From what point was Germany doomed during WWII?

[LightSpectra]

One thing I don't understand. Why Germans didn't knocked out British radar installations? Big structures, that will be hard to miss and that would surely give them some benefit at least at south of the island.

"Hard to miss?" That depends on a lot of things. Maybe if you fly right by one, you'd know what it was, but that requires some luck.

 

[r16]

radar stations were bombed , although there were some doubts to what they actually were . Pre war in 1939 Luftwaffe flew zeppelins for ESM to grab signals from the sites but as they didn't fit the preconceived notions they were disregarded . The famous technical miracle of centimeter radar was in technical mags by 1934 , and those meterlenght towers didn't make sense . So Germans ignored them . Later on they were bombed , only because they had to serve some purpose but the towers survived nearby blast effects just like Polish radio antennas in 1939 and Stukas were at high risk from RAF over the channel . So the missions were given up . Yeah , Britain "was saved" because of inferior tech .

edit: have been off for the year as ı found it in a modelling site , and the German system available in 1940 while still in the metrics was still superior to the British equivalents , in May a RAF bomber was shot down while in cloud . Would doubt the British had fire control at the time .

 

[Masada]

Also, what r16 said.

"Hard to miss?" That depends on a lot of things. Maybe if you fly right by one, you'd know what it was, but that requires some luck.

I think that's being a touch charitable. You had to know what a radar installation looked like to begin with, which might have been a little bit of tall order at the time. Then there's the question of whether or not it was really worthwhile knocking them out.

 

[say1988]

Even if you can identify the targets you still need to accurately guide their aircraft to the target (which presented some difficulty for a lone structure in the middle of nowhere along the coast
Then reliably hit it with bombs (keeping in mind that the divebombers were pulled off the front almost immediately after taking tremendous losses (contrary to popular opinion, the Stuka wasn't some miracle weapon in 1940, but obsolete in the face of competent anti-air defence).

Lastly, and perhaps more important, would this have even been effective?
How many stations were there (i.e. would bombing a few have a real impact) and how long would they take to resume operations (either repair or put a whole new one out)?

 

[r16]

ı believe one station was hit hard and put out of action for a while .But a fake station was put inline and it looked the attack had failed . An acknowledgement that they would enable concentration against the attacking bombers would have led the Luftwaffe to concentrate on the radars from the start and 100s of bombers concentrating on them would eventually knock them out . Radarsite bombing instead of Kanalkampf , not that big a change and it might have worked better . Though September , and rains would still come without a conclusive evidence.

 

[RickFGS]

I´d say the innability for Italy to take both Greece, Yugoslavia and North Africa delayed the invasion of Russia for some 5 months, forcing Germany to have to conquer all southern europe by itself and sending one of its best generals to a theather were provisions for a blitzkrieg war were insufficient.

"Luckly" for the allies, the italians did not suceed, had they achieved victory, Germany would had invaded Russia much sooner, and the 1.8 million troops and best trained armored divisons of Russia parked in Siberia would not have reached the eastern front in time, allowing the blitzkrieg spearheads penetration to the Caucasus oilfields and the industrial hills of the urals and the Ekateringburg province.

The defeat of japanese troops in Manchuria by the soviet commader Krushov also played an very important role, thus Germanys plans where wickked and could have worked, the soviets clearly underestimated Hitler, i read a lot of documentaries and books stating Stalin was prepared against an invasion and they used the echelons defense of retreating trough a large territory but i view it has excuses, no good strategy of defense envolves a losing great part of your entire ground airforce on the first day, or capture of some 500,000 soldiers in encirclements, not to mention the killing of millions of russians in the process.

I also hear and read lot of how invetibly the US would win due to its massive production capability, this is also not accurate, the US was still in the worst recession of its history, unemployment was at a peak, factories were old and inefficient, the Sherman design itself was largely prepared to mass production because it was the best they could pull out from the current conditions. Had Germany suceed in reaching the Urals, the allies would had never landed in europe.

Thus, had Italy and Japan won over its targets as at the time was expected, things could have been very different indeed. In this, the role of Britain sending pre-war reinforcements to Greece and Egypt played in my view a large turning point in the war. Had Germany supported the initial italian invasion, Russia could had been invaded much sooner, but they didn´t because they were already concentrating for the invasion itself.

Soviets did had more tanks and aircrafts, but they proved they could not use them well in the finnish war, also a clear sign that things were not under control, was the rush digging of defenses in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev only a few days/weeks of the german panzers arrival.

In all, the tenacity of greek, british and soviet defenders gained the time US need to put its factories into production not regarding the state of its economy, thus creating a state of wartime enployment and prosperity trough arms provisions and equippment to commonwealth and french-sphere nations.

