History questions not worth their own thread IV

[Glassfan]

the spy ring happens to be of British origin in the first place , but you didn't hear it from me . ı have heard the Soviet nuclear "threat" would have been credible in the mid 50s , with a minimum number of bombs and planes to carry them to a militarily meaningful range but the 1949 test showed the time table was behind the reality .

That is to say, the Soviet spys - Klaus Fuchs, etc. - were part of the British contingent to the Manhattan Project.

In any case, once Pandora's box is openned, there's no closing it. A big arguement in the 30's was that the Uranium Bomb was "impossible" to achieve; too technologically challenging (the separation problem), too expensive (during the Depression), too futuristic (SciFi stuff - H.G. Wells, Olaf Stapledon); it would never work. But once the Americans fired-off two or three, these arguments were shown to be demonstrably false.

During the Cold War, The Soviet Union became masters of reverse engineering - based often on what data the KGB could provide. Without the spys, the USSR was still a technologically savy country with some of the world's finest physicists and mathematicians, and would have only been delayed a few years (IMHO).

 

[r16]

no , ı really mean there was British spying against the project and Fuchs was hitten hard when his cover was not uncovered and he was kicked out to East Germany after serving his sentence . One of the first things ı learned when ı was given access to a particularly weird forum somewhere over the web .

as the German false start shows there were doubts which way was the right one and which were wrong , there are lots of internet stuff on how the Japanese were ahead and too few internet stuff on how decisive American mass production was ... Russians were doing fine , they had the theory and they have rarely been behind in any kind of theorizing though production of stuff is alltogether another different matter . KGB only provided evidence that what they already knew was the way to go .

 

[PlutonianEmpire]

WW2 Question: How was the Auschwitz death camp first heard of, by anyone other than the Nazi owners, after it became operational; unless it was first heard of prior to beginning operations? Also, did the Nazis try to cover it up completely, or was there some sort of propaganda involved?

 

[Dachs]

A Polish officer, one Captain Pilecki, volunteered to be held in the Auschwitz I camp (the concentration camp, not the extermination camp) in 1940 and smuggled information out during the course of that year. He escaped in 1943 and delivered a more detailed report at that time, but it was largely ignored. The Allied governments did not, by and large, take the existence of Auschwitz seriously until 1944, with the reception of other human intelligence. The Vrba-Wetzler report, authored by two other escapees, was compiled between April and May 1944 and released via the BBC and the New York Times in June of that year.

You asked about "death camp", and the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) camp was the part of the complex that fit that description. But Pilecki's initial report was smuggled out before Birkenau construction began, and certainly before the Nazis had decided on the Final Solution (which developed between late 1941 and early 1942). It was only with Pilecki's escape in 1943, following his realization that Allied forces would not be coming to assist in the camp revolt he had planned, that details about Birkenau were made available to the Allied governments (but not publicly released).

There was no real need to cover anything up on the part of the German government. People heard rumors, and probably the bulk of at least the German population had some idea that something bad was happening to the Jews, but they didn't really care - incredibly, there is a historiographical debate about whether most Germans' attitude was "passive indifference" or "implicit, inactive approval". (Another reason why WWII history sucks.) Those rumors didn't really travel very far outside Germany. People knew that Jews were being rounded up, because that part had happened before the war started, but the Nazis didn't even decide on the Final Solution itself until much later in the war - so nobody else knew about it, either.

 

[PlutonianEmpire]

A Polish officer, one Captain Pilecki, volunteered to be held in the Auschwitz I camp (the concentration camp, not the extermination camp) in 1940 and smuggled information out during the course of that year. He escaped in 1943 and delivered a more detailed report at that time, but it was largely ignored. The Allied governments did not, by and large, take the existence of Auschwitz seriously until 1944, with the reception of other human intelligence. The Vrba-Wetzler report, authored by two other escapees, was compiled between April and May 1944 and released via the BBC and the New York Times in June of that year.

You asked about "death camp", and the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) camp was the part of the complex that fit that description. But Pilecki's initial report was smuggled out before Birkenau construction began, and certainly before the Nazis had decided on the Final Solution (which developed between late 1941 and early 1942). It was only with Pilecki's escape in 1943, following his realization that Allied forces would not be coming to assist in the camp revolt he had planned, that details about Birkenau were made available to the Allied governments (but not publicly released).

There was no real need to cover anything up on the part of the German government. People heard rumors, and probably the bulk of at least the German population had some idea that something bad was happening to the Jews, but they didn't really care - incredibly, there is a historiographical debate about whether most Germans' attitude was "passive indifference" or "implicit, inactive approval". (Another reason why WWII history sucks.) Those rumors didn't really travel very far outside Germany. People knew that Jews were being rounded up, because that part had happened before the war started, but the Nazis didn't even decide on the Final Solution itself until much later in the war - so nobody else knew about it, either.

Ah, didn't realize there was more than one camp there. I meant to say the facility as a whole.

Anyways, thanks.

 

[r16]

although already answered in a detailed way , 1944 was a year everybody knew about the Final Solution and debated to do something about it or not . Americans certainly discussed bombing railroads leading to camps but people did not believe it was that serious .

 

[Lord Baal]

A Polish officer, one Captain Pilecki, volunteered to be held in the Auschwitz I camp (the concentration camp, not the extermination camp) in 1940 and smuggled information out during the course of that year. He escaped in 1943 and delivered a more detailed report at that time, but it was largely ignored. The Allied governments did not, by and large, take the existence of Auschwitz seriously until 1944, with the reception of other human intelligence. The Vrba-Wetzler report, authored by two other escapees, was compiled between April and May 1944 and released via the BBC and the New York Times in June of that year.

