Do we have free will? Is the world indeterministic?

[Traitorfish]

No, the definition does not exclude determinism. The mind is largely deterministic, but that doesn't matter to the definition, because if the mind is the more proximate cause, then it's free even if it's deterministic.

Then it feels like you're hanging onto the idea of "free will" more because you like the name than because it's actually a useful way of describing human choice-making.

You are a mental model of yourself that you have. All conscious (aka self aware) beings have such a model. It's a rough, but undeniably exists as a model, even though we have trouble pinning it down sometimes.

"What's a porcupine?"
"It's a noun".


Point being, yes, "me" is a model, but that model is generally taken to be a model of some really-occurring phenomenon, and its the nature of that phenomenon that I'm suggesting is being contested.

 

[Borachio]

Who's "I"? That is, again, pretty central to this whole question, and I tend to find that theories of free will (or, at least, those that don't just use it as an akward way of describing indeterminism) rest on a conception of the self that I don't find convincing.

Well, "I" just have to ask: what is this thing that doesn't find it convincing?

 

[Traitorfish]

That was my question, yes.

 

[Souron]

Ah, but that's where you're wrong/misunderstood. (While you're saying something else entirely, that I'm wrong specifically, I'm going to make deteminism incompatible with free will for the sake of underlining a very basic argument in determinism... I'm basically going to expand on my point even though it's probably wrong and crap) Establishing responsibility doesn't have anything to do with fault. Responsibility is a moral or legal distinction, fault is... Something else entirely. I think you're getting to the murder trial problem in the free will debate; if the murderer was subject to metaphysical determinism and free will didn't exist, should he still be jailed? Of course he should. Then the judge is similarly subject to metaphysical determinism and may jail the murderer. It's demonstrably a case of simple causality. You killed, you're jailed. Because as we're all subject to the illusion of free will, we have the necessity - not moral or legal necessity, but physical necessity - of acting on it and not being indifferent when someone commits something horrible. Look at my first post in this thread. Whether free will is objectively there or not, it shouldn't matter to us in most contexts, because we will always experience the illusion of free will; we can't act without this illusion. We're bound beings and must necessarily act accordingly - again, not legally or morally, but physically. We're simply not mentally capable to act as if we didn't have free will.

With regard to the murderer problem, I disagree that a non free willed killer machine should be treated precisely the same way as a killer human. Humans are praised and shunned for what they do, set as examples to other people, and themselves have an emotional concept of responsibility. A person who wronged someone, should work to right the wrong, if possible. Machines like we have today (as opposed to sapient machines) that malfunction may need to be decommissioned, but they will never be required to pay damages for their malfunction. Instead the humans ultimately responsible for the machine should right the wrongs committed by the machine.

That we all have this illusion doesn't make it true, however. Intersubjectivity =/= objectivity.

What is an illusion of what though? It's possible to imagine how free will can be not as free as it seems, but such models require free will to be possible. The compatibalist definition of free will does define free will out of existance, but it doesn't explain what it means to have an illusion of free will.

I'd like to concretize this: Free will "existing" is contradictionary to Physics with the capital P and is therefore problematic when working with Physics with the capital P. Everywhere else, it's simply irrelevant as a concept.

It's only contradictory if you define it incorrectly .

 

[Souron]

Then it feels like you're hanging onto the idea of "free will" more because you like the name than because it's actually a useful way of describing human choice-making.

No, I'm actually actively seeking the definition of free will that is tied to responsibility, and our other intuitions about the concept. I don't want to define freedom differently when I talk about "free will" and when I talk about "free the slaves".

Point being, yes, "me" is a model, but that model is generally taken to be a model of some really-occurring phenomenon, and its the nature of that phenomenon that I'm suggesting is being contested.

Most people don't contest that people have minds. Are you?

 

[Core Imposter]

With regard to the murderer problem, I disagree that a non free willed killer machine should be treated precisely the same way as a killer human.

If deterministic, the word should is illogical. One would not be making value judgements. They would just happen.

 

[Souron]

If deterministic, the word should is illogical. One would not be making value judgements. They would just happen.