 

[Dragonlord]

I´d say the innability for Italy to take both Greece, Yugoslavia and North Africa delayed the invasion of Russia for some 5 months, forcing Germany to have to conquer all southern europe by itself and sending one of its best generals to a theather were provisions for a blitzkrieg war were insufficient.

Sorry, but this is just ... wrong. There was never any question of Barbarossa kicking off 5 months earlier! It was abundantly obvious to the planners of Barbarossa that the offensive could only commence after the end of the spring rasputsita (see the picture earlier in this thread!). It is true that the initially planned date was some weeks earlier, but not months - and the delay was caused not so much by the Balkan campaign as by the rasputsita taking longer than anticipated and the roads in Russia not being dried out enough yet.

Italy's inept Balkan campaign and the consequent diversion of German forces certainly didn't help, but I doubt that was in any way decisive.

To the OP, IMHO German defeat only became inevitable at the end of 1942, with the failure of the offensives in Russia. The turning point was the decision to assault two objectives at once, ensuring that neither could be taken, and frittering away the strength of the Wehrmacht. Once the last chance to knock Russia out of the war had been lost, there could only be one end to the war.

Mind you, chances were against Germany before that, but defeat wasn't invevitable yet. If Russia had been knocked out of the war, the Axis might very well have been able to hold Fortress Europe against any conceivable attack - and Germany couldn't have been starved into submission as in WWI.

 

[Cutlass]

ı believe one station was hit hard and put out of action for a while .But a fake station was put inline and it looked the attack had failed . An acknowledgement that they would enable concentration against the attacking bombers would have led the Luftwaffe to concentrate on the radars from the start and 100s of bombers concentrating on them would eventually knock them out . Radarsite bombing instead of Kanalkampf , not that big a change and it might have worked better . Though September , and rains would still come without a conclusive evidence.

The resources it would have taken to knock down the radars and keep them knocked down by those methods would have far exceeded to costs to put the radars back up. And in the meantime, the Germans would have been unable to attack much of anything else. So there would be no gain to such a strategy.


@ RickFGS The fact that the US was still in the Great Depression (though improving considerably after 1937) actually meant that the US had an easier time mobilizing for war, rather than a harder one. Huge amounts of men, machines, and factories were idle and could quickly be put to other use.

 

[say1988]

the Sherman design itself was largely prepared to mass production because it was the best they could pull out from the current conditions

Not really, the Sherman design was extremely good for its intended role. US doctrine dictated anti-tank duties were given to dedicated tank destroyers and tanks only needed a minimal capability in that regard. And at the time it wa introduced it was at least a match for all German tanks fielded with the exception of the small numbers of Tiger Is and upgunned Panzer IVs (that had just recently entered service) and had quite similar capabilites to the T-34/76.

The Sherman gets a bad reputation largely because it was used in situations in which it was never intended to be used, which falls on the shoulders of those developing US armoured doctrine, no the tank.
That said, the Americans didn't need a great tank since they had all those factories lying around and the manpower needed. Yet they still needed to supply the British and Soviets (who took around half the production).

 

[red_elk]

"Luckly" for the allies, the italians did not suceed, had they achieved victory, Germany would had invaded Russia much sooner, and the 1.8 million troops and best trained armored divisons of Russia parked in Siberia would not have reached the eastern front in time, allowing the blitzkrieg spearheads penetration to the Caucasus oilfields and the industrial hills of the urals

The goal of Barbarossa plan was to reach Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, far from Urals.

and the Ekateringburg province.

Sverdlovsk province. Also was not planned for capturing.

The defeat of japanese troops in Manchuria by the soviet commader Krushov

Zhukov. And this battle happened two years before German invasion.

Sorry for nitpicking, too many mistakes.

 

[jlvfr]

May I suggest we change the question? It might make things simpler.

Something we have to keep in mind is that Germany was not able to sustain a long war. It's industry, logistics and politics simply couldn't do it. One example of this was the decision not to build long range bombers, made when the Luftwaffe was created. Germany could afford either a tactical support force or a strategic one; they went with a tactical support. Likewise, german industry couldn't produce enough steel for all demands, which is one of the reasons for the Kriegsmarine to be so weak. So, if Germany went to war it would have to win fast, or become bogged down. With this in mind:

"When did things start to go wrong for Germany?"

For me, this translates into "when did the *fast war* turn into *long grind*". This takes me back to the Battle of Britain. Till then, the germans had it all (pretty much) their way: the 2 major enemies brought down quickly, the 3rd brought to it's knees, everyone in awe of the german war machine, etc.

