What's your ontology?

which of the following things exist:


  • Total voters
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Hey, if you can specify something based on spacetime (which does exist), geometric properties (which do pertain to spacetime), and other material qualities (thermal conductivity and the like) such that "not-coat" exists iff Brennan's coat doesn't, then "not-coat" exists. More power to you. ;)
What's the electrical conductivity of a something that doesn't exist? :confused:

Anyway, all this just brings us back here:
Mise said:
Moreover, you've the problem of equivalence between Brennan's <not coat> existing and Brennan's coat not existing.

Ayatollah So said:
Regardless of how specific or general the explanation, if the explanation is true, and if it implies that holes exist, then holes exist.

No, the "hole" explanation isn't good enough to explain all the data. The explanation isn't true -- we have a FAR better explanation that covers a FAR wider range of data. Why would we want an explanation that is so lacking? Why would we call such a lacking explanation "true"?
 
But in all these cases, an alternative explanation that does not assert the existence of a hole, but rather asserts the lack of something else suffices. Why posit the existence of Y if it suffices merely to point out a lack of X?
Wow, I could not wish for a more perfect setup!
Because it doesn't suffice to point out a lack of X, one must also point out the presence of A,B,C (the parts of the sneaker that we all agree do exist, plus the regions of space that we are talking about). And Y =df. A+B+C!

The point is to simplify theories, not our language. Sure, we could ban the word "hole" and strike it from all dictionaries, and still say what we needed to say (albeit more verbosely) - but why bother?

What's the electrical conductivity of a something that doesn't exist? :confused:

You previously posited that a region of space surrounding Brennan's shirt does exist. Now, a region of space has (at least one; more if there are multiple materials therein) conductivity, right?

No, the "hole" explanation isn't good enough to explain all the data. The explanation isn't true

Explanation Z (the one that mentions the air space through the wall of the sneaker, and the sneaker itself) is true, didn't you just agree, on the previous page?

But Z, together with the correct definition of the English word "hole", implies that there's a hole!

It's as if you had just said "John is an unmarried man", and then went on to deny that bachelors exist.
 
Because it doesn't suffice to point out a lack of X, one must also point out the presence of A,B,C (the parts of the sneaker that we all agree do exist, plus the regions of space that we are talking about). And Y =df. A+B+C!
That region of space exists regardless of what materials are present in it's vicinity, so why on Earth would we claim it has a special existential status merely because of what objects exist around it? We have a name for it because we can perceive a discontinuity in e.g. shoe material, that is not the same as accepting that this discontinuity 'exists'.
The point is to simplify theories, not our language. Sure, we could ban the word "hole" and strike it from all dictionaries, and still say what we needed to say (albeit more verbosely) - but why bother?
Where did I say we should ban the word hole? Holes don't 'exist' is all.
 
Explanation Z (the one that mentions the air space through the wall of the sneaker, and the sneaker itself) is true, didn't you just agree, on the previous page?
No, I said that it explained some data. I think you're confusing "explains data" with "is true". This is exactly why we use things like Ockham's Razor, to determine the "most true" theory out of a set of competing theories. Explanation Q, which goes something like, "an invisible monster holds the water out of Fifty's shoe, but, for some reason, didn't in this case," explains the data just as well. The only reason you think that your "hole" explanation is true is because you already believe holes to exist, whereas you don't believe this invisible monsters to exist, so explanation Q sounds ridiculous to you.
 
That region of space exists regardless of what materials are present in it's vicinity, so why on Earth would we claim it has a special existential status merely because of what objects exist around it?

We don't: the spatial region doesn't change its status depending whether it coincides with a gap in some material. The hole's existence might depend on it, though.

If Fifty says "there is a hole in my sneaker", is what he says false?

If not, how do you reconcile "there is an X" with "X's don't exist"? Those seem like a direct contradiction.
 
I think you're confusing "explains data" with "is true".

I think "is true" is a necessary condition for "explains data". I also don't see what's objectionable about explanation Z. All it says is there is air in <this location>, there is sneaker material in <that location>, and the air gave way when the water displaced it. All of those are true and ought to be uncontroversial.
 
We don't: the spatial region doesn't change its status depending whether it coincides with a gap in some material. The hole's existence might depend on it, though.

If Fifty says "there is a hole in my sneaker", is what he says false?
Beats me, I haven't seen Fifty's shoes.
If not, how do you reconcile "there is an X" with "X's don't exist"? Those seem like a direct contradiction.
Only if you insist on reading 'there is an X' as being = 'X exists', which is pretty obviously not a necessary interpretation.

A hole is a region of space which is momentarily impinging upon our perception simply because it lacks something which we perceive as existing more or less continually around that region. It is pure label; It has no substance; It can be referred to entirely by reference to the lack or non-presence of something else; we only perceive it via a chance arrangement of other things. It is hard to imagine something less deserving of an ontological status.
 
A hole is a region of space which is momentarily impinging upon our perception
No it isn't! A hole exists despite perception. If I take my eyes off a hole, the hole is still there!

simply because it lacks something which we perceive as existing more or less continually around that region. It is pure label; It has no substance; It can be referred to entirely by reference to the lack or non-presence of something else; we only perceive it via a chance arrangement of other things. It is hard to imagine something less deserving of an ontological status.
Chance arrangment of things? How is the chance arrangement of a hole any more to chance then then that of a solar system (which I'm sure you would say exists)? And it's not simply non-presence, you need space, and space exists!

