Ask a Soldier

[Flying Pig]

Just as normal people do - have a hot drink and man through it! If it was a proper bout of 'flu - which is perhaps the most overreported disease in human history - in the field, you could probably expect to be CasEvac'd to the rear and off the exercise, to the ridicule and abuse of your colleagues.

My Brigade (173rd Airborne Brigade) and I parachuted into Iraq, 26 March 2003... it is completely sound, because it makes the enemy defend in depth. Meaning, he can't just pile on a front line. I would agree that the UK mustering enough air frames for a brigade may be... a bridge too far.

The British take the view that large-scale drops are very vulnerable - witness the huge casualty rates during Market Garden from men who hadn't even reached the ground, not to mention the chaos that followed - and so should be avoided against an enemy with credible air defence or even strong ground forces. I understand that the Americans and the Russians feel differently about it.

 

[kochman]

The British take the view that large-scale drops are very vulnerable - witness the huge casualty rates during Market Garden from men who hadn't even reached the ground, not to mention the chaos that followed - and so should be avoided against an enemy with credible air defence or even strong ground forces. I understand that the Americans and the Russians feel differently about it.

Well, you have to do it right.
Market Garden was a mistake basically based on poor recon. They didn't realize the 2 x SS divisions were in town re-arming after a long time at the Eastern Front...
The troopers didn't suffer much before hitting the ground in MG, from what I recall. That was D-Day, which was the last time large scale drops were attempted directly on the objectives.
In MG and beyond, the idea has been to parachute it well away from the objective, in an undefended area, regroup, then move to the objective. That's what we did in Iraq.

As far as our drop... We wouldn't have done it if we didn't have TOTAL mastery of the situation. We had something like 50 fighter jets escorting our 17 or so C-17s (10 with troops, holding 100 each). Any radar on the ground got turned on, which it did, it got a missile up its rear end pretty quickly.
There was 1 SAM fired at us, and it was way off (I don't know why).

I was pretty worried about Iraqi ground forces... seeing as how they had something like the 4th biggest ground army in the world, and it was between us and the closest friendly unit. That night there was 959 of us on the ground! The Iraqis never came.
Also, we did have an alliance with the Kurdish, so they amped our numbers up.

 

[Flying Pig]

In MG and beyond, the idea has been to parachute it well away from the objective, in an undefended area, regroup, then move to the objective. That's what we did in Iraq.

Indeed - even MG, though, saw several gliders and aircraft lost, even if there weren't men being shot down as they jumped. They also had to use sub-optimal flight paths to get around German air defences, and couldn't drop where they wanted to for the same reason - there's an article of mine on the subject knocking around in World History.

As far as our drop... We wouldn't have done it if we didn't have TOTAL mastery of the situation. We had something like 50 fighter jets escorting our 17 or so C-17s (10 with troops, holding 100 each). Any radar on the ground got turned on, which it did, it got a missile up its rear end pretty quickly.

Yes, that's essentially the defining point - we don't usually have that level of overwhelming superiority. We still do use parachute drops on occasion - elements of 1 PARA dropped into Helmand in 2010 as part of a thrust there.

 

[kochman]

Indeed - even MG, though, saw several gliders and aircraft lost, even if there weren't men being shot down as they jumped. They also had to use sub-optimal flight paths to get around German air defences, and couldn't drop where they wanted to for the same reason - there's an article of mine on the subject knocking around in World History.

Gliders =/= Airborne in my book.

Yes, that's essentially the defining point - we don't usually have that level of overwhelming superiority. We still do use parachute drops on occasion - elements of 1 PARA dropped into Helmand in 2010 as part of a thrust there.

Yeah, you need that... and our side has that... at least in the current theaters.
Either way, whether you actually DO the drop or not, it forces the enemy to defend against it... so, AA guns he might not have had... more troops in reserve, probably positioned at key bridges, airfields, etc.
This saves lives.

