"Commentaries/remarks on the Richard Brzezinski's publication on the Polish Winged Hussars:
Since I have already had the opportunity to read the newest publication of Richard Brzezinski, I would like to share few of my comments. First and foremost, however, I must address the completely false image of the Polish historiography which was depicted by Richard Brzezinski as follows:
"and until now, all I've ever seen in Polish works is that the hussars were invincible, unstoppable, superior to everything they ever met...If you take the time to read Swedish, German, Austrian contemporary sources another very different voice comes through, which most patriotic Poles will not trouble to listen to, because they know better..."
At the same time RB strives to represent himself as person not warped by the 'partial' Polish writings. In my short commentary I shall demonstrate falsity of both Richard Brzezinski's theory, to wit that the Polish historiography has been depicting the Polish Winged Hussars only as invincible heroes, and his self-proclaimed claims of novelty. In fact, Richard Brzezinski's 'discoveries' are no more than the repetition of Jerzy Teodorczyk's arguments from 40 years ago. Teodorczyk's erroneous arguments had been widely accepted in Poland after their proponent and had remained undisputed until the publication of my book, 'Fenomen Husarii' some 2,5 years ago.
Furthermore, I will show you shortly that the absence of partiality, with which RB so prides himself, is but his own conceit. But let us start the analysis from the beginning...
Already after the very preview of RB's booklet on the Osprey's web page it was apparent that it was not without errors. Reality, however, proved itself worse than I had thought...
The booklet is teeming with errors, substantial and linguistic. I have been most disappointed with the latter since they were easiest to avoid. For example: in the Polish language one does not write 'Choragiew Dworzaňska' but 'chorągiew dworzańska,' no spelling ' zycie' but ' życie', no 'przylbica' but 'przyłbica', etc. Erroneous spelling of the names is even worse - making 2 errors in the 3-letter surname ('Los' instead of "Łoś") was something that overfilled my cup of sorrow.
Linguistic mistakes do offend, but are not as harmful as the material errors that unfortunately are plentiful. Let's start with the cover. When Zdzisław Żygulski Jr. ( incidentally, his name also had been misspelled in RB's book), in his book "Husaria polska," criticized the winged hussar from the cover of the "Polish Armies" one might expect a more polished cover this time around. Meanwhile, the new cover contains an error that disqualifies RB as the expert of the subject. As I explained in my book, "Fenomen husarii " from 2004, and in the earlier article for the "L'art de la Guerre" (August-September edition of 2003) the aim of leaving the hussar's lance in the holster (tok) was simple - to reduce winged hussar's burden carried while holding the lance lowered and when striking enemy with it. To achieve that the leather strap, joining the tok with the saddle, must have been taut and not - and this is the error that I am after - slacking freely flowing in the wind, as shown on the Osprey's cover. This error, in spite of all appearances, is not trivial. This is as if someone painted a man firing a musket, who was depicted as firing from a gunstock and not from a barrel. Just as for anyone who knows what end of a musket shoots bullets, similarly for anyone who knows what purpose serves the leather strap connecting a tok (with a lance staying in there) with a saddle, such errors are simply embarrassing.
Let us go further. Dario already mentioned earlier that the statement appearing in the preview of this Osprey:
"It is also time to reassess one or two other accepted 'facts' about the Polish hussars - for example that these heavily armoured horsemen were able to change formation during a charge"
was false.
At this time I could only corroborate. Namely Bartosz Paprocki, in his work from 1578, wrote:
'Whereas the martial exercise is to train a soldier so he could orderly stand in formation, where they order him, quickly attack, and to spread/loosen and to come together [as formation] [...]'
And this was not just a theory because there is a winged hussar's description from one of mid-17th century battles, which corroborates the changing of the winged hussars' troop formation while executing a charge.
As a side-note, changing of formation for a purpose of minimalising losses from the firearms was practiced not only by the winged hussars but also by the lighter types of the Polish cavalry. And also the Polish infantry, while under fire, would fall to the ground in order to lower causalities.
Let us move onto the deep conviction by Richard Brzezinski about the efficiency of firearms discharge. I wrote about this subject in the book "Fenomen husarii," and in "Wojskowości polskiej w dobie wojny polsko-szwedzkiej 1626-1629.". I am not going to repeat all the arguments contained therein for brevity's sake. Instead I will quote what the Swedish king Carl X, who was fighting against them during the Deluge, thought about the efficiency of winged hussars. Namely from the memoirs of a Swedish soldier (Scotsman Patrick Gordon) of the period of the battle of Warsaw (29 July 1656) it is known that:
"[Swedish King Carolus X Gustavus] ordered all his brigade and regimental commanders to, when the winged hussars or the lancers attack them, part [with their command] and to give room to their [winged hussars] furious thrust, that, as he had known, could not have been then resisted by any force not tactics."
