Greatest Blunders in History
- Thread starter Loki130
- Start date
JohnRM
Don't make me destroy you
There is a lot of Monday-morning quarterbacking on this issue, in my opinion. The plan had a chance to succeed, it really did, but two things really screwed the Army of Northern Virginia. The first was Stuart's cavalry going AWOL and leaving the army blind. Even after they returned, intelligence on the Union Army was wholly inadequate.
The second issue was a stroke of fate. During the civil war, for the south, there were two main armories that supplied fuses for the artillery of the armies of the Confederacy. The armory which supplied the Army of Northern Virginia was located in Richmond. Prior to the battle of Gettysburg, there was an explosion at the armory. The Army of Northern Virginia was now getting its fuses from the armory in Charleston. Problem is, these fuses did not burn at the same rate, but artillery officers didn't know this. The new fuses burned much slower and throughout the Battle of Gettysburg, the Confederacy's artillery overshot the Union lines. Had this not been the case, the artillery barrage on the Union lines would have been far more devastating.
Now, of course, after such a massive artillery barrage, the massive amount of smoke, combined with a hot and humid day kept the smoke at ground level and obstructed the view of observers at the Confederate lines. They had no reason to expect that the barrage was ineffective.
The reality is that thousands of troops made it past long-range musket fire, past artillery fire, through canister shot, past volleys of close-range musket fire and actually penetrated the Union center for a brief moment. Had that artillery barrage been more successful, the attack may have succeeded to some extent. It would NOT have destroyed the Union Army and in the end, the Confederate casualties would still have been high, but the attack MIGHT have pushed the Union Army off the ridge and off the field of battle.
Was the charge a bad decision? I think so. After the losses suffered on the second day, General Lee should have withdrawn.
What was the bigger blunder of the third day? Union General Meade's decision NOT to counterattack, envelop, and destroy the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia. Had that happened, the war would likely have ended in less than a year.
Thousands of Germans died within sight of Moscow, BEFORE winter. It was close. At one point, Stalin gave the order to abandon the city, but changed his mind at the last minute.
The bigger blunder? Going to war in 1939.
innonimatu
the resident Cassandra
- Joined
- Dec 4, 2006
- Messages
- 15,374
The most the germans could hope for was to place Moscow under siege, and I don't believe they'd manage to close it. They failed to take either Leningrad or Stalingrad because there was no way they could win a street by street fight - a city as big as Moscow was in effect a fortress where attackers with serious logistic problems (the german supply lines were very overstretched) could not hope to prevail.
Well, I wouldn't exist.
A more recent history event. Gordon Brown's great idea of publicly saying that he is going to sell GB's Gold off when gold was at its lowest value for years, which made the price of gold drop even further. At the time UN's finance chancellor said that Brown had lost his mind and forgotten that a country uses it's gold reverses when times are bad, and how correct he was.
holy king
Deity
)
Sharwood
Rich, doctor nephew
Sure you would. Your parents would just have been somewhere better, like, say, Canada.
My mother would not exist as her ancestors would have been exterminated. Genocided, as it were. So I would have the same father but a different mother.
Sharwood
Rich, doctor nephew
Nah, we'd keep some of the white folk around as slaves, your mother could be descended from some of them.
Taras Bulba
gone
- Joined
- Jan 31, 2007
- Messages
- 1,442
Pickett's Charge
Eretz Yisrael
Korean Conscript
Belgium's existence..........
Wwhy didnt France just take Belgum as its own? Then things might have worked out differently.
Wwhy didnt France just take Belgum as its own? Then things might have worked out differently.
What today is Belgium used to be the original (southern) Spanish Netherlands, later Austrian and was occupied in France's revolutionary wars. In 1814-'15 the kingdom of the Netherlands was created, which however ruptured in 1830 into Holland and Belgium. Belgium became its own kingdom (until 1940-'45), while the Dutch king remained grandduke of Luxemburg until halfway through the 19th century, I believe. The original kingdom f the Netherlands was intended by the victors of 1814-'15 as a bufferstate against French expansion; the Belgian revolt of 1830 ofcourse nullified this aim.
