Alternate History Thread V

Question: It seems like you're using Eastern Christian and (Greek) Orthodox interchangeably throughout. Was this semi-shared identity actually a Thing at the time? (I dunno.)

I am not quite sure what you are finding confusing, so it is hard to say. In retrospect I probably should have used the term "Orient" Christian to refer to the Church of the East as most westerners think of Orthodox when they hear the word "Eastern" Christian.

As to the deeper question of what differences did the people of the day find between the two, it really depends on which person of the day you are asking. As mentioned, Dokuz Khatun, appears to have supported Christianity of all sects. When the Church of the East monk Rabban Bar Sauma toured Europe in 1280s he gave communion to King Edward I of England which usually doesn't happen with people you consider heretics. That said, William of Rubruck, a French diplomat to the Mongols has some nasty words to say about the Church of the East. In addition to being run of the mill heretics who were sabotaging his work, he also claimed that during the Eucharistic service of the Church of the East everyone got drunk and claims to have seen (the mother? a wife? I forget which exactly) of the Great Khan staggering home sloshed after a morning service.



So what happened to Mongke in China if he didn't die?

Yeah, someone should write a timeline or something about that.
 
Ok, a plausibility question on Sulla and his dictatorship.

Let's imagine that Sulla is struck by what is basically early onset dementia or something. Rather than resigning the dictatorship, he continues his rule through 81, 80, and 79 BC.

Furthermore, he completely destroys the Marian social reforms - particularly the reform that limits the size of farms. This was implemented by one of the Gracchi brothers (can't remember which one) to solve the problem of the patricians buying up large amounts of land and working them with slaves, forcing the smaller plebeian farmers out. Marius set a limit on the amount of land that could be owned by any one person, creating room for small pleb farmers to operate.

Let's say that Sulla basically goes 'screw the plebs.' and abolishes that law. On top of this, he basically grants himself a triumph, even though he hasn't been hailed as imperator by his troops, in a shocking violation of the laws concerning triumphs.

So, to conclude; Sulla continues his dictatorship for 3 years, repeals Gracchus' land limits, and grants himself a triumph, right before being murdered by an angry pleb or something. Is any of this plausible? Is it possible for Sulla to basically go nuts?

It will likely be the starting point of the RepublicNES I'm planning on doing soon.
 
Ok, a plausibility question on Sulla and his dictatorship.

Let's imagine that Sulla is struck by what is basically early onset dementia or something. Rather than resigning the dictatorship, he continues his rule through 81, 80, and 79 BC.

Furthermore, he completely destroys the Marian social reforms - particularly the reform that limits the size of farms. This was implemented by one of the Gracchi brothers (can't remember which one) to solve the problem of the patricians buying up large amounts of land and working them with slaves, forcing the smaller plebeian farmers out. Marius set a limit on the amount of land that could be owned by any one person, creating room for small pleb farmers to operate.

Let's say that Sulla basically goes 'screw the plebs.' and abolishes that law. On top of this, he basically grants himself a triumph, even though he hasn't been hailed as imperator by his troops, in a shocking violation of the laws concerning triumphs.

So, to conclude; Sulla continues his dictatorship for 3 years, repeals Gracchus' land limits, and grants himself a triumph, right before being murdered by an angry pleb or something. Is any of this plausible? Is it possible for Sulla to basically go nuts?

It will likely be the starting point of the RepublicNES I'm planning on doing soon.

He would have been kicked out before he even managed to reach the seventh month. A dictator could only hold that position for six months before he had to go before the Senate, and maybe then he could have an extension, which I doubt would have happened if Sulla showed that he was nuts. Also, if Sulla tried to abolish the farm size laws, although he could easily do it due to his power, the Tribune of the Plebs would certainly be able to make his opinion known. The only reason Caesar was a dictator for so long was because (a) he changed the term to one full year, (b) the Senate voted him to be a dictator for ten terms already in his first year and (c) the Senate then voted to make him "Dictator perpetuo", dictator in perpetuity.

There would have to be a very good reason for Sulla to be able to get the Senate to vote him as dictator for so long.
 
He would have been kicked out before he even managed to reach the seventh month. A dictator could only hold that position for six months before he had to go before the Senate, and maybe then he could have an extension, which I doubt would have happened if Sulla showed that he was nuts. Also, if Sulla tried to abolish the farm size laws, although he could easily do it due to his power, the Tribune of the Plebs would certainly be able to make his opinion known. The only reason Caesar was a dictator for so long was because (a) he changed the term to one full year, (b) the Senate voted him to be a dictator for ten terms already in his first year and (c) the Senate then voted to make him "Dictator perpetuo", dictator in perpetuity.

There would have to be a very good reason for Sulla to be able to get the Senate to vote him as dictator for so long.

I was thinking that the Senate was sitting there in fear of the Roman Legion standing right outside the Forum coincidentally.

Thats a good point though, I'll have to think about that. Cheers.
 
You will pardon me, but in a moral sense Pestel was even lower than Robespierre: he gave away everyone and everything.

Pavel Ivanovich Pestel is sometimes referred to as the Russian Robespierre. On the surface that might appear odd. The two revolutionaries have come from drastically different social environments. Maximilien de Robespierre was a French lawyer from a long lineage of lawyers. Pestel was the child of Baltic German nobles who served as the pillars of Tsarist rule since around the founding of St. Petersburg. Indeed, his own father was the governor-general of Siberia – at least until he was pushed out in favour of the disgraced reformer Speransky. That Pestel was meant for at least some slight degree of greatness was apparent from his birth; as a nobleman in the Russian Empire, he had a clear military and court career in store for him. Robespierre’s career likewise seemed more or less clear-cut, but in a different way. He was a typical member of the rising Third Estate, and his academic brilliance only seemed to serve to augment his natural advancement as a lawyer.

Of course, Pestel was no slouch in the scholarly department either. His teachers would remember him as their most capable pupil, and even if their memories were distorted by subsequent events, the speed of his academical advancement speaks for itself. His education was quite different from that of Robespierre, a typical beneficiary of the Ancien Régime public school system. “Pavlik” (his childhood nickname) was home schooled until he was twelve – typical enough for an aristocrat. After that, he and his brother were sent to continue their studies in Dresden, under the control of their grandmother who made sure to invite the best local professors to tutor them. While in Dresden, Pestel saw Napoleon; at the time he did not appear to be impressed, even though in the future, many would claim that Napoleon was his idol and role model. That seems to be an exaggeration. But back then, at any rate, he had other concerns. His education back home continued in the Russian imperial Corps des Pages, and he had the honour of being examined by the Emperor in person. That was in late 1811.

Robespierre’s mind was filled with Rousseauesque and classical Enlightenment ideas from a fairly young age. Still under the Ancien Régime, when revolution seemed unthinkable, he advocated causes of reform and social improvement. One should not exaggerate the extent to which the Robespierre of 1783 had the same ideas as the great terrorist of 1794; there was certainly a great deal of continuity, but the mild-mannered opponent of capital punishment could hardly have anticipated both the extremities of the changes to come and the drastic role he was to play in them. He could be “neither monarchist nor republican” as late as in 1791. The Revolution gained speed. Robespierre moved from calling for the political representation of the Third Estate in general to claiming leadership of the poorer bourgeoisie. A lower middle class man among the increasingly radicalised lower middle class, Robespierre and his friends took over the Jacobin Club just as it was abandoned by the moderate and the wealthy. He had the luck of going in the same direction as the country as it veered to the left; his political career took off on little more than eloquence and integrity. And this integrity was apparently real. He was an honest and straightforward radical, who, as far as anyone could tell, really believed that he simply expressed the general will of the French nation. He spoke out against war because he feared the power that generals might gain; that would be contrary to democracy. He said that Louis must die so that the nation may live, because he could not reconcile his morals with the idea that the king might be tried fairly and found to be innocent. Throughout his Reign of Terror, he kept acting in line with his worldview, even as it made him seem more and more monstrous from the outside. He recoiled against the atrocities of Fouche in Lyon; Fouche was genuinely going too far, because, though Robespierre didn’t know it, that man was evidently only pretending to be a true believer in the Revolution and the Republic. When it was time for Robespierre to be hauled off the stage of history and dragged towards the guillotine, he seemed to respond with a sort of helpless incomprehension, not really understanding to the end why he was no longer needed.

Robespierre slid into his role quite naturally; he spoke out for a class that he represented both literally and figuratively, and for a time, at least, his belief that he correctly represented the whole nation was close enough to being accurate. That was never an option for Pestel, of course. As already said, he and his family were pillars of the government. He joined the army shortly before Napoleon’s invasion. He collected wounds, medals and promotions, and fought his way back into Saxony (there he distinguished himself at Leipzig), then went on further into France. At the war’s end, he was a poruchik (lieutenant), and served in the staff of General Wittgenstein. There he took charge of intelligence work in the Ottoman Empire. He observed the movements of Filiki Eteria and Alexander Ypsilantis – and he warned off the Tsar from getting involved, pointing out that the rebellion was doomed and the apparent opportunity to restore the Byzantine Empire was false. Pestel had been well-commended for his efforts, even as public opinion mounted against the Tsar who seemed to support “legitimate order” even when it took the shape of Turkish oppression of fellow Christians. Even as the newly-minted colonel accepted the Tsar’s praise and extensive land grants, he also took part in the clandestine activity of secret societies.

What were the secret societies? They were made up of Russian officers, the intellectual cream of aristocracy that had fought in Europe and seen the achievements of the French Revolution first-hand. That was not all they had; perhaps it wasn’t the most important thing. They read Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Diderot; Pestel could find all those and then some in his parents’ library, which might speak to the ubiquity of such ideas in his circles. Pestel was also a Freemason from 1816 forward; he was not alone, and one of the many different things that the secret societies were trying to be was the Masons. Some thought of them as more akin to informal social gatherings, while to others they were political discussion clubs. Others were more serious. Pestel was among them.

