From what point was Germany doomed during WWII?

[red_elk]

It doens´t say clearly all of russian europe??? Then read Mein Kampf, you´ll see he clearly wants all of european russia plus the grain fields and mines over the Urals.

I'm not very much interesting in arguing about this, I was merely asking if you have any evidences that Germans had actual military plans of invading European part of the USSR as far as Sverdlovsk. Because from what I know, Barbarossa didn't imply this, but I could be mistaken. Mein Kampf is not a plan of military operation.

As for Zhukov, ins´t that what i said? The fact that he defeated them in 1939 turned the war in favour of the Soviets

Zhukov scared the Japanese off, and that was one of the reasons why they did not attack USSR in 1941, right. But I don't understand what "war" you are talking about? USSR and Japan were not in war, except a few border clashes in 1938-1939. And again, all this did not help to move additional Soviet troops from Far East, they were staying there until 1941.

Hitlers plans was to invade Russia before even invading France or Britain, thus coordinating with the Japanese timing, the problem was France and Britain declared war to soon, Chamberlain revealed not so weak in the end as Hitler thought he was mislead him with the signing of a non agression pact.

Where did you get this?
Hitler started planning of invasion USSR in summer 1940. In 1939, when USSR had problems with Japan, Germany needed peace with USSR (they signed non-aggression pact in August 1939)

 

[GoodGame]

That quite explains Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Japan would have surrendered to the Soviets otherwise.

I hope that was sarcasm. Actually I'm pretty sure of it.

I think BoB is ok, but not exactly right. I think that loss of manpower in Op. Barbarossa was the most important problem for the Germans in that time frame. They might as well have retrained those infantry as pilots instead of wasting them in the East. Secondarily would be not securing the Russian oil fields with the Southern group. But you can probably point to losses at Stalingrad and Leningrad as to being why. And you might point to transportation inefficiency/madness/winter for failing to take Leningrad swiftly.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Zhukov scared the Japanese off, and that was one of the reasons why they did not attack USSR in 1941, right.

No, not right. Their entire policy was based around control of China. In '39 they felt the Soviet Union was still the greatest potential threat to their control of China, sharing a large land border, a large army etc.
The fact that the Soviets didn't retaliate had as much to do with their decision as their defeat. The German invasion did more then anything possible to secure the Japanese border, because the Japanese felt even more confident that the Soviet Union would not move to oppose them in China. All an invasion of the Soviet Union, even one completely unopposed by Soviet Troops would do, would be to deepen their financial crisis, make control of China more difficult if not impossible, and make their objectives vastly more difficult to achieve: in short, they got no reason to do it.

 

[r16]

the Battle of Britain started with Luftwaffe attacks on the convoys in the Channel , which Dowding largely ignored . Had the attacks had been concentrated on the radar stations , of which the longrange varieties were always on the coast , the Bf-109s would have fuel , the bombers would spend less time over hostile territory , the Bf-110s would have been free to Lufberry all the time . And Dowding would not dare to avoid . The radars were not ships that would be replaced in due time nor France . France ? The British did not like 'em anyhow .

 

[Tahuti]

I hope that was sarcasm. Actually I'm pretty sure of it.

No it wasn't. The Soviets were conquering Manchuria and Korea which was pretty much a beating for the Japanese empire. Surrendering to the Soviets might be oversstated, but not nuking would surely necessitate an invasion.
While such an invasion would surely be won, chances are the Japanese isles would be partitioned between the Allies and the Soviets.
Operation Downfall would also allow for the Soviets to take over the entire Korean peninsula.

In short, the USSR would have had much more sway in Asia if it weren't for Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

I think BoB is ok, but not exactly right. I think that loss of manpower in Op. Barbarossa was the most important problem for the Germans in that time frame. They might as well have retrained those infantry as pilots instead of wasting them in the East.

Of what use are pilots when you are continually losing aircraft (and their production facalities)? The point was that after the BoB was won, Britain could touch Germany by air in ways Germany couldn't, which would prove disastrous for Germany's war economy.