I disagree with that. The process of thinking is not diminished by being being deterministic and "just happening". Quite the opposite, value judgments are better off for being consistent.

 

[Traitorfish]

No, I'm actually actively seeking the definition of free will that is tied to responsibility, and our other intuitions about the concept. I don't want to define freedom differently when I talk about "free will" and when I talk about "free the slaves".

Well that's kind of what I mean: "free will", in this usage, doesn't really have much to do with the classical concept of free will, and just becomes a sort of optimistic way of saying "brains do stuff on their own".

Most people don't contest that people have minds. Are you?

Yes, and it's the nature of that mind which I'm talking about. It's only worth so much agreeing "we have minds" if we both mean totally things by it.

What does it mean to say that "'I' chose to do x"? Does it mean that an indivisible cogito has chosen to do x? Or does it mean that a particular set of squishy circuits inside a cognitive system have issued a set of prompts to that effect? Presumably we'd say the latter, but then what is the relationship between the squishy circuits and "I"? If they're not equivalent, and they really couldn't be given that different bits of the brain produce different decisions, then can we say that "I" choose?

 

[Angst]

I have nothing more to add to the rest. I just wanted to answer this:

With regard to the murderer problem, I disagree that a non free willed killer machine should be treated precisely the same way as a killer human. Humans are praised and shunned for what they do, set as examples to other people, and themselves have an emotional concept of responsibility. A person who wronged someone, should work to right the wrong, if possible. Machines like we have today (as opposed to sapient machines) that malfunction may need to be decommissioned, but they will never be required to pay damages for their malfunction. Instead the humans ultimately responsible for the machine should right the wrongs committed by the machine.

This is really strange to me. I said nothing of the sort that humans should be actually treated as machines, I put forward the quite opposite (If we utilize the real definition of machine rather than the rhethorical/metaphorical one I use when discussing free will). Just like we shouldn't treat machines like rocks or birds or cookies. I see no connection with my statement and this problem you're presenting. I think I could possibly formulate the distinction between my argument and the point you're presenting... Uh I'll try:

Humans =/= nonsapient machines. Whether free will exists or not has no implication on this definition. Consciousness has. The complexity of a human makes it ridiculous to simply decomission him rather than having him need to repent. Also, a machine can't repent so there's no necessity to even consider that problem. That has nothing to do with free will; the ability to repent only belongs to humans (at least as far as I know) and humans would be able to repent regardless of free will existing or not.

If a machine has consciousness, you're able to have it repent rather than simply turning it off. I mean, can't you see this?

Just because I rhethorically call humans machines doesn't make pocket watches - or even guns - responsible for anything in the complex social interactions of a human legal system.

And that doesn't change whether free will exists or not.

 

[Souron]

Well that's kind of what I mean: "free will", in this usage, doesn't really have much to do with the classical concept of free will, and just becomes a sort of optimistic way of saying "brains do stuff on their own".

I'd say the other definition doesn't have much to do with the classical concept of free will, and mine does. I do agree with your wording though.

Yes, and it's the nature of that mind which I'm talking about. It's only worth so much agreeing "we have minds" if we both mean totally things by it.

What does it mean to say that "'I' chose to do x"? Does it mean that an indivisible cogito has chosen to do x? Or does it mean that a particular set of squishy circuits inside a cognitive system have issued a set of prompts to that effect? Presumably we'd say the latter, but then what is the relationship between the squishy circuits and "I"? If they're not equivalent, and they really couldn't be given that different bits of the brain produce different decisions, then can we say that "I" choose?

Because I don't see free will as incompatible with determinism, I don't see why it matters how the mind works.

Different bits of brain may produce different decisions, but this seems to sum up to a single action in the end, so that's likely just the mechanism the brain uses to consider alternatives.

I don't get what point you're trying to make.

 

[Traitorfish]

I'd say the other definition doesn't have much to do with the classical concept of free will, and mine does. I do agree with your wording though.

Eh, fair enough, I'm probably half talking out of my arse anyway.

Because I don't see free will as incompatible with determinism, I don't see why it matters how the mind works.

