Way to be late on a point that was already discussed, discarded, and moved on from.![]()
Way to win friends and influence people.

Way to be late on a point that was already discussed, discarded, and moved on from.![]()


I think you're probably right that you could develop some sort of delivery system that's *relatively* cheap and again I point to the Dragon or Cygnus systems. But as I've been saying all along, it's the payload that's going to drive costs.Ultimately I think what you want is to refine this down to a standard storage package (the "cargo container" aspect), which you can fit a highly standardized guidance and orbital insertion package to; much the same way as a JDAM kit is fitted to an ordinary gravity bomb, only you don't want your payload to explode on impact. A lot of the rest would be working out how to pack these things as fully as possible and how to arrange the launches, but it would really just become a logistical challenge at that point.
So I picked the wrong high-end car. Point still stands - until the volume goes up dramatically, you aren't going to see big savings because each rocket and certainly each payload are essentially one-off products. Moreover, they are high-end products that have to operate at the extreme limits of engineering in most cases. Particularly components meant to set up a colony on Mars. Sure, the supplies may be rather ho-hum, but all of the other equipment, from the living quarters, to the power generation facilities, to the atmosphere-cracking plants, to the rovers and so on are going to be extremely complex machines.While I'm by no means an expert at economics, I think this is actually very telling; a Lambo doesn't cost nearly as much to make as what it's sold for, either in terms of effort or materiel; even an ultra-high end supercar is not going to cost generally more than $10,000 to put together. Most of the price is for the badge and prestige. This applies to any given consumer product, whether it's Tide or a Cessna. The manufacturer, distributor, etc., are all getting their cut, and they want to keep their profit margins high. There are usually competitors, but they all essentially informally agree to keep prices within a certain range to keep these margins up (and because demand is limited and numerous other considerations). It's usually less "this is what it's actually 'worth'" though, and more "this is what someone is willing to pay," particularly for finished goods.
ULA doesn't hold all the cards - in fact, quite a lot of their high costs are driven by government ineptitude that's been going on for decades. They are also saddled with legacy costs due to the launch market implosion of the 90's, which saw Boeing and Lockheed massively overbuild capacity and drove out other competitors from the market. SpaceX came well after that and thus avoided that build-out. That, coupled with novel management practices means they do have an obvious cost edge. But it's not entirely the case that ULA has engaged in cost-fixing, it really does cost them a lot more to build rockets and in order to remain competitive, they are going to have to make some serious adjustments to how they build rockets and more importantly, how they manage their business. SpaceX is still relatively unproven but hopefully they will emerge as the market leader and drive down costs.ULA as an entity is particularly problematic because it's basically a cartel that has a monopoly on the (US) market and so it jacks up costs; it holds almost all the cards. When times are tough, it can basically set prices at whatever it wants. That SpaceX has so dramatically undercut them, from basically nothing reveals the degree to which they've been basically price-fixing. (For reasons which are understandable from a business perspective, sure, but true nonetheless.)
One-way. Costs went up, but they can't go down easily even if you bought more rockets.So there are huge scale effects, cool.
No, average costs go up because they simply don't have capacity to build more components at a volume that would see big savings. So they would have to retool at great expense and since the government and private markets don't currently have enough demand of US boosters, they can't recap that massive-up-front cost by averaging out over a long production run. Instead, they pass the cost on to the few customers they get, which means even at higher volumes, costs go up because the volume is not large enough for scaling to kick in.So if you build more components, average cost comes down. That sounds like a scale effect.
To your first sentence, the government didn't put in large orders - the private market did in the 90's and then imploded which left the rocket manufactures with an excess of components which has now run out.So at some stage government did manage to put in large enough orders to reduce average unit costs i.e. to achieve scale. With us looking at the results now in the cost competitiveness of older components over new stuff.
Because no has or can put in enough large orders! The one time things ever came close to that (in the 90's) the market imploded. Even with extremely optimistic projections about future launch demand, the projections don't even come close to what was projected in the 90's, when companies were talking about launching hundreds of satellites each.So at some point along the curve average cost rises. That's, well, a scale effect too (see graph). Although, again, this could be overcome if the government put in a large enough order sufficient to spread the costs of retooling, retraining etc across more units. So why is it that scale doesn't work in rocketry again?