 

[punkbass2000]

Just to be contrary (but not really), clearly Germany was not doomed at all. Just the Nazis, and rightfully so. Germany now commands one of the world's strongest economies.

But to address the spirit of the thread, the telltale were blows the evacuation of Dunkirk, the bombings of civilian London (as opposed to airfields and other, more strategic targets) and, of course, the Russian landwar, which they really should have anticipated.

 

[Tee Kay]

the bombings of civilian London

Bombing urban areas did pretty well for the Allies...

 

[say1988]

Just to be contrary (but not really), clearly Germany was not doomed at all. Just the Nazis, and rightfully so. Germany now commands one of the world's strongest economies.

That is like saying France didn't lose the Napoleonic Wars because there is a France today. Nazi Germany was Germany in the early 1940s.

 

[red_elk]

No, not right. Their entire policy was based around control of China. In '39 they felt the Soviet Union was still the greatest potential threat to their control of China, sharing a large land border, a large army etc.
The fact that the Soviets didn't retaliate had as much to do with their decision as their defeat. The German invasion did more then anything possible to secure the Japanese border, because the Japanese felt even more confident that the Soviet Union would not move to oppose them in China. All an invasion of the Soviet Union, even one completely unopposed by Soviet Troops would do, would be to deepen their financial crisis, make control of China more difficult if not impossible, and make their objectives vastly more difficult to achieve: in short, they got no reason to do it.

I agree that Soviet lands for Japan were not the first or second priority targets. The question is whether they were considering an opportunistic invasion. If they decided that USSR is about to collapse in 1941, it would be tempting for them to annex second half of Sakhalin, for example, or Vladivostok. Nobody is talking about full-scale invasion of Siberia, but if Germans captured Moscow in September, Japanese attack was IMO possible.

At least, it is undoubted that Soviet leaders considered treat of Japanese attack (before Pearl Harbour) seriously and kept considerable forces in Eastern regions. From what I read, experience of battles against Zhukov somewhat make Japan to understand that starting land war against USSR would be not a good idea. Is it true or not - that's arguable, but such opinion exists and it's not baseless.

 

[punkbass2000]

That is like saying France didn't lose the Napoleonic Wars because there is a France today. Nazi Germany was Germany in the early 1940s.

Pretty much. How many people were actually brought to justice and how many reaped the rewards? Thinking of nations in terms of who won is a little archaic, don't you think? Especially when the punishment is huge financial backing propelling one's economy.

 

[punkbass2000]

Bombing urban areas did pretty well for the Allies...

 

[kiwitt]

I think I read somewhere that the high command didn't think they "Germany", would be ready for a full scale war until 1944. And from what I understand that was also when they had the highest production. So starting war early really doomed them.

 

[Ataxerxes]

I think I read somewhere that the high command didn't think they "Germany", would be ready for a full scale war until 1944. And from what I understand that was also when they had the highest production. So starting war early really doomed them.

This ignores the fact that Germany's main target was always Russia. Everything else was almost a sideshow. Germany's concern was "how strong would Russia be in relation to us in 1944". They were concerned that if they waited, Russia would be impossible (which it was anyway). Also, the purges of the Red Army gave the Germans hope to strike before the Red Army recovered.

Of course, patience wasn't Hitler's virtue. He wanted to get his "life's work" going. It's true that Germany started earlier than they probably wanted but felt that was the best time. Also, Germany noted how horribly Russia did in their invasion of Finland, leading them to think the purges hurt Russia's army even more.

 

[ParkCungHee]

I agree that Soviet lands for Japan were not the first or second priority targets. The question is whether they were considering an opportunistic invasion. If they decided that USSR is about to collapse in 1941, it would be tempting for them to annex second half of Sakhalin, for example, or Vladivostok. Nobody is talking about full-scale invasion of Siberia, but if Germans captured Moscow in September, Japanese attack was IMO possible.

