data. His conclusion about what it is good for him is a value judgment between happiness and health. Empirical data can tell you what makes you happy (to a certain degree, it is a very hard thing to measures) and what makes you healthy (again to a certain degree), but it cannot tell you which one you should value over the other.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

I start with the premise that an outcome is good, and then I can collect data to see if an action produces the outcome. I might call that action good, but it's resting on the premise that the outcome is good, and that premise is not based on the empirical data at all. Let me give you an example.

Lets say I think it's good to sacrifice my happiness in the short term by eating more vegetables for the sake of my future health.

Okay, there is certainly an empirical element to this. We can try to measure short term happiness of people while eating vegetables. We can measure long term future health, too. So we design some great studies, collect some fantastic data, and all the evidence supports the empirical assumptions I made, namely, eating vegetables does in fact make me unhappy in the short term, and it does in fact make me more healthy in the long term. Great.

Now I'm talking to my friend, and he says "I think it's good to increase short term happiness, even if you have to sacrifice long term health , because well who the hell cares about living long if you aren't happy."

How am I going to change his mind? Give him more data about the long term health benefits of eating vegetables? He already has all the data. His conclusion about what it is good for him is a value judgment between happiness and health. Empirical data can tell you what makes you happy (to a certain degree, it is a very hard thing to measures) and what makes you healthy (again to a certain degree), but it cannot tell you which one you should value over the other.

1. These do not appear to be moral considerations at face value.
2. Both short and long term happiness in this context are part of your respective utility functions.

In this case you're using empirical data to make a choice based on anticipated experience, and that choice depends on what you value more. You seem to be asserting that there's an inherent moral aspect to this consideration, but I'm not seeing why that's the case.

You're skipping the most important step. What is the reason for "starting with the premise that an outcome is good"? Trace it back. While it's not easy, people do not start with a wholly arbitrary premise. You're not operating on a premise that "a large number of wooden cat carvings on Mars is good", you're picking happiness and health. Absent a causal reason these should be equally likely premises, but I don't think optimizing for short or long term quantity of wooden cat carvings on Mars is a discussion you considered having with this hypothetical friend.

 

[Chose]

1. These do not appear to be moral considerations at face value.
2. Both short and long term happiness in this context are part of your respective utility functions.

In this case you're using empirical data to make a choice based on anticipated experience, and that choice depends on what you value more. You seem to be asserting that there's an inherent moral aspect to this consideration, but I'm not seeing why that's the case.

You're skipping the most important step. What is the reason for "starting with the premise that an outcome is good"? Trace it back. While it's not easy, people do not start with a wholly arbitrary premise.

Of course the premise isn't wholly arbitrary. The point is that it is ultimately not justifiable by merely empirical data.

If you inexplicably don't think health and happiness are moral considerations, why don't you give me an example of something you believe to be morally good and we can work with that instead.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

Of course the premise isn't wholly arbitrary. The point is that it is ultimately not justifiable by merely empirical data.

If you inexplicably don't think health and happiness are moral considerations, why don't you give me an example of something you believe to be morally good and we can work with that instead.

I can give you an impression of my utility function, but not anything that is "morally good" in an absolute sense.

I'm not convinced we can conclude a premise isn't justifiable by empirical data alone, as opposed to more than we can access or interpret properly. That conclusion implies a broken causal link at some point.

 

[warpus]

What's weird is that each time I hear about Jordan Peterson these days it's somebody saying: "You don't want to hear about this guy, but either way here's an article about him"

 

[Chose]

I can give you an impression of my utility function, but not anything that is "morally good" in an absolute sense.

I'm not convinced we can conclude a premise isn't justifiable by empirical data alone, as opposed to more than we can access or interpret properly. That conclusion implies a broken causal link at some point.

The premise "You should value your long term health over short term happiness" couldn't possibly be justified by empirical data. To use your language, there is nothing in the laws of physics that suggest one is better than the other. This is true for the most basic elements of morality like "You should care about other people, not just yourself" or most basically the idea that 'you should be moral' in the first place at all.

 

[Lexicus]

I wasn't saying your conclusion about @TheMeInTeam was wrong. You were implying I'm a logical positivist, were you not? Or did I misunderstand something?

EDIT: I get it, you're saying I'm insane I think.

No i was talking about TMIT not you. Your position seems perfectly reasonable. And obviously we agree that morality is beyond the scope of science.

 

[Berzerker]

People feel better about themselves when they do good, seems scientific enough to me

 

[TheMeInTeam]

The premise "You should value your long term health over short term happiness" couldn't possibly be justified by empirical data.

Not from a moral standpoint, but it absolutely can otherwise. If your utility function has more stuff that benefits from long term health over short term, you pick long term. You seem to be operating under the premise that evidence *can't* predict a person's utility function. Not just that it's beyond our ability at present, but that it's literally impossible. I reject that proposition, but won't go into detail on it unless you confirm that's your angle. If you're arguing something else please clarify.