 

[SS-18 ICBM]

Can any officers here tell us of the military strategists they had to study at their military academy? And is it too much trouble to ask for a short summary and comparison of the theories of Jomini vs. Clausewitz?

 

[kochman]

Can any officers here tell us of the military strategists they had to study at their military academy? And is it too much trouble to ask for a short summary and comparison of the theories of Jomini vs. Clausewitz?

The WW2 Germans... fire and maneuver. I'm not kidding you when I say their tactics are used to this day.

The first "fire and maneuver" guy was apparently Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

However, what you seem to be asking is higher level stuff... strategic stuff versus tactical stuff.
I got out before I got to that level.

However, by and large, fire and maneuver is still quite applicable at higher/larger levels.

 

[SS-18 ICBM]

The WW2 Germans... fire and maneuver. I'm not kidding you when I say their tactics are used to this day.

I don't see why not, modern tanks are better performers but they aren't radically different.

However, what you seem to be asking is higher level stuff... strategic stuff versus tactical stuff.
I got out before I got to that level.

However, by and large, fire and maneuver is still quite applicable at higher/larger levels.

That's fine too, thanks for reminding me of the importance of tactics.

 

[kochman]

I don't see why not, modern tanks are better performers but they aren't radically different.

Yes, but those same tactics are also used by the infantry.
Basically, one element fires at the enemy from where contact initiated. A second element moves without firing to a flanking position, preferably at a right angle, and preferably under cover and concealment so they aren't seen... While the suppressing element maintains fire, the flanking element, now at a 90% angle to the enemy, starts advancing also firing.
The enemy is in a cross fire.
As the flanking element advances onto the objective/enemy position, the suppressing element shifts fire... meaning, shifts their aim away from the approach of the flanking element. As the flanking element gets to the objective, the enemy is now several weakened, the suppressing element "lifts" fire, meaning stops firing on the objective altogether, thereby avoiding friendly fire.
The enemy is probably pretty much toast at this point, and the flanking elements sweeps through the objective, nullifying any threat... then setting up a secure perimeter. The suppressing element, protected by the flanking elements security posture, moves on the objective, and the unit re-consolidates.

If you ever play Total War, try this out, it is quite effective!

That's fine too, thanks for reminding me of the importance of tactics.

For strategy, your specific question, I cannot address it. I wish I could actually.

 

[SS-18 ICBM]

Yes, but those same tactics are also used by the infantry.
Basically, one element fires at the enemy from where contact initiated. A second element moves without firing to a flanking position, preferably at a right angle, and preferably under cover and concealment so they aren't seen... While the suppressing element maintains fire, the flanking element, now at a 90% angle to the enemy, starts advancing also firing.
The enemy is in a cross fire.
As the flanking element advances onto the objective/enemy position, the suppressing element shifts fire... meaning, shifts their aim away from the approach of the flanking element. As the flanking element gets to the objective, the enemy is now several weakened, the suppressing element "lifts" fire, meaning stops firing on the objective altogether, thereby avoiding friendly fire.
The enemy is probably pretty much toast at this point, and the flanking elements sweeps through the objective, nullifying any threat... then setting up a secure perimeter. The suppressing element, protected by the flanking elements security posture, moves on the objective, and the unit re-consolidates.

If you ever play Total War, try this out, it is quite effective!

I don't get the feeling this works as well if the enemy is dug in with fortifications. If they are in the open though, is retreating the only way to counter it?

 

[MobBoss]

Can any officers here tell us of the military strategists they had to study at their military academy? And is it too much trouble to ask for a short summary and comparison of the theories of Jomini vs. Clausewitz?

Btw, there are military professional reading lists upated every year for the War College or the various department heads (Army Chief of Staff, etc.).

You can find those lists with a quick google search.

 

[kochman]

I don't get the feeling this works as well if the enemy is dug in with fortifications. If they are in the open though, is retreating the only way to counter it?

Well, nothing works as well if the enemy is dug in!
That being said, same tactic is used, at least with bunkers.

