Ask a Philosopher

[Wrymouth3]

What the hell is wrong with Slovaj Zizek. At this point he'll deliver his next lecture at a Psy concert trying to relate a Chipotle burrito to hermeneutics.

 

[Mise]

Speaking of ethics, how should we judge an ethical system? How should we decide which ethical system is the best?

 

[lovett]

What do you think are the defining characteristics of Analytic and Continental Philosophy? My take is that Analytics seem to be interested in epistemology, mathematics and linguistics and seek connection to the natural sciences while Continentals are more interested in ethics, aesthetics and existential philosophy and tend to have very literary style as opposed to the almost scientific dissertation style most analytic philosophy is written. Do you agree?

I also occasionally hear there are supposed to be insurmountable differences between the two schools. I strongly disagree, having both their own strengths and weaknesses, especially considering they tend to be interested in very different subjects. But how much do you think this is true?

I don't think the distinction is particularly useful anymore. It is really a historical definition. Analytic philosophy was a cohesive research program which survived until the mid to late 20th century (if one has to put a date on it, one would say it finally died in the 1980s). This research program had its roots primarily in the work or Frege, Russell and to an extent Carnap. And it was primarily done in America and Britain. Its central, defining interest was philosophy of language. The initial idea (the project of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein) was to excavate an ideal language from our natural language. This ideal language was meant to perfectly reflect the logical structure of the world - whatever that meant. And once we had it -once we spoke clearly- all the philosophical problems would evaporate.

This changed around the 40s and 50s with the 'ordinary language turn'. The Later Wittgenstein was a tremendous pressure here, but he really stands alone in the canon of western philosophy; he cannot be called 'part' of any school. Richard Rorty and Peter Strawson are some of the more prominient proponents of this shift. The idea was that there was no ideal language embedded in the natural languages we speak; the search for an ideal language was chimerical. But that did not mean we should turn away from language. Rather, we should describe the messy phenomena of natural language, describe how language is actually used. And agin, the idea was that once we saw the actual use of our normal language clearly then all the philosophical problems would evaporate.

So this was the central concern of the analytic research program; philosophy of language. Those working in this tradition were very interested in epistemology, but probably equally as interested in ethics. Slightly less so in aesthetics. But progress in all fields was deemed to hang on progress in philosophy of language.

In this context, the term 'continental philosophy' was coined. It was to refer to a much more disparate group of philosophers without a cohesive research program. Roughly, those philosophers writing in continental Europe from the early to late 20th century. Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Sartre and so on. And it was coined, frankly, as a pejorative term. Analytic philosophers used it with a sneer to refer to what they saw as the obscurantist style of much of this work. The accusation was that the main purpose of this dense literary style was to hide the lack of substance and protect fragile arguments -if any could be found in the first place- from refutation. Indeed, a group of Cambridge philosophers united in an (unsuccessful) attempt to prevent Cambridge awarding Derrida an honorary doctorate. I think this sneer was sometimes quite justified and the accusation occasionally hits its mark (I am yet to be convinced there is anything of value in Derrida's corpus). But it really is impossible to evaluate 'continental philosophy' as a cohesive entity, because it is not a cohesive entity.

Well, where does that leave the distinction today? Nowadays, almost all philosophy departments describe themselves as 'analytic'. But that is because all 'analytic' mean is 'clear, precise and rigorous'; it is an entirely stylistic term and the interest of 'analytic' philosophers range over everything. On the other hand, the analytic research program as described above is dead. There never was a continental research program, 'continental philosophy' is a rather vague term for a bunch of very different philosophers. Some of these philosophers good, and some bad (I am no expert here). So that is why the distinction is not very useful; it has always been somewhat invented, and can no longer describe the terrain of contemporary philosophy.

 

[Tahuti]

Speaking of ethics, how should we judge an ethical system? How should we decide which ethical system is the best?

I may not be qualified to answer you this, but here is my take: Ethics are negotiated based on the needs of all individuals involved within the particular ethical system. Some may get a better cut than others, but that won't be necessarily contested if individuals do not perceive this or decides that it may not be worth the effort to do so. What is moral or not is based on the implicit code that is based on customs, which in turn was implicitly negotiated between individuals to fulfill (their conception of) their needs as much as they possibly can. These needs can be material or immaterial, like personal achievement.