A Tsarist spy was not such a bad fit for a clandestine revolutionary gathering. He wasn’t that prominent in the moderate, mild, poorly-funded Union of Salvation, which recoiled at the thought of regicide – if only because they did not have enough resources to properly take advantage of it (though it’s still notable that while the revolution in France started as a fairly haphazard and spontaneous uprising that only later turned to the ideas of such drastic social and political transformations, the aristocratic Russian would-be revolutionaries started by making a conspiracy that discussed killing the Tsar and launching an armed coup). The slightly later Union of Prosperity saw Pavel Ivanovich amongst its leaders. This union was still hoping to bring about the abolition of serfdom and establishment of constitutional government in Russia by peaceful means. Pestel disdained it, and spoke out in favour of a military revolution and a republic. He soon found supporters, but the Union was disbanded just like its predecessor. It split. The officers of the guard in St. Petersburg rallied around Muraviev and others. Their thinking was to retain a constitutional monarchy and free peasants without taking away too much land from the nobles. The Vyatka infantry regiment commanded by Pestel was called “as good as the guard” by Emperor Alexander himself. Pestel led his own society in the south, and it was much more radical: his thinking was to exterminate the Romanovs, form a republic, free peasants with land (but not quite private property)… He had a great many other considerations on offer. The mistakes of the French revolution would be avoided by forming a provisional dictatorship from the start; actual democratic institutions could be introduced much later. The capital was to be moved to Nizhniy Novgorod. A police system would be set up to control the population and prevent any resistance to the necessary reforms. Jews, perhaps, could be resettled someplace Asia-wards.

It seems that the specifics of Pestel’s projects weren’t too important, though. There were few similarities between him and Robespierre. Both, as we have observed, were prodigies; both were taken in by Rousseau and the ideas of Enlightenment. Both became far-left radicals in the discourse of the time, and attracted a fair amount of supporters in their social circles, even if it was much more sensible, from the standpoint of simple self-interest, for Robespierre’s social class to follow him than for Pestel’s. The French bourgeoisie were fighting for their own immediate and natural interests first, with national interests emerging seamlessly enough from the latter, at least for a while; the Russian aristocrat-conspirators had much less of an intimate connection to the ideas they preached. If anything, a great deal of their – and by extension, Pestel’s – idealism seemed to be connected to the slowly growing idea of aristocratic civic service, which they were sworn to do both to the Tsar and to their Fatherland. Somehow, to some of them, the Fatherland became more important than the Tsar, while the Tsar himself became a hindrance.

Robespierre was not just a political diehard; he was also a religious fanatic, a sincere convert and prophet of a new religion, the Cult of the Supreme Being. Pestel was an ironclad Lutheran, and his convictions were in some ways utterly traditional; in line, perhaps, with the Protestant monarchy of Friedrich the Great. The ideas of Enlightenment and the French Revolution were useful enough, but they were simply the new clothes of an old Petrine and Prussian statist ideal that transcended even monarchy. If the Emperor was simply the first servant of his people, and if he did not do an adequate job, why not replace him? If a monarch and a form of government could be just replaced for the Empire to thrive, then surely those ends justify even more drastic transgressions. Killing off the Imperial family was permissible. So was betraying your fellow revolutionaries. Pestel was fanatical, in his own way, but he was also very, very cynical about his means. This was why his projects weren’t so important; he could adjust them in accordance with the moment’s needs. He could hardly be caught off guard the way Robespierre was, either; that is, he wasn’t immune to being taken by surprise, but he was never so convinced that he was beyond harm or could expect support. He had a very healthy paranoia, and thought quick on his feet.

And that might help explain why Pestel succeeded where Robespierre had failed.
 
Griboyedov A.S. on the secret societies said:
One hundred second lieutenants want to change the entire public life of Russia.

The initial events of the Russian Revolution happened entirely beyond Pestel’s ability to influence them directly. As of 1825, his active involvement in the plots of the secret societies appears to have been limited. The Southern Secret Society was strongly marked by his ideas, but had no absolute loyalty to him. He made some inroads in the north – the newer members, such as Ryleev and Kakhovsky, were often much more radical than the old guard, and so more sympathetic to Pestel’s ideas – but the core members of the Northern Secret Society still had some lingering distrust due to Pestel’s apparent dictatorial aspirations (indeed, who else could he have had in mind as the provisional dictator of Russia?). In 1824 Pestel had met with the leaders of the northerners, and with the help of his local supporters has managed to talk them around to a hypothetical support for a republic after an armed coup. But all of this was hypothetical; and in 1825 Pestel was in Tulchin in Little Russia, far away from the key events.

Ironically, the first event of the lead-up to the Revolution happened in the south. As disillusioned as anyone by the results of his reign, which started with the great promise of liberal reforms and tumbled into wary reaction, paranoia and increasing unpopularity among the very circles that he tried to patronise, Emperor Alexander together with his wife set off for Taganrog in Crimea. Just before then, he received yet another report about the secret societies, which he had been quite well aware of. As before, he dismissed them: “I myself have shared in and encouraged all such dreams and misconceptions in the past. I should not be so stern.” Despite Arakcheyev’s prompting to crack down on the Southern Secret Society, which was already then considering decisive action in 1826, Alexander’s self-loathing and resignation would not be swayed. He left for Taganrog and died in the 19th of November (or 1st of December, for Europeans) of 1825; or, according to some rumours, fled to England or abdicated in secret to take up the life of an Orthodox ascetic, which indeed might not have been out of line with his own mystical interests. Those rumours would come back to haunt the revolutionaries later. But right now there was a more immediate consequence of the Tsar’s disappearance. The Interregnum had begun.

In theory there perhaps should not have been an Interregnum, but for the liberal Emperor making a needless mess of things. Alexander died without any male children – at least, any male children that could be safely attributed to him (the legitimacy of his daughters was in doubt also). The succession law introduced by Tsar Paul suggested that the older of Alexander’s younger brothers, Constantine (then the de facto governor of Poland), should inherit. Constantine had absolutely no wish to inherit (he remembered all too well the fate of their father, murdered by his courtiers), and sought to use his morganatic marriage as an excuse. Secretly, Alexander accepted his preemptive abdication from the inheritance. However, only a very narrow and intimate circle knew about this and the younger brother Nicholas becoming the heir instead. In truth, neither one was too popular among the higher ranks of Russia’s military and political elite. For that matter neither Grand Duke was too eager to take the throne. This muddled situation caught the republican conspirators off guard just as much as Alexander’s apparent death did, even as it was used for power plays by more high-ranking, less high-minded officers.

Nicholas was in St. Petersburg. Constantine was in Warsaw. Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich, the general-governor of St. Petersburg, had carefully cultivated his own image as a friend of liberty and of secret societies, while consolidating his authority over the local armed forces. He said that the man who had 60,000 bayonets in his pockets could talk bravely, and insisted that Nicholas should let Constantine succeed. To this day, Miloradovich’s exact plans and ambitions remain unclear; he might as easily have had none or aimed at carrying out the revolution by himself. His actions, however, suggest that he perhaps sought to rule over the Tsar’s shoulder, using his loyal followers to make any attempts to unseat him doomed from the start. Constantine seemed more pliable and powerless in St. Petersburg, and so Miloradovich had Nicholas get out of the way and then called upon the army, the Senate, the Synod and the people to swear allegiance. This they gladly did; Constantine had the reputation of a liberal and intelligent Grand Duke, unlike the little-known, but apparently overly exacting and militaristic Nicholas. Nicholas, for his part, swore it too, glad to pass it off. Constantine remained in Warsaw and neither accepted nor renounced this oath, so for the next few days everyone assumed that he was practically the Emperor already.

The secret societies were caught off guard. The northerners were in a panic. All their discussed plans to kill Alexander and start a rebellion were in jeopardy. Furthermore, a popular new Emperor on the throne would be much harder to defy; and what would happen when he inevitably sees all the same reports that Alexander got? The city was full of rumours and turmoil, brought about the increasing confusion as to the political situation, and also by Miloradovich’s hasty actions to get Constantine accepted by everyone as their ruler as quickly as possible. The conspirators were rescued just as suddenly as they were imperiled, through no virtue of their own, by the sheer indecision of the imperial family. On December 15 (Gregorian style), Constantine finally rejected the throne in a private letter to Nicholas, who was talked around into assuming imperial power. But by now, in spite of Miloradovich’s reassurances, it was quite clear that the situation in the capital was getting out of hand. Nicholas asked Constantine to come to St. Petersburg and abdicate in public; apparently equally intimidated by the unrest in the city, Constantine resolved to stay away. This prolonged the indecision, but after countless delays, Nicholas finally decided to take power and request that a new oath of allegiance be sworn to him on December 26th (14th). The conspirators had learned of this and made their own plans to use the moment of confusion to launch a coup; the officers had hoped to mobilise their men in an armed revolt in support of Constantine, either not knowing or not caring that he wanted nothing to do with the imperial title.

What followed was nothing short of pandemonium, compounded by horrible mistakes and misjudgements committed by just about all the people involved (in other words, it was a pretty typical great historical event). Miloradovich failed to understand or quell the rising tide of dissent in the army; also, he missed Nicholas’ night-time meeting with the state council and subsequent conference with his military commanders. Thus, perhaps quite unwittingly, Nicholas stole a march on Miloradovich – but not on the conspirators, as he too was lulled into a false sense of security and did not bother, even now, to inform the population of the late Emperor’s decision. The revolutionary camp, however, was not any more organised than the government one. The rebel plans were haphazard and hastily put together; moreover, several personal rivalries flared up among the leaders. The December Uprising thus resembled a battle between two stumbling, clumsy giants: won, if it could be called a victory, only by blind chance, with both sides constantly on the brink of utter defeat.

When on the morning of December 26th some 3,020 soldiers from different Guard units led by 30 officers refused to swear their allegiance to Nicholas and marched on the Senate Square (unaware that the Senate had already sworn its allegiance to Nicholas, rendering the whole point moot), Sergey Petrovich Trubetskoy, elected to be the dictator of the rebellion, was already prepared to give up. This number was far short of what the revolutionaries were hoping to raise. The Ismail Regiment, that was supposed to march on the Winter Palace and arrest the imperial family, did not show; it seemed that the firebrand Yakubovich, who was to lead it, had decided that his personal grudge was with Alexander only, and so vacillated in grim melancholy at his failure to kill him. Trubetskoy decided to hang back. Kondraty Fyodorovich Ryleev and Prince Evgeniy Obolenskiy took over the rebellion on the square. 9,000 loyal soldiers met them there. The confrontation was decidedly lackluster, though; some half-hearted shooting aside, the soldiers on both sides were frankly as bewildered as anyone by the happenings. The rebels were left in the stupid position of waiting for Nicholas to arrive, not daring to show any kind of initiative. On the other hand, some of the soldiers from other units started to join the rebels as well. Civilian onlookers were attracted by the scene, though their sympathies were unclear.