And then they failed to bring the *fast war* to an end, by not forcing the UK to surrender. This in turn:
-forced a massive diversion of resources to build up the sub navy (they had less than 60 boats of all types);
-caused the loss of (almost) all international Atlantic and Mediterranean sea-based trade (the RN blockades);
-forced the need to maintain, in France, large numbers of 1st rate aircraft and troops (instead of just token police/garrisons), to prevent attacks
-ensured little italian support in Russia, because all their best troops were in Africa and Greece
-forced the entry, by Germany, into the Balkans and Greece, because the Brits were supporting these countries and Italy had problems, which...
-led to the loss of most of the paratroop corps in Crete
-forced german involvement in the Mediterranean, which, even if it involved far fewer ground troops than Russia, still required the support of hundreds of aircraft and dozens of transport and combat ships... which the Axis could ill afford. Not to mention all the logistics of supporting this effort
-ensured the brits could send help to Russia, via the North Sea and, latter on, Persia/Iran
-ensured there was a "naval base" from which to invade France in 1944

Now. Imagine the UK had been forced out of the war in June 1940 (surrender, armistice, doesn't matter). Imagine the full resources of Germany turned on lonely USSR. Imagine that all the german industry was focused on land/air production, with not one more ton of steel than necessary for the navy (why should it? no enemies from the atlantic!). Imagine the Mediterraneum an Axis sea, via which Germany had access to the North African oil. Imagine that Italy could divert it's best divisions (Folgore, Ariete, Bersaglieri, etc) to the USSR, along with it's aircraft.

For me, the Battle of Britain was where Germany started to loose the war.

 

[RickFGS]

The goal of Barbarossa plan was to reach Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, far from Urals.

Wrong, the goal was the european part, Hitler knew Ekaterinburg or Sverdvlosk (same city, different names) had a major role in the production of soviet tanks and planes, german tanks themselves and crews had parts manufactured/trained there prior to the war in the early 30´s.

Sverdlovsk province. Also was not planned for capturing.

Wrong again, its the same name as current Ekaterinburg and was one of the last goals in the german invasion for the "european part".

Zhukov. And this battle happened two years before German invasion.

Sorry for nitpicking, too many mistakes.

You are right in the name, but wrong in the logic, i´m assessing that the early defeat of Japan allowed the soviet reinforcments to reach the front in time, had Japan won the incursion the battle would tie up half the soviet forces for the remaining of the war. That was Hitlers plan, thus the relations during the early 1930´ that colminated into an agreement in 1936 ( Anti-Comintern Pact) and later into a military alliance..

If you want to go even further, there were also alliances of agression with middle eastern states and even with Mexico for a future invasion of US after the european conquest had been achieved. But thats another story.

 

[red_elk]

Wrong, the goal was the european part, Hitler knew Ekaterinburg or Sverdvlosk (same city, different names) had a major role in the production of soviet tanks and planes, german tanks themselves and crews had parts manufactured/trained there prior to the war in the early 30´s.

Wrong again, its the same name as current Ekaterinburg and was one of the last goals in the german invasion for the "european part".

Can you provide your source, where it says that Ekaterinburg was target of invasion in plan Barbarossa?

You are right in the name, but wrong in the logic, i´m assessing that the early defeat of Japan allowed the soviet reinforcments to reach the front in time, had Japan won the incursion the battle would tie up half the soviet forces for the remaining of the war. That was Hitlers plan, thus the relations during the early 1930´s with japan trough U-Boats.

Which Soviet reinforcements, those who helped to win the Moscow battle? They reached the front in time mostly because of Pearl Harbor, not because of battle which happened two years before. Though Halkhin Gol of course had some effect on Japanese decision not to start war against USSR in 1941.

 

[ParkCungHee]

If Japan had won Kalkhin Gol, at best, this would have moved the Chinese/Machurian-Mongolian Border forward a few miles. There would be no way it would have represented any serious commitment of Soviet Forces two years later.

 

[RickFGS]

Can you provide your source, where it says that Ekaterinburg was target of invasion in plan Barbarossa?

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/GPO/hitler1940.htm

In Hitlers remarks he clearly states the desire to exterminate Leningrad and Moscow, and continue his conquest to assimilate all of Russia´s european side.


Read Stalin´s memouries and the passage of :
http://www.reznikov.us/eBooks/Polit...at Stalin Knew - The Enigma of Barbarossa.pdf

In the words of the german embassador in Japan at the time:
-> However, Ott told Sorge that
‘‘the Japanese would begin to fight only when the Germans reached Sverdlovsk!’’