Eretz Yisrael
Korean Conscript
Thx for the information, but my point is, just take over Belgium and France would have been able to make a change in both World Wars.
Knighterror1013
Chieftain
I hate to say it, but I doubt France and Britian could have stopped Germany once the war started, no matter what really. The Germans possessed better tanks, planes, soldiers, rifles, pistols, artillery, training, Generals, central command, intellegince, logistics, scienctists, R & D, roads, industrial capacity, drive and belief. They also created that type of warfare that the allies copied in order to be affective. Heavy bombing before rushing in with the best tanks around and very well trained soldiers who were swift and mobilized, France and Britian stood no chance.
By the end of the Battle of Flanders, Britian France and Belgium had been humiliated and evacuated 338,226 troops from Dunkirk, I don't have the figures for how many more soldiers were lost.
As far as Germany invading Russia, lets take a look at what caused German high command believing they could defeat the Soviets. In 1939, Russia invaded Finland. Of course, anyone familiar with Russian military history knows Russia's classic (yet absurd) attack strategy. That is the Russion Onslaught, attack the objective with every
available man on every open avenue no matter the losses for either side. Tiny Finland, was very limited in man power (a population at the time of about 7 million, but I think I'm going over a million) and had WW1 era hardware. However, they had the will to fight and knew how the Russians would attack. The result, of course, was a Russian victory. However, if you look at the casualties, it may not seem apparently so.
Finland Losses - 25,000 killed or missing. Another 43,000 wounded.
Russian Losses - Giving conservative figures, atleast 200,000 dead (many say it goes higher, as the Russians had no problem feeding Finnish kill boxes, which were areas of extremely high concentrated artillery fire). Atleast another 400,000 wounded, but may go as high as double that.
In the battle of Suomussalmi, the Russians started with a 3:1 strength superiority. When the battle was over, the Finns lost 900, 1,700 wounded. The Russians lost 27,500, I could only imagine how many wounded as the figure is not listed. That was just one battle.
Ultimately, the Germans felt that they had across the board superioty over the Russians, except total manpower. The fact is, they did. The biggest blunder here is, and I believe another poster said it, was that Hitler took control of German command shortly after the Russian invasion. His Generals up to that point operated with remarkable freedom and it was quite revolutionary. They were given objectives, but it was up to them to decide how the operations were carried out. This led to decisive victory after decisive victory and showed just how brilliant the German generals were. However, Hitler took control, made stupid decisions, had ridiculous objectives, did not listen to his Generals, and severly hampered the German armie's ability to fight. Russia was well on its way to defeat, they had suffered losses of over 20,000,000 at the hands of the Germans (Fighting, bombing, starvation, extermination), and over 25,000,000 by the wars end. They survived because U.S aid, the Russian Winter, and Hitler's own foolishness and ego (HE wanted to be the one who beat the Russians).
By the end of the Battle of Flanders, Britian France and Belgium had been humiliated and evacuated 338,226 troops from Dunkirk, I don't have the figures for how many more soldiers were lost.
As far as Germany invading Russia, lets take a look at what caused German high command believing they could defeat the Soviets. In 1939, Russia invaded Finland. Of course, anyone familiar with Russian military history knows Russia's classic (yet absurd) attack strategy. That is the Russion Onslaught, attack the objective with every
available man on every open avenue no matter the losses for either side. Tiny Finland, was very limited in man power (a population at the time of about 7 million, but I think I'm going over a million) and had WW1 era hardware. However, they had the will to fight and knew how the Russians would attack. The result, of course, was a Russian victory. However, if you look at the casualties, it may not seem apparently so.
Finland Losses - 25,000 killed or missing. Another 43,000 wounded.
Russian Losses - Giving conservative figures, atleast 200,000 dead (many say it goes higher, as the Russians had no problem feeding Finnish kill boxes, which were areas of extremely high concentrated artillery fire). Atleast another 400,000 wounded, but may go as high as double that.
In the battle of Suomussalmi, the Russians started with a 3:1 strength superiority. When the battle was over, the Finns lost 900, 1,700 wounded. The Russians lost 27,500, I could only imagine how many wounded as the figure is not listed. That was just one battle.