Different bits of brain may produce different decisions, but this seems to sum up to a single action in the end, so that's likely just the mechanism the brain uses to consider alternatives.

I don't get what point you're trying to make.

The statement "I have free will" isn't meaningful unless we're able to define "I", and how we do so has profound consequences for the meaning and thus validity of the statement. If we accept that the self is not an indivisible Cartesian soul, but in fact a complex three-dimensional network of cognitive activity, and that most decisions are actually made within rather than by this network, to what extent is it possible to attribute these decisions to an "I", and what does it mean to do so?

 

[Leoreth]

A person who's body is under mind control cannot be held responsible for what his body does. It's his inability to choose what his body does that removes responsibility.

This is a bad analogy. Someone being "under mind control" is definitely not acting autonomously, and it would be the person exercising the mind control that is culpable in this case. To be clear, "under mind control" isn't the same as "without free will", and free will and autonomous decision are not the same thing.

Also, especially in the light of your other post on the subject, you don't seem to understand the "no free will" position in the way I do. To me the position "no free will" doesn't imply any other way of human behavior that the "free will" camp believes in. So your comparisons of people without free will to machines that have to be discarded in case of malfunction is unfair to the point of becoming a strawman.

At least I believe that what we perceive as free will is the product of uncountable contingent factors, which all produce our "decision" at any given point. This concept can be applied to all considerations that enter into criminal culpability. So in your mind control analogy, these factors are "overridden" by some external force, just like our "free will" is overridden by an external force during mind control under the free will model.

 

[Souron]

I have nothing more to add to the rest. I just wanted to answer this:



This is really strange to me. I said nothing of the sort that humans should be actually treated as machines, I put forward the quite opposite (If we utilize the real definition of machine rather than the rhethorical/metaphorical one I use when discussing free will). Just like we shouldn't treat machines like rocks or birds or cookies. I see no connection with my statement and this problem you're presenting. I think I could possibly formulate the distinction between my argument and the point you're presenting... Uh I'll try:

Humans =/= nonsapient machines. Whether free will exists or not has no implication on this definition. Consciousness has. The complexity of a human makes it ridiculous to simply decomission him rather than having him need to repent. Also, a machine can't repent so there's no necessity to even consider that problem. That has nothing to do with free will; the ability to repent only belongs to humans (at least as far as I know) and humans would be able to repent regardless of free will existing or not.

If a machine has consciousness, you're able to have it repent rather than simply turning it off. I mean, can't you see this?

Just because I rhethorically call humans machines doesn't make pocket watches - or even guns - responsible for anything in the complex social interactions of a human legal system.

And that doesn't change whether free will exists or not.

I agree with everything you say here, except how you are the words "free will".

Humans are able to repent, but only things that they do. We can't repent things we have no control over. Similarly, we don't repent things we have no choice about, even if we did them. If someone holds a gun to your head, you might do things you wouldn't otherwise do, but you won't necessarily regret doing them. So having a gun to your head diminishes your freedom and responsibility in the choices you make.

That's one instance where it is useful to define free will, as I have. It allows us to tie free will to responsibility, and make the intuitive claim that free will is required for responsibility. Even non-compatibalists like MisterCooper have claimed that free will is so required.

 

[Borachio]

That was my question, yes.

Gad nabbit!

New thread.

 

[Souron]

The statement "I have free will" isn't meaningful unless we're able to define "I", and how we do so has profound consequences for the meaning and thus validity of the statement. If we accept that the self is not an indivisible Cartesian soul, but in fact a complex three-dimensional network of cognitive activity, and that most decisions are actually made within rather than by this network, to what extent is it possible to attribute these decisions to an "I", and what does it mean to do so?

The self is a fuzzy idea, but not a useless one in my mind. I don't see how being manifest as a network diminishes the concept.

In fact there is a sense (like touch and sight) specifically for identifying what is and isn't part of your body. It can lead people to want to amputate themselves when it goes awry. So your self could be defined as the part of the world that you identify as you.

 

[Souron]

This is a bad analogy. Someone being "under mind control" is definitely not acting autonomously, and it would be the person exercising the mind control that is culpable in this case. To be clear, "under mind control" isn't the same as "without free will", and free will and autonomous decision are not the same thing.