Which Soviet reinforcements, those who helped to win the Moscow battle? They reached the front in time mostly because of Pearl Harbor, not because of battle which happened two years before. Though Halkhin Gol of course had some effect on Japanese decision not to start war against USSR in 1941.

The agreement between Hitler and Japan predicted an invasion by Japan of the asian side of Russia, the defeat of those troops earlier by Zhukov and his presence in the area in 1941 made Japanese generals not to attack.

 

[ParkCungHee]

The agreement between Hitler and Japan predicted an invasion by Japan of the asian side of Russia, the defeat of those troops earlier by Zhukov and his presence in the area in 1941 made Japanese generals not to attack.

What? No. The Japanese didn't attack because it was never in their interest to. The Japanese were wholly fixated on China, which was a far better target then anything Siberia or South East Asia could offer. They didn't attack the Soviet Union because it did absolutely nothing to help them defeat Chiang Kai-Shek, which was always their goal.

 

[red_elk]

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/GPO/hitler1940.htm

In Hitlers remarks he clearly states the desire to exterminate Leningrad and Moscow, and continue his conquest to assimilate all of Russia´s european side.

Exterminate Leningrad and Moscow - ok, it's known, but your link doesn't say anything about Sverdlovsk and intention to capture all European part of the USSR. I'm not sure this was even logistically possible and sensible for Germany in 1941. They wanted to finish war in 1941, according to their plans - as far as I remember, by reaching Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, to make German territory unreachable from air attacks from Soviet territory.

Read Stalin´s memouries and the passage of :
http://www.reznikov.us/eBooks/Polit...at Stalin Knew - The Enigma of Barbarossa.pdf

In the words of the german embassador in Japan at the time:
-> However, Ott told Sorge that
‘‘the Japanese would begin to fight only when the Germans reached Sverdlovsk!’’

Erm, this doesn't necessarily mean that the Germans planned to reach Sverdlovsk. This only says about Japanese plans.

the defeat of those troops earlier by Zhukov and his presence in the area in 1941 made Japanese generals not to attack.

Agree absolutely about decision of Japanese generals.
The only problem is that the presense of Zhukov and his troops in the area in 1941 was impossible. They were needed under Moscow. And troops were moved to the West not after Halkhin Gol in 1939, but only after Pearl Harbour in 1941. USSR had to keep considerable number of troops in Far East in 1939-1941, despite victories in Halkhin Gol and Hasan battles.

 

[RickFGS]

What? No. The Japanese didn't attack because it was never in their interest to. The Japanese were wholly fixated on China, which was a far better target then anything Siberia or South East Asia could offer. They didn't attack the Soviet Union because it did absolutely nothing to help them defeat Chiang Kai-Shek, which was always their goal.

Ohhh Really? You should read more on the subject:
http://siberianlight.net/khalkhin-gol-battle-nomonhan/

Plus, the japanese were using airplanes which incorporated many of German techincal designs, this was planed by Hitler, but the outcome was thank God another.

I´m just saying that the allies like to paint an "we would have won no matter what" scenario that in reality was very very far from the truth.

 

[RickFGS]

Exterminate Leningrad and Moscow - ok, it's known, but your link doesn't say anything about Sverdlovsk and intention to capture all European part of the USSR. I'm not sure this was even logistically possible and sensible for Germany in 1941. They wanted to finish war in 1941, according to their plans - as far as I remember, by reaching Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, to make German territory unreachable from air attacks from Soviet territory.


Erm, this doesn't necessarily mean that the Germans planned to reach Sverdlovsk. This only says about Japanese plans.


Agree absolutely about decision of Japanese generals.
The only problem is that the presense of Zhukov and his troops in the area in 1941 was impossible. They were needed under Moscow. And troops were moved to the West not after Halkhin Gol in 1939, but only after Pearl Harbour in 1941. USSR had to keep considerable number of troops in Far East in 1939-1941, despite victories in Halkhin Gol and Hasan battles.

It doens´t say clearly all of russian europe??? Then read Mein Kampf, you´ll see he clearly wants all of european russia plus the grain fields and mines over the Urals.

As for Zhukov, ins´t that what i said? The fact that he defeated them in 1939 turned the war in favour of the Soviets, Hitlers plans was to invade Russia before even invading France or Britain, thus coordinating with the Japanese timing, the problem was France and Britain declared war to soon, Chamberlain revealed not so weak in the end as Hitler thought he was mislead him with the signing of a non agression pact.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Ohhh Really? You should read more on the subject:
http://siberianlight.net/khalkhin-g... with, you know, [i]expanding into China.[/i]