Now, you also have what I would term "ethical designership", which are rationally designed forms of ethics, like utilitarianism and are usually never fully lived by in real life. It often comes packaged in ideologies like Libertarianism and Communism as well. The problem is that these kind are ethics are nothing but empty words if society does not live to them. In fact, the way humans are currently evolved, this might be physically impossible. Not to mention they often arbitrarily assigns what humans supposedly universally consider "needs", or they are interpreted as such, with the same results.

So a "good" (scare quotes for the fact I believe objective morality is never possible) code of ethics takes into account the fundamental "differentness" between individuals and thus the needs of humans (which are different for each individual, and may not necessarily entail arbitrary variables like happiness, which disqualifies me as a utilitarian) and the physical ability to live by them. To be sure, this is anti-utopian, and in fact celebrates the perpetual flawedness of human life. I believe ethical designership (which I see often here) is dangerous to ones' potential, but of course you decide.

In short, ethics cannot be universally judged. It cannot exist independently of life, so life is the variable that determines the value of ethics, which is different for everyone.

 

[Mise]

You first paragraph is a little confusing. Are you telling me how ethical systems are judged, or how they should be judged? I'm asking about the latter. Secondly, are you telling me about moral statements (such as "murder is wrong"), or are you telling me about ethical systems (such as Kant's categorical imperative, or Aristotle's virtue ethics)? I'm talking about the latter. Are you telling me that the value of moral statements are formed through negotiation between members of a society in order to best satisfy the needs of each individual in that society? Or are you telling me that the value of ethical systems ought to be established through negotiation?

In the rest of your post, you seem to have established a single criteria to help me judge an ethical system: whether anyone can actually live up to it. Is this the only criteria? Imagine two ethical systems, A and B. System A says "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". System B says "do unto others what you would have them do unto you, unless they are black, in which case you can do what you want to them". Both of these things are equally easy for one to live up to; perhaps B is easier to live up to than A, but for the sake of argument assume that they are equally easy to live up to. Why should I choose A over B?

EDIT: Also, are you telling me stuff that mainstream philosophers use to judge ethical systems, or are you telling me what your position on the issue is? They may be the same thing of course.

 

[Tahuti]

Are you telling me that the value of moral statements are formed through negotiation between members of a society in order to best satisfy the needs of each individual in that society? Or are you telling me that the value of ethical systems ought to be established through negotiation?

The former, of course. To be fair, I don't think normative ethics are meaningful - hence I call it ethical designership. Kantianism and Utilitarianism would be normative ethics. In fact, because of the highly subjective nature of ethics, I do not believe there are moral truths at all. This is not to say I favor brutish social darwinism, since I personally dislike it, but I think my opinion is not better than those who do.

Also, are you telling me stuff that mainstream philosophers use to judge ethical systems, or are you telling me what your position on the issue is? They may be the same thing of course.

Both. I have the feeling that philosophers who support normative ethics (i.e. Kant, Mill) seem to make assumptions they believe are self-evident, hence why I think ethics should be approached as a descriptive, and not a normative. In mainstream philosophy class, my position would be labeled "moral anti-realism" and would include names such as Nietzsche (at least, that's how I interpret him) and J.L. Mackie (one of the Australian realists, realist indicating their strongly metaphysical anti-idealist views).

 

[Mise]

Well I'm asking about the latter

 

[lovett]

Speaking of ethics, how should we judge an ethical system? How should we decide which ethical system is the best?

This is a very interesting question.

I will start by laying my cards on the table. I am a moral realist. That means I believe that ethics concerns mind-independent, objective moral facts - at least in the same way as does geography, astronomy or ecology. Given that, there is only one way to judge ethical systems: by whether they are true or false. The best ethical system is the ethical system which contains all and only ethical truths, much like the best mathematical system is that which contains all and only mathematical truths (and the best physical system...and so on). So that means your question is closely related to a question about moral epistemology: How do we find what the truth about ethics is? What are our best methods? If we answer this question, we will answer your question because the best system will be that which has been come to by our best methods - at least we will have justification for believing this to be the best.