The tension continued to build up when rumours started spreading about Nicholas’ death. An hour later Miloradovich arrived to confirm the rumours: Pyotr Kakhovsky, one of the conspirators, had fatally shot the Grand Duke before immediately turning himself in, full of remorse. Miloradovich sought to control the increasingly absurd situation on the square, neither attacking the rebel regiments nor joining them. But the tide of events was against him. He did not have 9,000 bayonets in his pocket, much less 60,000. The soldiers were starting to cross over to the rebel side. The disgruntled urban mob, including the long-suffering builders of the Saint Isaac’s Cathedral, jeered and attacked Miloradovich’s soldiers. Miloradovich himself barely dodged a piece of wood. At this point, another piece of news arrived; a group of grenadiers joined by some other discontented soldiers and antsy Ismailovites had entered the Winter Palace, which was in a state of panic and disarray. The imperial family was placed under protection/arrest; after Kakhovsky’s stunt, protection appeared fairly justified. Meanwhile, Trubetskoy and other leaders of the Northern Secret Society who were on the fence until now hurried to make up for lost time, having heard of Nicholas’ death, and set off towards the square.

Miloradovich did the only thing he could do at this moment to avoid getting trampled in the retreat. Nicholas’ death was tragic, he said, but distemper must not be allowed to reign over the state. The Guard had a duty to safeguard it while Constantine is brought to power. Having come to the square to the shouts of “Constantine and the Constitution”, the revolutionaries could not help but warily agree and go with Miloradovich to the Winter Palace. From the side it might have seemed as though Miloradovich had had his final triumph – hijacking the revolutionary forces after the death of a frankly inconvenient Grand Duke. In truth both he and the northern leaders must have felt that his time had passed. No matter how much he pretended that this was not the case, his control over the situation had slipped away. In his waffling he had discredited himself before the officers, if not the soldiers. Still, his reputation with the lower ranks could be his saving grace. This, again, was apparent both to him and to the conspirators, and had led to an awkward stand-off, where neither quite dared move against the other, and both hesitantly probed the soldiers for support. In the meantime, Miloradovich was allowed to be the figurehead of the public order in St. Petersburg, both by virtue of being general-governor and as a figure that was very marginally acceptable both to the revolutionaries and the disoriented, but rallying “conservative” camp. The Interregnum and its confusion thus continued, both in St. Petersburg and throughout the country.

The next step was clear, if also thoroughly unsatisfactory. Miloradovich had persuaded the grieving imperial family that Constantine had to be convinced to come back. Grand Duke Michael happily left St. Petersburg to deliver the message, reprising his role as a courier. Constantine flew into a panic upon hearing the news, and at first seemed to be preparing to flee to Germany or further. However, he came to his senses and was talked into going to St. Petersburg to accept the oaths of his loving subjects in person. “They killed my father and my brother, and now they will kill me,” he sighed, resigned. He left behind a Poland simmering with agitation, both at Constantine’s odious (though well-meaning) rule and at the activities of the secret societies connected to the ones in Russia.

Pestel and his acolytes in the south sat on the sidelines as 1825 drew to a close, waiting for further developments and desperately trying to step up their own plans. It’s clear that they did not know what to expect, but Pestel was getting ready for the worst. Having narrowly avoided an arrest earlier, he was now fully active again.
 
I have to admit that this is one of my weaker areas in Russian history; I'm quite curious to see how it turns out. Good stuff so far. :)
 
Thanks! I'm wondering whether I should try and provide more information on who all those strange people are, other than Pestel and maybe Nicholas and Constantine. :p
 
I am also lurking with interest.

Do you have any ideas on future scope? I'd love to see this turn into a workable TL map; Dachs will probably cry tears of joy.

We'll see how it goes.

Though right now I definitely do have some plans to expand it past the initial events. Not quite sure how far I'd take it chronologically yet. The best case scenario would be to take it to the end of the "long 19th century" by which point it would assuredly have a global impact, but of course that's really getting ahead of myself. :)
 
Am trying to write something now that I have time. I hope it's not a problem for you that much of it is yet more stage-setting and describing various key players. But after all, the sheer quantity of colourful personalities active in Russia at this time is a big part of why I started to write this. :p
 
I don't mind. Considering how long you've been gone, you could literally just plagiarize a phonebook and I would read it :)
 
I don't mind. Considering how long you've been gone, you could literally just plagiarize a phonebook and I would read it :)

OOC: Well then, here goes!

IC:

Speransky M.M. said:
Are you insane? Who makes this kind of offer ahead of time? Win first – then everyone will be on your side.

Constantine arrived in St. Petersburg in early January 1826. He accepted the oaths of allegiance with no particular enthusiasm, but also without making a scene in public. His coronation was to take place in Moscow, in July. In private he was still very much nervous and sometimes shouted at his servants and confidants, but after a few days in the capital, he seemed to be starting to calm down. Like many others, the Grand Duke was starting to think that perhaps there will be no greater disaster after all.

That certainly appeared to be how the foreign powers saw it. The deaths, in rapid succession, of Alexander and Nicholas, were surely troubling to the Concert of Europe. Alexander’s death deprived the Holy Alliance of a key supporter and a founding father; Nicholas’ was significant in another way, as it reminded some of the assassination of duc de Berry, another ranking member of an established dynasty struck down by a fanatical revolutionary. But on the whole, to the few foreign observers who bothered to comment at any length, this seemed to be a typical Russian brouhaha. Regicide was far from unheard of. The same went for the Guards, elite, somewhat praetorian-like military units established by Peter the Great, carrying out what appeared to be an armed coup, or trying to exert their influence on the court. They had not done so recently, but perhaps the long peace of Catherine and Alexander had come to an end. Thus, it was hardly seen as a revolutionary menace. Rather, it was mainly deemed an inconvenience when it came to negotiating a common plan of action against Turkey in the Eastern Question.

The government and the court were all too happy, on the surface, to maintain a semblance of normality where it was possible. They eagerly discussed coronation plans and foreign policy. However, unlike foreigners or people in the more provincial parts of Russia, the great and the good of St. Petersburg could not shrug off the events of December as a momentary outbreak of chaos, caused by misunderstanding, and now brought to a conclusive end. It was manifestly not so to any truly perceptive observer. However, certain factors, not least of which were the fractiousness and indecision that continuously plagued the Northern Secret Society, meant that the first act of this revolutionary drama was followed by an extended, wary interlude. Different factions used this breathing space to court allies and formulate a new plan of action, all the old schemes having been overturned by previous events.

Any attempt to pretend that nothing happened ran into the obstacle posed by the continued existence of the lingering aftereffects of December. Those aftereffects could be temporarily swept under the rug, but not removed – not without a further confrontation. Perhaps the most obvious such obstacle was posed by the Guards. In less than a day after the events, they were all marched back to their barracks by the same officers who brought them out, bemused and frustrated, but unbowed. A revolution, of a sort, had happened in the minds of the soldiers and also of many of the junior members of the Northern Secret Society that were involved in the manifestation. Since Catherine the Great’s accession, the political role of the Guards as king-makers had seemingly atrophied. But now it seemed to be reviving. The unpopular martinet officers who were making good careers over the last decade of Alexander’s reign were now more or less openly disobeyed, and most of them did not dare to make too much noise about it just yet, bearing in mind that some of the few deaths that actually happened on the 14th of December were among their own. Those of them who did not remember this were soon (in mid-January) reminded of it by the mysterious disappearance and death of one lieutenant Schilling, renowned for his extremely exacting attitude and little else. The soldiers were emboldened enough to take justice, as they saw it, into their own hands. The Guards had a new sense of power and solidarity with each other. They also felt some amount of respect and even reverence for their (generally more humane) liberal officers, but at the same time they were getting out of control – both that of the lower-ranking revolutionaries and that of the higher-ranking conservatives. Nonetheless, the former at least could feel that in case another show of power was needed in the next few months, they could trust the Guards to support them. This gave them confidence, while giving their opponents (as well as some likely supporters) cause for apprehension.

The availability of this volatile resource was the first of a series of contentious topics that brought out into the limelight the divisions in the rebel camp, giving the two different factions something more of a solid shape than they had while the Northern Secrety Society was fully underground. Somewhat confusingly, they came to be known as the Party of the Palace and the Party of the Square (sometimes also “of the Barracks”). Those names indicated the forces that they were courting, not their actual locations: for the first few weeks, at least, the Northern Secret Society continued to meet as one. But soon, the conflict over methods (“Shall we hope that liberal officials and frightened courtiers will accept our Constitution, or should we raise the troops to give them a second shove?”) turned into a personal struggle over leadership. Sergey Petrovich Trubetskoy, a prince who could trace his geneology back to Gediminas of Lithuania, a colonel of the Guard and a hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, the would-be dictator on the 14th, was now vigorously trying to reassert his authority as the director of the Northern Secret Society. While he was an obvious leader in the past, his apparent delay in coming to Senate Square was regarded by many as cowardice and cost him some political credit. However, others still saw him as a canny, well-collected political leader who was capable of holding the conspiracy together and forcing its changes through without further bloodshed. He was the great hope of those liberal and moderate revolutionaries who were disturbed by the apparent “anarchism” of the soldiers and the radicalism of those to their left.