As we can see, contemporary adversaries of the Polish winged hussars had a definitely better opinion of the husaria than Jerzy Teodorczyk or Richard Brzezinski. While it is possible that Richard Brzezinski might not have known the above fragment, yet it is puzzling that, when writing about usefulness of the husaria against the Swedish armies, RB omitted a very laudatory opinion by Cefali - opinion dating from after the Swedish Deluge - which, I am sure, RB is well aware of.
Unfortunately I noticed that this selective and partial treatment of primary sources appears in RB's work quite often. It is most apparent in the quoted descriptions of the hussaria fighting against the Swedish army (Kokenhausen, Mitawa/Mitau or Tczew/Dirschau). Anyone who knows what truly happened there grabs his head when reading how theses battles are used to support false thesis of alleged considerable efficiency of firearms or of the Swedish cavalry against the husaria. I am not going to describe each of these battles but in order not to leave an impression of being empty-worded I will show, with the example of Mitawa/Mitau, how RB manipulates his facts to fashion them to his arguments.
Appropriate fragment of RB work is as follows (page 53):
'Above all it was the massive firepower of the reformed troops of Gustavus Adolphus that put an end to the hussar's ascendancy. The first sign of problems came at Mitau in August 1622 where, facing a wall of fire from Swedish field guns and musketeers, the hussars flatly refused to charge. The Lithuanian hetman Krzysztof Radziwill wrote: "I rode from one cavalry unit to the next... said I would lead them myself, threatened them with gallows, promised them rewards, but nothing helped" (K. Radziwill, Sprawy wojenne i polityczne, p. 282)'
In reality, the book, cited as source by RB, contains a much more comprehensive description of the fighting, which appeared as follows (in the parenthesis I gave citations from appropriate sources)
On August 3, 1622 in the vicinity of Courland's town of Mitawa/Mittau the armies of Krzysztof Radziwiłł and Gustavus Adolphus clashed. Vanguard of the Swedish army consisted of several (3 or 4) reiter cornets/companies. They placed themselves at the forest's edge, "in the thickets, past the swamps" in such manner so the Lithuanian horse could not attack them. In van of these reiters came two canons, "and they fired from them against our banners/companies but by God's grace without any harm." Then, the commander of the Lithuanian reiters, Jerzy Krzysztof Rożen, with the hetman's permission sent a trumpeter to the Swedish reiters, "challenging them to take to the field unless they were sons-of-the-es." Swedes did not show any interest in such presented proposition. Instead of awaited cavalry action "several companies of (enemy) infantry rushed out from the forest.". Hetman directed against them three rota/companies of haiduk infantry. The firefight raged between the infantries of both sides. "Very laud musket gunplay lasted for an entire hour, as in a regular battle it would not have been greater." There were some 20 haiduks killed (and fell into the enemy's hands) while wounded there were some 30 more. When the servants "that on a hillock were digging a trench (entrenchment), being afraid of the gunplay, started to flee with their spades," Swedes, "understanding that these were the soldiers who were fleeing, sent to their own a larger reinforcement, and in such manner more than 2000 Swedish infantrymen jumped our throats and onto the hillock pushed."
Radziwiłł turned then to the JK Rożen's reiter companies (those were three companies, on register numbering 500-horse strong but their real strength was merely 300 horses) "so they would aid the infantry," but they evasively "said that they had no field" (the ground was not suitable for cavalry) and " replied that winged hussars should rush first." Why they refused? Reiters were foreigners that fought for a profit and not out of patriotic call. The Lithuanian army had serious financial problems at that time and was seriously behind the pay for their soldiers. In face of serious numerical advantage held by the enemy, when the motivation to continue fighting was not strong enough, when the ground was not favorable, all that was enough that the reiters refused to execute command. In such circumstances hetman turned then to the Janusz Ulik Szweryn's hussaria (on the register this unit had 200 horses, the real strength of this unit is unknown). But they also refused to charge. Why? The sources known to us do not explain this. One thing is certain - there is no mention in the sources about any winged hussars' fear of the gunfire of the Swedish infantry. These source suggest that, when faced with numerically superior adversary (just Swedish infantry alone was supposed to be 2000-3000), and having the ground unsuitable for cavalry action and - what may be the most important - the winged hussars seeing that they would not be supported by the reiters (after all those already had refused to attack), then the morale of Szweryn's hussaria must have been weak. Their commander did not decide to charge under such conditions. Thus meeting with another refusal there, Radziwiłł then turned to the next reiter company - Henryk Szmeling (200 horses on the register). Yet and this reiter company refused to carry out the command.