This is true for the most basic elements of morality like "You should care about other people, not just yourself" or most basically the idea that 'you should be moral' in the first place at all.

The laws of physics themselves don't dictate it. So what does? We do, broken down to component parts this is chemical/electrical signals in our brains. The laws of physics do dictate how our atoms interact.

There are evolutionary useful reasons for caring about other people in addition to oneself. On average groups of people that have done that (while not being overly selfless) have dominated history.

People feel better about themselves when they do good, seems scientific enough to me

That can be demonstrated with evidence, though we're still arbitrarily defining good or invoking mysterious origins for no reason.

What is not demonstrated with any evidence whatsoever is that these feelings have origins beyond causal reality as we understand it. Putting morality "beyond the scope of science" is, when you push that to its logical conclusion, invoking magic or a concept identical to magic. In terms of hypotheses, however, magic is one of those ones that doesn't seem so free from aelf's "social reprobation".

The interesting thing is that I was called crazy in this thread for stating that there's no credible reason to believe in a proposition that amounts to invoking magic .

 

[El_Machinae]

The premise "You should value your long term health over short term happiness" couldn't possibly be justified by empirical data.

Well, yes and no.

The society that prefers the former over the later will be able to out-last the later. There's a selection bias for which mindset is rewarded. The individual is part of a society, so while any specific individual will struggle to answer the question, the society itself tends not to (or "tries" not to, in its superorganism way). This will create a social momentum, at the very least. At that point, we use discussion to decide whether we prefer that trend. Liberal ideas like "the individual matters" are then forwarded and discussed and acted upon. A turn of the historical wheel, and the empirical reality decides who made the sustainable choice.

The individual can make decisions about the long-term as well. We have utility functions, both real and desired. (i.e., I can compare what you do compared to what you want). Some of the decisions we make will trundle us along the path with a tighter correlation between the two. Note that "you should value" is an attempt to change the 'real' utility function and the 'desired' one. It's an effort to use rationality (or at least, empirical techniques) to mold the instincts underlying our decision-making.

Don't think this is an is/ought fallacy. We can individually and societally change both our stated goals and our actual actions, and that changes the nature of how the future unfolds. But history will turn, and all of those decisions will be empirically tested.

 

[Chose]

Well, yes and no.

The society that prefers the former over the later will be able to out-last the later. There's a selection bias for which mindset is rewarded. The individual is part of a society, so while any specific individual will struggle to answer the question, the society itself tends not to (or "tries" not to, in its superorganism way). This will create a social momentum, at the very least. At that point, we use discussion to decide whether we prefer that trend. Liberal ideas like "the individual matters" are then forwarded and discussed and acted upon. A turn of the historical wheel, and the empirical reality decides who made the sustainable choice.

It's unclear to me how this isn't the naturalistic fallacy. It isn't enough, morally speaking, to simply say that preferring health over happiness is evolutionarily rewarded. It goes without say that if we place to much value on that which evolution has selected for, it leads us down a disastrous path.

The individual can make decisions about the long-term as well. We have utility functions, both real and desired. (i.e., I can compare what you do compared to what you want). Some of the decisions we make will trundle us along the path with a tighter correlation between the two. Note that "you should value" is an attempt to change the 'real' utility function and the 'desired' one. It's an effort to use rationality (or at least, empirical techniques) to mold the instincts underlying our decision-making.

Don't think this is an is/ought fallacy. We can individually and societally change both our stated goals and our actual actions, and that changes the nature of how the future unfolds. But history will turn, and all of those decisions will be empirically tested.

Yes, it's great to attempt to decrease the delta between your actual actions and desired actions, but that isn't the only meaning of "you should value". The more important, and relevant, meaning is deciding what the desired actions are in the first place. Any utility function is a slave to our initial definition of well being.

Not from a moral standpoint, but it absolutely can otherwise. If your utility function has more stuff that benefits from long term health over short term, you pick long term. You seem to be operating under the premise that evidence *can't* predict a person's utility function. Not just that it's beyond our ability at present, but that it's literally impossible. I reject that proposition, but won't go into detail on it unless you confirm that's your angle. If you're arguing something else please clarify.

You can't just assume utilitarianism when we are discussing the basis for morality, okay. If you define well being a certain way, sure, you can use evidence to construct a utility function in theory. What the evidence cannot do, is tell you how you ought to define well-being, or why we should care about someone else's well being at all, or even more difficult, why we should care about everyone's well being equally to our own.

The laws of physics themselves don't dictate it. So what does? We do, broken down to component parts this is chemical/electrical signals in our brains. The laws of physics do dictate how our atoms interact.

There are evolutionary useful reasons for caring about other people in addition to oneself. On average groups of people that have done that (while not being overly selfless) have dominated history.

There might be useful reasons, from the evolutionary perspective, for committing all types of atrocities, murders, and rapes. Why should I care about that when thinking about morality? Who dominated history is surely not a useful metric for morality. I find it very shocking that this idea is even brought up.