So with that in mind, in modern moral philosophy the method of reflective equilibrium has been the most important (A Rawlsian term). One's beliefs are in reflective equilibrium when they cohere perfectly. This straightforwardly includes consistency; one's beliefs fail to cohere if one holds contradictory beliefs. But it also includes relations of explanation and support. A system of beliefs in which some beliefs support of explain other beliefs is more coherent. So a belief set in reflective equilibrium won't just be empty - it will contain a dense network of deeply entwined beliefs. So the method of reflective equilibrium will now be fairly obvious; it is the movement from one's current belief set into a belief set in reflective equilibrium. One takes the beliefs one holds at present and, by making them more coherent, improve them. So this is at least one very plausible epistemology - we come to know moral facts through a coherentist method.

I'll take a moment to suggest why we think this method might work. This is an issue that stretches far beyond ethics; many people think this sort of method is the only one available for us in knowing any facts. So we can only come to know things about the world through a broadly coherentist process. But one doesn't need to believe that to think this is a good epistemology in some fields. One suggestion I find very attractive is that ethical facts just are (some of) those we would be believe if we were fully rational, and to be fully rational is to be in full reflective equilibrium. So fully rational people would believe murder was wrong and suffering was a bad (and therefore -although this is an addition- neither murder nor cause suffering). If that is the case the the method of reflective equilibrium clearly works; it gets us closer to the state in which we believe the ethical facts. This sort of epistemology seems to me quite fruitful in other a priori areas as well; mathematics is the most obvious.

Anyway, what does this mean for the assessment of ethical systems? Well, it means the best system is one one would believe in reflective equilibrium. So the best system is the most coherent system (it is possible there could be several of these). It is a consistent system with the most links of explanation and support between different beliefs. In practice that means we can assess systems like this: we can first take our verdictive moral intuitions (Killing that baby is wrong! That genocide was evil!) and then see if we can reconcile them with general principles (Disrespecting humanity is wrong!). To put it very crudely, the best ethical systems are those which allow us to explain these verdictive judgements with the simplest, most parsimonious principles. This may, of course, involve some revision to those judgements: what we do is take our moral judgements and our considered moral beliefs, see if they are reconcilable, try and explain them with general principles and then revise as appropriate. This is, of course, a very complex task; we also have to consider our judgements about praise and blame, about motivation and reasons and so on and so forth. That is why ethics is hard.

So hopefully that answers your question. I've said i'm a moral realist and that certainly colours this answer. But it isn't an answer only moral realists can use, I should stress. Those why think ethical truths are constructed can say much the same as I have said and come out with a similar way of evaluating ethical systems. Those who think moral language isn't descriptive, and instead expresses particular attitudes, can also say this. They can say we have reason for all our attitudes to be in line and this is why the method of reflective equilibrium works. The only person who cannot say what I have said is the moral nihilist; the person who thinks that moral language is both descriptive -it tries to describe facts- but that there are no facts for it to describe. There are no moral truths and all moral language is in error. For this sort of person, there is no evaluating different ethical systems: they are all wrong.

 

[Winston Hughes]

Is it a problem that philosophy is conducted (or appears to be conducted) exclusively within the ivory tower of professional academia?

 

[Borachio]

This is a very interesting question.

I will start by laying my cards on the table. I am a moral realist. That means I believe that ethics concerns mind-independent, objective moral facts - at least in the same way as does geography, astronomy or ecology. Given that, there is only one way to judge ethical systems: by whether they are true or false. The best ethical system is the ethical system which contains all and only ethical truths, much like the best mathematical system is that which contains all and only mathematical truths (and the best physical system...and so on). So that means your question is closely related to a question about moral epistemology: How do we find what the truth about ethics is? What are our best methods? If we answer this question, we will answer your question because the best system will be that which has been come to by our best methods - at least we will have justification for believing this to be the best.