Maybe after a total, and complete collapse, the scale of post 1917. But at that point, the Japanese invasion is irrelevant, because it's entirely dependent on a total German victory, and even then, the Japanese occupation would be militarily insignificant, consisting of the occupation of a major port and an unimportant island.

At least, it is undoubted that Soviet leaders considered treat of Japanese attack (before Pearl Harbour) seriously and kept considerable forces in Eastern regions. From what I read, experience of battles against Zhukov somewhat make Japan to understand that starting land war against USSR would be not a good idea. Is it true or not - that's arguable, but such opinion exists and it's not baseless.

Well yes the Soviet Union considered the Japanese to still be a threat, but that's because they didn't have access to higher Japanese planning, which by June was far more worried about war with the United States.

 

[jlvfr]

I think I read somewhere that the high command didn't think they "Germany", would be ready for a full scale war until 1944. And from what I understand that was also when they had the highest production. So starting war early really doomed them.

The Navy's expansion plan, planned in January 1939 (Plan Z) wasn't supposed to be completed before 1944/1945...

 

[Domen]

Bombing urban areas did pretty well for the Allies...

So it did for the Germans as long as they had air supremacy.

In 1939, when USSR had problems with Japan, Germany needed peace with USSR (they signed non-aggression pact in August 1939)

The most important reason of signing "peace" (it was actually an agreement, an alliance - not peace) was Poland, not Japan.

This ignores the fact that Germany's main target was always Russia. Everything else was almost a sideshow.

Not always. There was time when Hitler was thinking about creating his "Lebensraum" in Western Europe.

Hitlers plans was to invade Russia before even invading France or Britain, thus coordinating with the Japanese timing, the problem was France and Britain declared war to soon, Chamberlain revealed not so weak in the end as Hitler thought he was mislead him with the signing of a non agression pact.

Well before Hitler invaded Poland, he was planning to invade France first.

For some time Hitler hoped Poland could be subjugated without a fight and become one of his allies (i.e. puppet states), like later Romania.

 

[Domen]

In winter the ground is frozen. Your tanks don't sink into the roads.

But in winter you have huge problems with mechanical vehicles due to low temperatures...

Maybe you don't live in a country where low temperatures happen, so you don't know.

You also probably have some better rail transport than Polish State Railways so you also don't know how much problems railways have in Winter...

But in this case technological level in WW2 was not as advanced as that of modern Polish State Railways so my experiences are most realistic...

the ground is frozen. Your tanks don't sink into the roads.

In winter, there is a lot of snow. And vehicles can sink into snow...

Plus there is the thing with railways about which i wrote above - which causes even more problems with logistics.

So I can't agree that "Winter's actually a great time to launch an offensive in Russia".

Sorry, but the fact that rasputitsas are even worse than Winter, doesn't prove that Winter is "great"!

 

[red_elk]

The most important reason of signing "peace" (it was actually an agreement, an alliance - not peace) was Poland, not Japan.

I didn't say that non-aggression pact was about Japan.
The purpose of non-aggression pact for USSR was to postpone German possible attack for as long as possible. In 1939 USSR continued active preparations for war against Germany (according to you, against "ally"). For Soviet Union in August 1939 there was risky situation of possible international isolation and aggression of Germany together with its allies. All attempts to create alliance with France, Britain and Poland failed, mostly because of Polish position not to sign any agreements with USSR. In this situation, non-aggression agreement with Germany allowed to postpone German aggression by almost 2 years and greatly increase military potential of Soviet army.

As for secret part of the agreement - yes, one of its purposes for USSR, was to return Western Belorussia and Ukraine territories, which were annexed by Poland in 1920. It also allowed to keep Germans further away from Soviet mainland, without agreement in June 1941 they would be much closer to Moscow.

 

[Domen]

For Soviet Union in August 1939 there was risky situation of possible international isolation and aggression of Germany together with its allies.

How could be the USSR invaded in August 1939 if there was no German-Soviet border?

Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were not German allies at that time.

Romania had an Anti-Soviet alliance signed with Poland in case of Soviet invasion against any of these countries.

Of course relations between Poland and Romania were warm also regarding their German policy, but Romania was not obliged to actively help Poland in case of German invasion, while in case of Soviet invasion it was obliged to declare war on the Soviet Union and send a certain number of divisions to Polish territory to resist the Red Army. Clearly both states were more afraid of Soviet expansionism than of German expansionism.

If by "Germany and its allies" you mean Japan, then you forgot that on 15 September 1939 the USSR signed an unlimited ceasefire with Japan.

And in April of 1941 a non-agression pact was signed with Japan.

All attempts to create alliance with France, Britain and Poland failed, mostly because of Polish position not to sign any agreements with USSR.

I am not surprised that Poland rejected the Soviet "generous offer". The Soviet "generous proposition" was as follows:

The Soviet "offer of help" in case of Polish-German war included only demand ("proposition") of allowing the Red Army to "come in contact with the German army" (this is accurate quotation) in Eastern Galicia, Suwalszczyzna (the region around the towns of Suwalki and Augustow) and Pomerania (= coastal areas of East Prussia). Not in other areas.

You do realize that allowing the Soviet "ally" to enter and march across Polish territory would mean de facto Soviet occupation. Was there any territory in the entire history of the Soviet Union, which - once entered - was ever peacefully abandoned by the Red Army? No. Was there any "ally" of the USSR which avoided "Sovietization" and becoming a puppet state of the "great mother Russia"? Probably no.

The fact is that entering into an alliance with the USSR (= accepting the Soviet demand of allowing the Red Army to march into Eastern Galicia, Suwalszczyzna and Pomerania) equals becoming puppet "vassal" of the USSR.

What REAL interest did Stalin have in proposing that "support" for Poland?

Was that proposition really about providing real support? Or just another political game of Stalin.

We know that Stalin's aim was to provoke an outbreak of war betwen Western Powers and the III Reich.

But how would supporting Poland help this to happen?

Moreover - Bolshevik crimes and their "reputation" from 1920 were still remembered in Poland.

Hitler, on the other hand, was - at that time - not yet renowned for his crimes.

If Poland accepted the Soviet "offer", annexation of Poland by the USSR would be very probable.

Of course from modern perspective Polish sufferings under the German occupation were not worth refusing the Soviet "generous offer". But as I already wrote - in 1939 it was the Soviet Union which had reputation of criminal state, not Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany gained reputation of criminal state only during the subsequent years.

In 1939 Poles did not consider Soviet leaders as ones who could be trusted. Rightly.

The Soviet "offer of help" in case of Polish-German war included only demand ("proposition") of allowing the Red Army to "come in contact with the German army" (this is accurate quotation) in Eastern Galicia, Suwalszczyzna (the region around the towns of Suwalki and Augustow) and Pomerania (= coastal areas of East Prussia). Not in other areas.

This means the Soviets were not interested in helping the Polish army to resist the German onslaught where it would be most urgent, most necessary (depending on strategic situation) - but only in some certain parts of Poland.

Strangely enough, these parts of Poland were the same as the Soviet Union annexed during further years:

Eastern Galicia and Suwalszczyzna were in the Soviet sphere of interests in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

Eastern Galicia = more or less the same territory as "Western Ukraine".

Eastern Galicia was annexed in September of 1939. Suwalszczyzna was not annexed only because on 28.09.1939 some changes were made in the initial plan of partitioning Europe from the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. According to the agreement of 28.09.1939 Lithuania was given to the USSR in exchange for Suwalszczyzna, while in the original Pact Lithuania was within the German sphere of interests and Suwalszczyzna within the Soviet.

Pomerania (meaning "coastal part of East Prussia" in this case) was annexed in 1945 (Kaliningrad Oblast).

This all proves, that Soviet alleged intentions of "helping Poland" were in fact dishonest.