It seems simple to me, holes are regions of space, all regions of space exist, holes exist.
 
I think "is true" is a necessary condition for "explains data".
It's the other way around. Every single scientific theory is evaluated on this basis...
I also don't see what's objectionable about explanation Z. All it says is there is air in <this location>, there is sneaker material in <that location>, and the air gave way when the water displaced it. All of those are true and ought to be uncontroversial.
An explanation isn't a collection of true statements... It must have explanitory power. In this case, it doesn't. It barely explains this one situation adequately. For a start, the air in <this location> was allowed to get to <this location> from <another location> because of the local non-existence of shoe material at <this location>. You'd have to come up with yet another theory to explain how Fifty's foot got "aired". I don't require several different theories just to explain how Fifty's shoe got wet...

I fail to see how your X different accounts of one simple phenomenon is "ontological parsimony" :p
 
No it isn't! A hole exists despite perception. If I take my eyes off a hole, the hole is still there!
No it doesn't. Prove me wrong. :p
Chance arrangment of things? How is the chance arrangement of a hole any more to chance then then that of a solar system (which I'm sure you would say exists)? And it's not simply non-presence, you need space, and space exists!
Because a hole results from the continuity of arrangement of other things. Take those things away and where is the hole? If a hole existed it'd still be there...
It seems simple to me, holes are regions of space, all regions of space exist, holes exist.
So now hole is just an alternative word for 'space'?
 
Only if you insist on reading 'there is an X' as being = 'X exists', which is pretty obviously not a necessary interpretation.

What on earth could "X exists" mean, if not simply "there is an X"? Come to think of it, we have seen one definition of "X exists" which demands more than merely that there is an X - Birdjaguar's. He demands permanence and immutability (IIRC) before he grant the blessings of "existence".

What kind of atheist did you say you were, again? :lol: ;)

It's the other way around. Every single scientific theory is evaluated on this basis...

I think the phrase you want is "potentially explains". The prosecutor's theory of the crime potentially explains how the blood got on the glove - but only if the defendant really is guilty does it actually explain that.

This is just a verbal difference though. If you want to drop the "potentially" and use "explains" in a wider sense, it's whatever. Tomahto, Tomayto.

An explanation isn't a collection of true statements... It must have explanitory power. In this case, it doesn't. It barely explains this one situation adequately.

Actually (and not merely potentially) explaining one situation is enough. Or for that matter, the mere collection of those particular true statements is enough to imply the existence of the hole.
 
What on earth could "X exists" mean, if not simply "there is an X"? Come to think of it, we have seen one definition of "X exists" which demands more than merely that there is an X - Birdjaguar's. He demands permanence and immutability (IIRC) before he grant the blessings of "existence".

What kind of atheist did you say you were, again? :lol: ;)
:p:lol:

'There is an X' could also apply to conceptual entities and theories, which I think do not deserve to be placed in the same existential category as, say, Fifty's shoe, which is a physical object. IMO you have to recognise that you are using the word 'exists' to refer equally to fairly obviously different sets of things. How do you justify this?
 
'There is an X' could also apply to conceptual entities and theories, which I think do not deserve to be placed in the same existential category as, say, Fifty's shoe, which is a physical object. IMO you have to recognise that you are using the word 'exists' to refer equally to fairly obviously different sets of things. How do you justify this?

Sure, concepts and theories exist and (IMO) are quite different from physical objects. That doesn't bother me - almost the opposite, because I wouldn't want to make ontological uber-parsimony out to be a tautology. It might be true (I doubt that), but it sure as heck ain't no tautology.

I don't think there's much danger of people confusing abstract entities like words or concepts with their referents. The only real-life example of the use-mention fallacy I've ever seen was on Sesame Street: Without the letter R, all your FRIENDS would be FIENDS! :lol:

OK, OK, the use-mention fallacy is pretty important in philosophy. But not in real life ;)
 
I think the phrase you want is "potentially explains". The prosecutor's theory of the crime potentially explains how the blood got on the glove - but only if the defendant really is guilty does it actually explain that.

This is just a verbal difference though. If you want to drop the "potentially" and use "explains" in a wider sense, it's whatever. Tomahto, Tomayto.



Actually (and not merely potentially) explaining one situation is enough. Or for that matter, the mere collection of those particular true statements is enough to imply the existence of the hole.

Right, and the difference between "potentially explaining" something and "actually explaining" something is whether or not that potential explanation holds up to the rigour of scientific method, or some other intellectually rigorous framework of determining what is "objectively true".

It is for this reason that Z doesn't explain that one situation -- W does.

Remind me again why Phlogiston doesn't exist?
 
Remind me again why Phlogiston doesn't exist?

Here's the definition I googled:
A hypothetical substance formerly thought to be a volatile constituent of all combustible substances, released as flame in combustion.

So it has to be volatile, and common to all combustible substances, and released as flame. Well, kerosene is volatile and released "as" (well, at least "in") flame, but isn't common to all or even most combustible substances. And some combustible substances, like charcoal, don't contain any volatiles. So no matter how you look at it, some of the defining traits of phlogiston go unfulfilled.

In order to say the same about "holes" you'd have to point to some defining condition that goes unfulfilled. But what could that be?
 
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