So with that in mind, in modern moral philosophy the method of reflective equilibrium has been the most important (A Rawlsian term). One's beliefs are in reflective equilibrium when they cohere perfectly. This straightforwardly includes consistency; one's beliefs fail to cohere if one holds contradictory beliefs. But it also includes relations of explanation and support. A system of beliefs in which some beliefs support of explain other beliefs is more coherent. So a belief set in reflective equilibrium won't just be empty - it will contain a dense network of deeply entwined beliefs. So the method of reflective equilibrium will now be fairly obvious; it is the movement from one's current belief set into a belief set in reflective equilibrium. One takes the beliefs one holds at present and, by making them more coherent, improve them. So this is at least one very plausible epistemology - we come to know moral facts through a coherentist method.

I'll take a moment to suggest why we think this method might work. This is an issue that stretches far beyond ethics; many people think this sort of method is the only one available for us in knowing any facts. So we can only come to know things about the world through a broadly coherentist process. But one doesn't need to believe that to think this is a good epistemology in some fields. One suggestion I find very attractive is that ethical facts just are (some of) those we would be believe if we were fully rational, and to be fully rational is to be in full reflective equilibrium. So fully rational people would believe murder was wrong and suffering was a bad (and therefore -although this is an addition- neither murder nor cause suffering). If that is the case the the method of reflective equilibrium clearly works; it gets us closer to the state in which we believe the ethical facts. This sort of epistemology seems to me quite fruitful in other a priori areas as well; mathematics is the most obvious.

Anyway, what does this mean for the assessment of ethical systems? Well, it means the best system is one one would believe in reflective equilibrium. So the best system is the most coherent system (it is possible there could be several of these). It is a consistent system with the most links of explanation and support between different beliefs. In practice that means we can assess systems like this: we can first take our verdictive moral intuitions (Killing that baby is wrong! That genocide was evil!) and then see if we can reconcile them with general principles (Disrespecting humanity is wrong!). To put it very crudely, the best ethical systems are those which allow us to explain these verdictive judgements with the simplest, most parsimonious principles. This may, of course, involve some revision to those judgements: what we do is take our moral judgements and our considered moral beliefs, see if they are reconcilable, try and explain them with general principles and then revise as appropriate. This is, of course, a very complex task; we also have to consider our judgements about praise and blame, about motivation and reasons and so on and so forth. That is why ethics is hard.

So hopefully that answers your question. I've said i'm a moral realist and that certainly colours this answer. But it isn't an answer only moral realists can use, I should stress. Those why think ethical truths are constructed can say much the same as I have said and come out with a similar way of evaluating ethical systems. Those who think moral language isn't descriptive, and instead expresses particular attitudes, can also say this. They can say we have reason for all our attitudes to be in line and this is why the method of reflective equilibrium works. The only person who cannot say what I have said is the moral nihilist; the person who thinks that moral language is both descriptive -it tries to describe facts- but that there are no facts for it to describe. There are no moral truths and all moral language is in error. For this sort of person, there is no evaluating different ethical systems: they are all wrong.

This is an interesting answer.

But if there may be more than one ethical system which satisfies your criteria, you're still left with the problem of deciding which one is the best. Or would they all come in at equal first place?

And just exactly what is wrong with moral nihilism? What makes you think that a moral system must exist? (If indeed you do.)

 

[Mise]

@Lovett: An interesting answer indeed, thanks!

My first thought is that it's better to be right than to be consistent. What happens if the process of reflective equilibrium gets stuck in a local equilibrium? Would it not be preferable to admit some inconsistencies in your ethical system(s), in order to arrive at a greater number of (what you rationally believe are) moral truths?

But if there may be more than one ethical system which satisfies your criteria, you're still left with the problem of deciding which one is the best. Or would they all come in at equal first place?

If you can't tell two things apart then they're identical. Something I learnt in Physics (Of course they're not "identical" literally, but if they're as good as each other then it doesn't matter which one you pick, you will be an equally moral person either way.)

 

[Borachio]

I'm reminded that schizophrenics often have internally consistent models of the world (a kind of local equilibrium?). Or at least I have heard it said so. Perhaps the point is that they really don't: that they're missing one crucial consistency with the rest of humanity.

 

[Mise]

Yes and at least from stereotypes on TV, paranoid people also seem to have an answer for everything. Hard to argue that the Hollywood Paranoid Archetype doesn't have a "dense network of deeply entwined beliefs" that are also internally consistent.