All the Soviets wanted was probably to enter these territories, hold them until German army destroys Polish army elsewhere and then annex them, just like in real they annexed Eastern Poland and under the same pretext. After this happening, they would probably sign ceasefire with Germany or something (in case if they would ever declare war on Germany before - because "come in contact with the German army" may mean something else).

And the eventual "cooperation" of the Red Army with Polish Army - if any would even take place - would probably look just like the cooperation of Home Army (AK) with the Red Army against Germans looked like in 1944 / 1945. In case if you don't know, that cooperation was as follows: after joint Soviet-Polish combat against German forces and joint liberation of certain area from Nazi hands, Soviet forces were disarming and arresting Polish partisans...

Note also that "entering Suwalszczyzna" inevitably equals marching across entire "Western Belarus".

So if the Red Army was allowed to enter Suwalszczyzna, it would also enter Western Belarus for sure.

And - as we all know - "Western Belarus" was also annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939.

The state like Soviet Union simply was not and could not be Poland's trusted ally in 1939.

Even accepting Hitler's offer was more probable than accepting Stalin's offer. After all Poland had quite good international relations with Nazi Germany for a considerable period of time. Also most of Polish high-ranking officers considered the USSR a bigger threat for Poland's independence than Nazi Germany.

As for secret part of the agreement - yes, one of its purposes for USSR, was to return Western Belorussia and Ukraine territories

These territories were never possesed by the USSR before September of 1939.

which were annexed by Poland in 1920.

They were annexed by Poland in 1921 (Treaty of Riga), not in 1920.

Actually, it was not "one-handed" annexation by Poland. Also the USSR participated in dissolution of independent Ukrainian state.

Treaty of Riga was a partition of Belarus and Ukraine (both eastern and western) between the USSR and Poland.

without agreement in June 1941 they would be much closer to Moscow.

They would be in a much more comfortable position. There was a powerful line of fortifications called Stalin Line across the old Soviet border. It was much more powerful than the newly-started in 1939 Molotov Line, construction of which was not yet finished before June 1941.

The "more terrain to retreat" advantage is not always an advantage - and in this case it clearly wasn't.

Especially considering that the entire retreat of the Red Army in the Summer / Autumn of 1941 ended in a terrible disaster - encirclement and subsequent destruction of tens of hundreds of thousands Soviet troops in a number of massive pockets.

In this situation, non-aggression agreement with Germany allowed to postpone German aggression by almost 2 years

The purpose of non-aggression pact for USSR was to postpone German possible attack for as long as possible.

Germany was not planning to invade the USSR in 1939. That's more than certain.

Hitler wanted to eliminate France and Great Britain first. He considered an alliance with Great Britain too.

The purpose of non-aggression pact (or rather its secret protocol in which the partition of Poland was agreed) for Germany was similar - to ensure that they would receive Soviet military help in their campaign against Poland and to ensure that Poland would not receive Soviet military help against them.

Without signing the Soviet-German pact before the invasion, Hitler would probably never risk to invade Poland.

and greatly increase military potential of Soviet army.

So I wonder why the full mobilization of the Red Army was halted after the Soviet-German pact was signed and after the subsequent defeat of Poland by German and Soviet forces?

Many Russian historians claim that the Red Army was not prepared at all for the German invasion in June of 1941 and that's why it collapses so rapidly during the first months of Barbarossa.

You claim the opposite - that the Red Army was prepared for the German invasion because it managed to "greatly increase its military potential", thanks to the pact with Germany in 1939.

So which is true? Was it prepared for the German attack in 1941 or not?

 

[bombshoo]

I think I read somewhere that the high command didn't think they "Germany", would be ready for a full scale war until 1944. And from what I understand that was also when they had the highest production. So starting war early really doomed them.

Though much of the reason for their higher production was from things they learned from the war itself, the production power of occupied areas, as well as just being desperate and working their labor even harder. Had their been no war until then, it's doubtful their production would have reached these same levels by that point.