Also, especially in the light of your other post on the subject, you don't seem to understand the "no free will" position in the way I do. To me the position "no free will" doesn't imply any other way of human behavior that the "free will" camp believes in. So your comparisons of people without free will to machines that have to be discarded in case of malfunction is unfair to the point of becoming a strawman.

The chief point of contention between incompatibalists like you, and compatibalists like me is the definition of free will. So my purpose in bringing up examples like mind control, and having a gun to your head is to demonstrate that the compatibalist definition is more in line with our intuition, closer to other related meanings of the word freedom, and altogether more useful.

But I can also attack you from the other side: Why is free will as you define it a useful concept to have a word for?

At least I believe that what we perceive as free will is the product of uncountable contingent factors, which all produce our "decision" at any given point. This concept can be applied to all considerations that enter into criminal culpability. So in your mind control analogy, these factors are "overridden" by some external force, just like our "free will" is overridden by an external force during mind control under the free will model.

Overriding freedom is restricting freedom, it means less freedom. So if your free will is over ridden, you don't have free will in a particular choice. This isn't just semantics -- conceptually being overridden is the opposite of being free.

 

[Angst]

I agree with everything you say here, except how you are the words "free will".

Humans are able to repent, but only things that they do. We can't repent things we have no control over. Similarly, we don't repent things we have no choice about, even if we did them. If someone holds a gun to your head, you might do things you wouldn't otherwise do, but you won't necessarily regret doing them. So having a gun to your head diminishes your freedom and responsibility in the choices you make.

That's one instance where it is useful to define free will, as I have. It allows us to tie free will to responsibility, and make the intuitive claim that free will is required for responsibility. Even non-compatibalists like MisterCooper have claimed that free will is so required.

So basically being conscious while doing an action means that you have free will?

The gun analogy isn't holding up as you present it. We aren't aware of the hypothetical gun. The whole point is that free will is an illusion which we have no ability to live without. And no, I'm not being conspiratory here. I'm merely following physics. If you can provide a scientific counterpoint (And not a legal necessity or practicality), anything, I'm willing to change my mind, but as of yet I haven't seen anything that told me Newton was a nut.

And again, this necessity is still just not there. "I had no control over killing the baby. Free will doesn't exist" is not an argument to escape jail or even repent. Realizing free will doesn't exist did not make me lose the ability to repent, because my illusion of it is still there. I have to work within my irrational framework.

 

[Souron]

So basically being conscious while doing an action means that you have free will?

The action has to be a product of your conscious process. Jerking your knee because the doctor hit it does not count, even if you're awake at the time.

The gun analogy isn't holding up as you present it. We aren't aware of the hypothetical gun. The whole point is that free will is an illusion which we have no ability to live without. And no, I'm not being conspiratory here. I'm merely following physics. If you can provide a scientific counterpoint (And not a legal necessity or practicality), anything, I'm willing to change my mind, but as of yet I haven't seen anything that told me Newton was a nut.

And again, this necessity is still just not there. "I had no control over killing the baby. Free will doesn't exist" is not an argument to escape jail or even repent. Realizing free will doesn't exist did not make me lose the ability to repent, because my illusion of it is still there. I have to work within my irrational framework.

I'm not contesting physics. I'm contesting the definition of free will.

It is possible for there to be a "hidden gun" if had you tried to take make a different choice than you did, someone would have forced you otherwise. For example a manifesto who wants to stay in the mafia may not be aware that he is not allowed to leave because he knows too much. So there is a hidden gun keeping him in the mafia. In contrast, newton's laws are not a "hidden gun", because they aren't external to the mind; they are part of the mechanism of the mind. The mind does not hold itself hostage.

So I would say anyone who does not have a metaphorical gun to their head, and is not physically bound should properly be considered to have free will, regardless of the inevitability of their choices.

 

[Mechanicalsalvation]

How can one have free will if he isnt free? We have only limited free will.

 

[Souron]

Well sure, we can't choose to fly spontaneously. But there's a whole host of things that we can do spontaneously.