You asked about "death camp", and the Auschwitz II (Birkenau) camp was the part of the complex that fit that description. But Pilecki's initial report was smuggled out before Birkenau construction began, and certainly before the Nazis had decided on the Final Solution (which developed between late 1941 and early 1942). It was only with Pilecki's escape in 1943, following his realization that Allied forces would not be coming to assist in the camp revolt he had planned, that details about Birkenau were made available to the Allied governments (but not publicly released).

There was no real need to cover anything up on the part of the German government. People heard rumors, and probably the bulk of at least the German population had some idea that something bad was happening to the Jews, but they didn't really care - incredibly, there is a historiographical debate about whether most Germans' attitude was "passive indifference" or "implicit, inactive approval". (Another reason why WWII history sucks.) Those rumors didn't really travel very far outside Germany. People knew that Jews were being rounded up, because that part had happened before the war started, but the Nazis didn't even decide on the Final Solution itself until much later in the war - so nobody else knew about it, either.

This is a great post, but I would add that the Nazis were much better at covering their tracks among the general populace by this point, after the absolute disaster that followed the similar extermination program against the inmates of asylums and sanitariums in 1939-40.

 

[History_Buff]

On the topic of WWII: I've often heard it said that the Allies could have very easily crippled German productivity by bombing power production centers rather than factories.

Is there some reason they didn't do this? Or did they do it anyway, and the anecdote above is just really oversimplifying things?

 

[Bowsling]

The strategic bombing of Germany didn't really achieve anything other than to keep the Soviets happy while they beat the snot out of Germany to cut their own losses when hey finally invaded France.

And I don't think this would have changed had they started bombing power plants.

 

[Cutlass]

On the topic of WWII: I've often heard it said that the Allies could have very easily crippled German productivity by bombing power production centers rather than factories.

Is there some reason they didn't do this? Or did they do it anyway, and the anecdote above is just really oversimplifying things?

The Germans had just a few "bottleneck" areas of their economy that were particularly vulnerable or had major repercussions throughout the rest of their economy. Mainly coal, oil, steel, electricity, and rail. Bombing these, as opposed to the manufacturing, shipbuilding, dehousing of the population, had the greatest effects on overall German economic capacity.

 

[Masada]

Precision bombing was hard. And the nature of those targets made it even harder.

 

[Joecoolyo]

On the topic of WWII: I've often heard it said that the Allies could have very easily crippled German productivity by bombing power production centers rather than factories.

Is there some reason they didn't do this? Or did they do it anyway, and the anecdote above is just really oversimplifying things?

I remember reading about a British bombing of a hydroelectric dam during WW2, but my memory is fuzzy and it might just have been a regular dam.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Precision bombing was hard. And the nature of those targets made it even harder.

Plus, many of the bottlenecks were easy to get around.
For example, even though the ball bearing industry was extremely concentrated, the Germans made up for the shortfall by using more slide bearings.

 

[say1988]

I remember reading about a British bombing of a hydroelectric dam during WW2, but my memory is fuzzy and it might just have been a regular dam.

The Dambusters. Impressive, but not that effective as the dams were repaired quite rapidly.

 

[Cutlass]

With WWII tech is was very hard to get critical hits on point targets with level bombing, and the higher the altitude of the bombers, the worse that got. Which is why it made sense to bomb facilities that covered large areas, like rail yards. But in many cases it was not too difficult to repair the damage. So by dispersing the bombing efforts, it became less effective overall.

 

[AnthonyBoscia]

Always worth another watch.

 

[say1988]

The strategic bombing of Germany didn't really achieve anything other than to keep the Soviets happy while they beat the snot out of Germany to cut their own losses when hey finally invaded France.

And I don't think this would have changed had they started bombing power plants.

While probably not worth the costs, I find the typical argument that it was pointless (the fact that Germany continued to increase production) to be pretty flimsy.
The fact that production was increasing says nothing to the effectiveness of the raids beyond that they weren't decisive. It is very likely German industry would have increased faster without regular bombing, the question becomes how much.
Further, that ignores the German industry and military assets diverted to defending against the bomber offensive, in the forms of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and R&D.

And keeping the Soviets happy isn't anything to ignore either.

Like I said, I don't think the bomber offensive was worth the cost, just the simple arguments are flimsy and overused.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

But in many cases it was not too difficult to repair the damage.

Except when an entire city was leveled and 40,000 people perished in a week-long firestorm.

 

[Bowsling]

While probably not worth the costs, I find the typical argument that it was pointless (the fact that Germany continued to increase production) to be pretty flimsy.
The fact that production was increasing says nothing to the effectiveness of the raids beyond that they weren't decisive. It is very likely German industry would have increased faster without regular bombing, the question becomes how much.
Further, that ignores the German industry and military assets diverted to defending against the bomber offensive, in the forms of aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and R&D.

And keeping the Soviets happy isn't anything to ignore either.

Like I said, I don't think the bomber offensive was worth the cost, just the simple arguments are flimsy and overused.

Yes, you are right. Way to teach me to make fairly controversial posts in the morning.

 

[Cutlass]

Except when an entire city was leveled and 40,000 people perished in a week-long firestorm.

I don't deny that it was horrible.

However, as a war fighting strategy it was, let us say, over rated in effect. Contrary to the claims of air power advocates, it did not have either the strategic effect of crippling Germany or Japan's war fighting capability. And neither did drive the populace or the government to surrender. That's not to say that it had no effect on those nation's ability to fight. Just that it did not have a decisive one. And in the meantime the price paid by the attackers was horrendous as well. So you can really make an argument against its being worth the effort.