The leader of the “Squarers” was Kondraty Ryleev, the man who brought the soldiers to the Senate Square. He was the son of an impoverished minor nobleman; a passionate poet and an employee of the Russian-American Company. The St. Petersburg office of the Company was one of the meeting-places of the Northern Secret Society; now it became a secondary headquarters for its radical wing. Ryleev and Trubetskoy came up with the original plan of the revolt together, but Trubetskoy apparently despaired when it began to fall to pieces. He did not believe in “revolutionary improvisation”. Ryleev did, and it seemed to pay off. He also believed or came to believe in regicide, republicanism and revolutionary martyrdom (which meant that he was not too risk-averse even when he could see the risks just fine). His circle of friends included other poets, such as Kuchelbekker; mad (from his head wounds and the way late Emperor Alexander murdered his Guard career for taking part in an illegal duel) Yakubovich with his personal grudges and suicidal bravery that made him a hero in Caucasus; and Kakhovsky, the actual regicide, of whom more will be said later. Ryleev and many other, younger, more impressionable revolutionaries did not understand how Trubetskoy could still claim to command their loyalty. They did not understand why they were letting Miloradovich pretend to be in charge and a new Romanov to be crowned. They felt that they could lead the Guards in a real revolution, turning the 14th into a sort of rehearsal before the actual play. And there was someone else behind them, in addition to the Guards and the sailors and the city mob, which they were now starting to court with their pamphlets. Ivan Ivanovich Gorbachevsky, another impoverished nobleman and one of the few who knew enough to try and bring the revolutionary ideas to the masses, was effectively an envoy of the Southern Secret Society in St. Petersburg. He returned there shortly after news of the uprising reached Little Russia. Thus the enemies of the Northern radicals saw the Napoleonic figure of Pestel behind Ryleev’s back.

It must be said that this was hardly accurate. Pestel and Ryleev had similar programs, up to a point, but vastly different temperaments. Ryleev was a passionate republican at heart, so fiery that he seemed doomed to die through spontaneous combustion; Pestel, as we have already established, was a strict pragmaticist who was perfectly willing to join radicalism with effective autocracy. They were fire and ice. Ryleev might have looked up to Pestel to an extent, and indeed he was more than happy to discuss plans with his envoys, but Pestel and his supporters back in Kiev looked down on the disorganised and meandering plans of Northern “liberalists”. Pestel’s plan with regards to St. Petersburg, as of the winter and spring of 1826, was to wait and see. Nevertheless, he did not neglect the idea of winning over the soldiers. Agitation among the regiments in Little Russia continued. At the same time, Pestel renewed his contacts with the Patriotic Society in Poland and with Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov in the Caucasus. The latter had served under Miloradovich. He was in charge of Russian and then Allied artillery during the 1812-1814 stage of the Napoleonic Wars. And now he was the commander-in-chief of all Russian forces in Caucasus and a known friend of Russian liberals of all stripes who so often ended up as exiles in his own forces. Of course, he had his hands full, dealing with the uprisings of Chechnyan and Ingushetian mountaineers. But this incredibly ungrateful task by itself made him increasingly unhappy about his assignment, while the death of his patron Alexander made the general wonder about his career security. Mayhaps marching north might be more lucrative. Similar thoughts were entertained by the former military superior of both Pestel and Trubetskoy, General Pavel Dmitriyevich Kiselyov, whose forces were in greater proximity. Thus the southern conspiracy widened, preparing to take advantage of the northern events as they came.

Trubetskoy’s saving grace, back in St. Petersburg, was that the government faction (if it may be called that) was even more divided than the revolutionaries. The truth is that there were many different factions that constituted the apparent Russian establishment. Maria Fedorovna, the Empress Dowager, wife of the late, murdered Tsar Paul and mother of Alexander, Nicholas, Constantine and Michael, was the informal leader of the court party. Distraught over Nicholas’ assassination and the attack on the Winter Palace, the courtiers were perhaps the one group that was the most paranoid about the revolutionaries and yet the least willing to consider compromise with them. Grand Duke Michael was a natural member of this party. He vainly tried to oppose the spread of revolutionary agitation in the army, and yet was also the idol of the loyal officerdom. The more conservative ministers tended to sympathies with this group too; although perhaps the correct term is not “conservative” so much as career-minded and more tied and loyal to the court than to the nation. As an example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode, the Portuguese-born son of a Russian German diplomat and a Protestant Jewess, who never quite learned to speak Russian, had little reason to look sympathetically upon the cause of national reform; those reformists-cum-revolutionaries hated his type of foreign political appointees, making his loyalty to the court party a matter of self-preservation. The great strength of this faction was the clarity of its short-term vision: the revolutionaries were to be crushed or at least swept under the rug through any means available. Only after that is done can they breathe easily and consider other projects.

However, while its resolve was stiffened enough by recent events for it to lack the sort of indecision that hampered its archenemies, this faction was held back by fear and uncertainty. Not even the Emperor-to-be was trustworthy (though few in the court faction dared to say as much out loud). Of all of Tsar Paul’s sons, Constantine was, by all accounts, the most like his father, both in appearance and in character. Only, Paul’s obsessions were religious mysticism (inherited by Alexander) and militarism a la Frederician Prussia (understood by him largely out of context of Old Fritz’ Enlightenment ideals of civil service and accountability, focusing instead on extreme discipline and “regularity” – an understanding and a fondness which carried over to both the late Nicholas and Michael). Constantine rather had an odd, extremely one-sided fondness towards Poland and Polish nationalism, and a keen love for Russian liberalism also. He was made even more suspect in the eyes of his own family by his apparently cowardly conduct in the crisis and by his morganatic marriage to the daughter of a poor Polish count. Joanna Grudzinska, whom he had married out of love and in disregard of the wishes of his family, was to be his ticket out of the line of succession. He had to be dragged back to St. Petersburg to save the dynasty, but the dynasty was understandably not convinced that he was in any way up to the task.

To overcome its frightened impotence, the court faction needed firm allies on the outside. The first such ally was Aleksey Andreyevich Arakcheyev, the favourite of Alexander’s later years, his greatest personal agent, the chief executor of his most unpopular projects, and the boogeyman of Russian liberal thought. This view of him was hardly fair. He was a typical lesser Russian nobleman, except in that he was extremely talented (especially in mathematics and military drills) and fortunate enough to be noticed. Arakcheyev made his career under Paul, who appreciated his pedantry and capacity for carrying out orders to the letter. He was extremely loyal to the Tsar in a way that harkened back to the 17th century if not earlier; but he also selflessly tried to improve the lot of his fellow long-suffering Russian Don-Quixotes when they tried to make a career. His name was particularly tainted by its association with the military settlements – Alexander’s audacious plan to make the Russian army loyal and self-sufficient by providing soldiers with special land and housing under strict, rational regulation, while resettling those who already dwelled on the lands used somewhere else. Arakcheyev privately thought that this was folly, and tried to get the Tsar to see the same, but when given the order, he went ahead and organised the military settlements with his usual exactness. This unholy hybrid of barracks and villages was nothing short of disastrous, becoming both a cause célèbre for Russian reformists and a hotbed of anti-government sentiments that have done so much to contribute to the revolutionary movement. Arakcheyev, thus, became a villain.

His motto was “faithful without flattery”. He was a lot more open to reform than many might have thought, and he saw what many in the court refused to see – that the revolutionaries were moved by a genuine wish to improve Russia, and hypothetically could be reasoned with along those lines. But he was doomed. Arakcheyev’s tragedy was that he was faithful to the House of Romanov, the continued existence of which the revolutionaries were increasingly inclined to disregard, and mistrusted by its enemies besides. Therefore he allied with the court faction; but his own influence was rapidly falling away with Alexander’s death. A different ally was needed for it to stand a fighting chance, and this one was perhaps predictable, but still much less reliable than faithful Arakcheyev. The man who would be dictator with 60,000 bayonets in his pocket had finally made up his mind.
 
There was perhaps no one in St. Petersburg for whom the events of the 14th were more of a rude awakening than Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich. A nobleman of Serbian origin, Miloradovich was one of the biggest heroes and the biggest winners of the War of 1812, as far as the Russian political scene went. He had been fighting, with varying success and distinction, since 1788, was said to have been the only Russian general to gain an advantage at Austerlitz, and ended the Revolutionary Wars a General of the Infantry. In peacetime, having been made first the commander of the Guards and then the general-governor of St. Petersburg, Miloradovich rested on his laurels as a warrior poet, a patron of arts and artists, and an idol of liberal minds. At the same time, however, those who saw past his legend tended to realise that as a peacetime administrator he was woefully incompetent and uneducated. He was not stupid, but he did get very careless and negligent. He felt with good reason that he could get away with it, until the 14th. After the 14th he had to sober up.

The manifestation on the Senate Square, the jeers and projectiles of the city mob and above all his clear loss of influence over the Guards had been in equal part humiliating and alarming to the general. The mutiny in particular he regarded as a personal insult. His own actions on that damned day have left him too exposed to seek immediate revenge. They drove a wedge between him and the court, even as they discredited him in the eyes of the revolutionaries. And as he could no longer be sure of the loyalty of his soldiers, he had to ally with one of the factions. Regardless of his past liberal sympathies, the general felt it was too late for him to ally with Trubetskoy, to say nothing of anyone to the left of the prince. Besides, his own ambition didn’t allow him to play second fiddle to any revolutionary leaders. Therefore his path was clear; he reaffirmed his alliance with the court, and despite Maria Fedorovna’s lingering dislike of him, the Dowager Empress had to follow Arakcheyev’s advice. Miloradovich was informally promised the court’s support and blessing in assuring order in the city during the transition of power to Constantine; just as informally, he promised to do his best to bring the army back over to the government’s side.

The last link in the chain of alternatingly struggling or allying conspiracies was formed by the liberal bureaucrats in the Tsar’s government. In some ways it was the most important link, because it was the one group that granted actual legitimacy to the revolutionary cause. After all, by themselves, the revolutionaries were at best the scions of illustrious families, blessed with moderately successful and highly prestigious military careers and the fickle support of some soldiers and common citizens. If they had found the nerve to push for the creation of a new government, as they had originally planned, perhaps things would have been different; but as it was, their plans were in too much disarray for them to press their advantage in December. Without any official status, they hardly had any means for influencing the political events with anything short of another armed uprising. This situation was utterly unacceptable to Trubetskoy, though not to Ryleev. Therefore the prince resolved to meet with the indisputable leader of Russia’s liberal bureaucracy – Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky.