Ultimately, the Germans felt that they had across the board superioty over the Russians, except total manpower. The fact is, they did. The biggest blunder here is, and I believe another poster said it, was that Hitler took control of German command shortly after the Russian invasion. His Generals up to that point operated with remarkable freedom and it was quite revolutionary. They were given objectives, but it was up to them to decide how the operations were carried out. This led to decisive victory after decisive victory and showed just how brilliant the German generals were. However, Hitler took control, made stupid decisions, had ridiculous objectives, did not listen to his Generals, and severly hampered the German armie's ability to fight. Russia was well on its way to defeat, they had suffered losses of over 20,000,000 at the hands of the Germans (Fighting, bombing, starvation, extermination), and over 25,000,000 by the wars end. They survived because U.S aid, the Russian Winter, and Hitler's own foolishness and ego (HE wanted to be the one who beat the Russians).
philippe
FYI, I chase trains.
Eretz, I think becuase you are korean, you have a certain knowledge on the matter, but beware, saying this is like a westerner saying, that Korea's existence is a mistake and that Japan should have kept annexing it.
If someone would say that too an Korean in Seoul, you could well imagine the outrage.
There is a reason the lion's claw at waterloo is pointed at France.
North King
blech
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2004
- Messages
- 18,165
They did. The rest of Europe didn't like that very much... I assume you know about the Napoleonic wars?
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
Of course the Germans did good during the opening plays of Barbarossa; the Soviet Union had a three-tiered defense. They knew they couldn't defend in Poland, and they never planned to. This is why the Germans didn't encounter anything of decent quality until they neared Minsk, which is where the second line was. The third was about where the Germans were stopped in the winter of 1941-42.
As for US aid, it is very much played up to be more than it was. Perhaps the food and supplies helped them out a bit for a few crucial months, but at its absolute most, US aid never amounted to more than~ 15% of their total GNP. Even by the end of 1941, the USSR had made twice as many aircraft as the Germans, despite being far behind that number in June. By the end of 1942, they were making more T-34s and KV heavy tanks than the Germans were of every kind of armored vehicle combined.
As for their losses, the USSR had lost about 4.3 million men (equivalent to the total size of their army on 22 June) by the end of 1941; yet their army at the same time was 5.3 million strong. But then, the Russians had more to work with than the Germans, who couldn't stand the losses inflicted between Minsk and the outskirts of Moscow and replace them in a decent fashion. This leads to the heart of the German Mistake: transportation in Russia is bloody horrible. For the same reason the Soviets never tried to defend in Poland is that which the German attack ultimately petered out where it did in November-December 1941; it's simply impossible to manage such a scale of war on such long, slow, and unreliable supply lines.
As for US aid, it is very much played up to be more than it was. Perhaps the food and supplies helped them out a bit for a few crucial months, but at its absolute most, US aid never amounted to more than~ 15% of their total GNP. Even by the end of 1941, the USSR had made twice as many aircraft as the Germans, despite being far behind that number in June. By the end of 1942, they were making more T-34s and KV heavy tanks than the Germans were of every kind of armored vehicle combined.
As for their losses, the USSR had lost about 4.3 million men (equivalent to the total size of their army on 22 June) by the end of 1941; yet their army at the same time was 5.3 million strong. But then, the Russians had more to work with than the Germans, who couldn't stand the losses inflicted between Minsk and the outskirts of Moscow and replace them in a decent fashion. This leads to the heart of the German Mistake: transportation in Russia is bloody horrible. For the same reason the Soviets never tried to defend in Poland is that which the German attack ultimately petered out where it did in November-December 1941; it's simply impossible to manage such a scale of war on such long, slow, and unreliable supply lines.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
Of course the Germans did good during the opening plays of Barbarossa; the Soviet Union had a three-tiered defense. They knew they couldn't defend in Poland, and they never planned to. This is why the Germans didn't encounter anything of decent quality until they neared Minsk, which is where the second line was. The third was about where the Germans were stopped in the winter of 1941-42.