This crisis, however, did not spread throughout the entire Lithuanian army. Unfortunately, "other [companies] albeit willing [to fight] their own places in the army's battle order had to guard, because the enemy horse with part of the infantry in the affair [battle order] stood fast, awaiting our confusion." In these circumstances, before the Lithuanian battle order regrouped, before those 'willing' companies arrived onto the field, the Swedes were able to take the hillock with the Lithuanian artillery pieces there.
Ultimately the Lithuanian hussaria charged those ( troops). There were found "two so righteous hussaria companies" that "while the ground was not for a hussar (undesirable for winged hussars)" yet "in the very fire of the enemy troops they rushed" and "great injury in them they caused." Those companies were: the Połock voivode Janusz Kiszka's company, on the register 200 hussars, and the referendarz of Grand Dutchy of Lithuania Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski's company, of the same register's number. This charge proved to be successful. Hussars, in spite that they were attacking on the ground not quite suitable for cavalry action, withstood the fire of more numerous infantry and passed through its lines, inflicting heavy causalities on the Swedes. It was not, however, the end of fighting. Winged hussar companies "having broken through and without reinforcement remaining, could not turn around." Swedes brought onto the battlefield additional infantry units, position them in the thickets and in the trenches (including the entrenchment dig out by the Lithuanian servants) and maintained their positions, because on such prepared infantry "the cavalry second time could not joust (strike)."
The very charge on the fire-spewing lines of the Swedish infantry cost our winged hussars 2 killed (Nakurski and Orwid) and unknown quantity of wounded, while "in the horses not a small injury they caused." The Swedes were supposed to have died "close to 500" on this day. Some of quoted number included that infantry, which had been under Lithuanian infantry fire before the hussaria's charge.
Those are the sources on which RB calls. As we can see, it takes plenty of bad intentions to rely upon in order to arrive at a conclusion that since that time the winged hussars were afraid to charge on the Swedish muskets and canons.
Moreover, these sources demonstrate something opposite - bypassing the morale crisis (not caused however by the alleged effective musket-cannon fire of the Swedes) that affected the winged hussars of the Szweryn company, we see that the husaria still was able to charge with success on more numerous lines/ranks/formations of the Swedish army. And they (husaria) did that with their own minimal losses.
Described here battle of Mitawa demonstrates also that the very same thing that I try to underline in my books (including my newest book "Na skrzydłach husarii," to be published next year) - usefulness of husaria on the battlefield was more dependent on the shape of the battlegrounds than on the guns of the adversary. The ground unsuitable for cavalry (e.g. swampy, wooded or criss-crossed with fittingly wide ditches) and also the artificial obstacles placed by the enemy (e.g., field-works, entrenchments) stopped the hussaria charges. And that was the factor that from the 1620-ies on the Lithuanian and Polish hetmans placed their attention, when in their letters and reports explained reasons for the absence of spectacular successes in the fighting against the Swedes - such successes that Poles and Lithuanians had earlier, i.e., when the Swedes did not use any artificial nor natural barrier/obstacles to check/arrest the charging Polish-Lithuanian cavalry.
As I have written here earlier, I will not list all errors that RB committed in his publication. It would have been too much time for me to do so. I will add, however, that it is not true that the longest winged hussar lances - according to source - reached only to 5,6 meters. There exists a winged hussar lance measuring (without the point) 6.15 meter (over 20 feet). There also exists this very credible primary source that simply states the following: ... that in the first half of the 17th century our winged hussars had been using these long lances.
Summing up, in my humble opinion, the RB Osprey on the Polish Winged Hussars should not fall into the hands of people who will be treating this book as the sole source of information about husaria. This book it should not be treated as such, although at times interesting and valuable, because it contains such large quantity of error that a person without deeper knowledge of this subject and without ability to confront this or enlarge the matter via studying other works (especially sources and monographies in Polish) upon finishing this RB Osprey will retaining a false perception about the Polish winged husaria. The perception so much more dangerous because the very author declares himself an impartial and supremely knowledgeable in the matter/topic. Unfortunately I must find that those almost 20 years of research on the Polish husaria, the fact that RB boasts about at the beginning of his book, have been definitely too little and not enough to avoid this quantity of so essential errors."