Mikhail was the son of a simple, last name-less village priest. His surname was given to him in a provincial Orthodox seminary – it came from sperare, “to hope”, because he was a promising student. This name took a different meaning years later, when, after turning down a very promising monastic career, Speransky became an imperial official and made a breathtakingly rapid ascent. In the liberal years of Alexander’s rule, Speransky bore the hopes of the liberal intellectuals and statist bureaucrats alike, and most of all, the Tsar himself. Ironically, his plans of drastic governmental and educational reforms made him no lesser a villain in the eyes of high society than Arakcheyev himself, who would come to replace him. He was accused of being a Jacobin and sent away. In 1816 he replaced Pestel’s father as the general-governor of Siberia, a title that sounded much more impressive than it was in practice for someone who once seemed to be the first man in St. Petersburg (after the Tsar, of course). He was brought back to the State Council, and had played a part in trying to engineer Nicholas’ accession – because, as he knew, it was wholly lawful. Yet at the same time, already back then Speransky was quite actively receiving revolutionary envoys. They promised him a position in their government; he told them to seize power first and talk about it later. On the 14th, they tried and miserably failed to do so, but not without showing that they did have some amount of power on their side. The old, embittered minister smelled opportunity. While the conservative forces were off-balance, he and like-minded persons, both among the revolutionaries and inside the very government, had an excellent opportunity to bring about change. He now met daily with Trubetskoy and his envoys, and worked to bring other patriotic ministers over to their side. Even more importantly, he met with Constantine, who made a big show of listening to the famous archliberal of Russia, and promised to give him a more important position soon. His promises were empty air, for now (the uncrowned Tsar did not dare remove any of his current ministers so early), but Speransky was not too insistent on receiving a ministry in a government that might be overthrown within months. Having informal influence on the Tsar suited him and his government allies, who could finally hold their heads high, just fine.

The first crisis to bring out the disagreements among different factions did not wait too long. The too-happy soldiers of the Guards and the embarrassed general-governor did not make up the whole of the visible human fall-out of December 14. There was also a dead would-be Tsar and his imprisoned murderer. The former did not get up to much trouble. Alexander’s will and the oath of allegiance aside, he never reigned. Still, he was a tragically murdered Grand Duke of the House of Romanov, and was to be buried with all due ceremony, but not before some rather awkward delays. But then, his older brother didn’t fare any better; his corpse was being kept in a ready state for an indecently long time. Finally, Miloradovich decided to cut the Gordian Knot and forced through the funereal proceedings for both Romanovs in mid-February, hoping it would calm down the court. It most certainly needed the distraction.

Pyotr Grigoryevich Kakhovsky was yet another impoverished nobleman who found his way to the Northern Secret Society, but unlike many of his compatriots, his career was much more spotty. Unlucky in love and war, Kakhovsky had become obsessed with ancient Roman history. He admired the fate of Marcus Brutus, and pledged to seek a similar one for himself. This modern Brutus may have reached his immediate goal of bagging a Caesar (or nearly so, anyway), but the circumstances have been drastically changed, adjusted to the different conditions of his feat. For one thing, instead of confronting Caesar at the Senate with a merry band of likeminded murderers, he ran up on his own to and shot (after a considerable, painful delay) Nicholas while the Grand Duke was on his way to the Senate Square. For another, rather than lead a republican uprising and die in glorious battle, he turned himself in and was put under arrest at the Peter and Paul Fortress, which had long ago come to double as a place of internment for political prisoners. The actual assassination was not his idea, but rather Ryleev’s, and at the last moment, Kakhovsky had felt considerable doubts about the morality and ethics of the whole thing. He managed, barely, to go through with it, but very nearly broke down afterwards, and offered no resistance. He did not say anything incriminating, but on the other hand, that might have been because Miloradovich had gone out of his way to avoid any serious interrogations of the subject. The man knew nothing that Miloradovich wanted to know; he might, however, have known things that Miloradovich did not wish anyone else to find out. Perhaps by keeping him prisoner and not hurrying along his execution, the general was hoping to leave a door open for reconciliation with the revolutionaries. But as we know, that did not happen. The general made his mind up otherwise, and Kakhovsky, whom he had previously visited in his cell, was to become his human sacrifice to the court faction.

The rebel camp was in a furor when soldiers and officers caught wind of the government’s plan to put Kakhovsky on trial – and moreso about the imperial family’s insistence that he should be quartered, the customary punishment for the murder of a member of the House of Romanov. The lower-ranking members of the Northern Secret Society found the idea of Kakhovsky being executed outrageous, more so if they just let it happen. The leadership was not so sure. Ryleev was willing to sacrifice Kakhovsky from the start, though he was also hoping that they will have won by now. The young man was deemed expendable because he had few personal connections with anyone outside the Society itself. Even now, he might serve as a martyr to be avenged; somehow this did not appear perfidious, even though Ryleev was sincerely quite keen on personally doing the avenging if divine providence were to favour it. As for Trubetskoy, he was ruing the day he gave Kakhovsky’s and Ryleev’s plan the go-ahead, because it caused them a whole heap of problems, even if it won them the stand-off on the Senate Square. As a murderer who was caught red-handed and turned himself in immediately, Kakhovsky was noble, iconic, sympathetic and utterly indefensible in any moral or legal sense. The most that one might hope for is mercy; perhaps quartering might be replaced by hanging. Still, Trubetskoy understood the political significance of the trial. Miloradovich and the court could not be allowed to score this victory, not because Kakhovsky deserved to walk away free or alive or because it would be a dangerous victory for the enemies of the revolution, but because the Squarers would doubtless use this as an excuse for another rebellion, which would either be drowned in blood, or start an even more bloody reign of terror. To Trubetskoy that seemed increasingly unacceptable. He went to Speransky.

There was not much that Speransky could do to save Kakhovsky; he was sure of this. But that wasn’t necessary. What both he and Trubetskoy agreed was needed was to stretch the process out as much as possible, forcing the tensions to die down and neutralising, as much as it was possible, the political significance of the trial. Speransky and his close ally Nikolai Semyonovich Mordvinov both became involved in the trial, and drowned it in discussions about the specifics of the justified punishment. Meanwhile, unwholesome rumours spread about Kakhovsky’s supposed (and believable, considering his behaviour!) insanity, though it was not brought up at the trial as the opposite was too easily proved when it came down to it. Miloradovich and the court simply did not expect any resistance; justly so, in a way, but it did not help in their circumstances at all. Worse still, Constantine began to quietly voice the idea that perhaps being imprisoned for life in the Peter and Paul Fortress could be punishment enough. Or perhaps the poor madman could be placed under house arrest? This was outrageous, and yet it utterly discouraged the conservative faction from pressing the issue. Miloradovich tried to appease his new allies with funerals, while the trial halfheartedly dragged on without Kakhovsky, who was returned to his cell and gradually forgotten in the face of new developments.

Encouraged by this victory and his own successful politicking within the State Council, Speransky first broached the topic of a new constitutional project in March 1826. Arakcheyev held back his allies from attacking. This was wise, because Constantine was taken in by the idea; though, again, he was unwilling to take any concrete steps past letting Speransky form a committee to develop this idea. Perhaps he hoped to repeat what Alexander did for Poland, and thus outdo his dead brother by bringing a constitution to the whole Russian Empire. Speransky used this permission for what it was worth. Trubetskoy was not invited, not having much experience with government work, but the original, more moderate and at the same time more bureaucratically-savvy founders of the Northern Secret Society – Nikolai Ivanovich Turgenev and Nikita Mikhailovich Muraviev (the latter the author of the constitutional program espoused by the Northern Secret Society as a counter to Pestel’s “Russian Truth”) – were both on the committee. There could be no talk of abolishing the monarchy here, of course (but then, Muraviev’s constitution did not call for that either). Serfdom was also a problem that was decided to be impolitic to tackle straight away, to Ryleev’s disgust. Legal reforms, the abolition of military settlements and the establishment of freedom of religion were also worthy causes that would have to wait their turn. Therefore the main issue approached by the committee was that of creating a parliament. Muraviev’s idea was strongly based on the American Congress: the Empire was to be divided into 13 Dominions (or States, or Realms – translations varied almost as much as actual drafts) and 2 Regions, which would all send two or three representatives to the higher chamber, while the free population (not including serfs or servants; Muraviev might have liked to also exclude courtiers, but in the current atmosphere that was not a good option to suggest) would elect representatives to the lower chamber. The Emperor was to retain supreme executive powers and a hefty allowance, pleasing Constantine. Speransky’s faction at the court was growing stronger. The “luminary of liberal bureaucracy” won over the conservative Minister of Finance, Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (AKA Georg Ludwig von Cancrin) by promising support for a financial reform. In April, an even bigger victory was scored when the previously mentioned General Kiselyov accepted the position of the Minister of War.

This benign and promising course of events was too good to be true. On the 8th of May 1826, just as everyone was starting to forget all about him, Kakhovsky was found dead in his cell. Apparently he had been poisoned. What exactly happened remains a fertile field for niche conspiracy theories to this day. Some say that the ones to blame were radical revolutionaries who were tired of waiting for him to be martyred and perfectly willing to sacrifice him. Others point out, quite reasonably, that it really might have been suicide; that Kakhovsky, miserable with uncertainty and lingering guilt, might have prevailed upon his guards or figured out some ingenious way to poison himself with the limited resources he had available. But, of course, back then, almost everyone was privately convinced that Miloradovich was to blame. Surely he had much to lose from the continuing trial or for that matter from Kakhovsky’s continued existence! Surely, also, he now craved a confrontation, because his influence over the Tsar was rapidly slipping away! Even his own allies rebuked the general for his hasty action, which he answered with blunt incomprehension.

Surprisingly, and anticlimactically, Kakhovsky’s death did not cause any immediate uprising (although the volume of the persistent low-level turbulence that commanders had to turn a blind eye to among the guards had increased). That ship had already sailed. It had a different effect. It soured all hopes for reconciliation between Miloradovich and Speransky, which the latter, at least, was starting to entertain. It cast an additional dark cloud on Miloradovich himself. And as his reputation deteriorated further, the general was increasingly tempted towards a drastic course of action. While rebellious sentiments waxed and waned in St. Petersburg, Miloradovich began to develop his own plot. His police work, so flawed in the previous year, had improved immensely, as he now had a clear idea of what regiments were suspect and which ones could still be relied on. Moreover, he understood that while the Tsar was in St. Petersburg, getting him from out of Speransky’s baneful influence was impossible. Therefore he did what he could to encourage him to move his coronation to the first half of June. Was he (Miloradovich) not asked to maintain order? Would the coronation not put an end to all talk of distemper and revolution in Russia? Constantine thought about it and agreed. A plan was being put into motion that would – contrary to its original purpose – result in the end of this odd interlude and the beginning of the Russian Revolution proper.
 