I agree. And while SpaceX can hopefully keep their own costs low, which will have a knock-down effect on providers like ULA, that's not because of scale. It's not the case that SpaceX can provide lower costs because of high demand, they have much lower management and fabrication costs relative to the older providers and that's where their savings come from.I haven't read nearly all of the immense walls of texts of doom in the previous pages, but just a comment on the notion that "economies of scale" will make "rockets cheaper" and thus manned space exploration will kick off.
Maybe. However, there is currently no demand which would stimulate such development. Everybody is hyping what SpaceX does, but in the end they're simply rationalizing the existing space launch business, which is (as Zubrin himself pointed out) extraordinarily conservative.
More fundamentally, I believe the physics of conventional space launch makes it extremely unlikely any kind of "big dumb booster" + "mass production" would bring prices of space travel back to Earth (pun very much intended).
What's needed are completely new, smarter approaches to the problem. Like *cough Skylon *cough*.
One way, one way, one way. Going back from 23 rockets to 26 rockets will not bring back the old costs.Apparently there's huge scale effects as one moves from 26 to 23 units.
No it doesn't, see above.That suggests that scale is a factor at current levels of production and that it does already help to significantly reduce costs.
To the first bolded part - that's untrue. I've been pointing out over and over again that costs increased with lower volume but they don't decrease with increased volume. Particularly now that plants have been closed, their is an absolute limit to engine availability and older surplus parts have run out, etc etc.To that point: the CBO estimated in 1990 that the total program cost for 132 B-2 bombers would be $76.7 billion, or $581 million per bomber (in 1991 dollars). In 1997 dollars, this would be around $688.6 million per bomber; the actual total program cost for the 21 B-2s actually produced in 1997 dollars was $2.1 billion per bomber. For around 2x the cost, Congress could've bought 6x the bombers. (This has interesting implications for the constant reductions of F-22 and F-35 buys, but that's neither here nor there.)
Major aerospace items have absolutely horrendous cost-scaling. The previously cited evidence indicates it's no different for boosters, and I don't see any reason why it would be. Cost-savings of anywhere from a factor of 2 to 3 per purchased unit in extended production runs don't seem uncommon; that adds up tremendously over time. For something where you're doing continuous production (like boosters) instead of a limited run (like bombers), this is even worse due to the need to keep the plants, personnel, tools, etc., on hand and in working order instead of packing up the machinery for storage and reassigning the personnel (overhead and downtime become serious factors in costs). I would predict significantly larger cost savings for continuous production items by ramping up production.
Couple that with a competitive industry that isn't price-gouging its customers, and well... I can't tell you exactly how much money you'll be saving per unit capacity, but it'll be a helluva lot.
They claim that they can do a launch, land the vehicle and then turn it around to do another launch, I think I read they plan on doing something like 4 or 5 per week with the same booster. That would really bring down costs significantly. But there are a few caveats to consider:About Skylon, to me their ridiculously low development and production cost looks like something pulled completely out of their ass, do they have specific plans that would explain their low price? Perhaps that low cost implies huge volumes of them being manufactured?
I posted a video here a while back called 'The engine that came in from the cold'. It's a documentary on that subject and it's really good and definitely worth checking out if someone has an hour to spare. It's on youtube.e: For content, have a short but interesting piece on the X-37. The origins of the Atlas V's first stage engines, the RD-180, in the N-1's NK-33 was particularly amusing to me.
Well, the 'payload' in the case of the X-37B is actually the X-37B from the perspective of the launching rocket. What the X-37B carries into space in it's cargo bay is most likely equipment that helps the X-37B do it's primary mission, which, from what people can gather, is spying on other countries. I don't think it deploys satellites in it's own right but then again, no one really does as it's a secret project.That X-37 article was more informative than most that I've seen on it (tho' I haven't sought them out).
But I was surprised to hear that the payload is limited to 500lbs. Yet the vehicle itself measures in at 5.5 tons. So we have a ratio of 1:25 for payload to vehicle. That doesn't seem very high, but what do I know?
What sorts of satellites are less than 500lbs? I'm guessing a lot of them, otherwise this airframe (spaceframe?) would have been spec'd to different parameters. But I just sort of thought that most satellites were heavier than that. But as I said a moment ago, "what do I know?"