As for US aid, it is very much played up to be more than it was. Perhaps the food and supplies helped them out a bit for a few crucial months, but at its absolute most, US aid never amounted to more than~ 15% of their total GNP. Even by the end of 1941, the USSR had made twice as many aircraft as the Germans, despite being far behind that number in June. By the end of 1942, they were making more T-34s and KV heavy tanks than the Germans were of every kind of armored vehicle combined.
As for their losses, the USSR had lost about 4.3 million men (equivalent to the total size of their army on 22 June) by the end of 1941; yet their army at the same time was 5.3 million strong. But then, the Russians had more to work with than the Germans, who couldn't stand the losses inflicted between Minsk and the outskirts of Moscow and replace them in a decent fashion. This leads to the heart of the German Mistake: transportation in Russia is bloody horrible. For the same reason the Soviets never tried to defend in Poland is that which the German attack ultimately petered out where it did in November-December 1941; it's simply impossible to manage such a scale of war on such long, slow, and unreliable supply lines.
As for US aid, it is very much played up to be more than it was. Perhaps the food and supplies helped them out a bit for a few crucial months, but at its absolute most, US aid never amounted to more than~ 15% of their total GNP. Even by the end of 1941, the USSR had made twice as many aircraft as the Germans, despite being far behind that number in June. By the end of 1942, they were making more T-34s and KV heavy tanks than the Germans were of every kind of armored vehicle combined.
As for their losses, the USSR had lost about 4.3 million men (equivalent to the total size of their army on 22 June) by the end of 1941; yet their army at the same time was 5.3 million strong. But then, the Russians had more to work with than the Germans, who couldn't stand the losses inflicted between Minsk and the outskirts of Moscow and replace them in a decent fashion. This leads to the heart of the German Mistake: transportation in Russia is bloody horrible. For the same reason the Soviets never tried to defend in Poland is that which the German attack ultimately petered out where it did in November-December 1941; it's simply impossible to manage such a scale of war on such long, slow, and unreliable supply lines.
This is incorrect on various points:
- German tanks on the start of WW II weren't superior; the French Char bis, the British Mathilda II and the Soviet T34 were better than the Panzer I-IV series either in armour, firepower or both (Tigers and Panthers - copied of the T34 - only appeared in Kursk 1943)
- the attack on the West (Fall Gelb) was a huge gamble, which paid off due to superior tactics (the Blitzkrieg concept notably encompassing close cooperation between armour units and air support) against numerically stronger Allied armies which however lacked effective coordination
- the Luftwaffe's failure during the Battle of Britain - while the RAF was in dire straits - was in fact ominous of things to come
- the Soviet Western defense was de facto non-existent; theoretically it was a forward defense, but neither that nor the abandoned inland Stalin Line were effective in June 1941; even in 1942 a repeated attack on the Moscow area was expected, hence the adequate defenses there
- German intelligence on the Soviet military situation hugely underestimated the number of tanks (some 8,000, making the Soviet tank force the largest in the world - though seriously outdated) and Soviet resilience in general
- Operation Barbarossa was flawd from the outset, as it divided the Axis thrust into 3 army groups, each with separate and ultimately unattained goals: Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus oil region - with the Axis declaration of war on the US in December 1941 (following Japan's offensive away from the Soviet Asian border and into the Pacific) the Anti-Komintern as a whole wase in effect doomed, despite the seemingly spectacular successes during 1942.
privatehudson
The Ultimate Badass
- Joined
- Oct 15, 2003
- Messages
- 4,821
Whilst I agree that those tanks generally had the edge in either firepower or armour protection what you say in brackets isn't true. The Tiger first saw action in September 1942 and its design origins predate Barbarossa. Although the design process was speeded up by seeing the T34 the main design changes were to increase weight and arnament, the Tiger did not copy features such as sloped armour. The Panther was the tank that responded to the T34 and saw action at Kursk for the first time.
One thing to bear in mind by the way with many French WW2 tanks is that whilst they were often better armoured or armed than their German opponents they usually had to cope with only having 1 man turrets. This meant that the commander's of such tanks had to direct the tank, load and fire the weapon at the same time.
Similar threads