LESS WORDS, MOAR PHONE NUMBERS.

Looking forward to the explosion. :p

OOC: My painstaking research that took me most of the last two days has revealed that they did not have phones in early-to-mid 19th century Russia. This is disappointing, but explains a lot. By way of apology I typed up this:

IC:

Muraviev M.N. or maybe Ryleev K.F. said:
My God, what a country. They cannot even hang us right.

Constantine’s coronation in Moscow went through flawlessly, and he was acclaimed with equal eagerness by the staid, respectable local aristocracy and the high-minded intellectuals. Karamzin, the old patriarch of sentimental poetry and Russia’s first true great conservative historian who might have rallied those minds against Constantine’s patronage of ill-considered and poorly planned liberal reforms, had passed away not long ago. Pushkin was the new rising star of the literary world, and he sincerely praised Constantine as did many others; they saw him as a romantic hero, “not unlike Henry V”. Constantine reveled in the praise, but still found the time for state affairs, both in the run-up to and in the immediate aftermath of the coronation. In May, he found the time to meet the Duke of Wellington, who traveled to discuss the Greek situation. Once upon a time, Catherine the Great had entertained the notion of restoring the Byzantine Empire, and groomed one of her grandsons for the task, naming him Constantine and assigning a Greek nanny to take care of him and teach him the language of his future subjects; nothing had come of that, but that grandson still felt some sympathy for the Hellenes and their plight, as did many Russian liberals. He was therefore only too happy to join in the British plan to press the Ottomans into ceasing their campaign and granting Greece full autonomy within the Turkish Empire. No doubt he also fancied being known as the Tsar who had brought freedom, first to the Poles, then to the Russians, and now to the Greeks, the very inventors of liberty.

Speaking of bringing freedom to the Russians, Constantine was still a bit too cautious to consider the projects for abolition of serfdom that were starting to reach his attention, but he was willing to form a committee to consider land reform. He showed rather more enthusiasm for the constitutional project. Finally remembering his promise, he finalised the restoration of Speransky to power by appointing him the Minister of Justice. This did not deter the aging minister from paying full attention to the constitution committee; he seemed to have felt that this was his last chance to make good on all the hopes that were associated with him, and so he threw himself headfirst into the work. Seeing the need to preserve a strong and centralised empire, Speransky overrode Muraviev on the issue of regional autonomy for the Dominions. Still, he directed the committee to get to work on defining their actual borders and the proper election process. It might take some time to actually implement it and elect the first Russian People’s Assembly (Narodnoye veche), but Speransky had developed plenty of patience while out of favour. He made sure also to secure a freedom of religion and an equality before the law clause in the constitution, though how it would apply in the heavily stratified Russian society was left as an exercise for the reader.

On the surface, therefore, all seemed well in early June. There were, admittedly, grumblings and what now appeared to be chronic turbulence in St. Petersburg, in Warsaw and the big cities of the south, and Constantine was in no hurry to return to his capital, rejoicing in the quiet, comparatively steady social life of Moscow, under the auspices of general-governor Dmitriy Vladimirovich Golitsyn. Speransky and the rest of the government had returned to St. Petersburg. Miloradovich had followed soon after – much to Speransky’s relief. He left behind some allies with the new Emperor’s retinue, though, Hans Karl von Diebitsch foremost among them. Under Alexander, whom he had accompanied to the Congress of Laibach and to his last retreat to Taganrog, von Diebitsch had been conducting investigations into the secret societies. He never did manage to crack down on them due to the chaos of the Interregnum, but he did gather a large amount of information on Speransky’s closest associates and their regicidal, truly revolutionary plans. And now the process of slowly feeding Constantine with this information began.

It wasn’t so straightforward (if slow) as Miloradovich might have hoped. Diebitsch had overplayed his hand a little by making it seem as though Ryleev and Pestel were the ones in close contact with Speransky and Kiselyov, rather than Trubetskoy. Constantine was quietly incredulous at first. Still, his paranoia began to take over, bolstered by the apparent resentment of many Muscovite nobles – not at Constantine or his bold plans, God forbid, but at the return of Speransky and at his plans that ran counter to tradition and privilege. They remembered tearfully how that horrible priest had forced some of the first families of Russia to part with their children under Alexander, sending them to study at the cruel, cold Lyceum. They spoke of the bureaucracy and red tape that had flourished in his care, and hinted that it would tie his own hands as well. Constantine looked over the project of the constitution and found that his powers, while considerable, were strictly in the bounds of Law; that was very good and liberal, but still somewhat disturbing. At the same time, Diebitsch had procured for him information directly linking Speransky to the uprising and the regicide of December 14th. By August, when Constantine had finally returned to St. Petersburg, Speransky could see the first alarming signs of the Tsar’s growing lukewarmness towards him and his projects. The plan to abolish the military settlements, having been proffered to the Tsar on his return, was accepted in principle, but returned to Kiselyov over matters of phrasing and other such details.

Still, Constantine didn’t act. Not by himself. It seemed he wasn’t fully convinced that Speransky’s trucking with revolutionaries was real – or perhaps, much like in Poland, he found it excusable. Those regicidal radicals did worry him, however. After finally granting Arakcheyev a proper private audience, he asked him to head over to Kiev and investigate the Southern Secret Society. Diebitsch was charged with looking into matters in St. Petersburg. Miloradovich fumed; apparently the Tsar still did not trust him. But this would have to do. The audacious murder of General-Lieutenant Alexander von Benckendroff while leaving a prestigious restaurant on August 29th gave him the excuse he needed. The Emperor and Kiselyov himself (who, having only arrived in the capital after the 14th, perhaps did not see the events in the city as a grand revolutionary drama between liberals and conservatives so much as merely a situation where disruptions of public order and military discipline had gotten ridiculously out of hand) publicly called upon Miloradovich to restore order, and to carry out a sweeping expansion and reform of the local police force. This turned out to be mostly a matter of turning the spy network established by Miloradovich into a proper police force. Martial law was introduced in the city, and no one dared protest it – again, even the more moderate revolutionaries increasingly saw the situation as justifying a thorough crackdown if only so that they could get back to work. Dozens of investigations were reopened, Miloradovich’s spies searched people’s houses and company offices, and the first few arrests were made. Ryleev and Gorbachevsky went into hiding; many of their allies did likewise, but some of the junior members of the conspiracy were taken in, especially as evidence had linked them both to Schilling’s disappearance and to Benckendorff’s assassination. Trubetskoy, Muraviev and their associates were left untouched. The Northern Secret Society was sundered, as one part of it now met at Speransky’s office in the Shuvalov Palace, and the other was either in the Peter and Paul Fortress or hiding in the docks.

On September 11th, the soldiers of the Moscow Guard Regiment had had enough of Miloradovich’s White Terror – and that of their own commanders, encouraged by the general-governor’s sudden vigour. Ordered to cooperate with the police, they refused to hand over the revolutionary pamphlets spread by Gorbachevsky, and instead attacked the gendarmes who tried to drag away the poet Kuchelbekker, who was spotted trying to hide among them. They chased away the police and arrested some of the resisting officers. Their commander, Baron Fredericks, barely escaped to call for help. This was provided with surprising speed, as Miloradovich led his loyal guards (particularly, the Mounted Leib Guard), gendarmes and regular army troops to crush the rebellion before it could spread to any other units. The officers were freed, the apparent instigators of the uprising were put under arrest and then hanged, and the rest of the troops were moved to new barracks further from the city, though officially the unit was not disbanded. A precedent was made for rapidly and ruthlessly crushing any dissent, which was repeated during a subsequent popular disturbance at the markets. Miloradovich was in control, and the rebels were seething as victory appeared to slip from their grasp.

Miloradovich’s heavy-handed punishments and censorship policies, as well as intensifying waves of arrests, were nothing out of the ordinary for the Russian Empire – under Alexander. But the thaw of the first few months of Constantine’s reign was apparently enough to make people forget. Outrage grew in the saloons and at the court; even Grand Duke Michael privately admitted that the Serb was outstepping his boundaries, though that might have been because he barely saw fit to consult with the Tsar. In truth this was an elaborate bait – and Speransky fell for it, hook, line and sinker. The Minister of Justice told the Tsar that while maintaining order was good and fine, “it would be a blow to those whose tied their hopes with Your reign” to let Miloradovich continue arresting and perhaps even executing the flower of Russian aristocratic youth. He urged mercy. Constantine, normally well-disposed to be merciful, was in a bad and troubled mood; those disturbances suddenly reminded him vividly of last year and of his old fears. He shouted at Speransky, declaring that if he showed those people mercy he’d be dead in a month, the House of Romanov in two months after that, and the whole Russian Empire won’t make it to next year! Part-cowed, and part-aware of Constantine’s volatile moods, Speransky saw fit to retreat for now, brooding. Indeed, a few days later Constantine was willing to talk to him again and promised to rein Miloradovich in. But rumours about a rift between the liberal ministers and the Tsar already spread. When Miloradovich met with Constantine on September 25th, the Emperor had failed to rein him in, and found himself agreeing, to his horror, that the martial law must be stepped up. Speransky had betrayed his trust by cavorting with murderers and revolutionaries, and even now he was trying to use his influence to cover for them. By October 7th, with news reaching the capital about uprisings in Poland, Little Russia, the Urals and Caucasus, Constantine was ready to approve the next step: Miloradovich was empowered to start arresting everyone connected to the revolutionaries, effectively permitting him to stage a military coup against the “corrupted” liberal government. Which he did, with gusto.

The news that reached St. Petersburg from the outskirts of the Empire was conflicting and confused. The events in the Urals had nothing to do with what was happening in Europe; it was just another chronic rebellion of peasants drafted to work on factories against particularly harsh overseers. Caucasus, likewise, was experiencing a tribal uprising inspired by Sufi mystics called the murids, who called for the religious revival of Islam among the mountaineers and their liberation from non-Muslim oppression. It was only relevant inasmuch as it harried Yermolov and frustrated Constantine’s foreign policy due to the likely, but unproved, link between the rebels and the Ottoman Empire. Poland was something else; having become convinced that Constantine, who was never much liked, had finally made up his mind to bring back Alexandrian repression, the Polish nobility and the army that Constantine himself helped found had decided to preempt him by starting a rebellion. The Patriotic Society, spurred on by Pestel and led by left-liberal intellectuals such as Walerian Łukasiński (earlier released from his arrest as part of Constantine’s thaw) and Antoni Jabłonowski, ended up playing a negligible part in it; the main force came from the disgruntled army officers and the Sejm itself. Warsaw was captured, the surprised Russian garrison was placed under arrest, and the Sejm proceeded to bicker in good Polish szlachta style. What happened in Little Russia was more alarming if less personally embarrassing.

