How do you mean? International relations form consistently outside of power axes and are only disrupted by conscious effort on the part of said axes.
I'm not talking about power axes as order forming agents, but rather as central poles around which the current international order is arranged (the "Is" of the current state of affairs as I see it, not the "how"). These poles didn't necessarily form the order, and the order might endure a change in the current constellation of powers, but they do dominate its strategic considerations in the present. These poles possess bonds (strong, weak and antipathic) with states within and without of their "spheres" which are the primary drivers as I see it of current world affairs.
So to give an example of this, there is a clear Russian pole (one of three as I see it), around which various satellites orbit (in eastern Europe, Kazakhstan and so forth) which could be classified as strong bonds, weaker bonds also exist between Russia and states like Ascendant China, the United States as well. Together they can be said to form a Russian Sphere, ergo the part of the world where Russia is the strongest great power (positive*) influence on lesser states behaviours. However Antipathic bonds exist as well, between Scandinavia and Russia, the Proletarist States of America and the United States (and Russia) and so forth where Russia may be the strongest (negative*) influence. These bonds are formed in reaction to the agency and strategic realities of the Russian sphere and serve as an axis around which international events pivot (not the only one though).
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~note: positive and negative used in the sense of "negative" being a response against, and "positive" being a response towards.
I'm not sure that's at all accurate, Jehoshua. I'd say all those powers have serious international influence or the potential for it, perhaps excepting Argentina and Vinland. I'd say that Brazil and Japan each have more practical influcence than Germany, for that matter.
Germany is interesting in that its influence (enacted, or rather not, through active agency) is precipitously declining due to a lack of will on its part (as I see it). Very, very recently in game terms Germany clearly had a sphere in the line of the Russian or British spheres which serves as a main pivot of global international relations. This being evident in the war in France which established Germany as the Hegemon of Western Europe (with Italy as a junior partner). Its been a real failure of German foreign policy that its failed to leverage its still powerful economic and military position into sustaining its hegemonic role, and political influence.
That said influence (not to be confused with loud-bluster) is not everything (noting the lesser powers are far weaker on real terms than Germany), and the German hegemonic sphere has not yet reached the point of total collapse (and can easily be revived by a more publically assertive and active Germany I think). So I think as of the current capto-iugulum year its still fair to speak of three main poles, even if the German pole is at best in the throes of a serious illness.