 

[El_Machinae]

Okay, how do you stand on the mind/body problem? What're the thoughts on how consciousness manifests and what kind of evidence will be required?

Secondly, are there any interesting philosophy podcasts?

 

[Gary Childress]

Great topic Lovett! Thanks for posting it! I've studied philosophy a bit myself and think it the most useful thing I've done in life, to familiarize myself with the foundations of thought and understanding which human civilization is and has been built upon. It really gets you into a whole new world of dialog with the masters, not to mention it can help a person in life more than Dr. Phil ever could! Can't go wrong with philosophy as far as I'm concerned!

 

[Smellincoffee]

Do you use philosophy in practical terms, like the Stoics and Epicureans once did?

 

[Gary Childress]

Do you use philosophy in practical terms, like the Stoics and Epicureans once did?

Maybe I'm not supposed to answer this in this thread, I don't know, (my apologies if not, this will be my only answer if I'm not) but the Stoics and Epicureans weren't the only philosophers concerned with "practical" matters (if by practical you mean something along the lines of "usefull" or involving "action"). Descartes' meditations are/were essentially as much "practical" as what the Stoics and Epicureans wrote. Don't forget the Skeptics and Cynics as well (my personal favorites), they were also very "practical" philosophers. Kant's ethics are about practical, everyday matters. Stuff like Bertrand Russell's "Principia Mathematica" are essentially about "practical" matters, they're just a bit harder to understand than other works. Philosophy in general is about "practical" matters. It's a popular myth that so much philosophy is "impractical" or that ordinary people don't use it. It's a myth we tell ourselves that makes us more comfortable thinking that there is no reason to involve ourselves in something we don't think much about, like Aesop's sour grapes.

I know Wittgenstein is popular for the "philosophy is dead" stuff but don't believe it for a minute. As Bertrand Russell more or less quipped about Wittgenstein, at that point Wittgenstein essentially got lazy, frustrated and gave up. Philosophy is a never ending process and it is as essential to human nature as breathing. There is "no exit" from being philosophical. Unless of course you die....maybe.

 

[Perfection]

Does Mary learn anything when she sees red for the first time?

 

[lovett]

This is an interesting answer.

But if there may be more than one ethical system which satisfies your criteria, you're still left with the problem of deciding which one is the best. Or would they all come in at equal first place?

And just exactly what is wrong with moral nihilism? What makes you think that a moral system must exist? (If indeed you do.)

Yes, apologies: I misspoke. I meant to say that convey the notion that there could be several maximally coherent ethical systems which didn't contradict one another. So the disjunction of these system is what one should believe. If they did contradict each other, as you rightly comprehend, that would be very bad news for the combination of reflective equilibrium and moral realism.

As per moral nihilism, there are a number of things wrong with moral nihilism. Firstly, there are no good arguments for moral nihilism: this is my opinion, of course. There are no arguments which should lead us to think moral facts don't exist. That's the most important thing, because I think most people become nihilist under the misapprehension that some argument is, in fact, a good argument for nihilism. Unfortunately, I cannot deal with all the arguments for nihilism at a stroke, because they don't all fail in the same way. But I think one of the most persuasive things to say here is to make an analogy between moral facts and facts about our reasons.

By 'reasons' I mean the sort of thing -whatever it is- that rationally justifies us in doing some action. So, if I am thirsty, my thirst is a reason for me drinking the clear liquid (water) in the cup in front of me. It justifies my drinking that liquid and allows me to defend myself from the charge of irrationality vis a vis the drinking. Moreover, reasons are at least prima facie objective. Suppose that unbeknownst to me the clear liquid in the class was actually poison. Then I would have no reason to drink it, even though I thought it would quench my thirst. So our reasons are not just what we think our reasons are. And reasons are very important; we try to do everything for reasons. And it is very hard to deny that reasons exist - like the nihilist does about moral facts. That is partly because reasons mediate what we should and should not believe. I should only believe P if I have a reason to believe P. But then, if reasons don't exist I shouldn't believe reasons don't exist. And that is because I have no reason for that belief. That isn't a contradiction, but it is a very unhappy situation to be in. We would need a strong argument to accept it, I think.