Alarmed by the crackdown in St. Petersburg and by Arakcheyev’s investigations in Kiev, Pestel and his comrades – Ivan Grigoryevich Burtsev (a colonel and originally an “envoy” of the Northern Secret Society), Vasiliy Lvovich Davydov (another colonel) and Sergey Grigoryevich Volkonsky (a major-general) had decided that the time to act was now. They already had several regiments all to themselves. Their allies were ready to turn soldiers in other regiments over to their cause, hopefully dragging their commanders along with them. Pestel had found bigger, if more dubious allies. Peter Wittgenstein, the supreme commander of the southern Second Army, was close to retirement, but willing to turn a blind eye to his old protégé Pestel’s plots; between Speransky and Miloradovich, he was increasingly open to the idea of a military revolution. Ivan Osipovich Witt, the commander of the southern military settlements and former client of Arakcheyev, was worried for his career regardless of what happens, and on increasingly unfriendly terms with his old chief. The levels of disgruntlement and uncertainty being what they were, by late September Pestel was perfectly ready to cross the Rubicon. The plan went off almost without a hitch, despite the doubts that some felt regarding Pestel’s allies; the rebellions, secretly assisted by Witt, started at the military settlements, carried over to the undecided regiments, and then took over the entire Second Army as Pestel occupied Tulchin and Kiev. A few more officers had to be killed than he had hoped, and Arakcheyev, frustratingly, avoided capture and escaped to Odessa. But now the Second Army controlled half of Ukraine and the Directory was set up in Kiev, made up of Pestel, Yushnevsky, Burtsev, Muraviev-Apostol and Volkonsky. Both Wittgenstein and Witt found their way there. Military settlements were disbanded, demeaning corporal punishments were abolished, taxes were cut and the most odious (or loyal) imperial officials were arrested. The Second Army moved to secure Chernigov and Kursk, all while defeating or even subverting to their side what little resistance government forces could muster. But this rebellion seemed oddly lackluster; the Directory spoke a lot about protecting the Empire from its enemies, but said nothing about a republic; and Pestel did not seem to make any plans to march on Moscow, preferring to establish full control of his immediate surroundings and quietly cull resistance in his own ranks, sending those he found less loyal – not to their deaths, but to backwater areas where they could do him no real harm. He was waiting on news from the capital.

The drama of St. Petersburg finally came to a head after October 14th. At the last moment, Constantine felt pangs of guilt, or perhaps simply of fear towards Miloradovich. In any case, he once again proved himself to be the court party’s worst enemy by first trying to warn Speransky and the others, and then arranging to flee the capital, heading for Moscow. It was too late for Speransky; Miloradovich’s loyal troops openly occupied the capital and the Winter Palace itself, arresting the Minister of Justice and many of his allies. He did not even struggle, perhaps still waiting on Constantine to call the general-governor off. Muraviev was arrested also. Trubetskoy, Turgeniev and Kiselyov were among those who managed to flee with or after Constantine. Miloradovich was powerless to chase them, but instead focused on hunting down others who tried to hide out in the city. Only a few members of the Palace party made it to a bittersweet reunion with the Squarers. Hugging their leader, Gavriil Stepanovich Batenkov, Kondraty Ryleev declared that the time to act had come. They were now the only force in the city that could oppose Miloradovich’s Napoleonic ambitions that threatened to drag Russia deeper into tyranny even as it sought to reach for freedom. All disagreements among the men of good intent now had to be forgotten. With or without the Tsar, with or without Speransky or Muraviev’s constitution, they had to make a stand.

Miloradovich was fully expecting them to, of course. While his agents had failed to arrest Ryleev, they did nab some lesser conspirators – most notably, Yakubovich, who managed to kill two men and maim another before being arrested (the poor fools did not count on his extremely sane habit of sleeping with a sword). He also sent loyal troops to disarm the suspect Guard regiments. What he did not account for was that Ryleev had gotten much better at planning revolutions since December 14th. The plan of action developed by the underground leadership of the Barracks party was two-pronged. Miloradovich anticipated the first prong well enough when he attacked the Guards. The disarmament started out well enough, but he had underestimated the extent to which the rebels had prepared for this event; before long, the guards in several regiments have managed to organise armed resistance. Even the disarmed units turned out to have acquired hidden caches, courtesy of sympathisers in the government and higher ranks (a belated proof of Miloradovich’s thesis that radicals had their claws in Speransky’s clique). There were three hotbeds of the Guards rebellion – rather like in December, but bigger and more consolidated. Miloradovich managed to crush the southeastern rebels in a pitched battle on Semenovskaya Square, scattering the disloyal parts of the Jaeger and Semenovsky regiments of the Leib Guard. Some of them managed to retreat in relative order to join up with the Naval Guards in the southwest, which held out for longer, trying to hold the narrow streets. In the end, however, that ragged stand turned into a massacre; Miloradovich brought up the artillery and broke the rebel ranks, then chased them into the cold, still waters of the Neva. But this vital delay won time for the rising of the grenadiers, the Finnish Regiment and – the second prong.

Developments on the northern side of St. Petersburg were uneven. The rebels tried and failed to seize the outer defenses of the Peter and Paul Fortress. Ryleev had hoped to make it a Russian taking of the Bastille, but reluctantly conceded that their imprisoned comrades would have to wait a little longer. Vasilyevsky Island, the western part of St. Petersburg connected to the rest of the city by bridges over the Neva, had become the main battlefield. The remaining rebel forces clashed with Miloradovich’s troops on Admiralty Square. The fight was bloody, vicious and indecisive – the rebels almost prevailed over the loyal Guards before Miloradovich brought over the regular troops from other parts of the city. Yet he was delayed by a near-mutiny among his artillery and also by the harrying of the city mob – particularly dockers and sailors from the island. They could do nothing more than delay his movements, though, as most of them did not dare to actually assault the government forces.

Until the darkness came, that is. By night-time, the Admiralty Square was still contested, neither side willing to give up its apparent advantage. But under a dark sky, the advantages of artillery and rifles became less apparent, while the civilians grew more bold. Gorbachevsky’s bid to rouse the poorest and most rebellious parts of the city population had paid off. Stevedores struck the general-governor’s flanks. Soon, he had to retreat. The situation might have still been salvaged, but for the rebellion on St. Isaac’s Square. The builders in the “village” around the St. Isaac’s Cathedral (built under Peter the Great, razed and built again under Catherine the Great and her unfortunate son, and then torn down again and put under construction by Alexander in 1802) did not require much radical agitation. Their work was hard, their living standards were increasingly atrocious, they had no love for Miloradovich – and they inexplicably loved Constantine, who they heard was either chased out or locked away by the general-governor. They set upon the retreating forces, setting up traps, throwing large stones and wielding hammers, pickaxes and laths as weapons in melee. The retreat, then, turned into a rout.

The fighting dragged on into October 15th. Much to Ryleev’s frustration, the rebel rally, while enough to foil Miloradovich’s plan, fell just short of taking the Winter Palace. The tired Guards and disorganised workers and sailors could not push further when encountering stiff and still fairly organised resistance – organised by Grand Duke Michael, who some said was now being groomed for the throne, Miloradovich and the court party having become utterly disappointed with Constantine. It and the Peter and Paul Fortress, as well as the loyalist barracks on Semenovskaya Square, became the main pillars of anti-revolutionary resistance. Skirmishing, raids and sallies continued through the day as both sides tried to rally their remaining followers. The nail was placed in Miloradovich’s coffin when the Guards stationed on Semenovskaya Square joined the rebellion after a too-enthusiastic attempt to use them to plug holes in the Winter Palace’s defenses. Soon, the southern part of the city fell into rebel hands, cutting off the most likely route of escape. By evening, they had rallied enough, while Miloradovich’s supporters started to desert him en masse. And the night of October 16th saw the final, triumphant assault.

The imperial family was placed under arrest yet again – on a more permanent basis this time, as there were no forces left in the city that would dislodge the rebels from the Winter Palace. The revolutionaries were disappointed to discover that Constantine was indeed no longer there and so could not be forced to abdicate. Nevertheless, they lost no time in calling for a Constituent Assembly and proclaiming, perhaps a little hastily, the Russian Republic. The prisoners were freed, including Speransky. While Ryleev treated him with utmost courtesy and respect, and hailed him as the “father of Russian democracy”, it was clear to both of them that Speransky’s days in power were now well and truly over. It was different from his previous disfavour because it was increasingly clear to him that soon there really might not be a Tsar for him to return to. All of his political experience hinged on trying to guide a monarch towards the light and using his absolute authority to bring about good ends (he was a little dubious on whether the same could be done with an ignorant and unruly mob). But Speransky did not struggle against it in any case, having been both unnerved by the harrowing events of the previous days, and disillusioned by Constantine’s cowardice in a critical moment. He went back to his house, after having passed on the proverbial torch to Muraviev.

As for Miloradovich himself, the newly-rechristened Republican Guards found him hiding at the house of a certain ballerina that he greatly favoured. He did not resist and did not lose his composure until the end. According to a legend that spread after the event, the inexperienced revolutionaries have botched his hanging on the first try, giving him one last chance to gloat. “You can’t even hang me properly!” he laughed quite madly. “How do you hope to run an Empire?!” But on the second try, they succeeded.