With trenches everything changes, and that's a whole new idea... However, to get to the bunker, fire and maneuver is still used. It's inside the trench that things change.

 

[cav scout]

Well, nothing works as well if the enemy is dug in!
That being said, same tactic is used, at least with bunkers.

With trenches everything changes, and that's a whole new idea... However, to get to the bunker, fire and maneuver is still used. It's inside the trench that things change.

A little HE w/ superquick fuze setting on the objective beforehand is also helpful.

 

[Flying Pig]

Can any officers here tell us of the military strategists they had to study at their military academy? And is it too much trouble to ask for a short summary and comparison of the theories of Jomini vs. Clausewitz?

The Commissioning Course is based far more around leadership than strategy - by far the biggest intellectual influence on the British junior officer is William Slim, although we heard quite a lot from TE Lawrence, the Lord Harding (he gave an excellent lecture on the qualities of a leader which essentially defined the British attitude to leadership) and a bloke called Sidney Jary, who commanded a platoon of the Somersets from D-Day until VE Day, in the process becoming the only British platoon commander to survive that length of time with his original platoon intact.

In brief, Jomini treats war as a science and tries to pin it down to defined plans, while Clausewitz is dominated by the 'fog of war' and the need for flexibility. Jomini believed in the decisive breakthrough which characterised Napoleon's wars, and believed that battles were won by placing superior firepower at the most critical point on the field. He had a huge amount of influence in the US before the Civil War, which meant that generals on both sides of that conflict often began the war fighting quite rigid battles with plans which worked, but were fundamentally perscribed rather than imaginative: this changed later on as they realised the weaknesses of this approach. Clausewitz always argued against reducing warfare to the purely technical, which seems characteristic of Jomini's approach.

The WW2 Germans... fire and maneuver. I'm not kidding you when I say their tactics are used to this day.

The first "fire and maneuver" guy was apparently Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

However, what you seem to be asking is higher level stuff... strategic stuff versus tactical stuff.
I got out before I got to that level.

However, by and large, fire and maneuver is still quite applicable at higher/larger levels.

Those tactics have been going for far longer than that, although the Battle Drill as we know it is a product of the mid-Second World War - there's a story of a young officer at Salerno teaching it to his men, and after explaining it being asked by his Sergeant, in incredulous tones - 'aren't you going to lead us, sir?!'

Yes, but those same tactics are also used by the infantry.
Basically, one element fires at the enemy from where contact initiated. A second element moves without firing to a flanking position, preferably at a right angle, and preferably under cover and concealment so they aren't seen... While the suppressing element maintains fire, the flanking element, now at a 90% angle to the enemy, starts advancing also firing.
The enemy is in a cross fire.
As the flanking element advances onto the objective/enemy position, the suppressing element shifts fire... meaning, shifts their aim away from the approach of the flanking element. As the flanking element gets to the objective, the enemy is now several weakened, the suppressing element "lifts" fire, meaning stops firing on the objective altogether, thereby avoiding friendly fire.
The enemy is probably pretty much toast at this point, and the flanking elements sweeps through the objective, nullifying any threat... then setting up a secure perimeter. The suppressing element, protected by the flanking elements security posture, moves on the objective, and the unit re-consolidates.

The point is that the firefight must be won first - in the British system, the entire section lays down a huge amount of firepower to suppress the enemy, and then the assaulting fire-team - now not under a meaningful amount of enemy fire - can get up and make the assault.

I don't get the feeling this works as well if the enemy is dug in with fortifications. If they are in the open though, is retreating the only way to counter it?

You can still win the firefight against a dug-in enemy - in fact, it's sometimes easier, because the enemy are more inclined to duck and cover rather than continue to fight with bullets landing around them.

A little HE w/ superquick fuze setting on the objective beforehand is also helpful.

Or an air strike - known as a 'mop call' in British parlance, because the assaulting infantry will need mops to clean up what remains of the enemy afterwards.