How this links up to moral facts is that moral facts -facts about what is right and wrong- are (or can be) in all respects on par with facts about our reasons. So if there are arguments which lead us to deny the existence of moral facts, it is highly surprising that we don't deny the existence of reasons. Indeed, many people thinks moral obligations just are reasons. But we really don't want to deny the existence of reasons. So that should make us equally reluctant to accept unexamined any purported argument that concludes moral facts don't exist.

I should say this particular analogy is a particularly vivid demonstration of a general point: error theories are bad. That is to say, theories which attribute massive error to people should -all else being equal- be rejected. That is because people are usually right (else we would be locked in scepticism!). Moral nihilism is an error theory par excellence. That is because our moral discourse pre-supposes the existence of moral facts. So, unless there are good arguments for nihilism, we certainly shouldn't accept it.

@Lovett: An interesting answer indeed, thanks!

My first thought is that it's better to be right than to be consistent. What happens if the process of reflective equilibrium gets stuck in a local equilibrium? Would it not be preferable to admit some inconsistencies in your ethical system(s), in order to arrive at a greater number of (what you rationally believe are) moral truths?

I think it is important first to be clear about what consistency means. Consistency is not full coherence. Consistency is a mere lack of contradictory beliefs. It is hard to see how one could improve one's belief set by accepting a bunch of contradictions. One might, of course, arise at a greater number of truths. But in the same way I believe all the truths if I believe every proposition and its negation. But that is no improvement. I'd venture that it is generally true that removing contradictions from one's belief set improves it, simply because if one believes two contradictory beliefs one has at least one false belief. Indeed, A fully coherent belief set will also be fully consistent (otherwise it could be improved, by removing a false belief).

With that cleared up we can get to your more substantive concern. I think you have a number of concerns. One is whether the method of reflective equilibrium could get 'stuck': we could get stuck in a local equilibrium unable to ever achieve full equilibrium. And I think it could. But so can all our methods - if we are brains in vats (for instance_ there are no methods for finding out facts about the world. But this possibility does not mean we shouldn't use the best methods we have available: we use them on the assumption we are not in a terrible epistemological condition.

The second concern you may have is whether one could have two or more incompatible systems of belief which were nonetheless fully coherent. I am committed to the view that -in ethics at least- you could not. I'd say the same about mathematics, at least some parts of it. If this isn't true then the combination of the method of reflective equilibrium and moral realism is in trouble. But I don't think it is very implausible. That is because the notion of coherence being used is a very 'thick' one. It is not just consistency (the null set is perfectly consistent). It is also support and explanation. This gives us a lot of capacity to say that there is only one fully coherent system, because we can judge systems on various grounds.

Take the paranoid schizophrenic, for instance. Actually, I don't know much about the actual paranoid schizophrenic, so take the hollywood version of the illness. As you say, these people are depicted as having an 'answer for everything.' But I think it is pretty plausible that the explanatory links between their answer are much weaker than those between mine and yours. If I stub my toe 'The government did it!' is not a good explanation. And there are loads of reasons for that: it fits in oddly with the other things I observe in the world, it is not supported by those things and gives them no support, and there are better explanations waiting in the wings. So in that sort of way if I were to hold this belief my belief set would be less coherent.

Is it a problem that philosophy is conducted (or appears to be conducted) exclusively within the ivory tower of professional academia?

I think the best answer to this is: not in a way special to philosophy. That is to say, it would be great if people outside academia could do cutting edge work in philosophy. It would also be great if they could do cutting edge work in mathematics or physics. But, by and large, they can't. That is because all these fields require very extensive training to do cutting edge work, and the time in which to do it. So, although it would be good if everyone had the relevant capacity, I am reluctant to call the lack of it a 'problem' (partly, because it is obviously insoluble).

Maybe you mean to get at something else with your question. If so, feel free to explain.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Why is Bertrand Russell such a flippant dick? History of Western Philosophy had such great potential.

How much of philosophy, do you think, is a search for truth, and how much is people musing about how they think the world works?

What reply do you have to the common criticism (which obviously comes from an empirical position) that philosophy doesn't prove anything?