The Russian Republic was off to a rocky start from day one, exacerbated by the fact that, as we have seen, many of those who brought it to power still felt a great deal of loyalty to the Tsar. Confusion and anarchy reigned both among the revolutionaries and in the city itself, where the city mobs and many of the lower-ranking Guards alike have taken to looting and drunken disorder. In this chaos it was not hard for the remains of Miloradovich’s forces – actually not that few, as it turned out – to slip away to Tsarskoye Selo, commanded by Diebitsch. Having united with more monarchist forces there, this army set out towards Moscow, because Miloradovich was not the only general in Russia who thought that he could rule over the Tsar’s shoulder. The High Duma of the Northern Secret Society, reconvened in the Admiralty Building (the Winter Palace was actually damaged in the fighting), tried desperately to control the situation, now positioning itself as a sort of provisional government of the Republic until the Assembly could be convened. The only man who could realistically control the situation now was Ryleev, and he did his best to calm the city down after three days of looting, even nipping in the bud a fire that seemed poised to destroy St. Petersburg. But it was clear that this work was taking a lot out of him. Moreover, he had been injured during the fighting, and started coughing blood in the middle of an impassioned speech against those who would bring division into the camp of the righteous. The city-sized Russian Republic barely held its own, and was clearly not prepared to expand outwards: they had to hope that other cities and armies will declare for them.
 
It was much to their frustration that Pestel did not seem to be in much of a hurry to do so. In November, still without pledging loyalty to the Russian Republic, the Second Army set out towards Moscow, once again overcoming the half-hearted resistance posed to it by divided and demoralised local forces. Wittgenstein was effectively made to stand down, “retiring for reasons of health”; Pestel did not claim any higher rank, because both Wittgenstein’s resignation and his own promotion required the Tsar’s approval. So, as some joked, he decided to ask for it in person and bring the whole army with him as proof of his capacity to command. He was perhaps not the most personally inspiring leader that the revolutionaries could muster, but his sheer military experience, organisational skills and cool confidence helped quiet most immediate challenges for leadership. He was assisted in this, of course, by Witt’s and his own extensive system of spies, who have already foiled a counter-insurgency plot back in Kiev. They would prove to be vital in the struggle for Moscow.

While not nearly as anarchic as St. Petersburg, Moscow was easily more confusing. It had been the main destination for high-ranking refugees fleeing out of St. Petersburg since the start of Miloradovich’s reign of terror, and it had only become worse after the governor-general was hanged. The first among refugees, Emperor Constantine I himself, still valiantly tried to hold court, with mixed results. All talk of sweeping reforms was now abandoned, of course, although the Tsar seemed to condemn Miloradovich and the “anarchists” in equal measure. Kiselyov remained a prominent figure in the government – perhaps the most prominent, as he increasingly consolidated control over the Moscow garrisons. When Diebitsch arrived in Moscow, a few days ahead of Pestel, the two men had a private conference. The end result was that Kiselyov resolved to support Diebitsch in holding Moscow and preparing a new expedition to reclaim St. Petersburg from the rabble. Unlike Diebitsch, he was misinformed as to the force and aim of Pestel’s uprising, and thought that it might be content with stealing Little Russia, which, while unfortunate, was expendable, compared to the capital of the Russian Empire. On the other hand, if Pestel was going to try and threaten Moscow, then perhaps this would be a good chance to nab the villain and end his rebellion in one go. Thus, he made plans to confront the rebels after they cross the Oka River on their way to the old capital.

Another complication did not fail to arise when news belatedly reached Moscow of Yermolov’s departure from the Caucasus. Leaving a small garrison behind to hold the mountaineers at bay, Yermolov took the most mobile parts of his Special Caucasian Corps and marched north to an unknown purpose. He was still a good distance away from Moscow, and his true purpose and alignments were an enigma, but this nevertheless added a new element of haste to the tsarist forces’ decision-making. They had to confront and defeat Pestel before Yermolov could even come close.

Both Pestel and Diebitsch took each others’ bait. Pestel crossed the Oka near the flourishing small industrial city of Serpukhov, exposing himself to Diebitsch’s forces. But a fatal delay had cost Diebitsch the chance of occupying the elevations near the town. Pestel’s subordinates toyed with the idea of recruiting the factory workers to their cause, but Pavel Ivanovich nipped this in the bud. It has long been his conviction that the only force capable of carrying out a revolution in Russia was the army. The petite bourgeoisie that ensured the success of the revolution in France practically did not exist in most of Russia; moreover, in those places where it did exist, it was frequently the most loyal to the imperial government of any parts of society, because it was completely dependent on its favour. The great bulk of the aristocracy was too self-interested to carry out a revolution (present company excepted), even if it was the most independent from the Tsar. That very independence made it careless and unconcerned with the well-being of others. Peasants and urban workers were a purely destructive force in their current, uneducated, aggrieved state. They had no organisation and no long-term program, and they were all too easily misled. The liberal bureaucracy had already shown its true strength – it folded all too easily, without the Tsar’s support it had no force, and the Tsars were seldom willing to support it. When told of Miloradovich’s defeat, Pestel darkened and was given pause, but only for a moment. Yes, Miloradovich had tried to rule through military force alone and was thwarted when he underestimated the power of the streets. But, Pestel said, he only truly fell after his own army betrayed him. And had he established better control over it from the start, he would already have been the master of this country.

The actual battle on the Nara River – a tributary of the Oka, flowing near Serpukhov – was a classic draw in a tactical sense. Neither side was willing to risk it all. Again and again, Diebitsch seemed to threaten the Second Army’s flanks, but he could not force his advantage. He forced Pestel on the defensive, and sometimes it seemed as though he was about to lose his nerve, but at the end, the northern army was forced to retreat back to Moscow, having taken many more casualties than Diebitsch had expected. Though he didn’t know it yet, the struggle was already over. Between Yermolov's return to Russia and his ally’s failure to secure a decisive victory, Kiselyov had changed his mind – convinced, perhaps, by Pestel’s secret envoys in the city. On November 28th, two days after first confronting Pestel on the Nara, Diebitsch realised that something had gone wrong when the expected supplies and reinforcements did not arrive. He tried to give battle again, but this time Pestel had the advantage. With Diebitsch’s defeat at the village of Vidnoye, the road to Moscow was open. But there was one more typical touch. In his proclamation to the citizens of Moscow, spread ahead of his forces by his spies, Pestel assured the population that he, a loyal subject and servant, sought nothing other than the release of Emperor Constantine I from the custody of traitors and conspirators, and the restoration of order in Russia. Constantine, his court and Kiselyov himself may well have seen this proclamation for what it was. But with it, they lost all hope of resisting. Openly penitent for his mistakes, Kiselyov greeted his former subordinate and allowed him to effectively occupy the city, well ahead of Yermolov’s forces.

What remained turned out to be child’s play. With Constantine and his ministers in tow, Pestel marched to St. Petersburg as soon as some semblance of order in Mocow was ensured. Despite complaints about going in winter, he rightly reasoned that it both beat going there in spring or autumn, when the roads cease to exist, and would make it impossible for the ragtag leadership of the Russian Republic to organise undesirable resistance. In any case, he was in luck. Ryleev died from his wounds without Pestel having to confront him. There were a few unfortunate incidents on the outskirts of the city with overzealous Republican Guards, but after Pestel had assured their commanders of the purity of his intentions, the vanguard of his army was allowed to enter the city and restore order. It turned out to be remarkably easy, as the worst troublemakers were either already dead or licking their wounds from the street clashes that followed Ryleev’s death. The republican government had agreed to make a deal with Pestel in exchange for him pledging to support the Constituent Assembly. It came as no surprise to anyone, therefore, when in early February of 1827 Constantine had gave his official abdication. He was, if anything, rather relieved that he had been allowed to do so. He was less relieved when, together with the rest of his family, he was transported to the Shlisselburg Fortress.

By now everyone was expecting that the worst of this mad anarchy was over. Even Pestel himself was willing to let his guard down as he had hoped that he would get a chance to actually carry out his planned reforms. All such hopes were to be rudely disappointed. The radical, republican Military Revolution may have prevailed in the three great capital cities of Russia – Kiev, Moscow and St. Petersburg. But now its fate was being decided elsewhere.
 
I assume that the Grand Duke Michael was incarcerated and didn't manage to flee with Constantine? He seems to be the only Romanov left with any fighting spirit by the end of things.

That he is, but he became an independent player a little too late. That being said, he had an excellent window to flee the country between Miloradovich's and Pestel's respective bids for St. Petersburg, not to mention a fair amount of connections in the western reaches of the Empire. Realistically, I find it unlikely that he would still be in Russia after the revolution, unless he had been killed. Make of that what you will.
 
In May, he found the time to meet the Duke of Wellington, who traveled to discuss the Greek situation. Once upon a time, Catherine the Great had entertained the notion of restoring the Byzantine Empire, and groomed one of her grandsons for the task, naming him Constantine and assigning a Greek nanny to take care of him and teach him the language of his future subjects; nothing had come of that, but that grandson still felt some sympathy for the Hellenes and their plight, as did many Russian liberals. He was therefore only too happy to join in the British plan to press the Ottomans into ceasing their campaign and granting Greece full autonomy within the Turkish Empire. No doubt he also fancied being known as the Tsar who had brought freedom, first to the Poles, then to the Russians, and now to the Greeks, the very inventors of liberty.
This is all excellent, by the way. I've been kinda sorta away, so I haven't really commented on it - sorry about that - but this in particular struck me as interesting. Not because of the Greek part (stupid Greeks), but because of the Wellington part. Historically, that mission was part of Canning's mutually exclusive Turkish plan: use Stratford Canning at the Porte to try to frighten the Turks into a Greek autonomy plan by threatening them with a Russian war, while Wellington attempted to moderate Russia's real policy to reduce the likelihood of an actual war. Wellington, of course, was pressured against his will into basically agreeing to commit Britain to support Russia in an indefinitely expansible series of ultimata and war aims purely for the sake of the Russian connection, the course of action that eventually led to Navarino.

The text here is vague, but it seems as though Konstantin, unlike Nikolai, more or less agreed with Canning's proposed "plan", which was hardly much of a plan at all, instead of trying a new policy that, while it was reckless and warmongering, actually had the merit of eventually getting something done. It will be interesting to see how letting Greece simmer some more will eventually work out. It's hard to imagine the Egyptian-Ottoman forces possessing the ability to force the Greek rebels out of the various hidey-holes into which they had crawled by 1826 (Ibrahim's zillion failed assaults on Mani come to mind), which means, in all likelihood, continued occupation, fiscal strain, and even more of a humanitarian crisis in the countryside. Unless, of course, Canning dies as in OTL and the British acquire a prime minister with more than six brain cells.
 
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