 

[SS-18 ICBM]

In brief, Jomini treats war as a science and tries to pin it down to defined plans, while Clausewitz is dominated by the 'fog of war' and the need for flexibility. Jomini believed in the decisive breakthrough which characterised Napoleon's wars, and believed that battles were won by placing superior firepower at the most critical point on the field. He had a huge amount of influence in the US before the Civil War, which meant that generals on both sides of that conflict often began the war fighting quite rigid battles with plans which worked, but were fundamentally perscribed rather than imaginative: this changed later on as they realised the weaknesses of this approach. Clausewitz always argued against reducing warfare to the purely technical, which seems characteristic of Jomini's approach.

I'm not too far off the mark for suggesting Clausewitz is better suited for asymmetric warfare, am I?

 

[MobBoss]

I'm not too far off the mark for suggesting Clausewitz is better suited for asymmetric warfare, am I?

Actually, i'd say Sun Tzu is more suited for that for the simple reason he truly adopts an anything goes kind of attitude as long as it works. Fighting men of Clausewitz' era viewed soldiering as an honorable profession even if it was ultimately political, thus I dont think he would have regarded asymmectric warfare as something to engage in.

 

[Flying Pig]

Certainly the better of the two; asymmetric warfare wasn't really a Thing, to use a Dachs-ism, in the career of any 'classic' military writer: what we would now call unconventional tactics had been practiced since Fabius Cunctator, but 'guerrilla' forces were still recognisable as soldiers in formed units; the idea of a war where an enemy combatant becomes indistinguishable from a civilian hadn't really come about at their time. Clausewitz placed a much greater emphasis on flexibility, and identified the confusion that comes about in combat operations through uncertain information, the time-delay between enemy action and the report of that action reaching high command, and the strained intellects and emotions of men on the ground: these things are all magnified in asymmetric warfare, and he would certainly have seen 'the continuation of policy by other means' in the Viet Cong or the Taliban. I would take issue with Mobboss' statement, though: I think you're right that he wouldn't have thought that engaging in asymmetric warfare as the unconventional side was a moral or sensible thing for a soldier to do - after all, these sides can't win; they can only force the other side to lose: this means that they don't have the power of initative on an overall level - but I equally don't think he would have had any qualms about fighting an enemy who was using such tactics, since to retreat from such a struggle would be a failure of the army, and so a failure of the State.

 

[MobBoss]

Oh, FP, I dont think he would have had any qualms fighting an enemy using those tactics either. I fully imagine he would have come up with a solution not unlike those used against the Boers.

 

[Ayn Rand]

And is it too much trouble to ask for a short summary and comparison of the theories of Jomini vs. Clausewitz?

I've read Clausewitz but not Jomini - as far as I understand though they are largely similar, treating the operatonal level of war primarily as a means to resolve tactical problems and concentrating on battlefighting and physical destruction. I might be wrong but I think they were both pursuing essentially the same style of military theory with only slight differences.

Shimon Naveh is a great author to read IMO if you want to get some dialectic - his book "in pursuit of military excellence" is diametrically opposed to the mentality of Clausewitz and Jomini and much more in the modern style of manoeuvre warfare. He does a good job of recording the evolution of german and soviet military theories and the process of doctrinal reform that created american AirLand military theory.

 

[SS-18 ICBM]

What factors make it impossible to combine a surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile system in one package (i.e., a man-portable missile launcher that can engage both aircraft and armored vehicles)?

 

[Cutlass]

Kind of all of them.

Break it down by parts: A missile designed to destroy an armored vehicle has to have a powerful warhead and has to hit a slow moving target. That's usually accomplished by some form of shaped charge warhead that puts as much of possible of the explosive force in a very narrow direction. A missile to destroy an aircraft needs a much smaller warhead, but has to track and hit a rapidly moving, and maneuvering, target. That's accomplished by a warhead that explodes shrapnel into a spherical area to maximize the likelihood of shrapnel hitting the aircraft when the warhead detonates in close proximity, rather than an actual hit.