"Maybe the collapse is starting right now right here or maybe it will start far away from here in a billion years. We do not know,"
So it's down to, essentially, the industrial collapse of the industry? If that's the case, were 1. the required industry to be rebuilt to prevent bottlenecking (somehow), and 2. the demand for boosters to exist (somehow), would you expect cost-scaling to be possible and hold?hobbsyoyo said:To the first bolded part - that's untrue. I've been pointing out over and over again that costs increased with lower volume but they don't decrease with increased volume. Particularly now that plants have been closed, their is an absolute limit to engine availability and older surplus parts have run out, etc etc.
I don't think that we're really disagreeing here. My point is that having all the stuff on hand to make boosters is a big driver of expenses unless it is constantly being utilized; which as you point out, it's not. You have to keep it all in working order and then constantly start and stop production; a series of continuous limited runs, as it were. This overhead forms a large part of the ultimate program cost. Shifting to an actual constant production line (somehow) would defray this, and presumably allow cost-scaling to take hold (per above question).To the second bolded part - rockets currently are much more of a limited run product like bombers. While yes, they are built on an ongoing basis instead of all at once with bombers, the volume at any given time is so low that costs are extremely high. That, coupled with all of the structural industry problems I've spoken about means that costs aren't going to go down due to scaling. ULA will have to rip-off pages from the SpaceX playbook and rethink management practices to really bring down costs and also rethink their engine situation.
Well, the 'payload' in the case of the X-37B is actually the X-37B from the perspective of the launching rocket. What the X-37B carries into space in it's cargo bay is most likely equipment that helps the X-37B do it's primary mission, which, from what people can gather, is spying on other countries. I don't think it deploys satellites in it's own right but then again, no one really does as it's a secret project.
However, if they were dropping off satellites with the X-37B, they'd probably be experimental payloads to test novel hardware, as Symphony D says. But most likely it just carries fancy camera equipment and radars that it keeps with it and doesn't drop off into orbit.
I forgot this is not a single stage platform.Something else I thought of -I forgot this is not a single stage platform.
Yeah, I know I've beat that horse to death but things got super screwed up in the 90's. There was this massive build-out to launch all these expected satellite orders and then they were all canceled and half the launch industry went out of business and the other half that survived was loaded with massive legacy costs in the form of idled factories and a now-redundant workforce that obligated them with pensions, etc.So it's down to, essentially, the industrial collapse of the industry?
Great question. Short answer:If that's the case, were 1. the required industry to be rebuilt to prevent bottlenecking (somehow), and 2. the demand for boosters to exist (somehow), would you expect cost-scaling to be possible and hold?

That's a really good analogy and I think you're spot on.I don't think that we're really disagreeing here. My point is that having all the stuff on hand to make boosters is a big driver of expenses unless it is constantly being utilized; which as you point out, it's not. You have to keep it all in working order and then constantly start and stop production; a series of continuous limited runs, as it were. This overhead forms a large part of the ultimate program cost. Shifting to an actual constant production line (somehow) would defray this, and presumably allow cost-scaling to take hold (per above question).
You can see a similar issue with say, the US nuclear weapons industry, where a very large percentage of the expense is in maintaining the facilities, personnel with experience, etc., rather than the warheads themselves (which are, comparatively free). I wouldn't claim the booster industry is exactly the same, but it shows a lot of similarities in this regard, in addition to the other problems.

One of the main capabilities of the X-37B is that it can do plane-change maneuvers, i.e. it can change the inclination of its orbit. This is an extremely costly (as far as deltaV) kind of maneuver that has a huge penalty as far as fuel requirements.
Inclination is the angle at which it crosses a given latitude, right? Why does changing that angle take a lot of energy? When they talk about changing the orbit of an asteroid they don't need massive amounts of energy, even very small amounts well-timed can be enough to avoid a collision with earth (so the thinking goes) - I would have thought it would be the same with something orbiting earth.