History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VIII

[Dachs]

In that case, the only way the ancient Goths could plausibly have anything to do with it is if they resided in the geographical region of modern-day Germany, and from my google search, they didn't.

well THAT'S a minefield

 

[innonimatu]

Finally, there's also a sense in which the Scots regarded themselves as distinct political community, and resented the prospect of subjugation to what they saw as a foreign power, especially one with which they had fought many bloody wars, even while nominally under the same monarch. There was simply a lot of cultural and emotional inertia to overcome, and a certain reading of the political trajectory of Scotland over the last few decades might suggest that this was never fully resolved so much as it was repressed.

Funny how one keeps noticing nationalism predating the modern age.

 

[Imaus]

In that case, the only way the ancient Goths could plausibly have anything to do with it is if they resided in the geographical region of modern-day Germany, and from my google search, they didn't.

How did you come to that particular conclusion? The Goths were a people of the migration era. Jeromes traces them back to lower Scandinavia, they hopped over to Poland, some went to Crimea, others went to Dacia and Thrace and then to Italy, Spain, France, North Africa. They were a Germanic people, specifically, East Germanic. They got equated to 'Goths' by the English Proto-Romantics and Renaissance men trying to trace their selves to the past; sort of like Sarmatism in Poland.

Hell, most 'Germans' didn't reside in 'Germany', most of them were in Belgium and West Germany while East Germany was always more fluvious; and there was repopulation of the era throughout the ages, up to and including a sort of 'justification' for the Imperial and Fascist Reichs. People move around, and the Germans were some of the most prolific in this regard because apparently the Baltic/Scandinavian era really sucked.

 

[caketastydelish]

But did Europe at that time also have preps and jocks?

 

[Imaus]

But did Europe at that time also have preps and jocks?

Romans for Preps and Huns for Jocks.

 

[Ajidica]

Jeromes

Jordanes.
To add, a bunch of "Goths" also stayed in "Poland" and eventually merged with the later Slav migrations.

 

[Traitorfish]

Funny how one keeps noticing nationalism predating the modern age.

I don't think that the seventeenth century is generally regarded as part of the pre-modern era, at not least in the literate cities of Northern Europe.

Jordanes.
To add, a bunch of "Goths" also stayed in "Poland" and eventually merged with the later Slav migrations.

No, no, it's the Vandals who went to North Africa.

 

[sophie]

I don't think that the seventeenth century is generally regarded as part of the pre-modern era, at not least in the literate cities of Northern Europe.

The era is termed the "Early Modern" for a reason.

No, no, it's the Vandals who went to North Africa.

The Vandals themselves spoke an East Germanic language, and Procopius refers to the Vandals as being part of the "Gothic Nation"

 

[Ajidica]

The Vandals themselves spoke an East Germanic language, and Procopius refers to the Vandals as being part of the "Gothic Nation"

I think you missed the 'Poland is in North Africa' joke....

 

[caketastydelish]

I never understood that joke/meme but I REALLY hate it.

 

[sophie]

I think you missed the 'Poland is in North Africa' joke....

 

[Ajidica]

I never understood that joke/meme but I REALLY hate it.

To explain - back in the day we had a bajillion threads about whether Poland was in Eastern Europe or Central Europe. In the end, we decided that everyone was wrong and that Poland was actually in North Africa.

It is also one of the best in-jokes OT has ever created, up there with They Stoled My Camera and Pants.

 

[caketastydelish]

I never found it funny, frankly.

 

[Traitorfish]

I never found it funny, frankly.

Oh, it was never funny. That's what makes it funny.

 

[HSC]

I've been lurking on this forum for far too long, so I decided that it was time to create an account and actually contribute

I've been reading Kaiser Wilhelm II: A Life in Power by Christopher Clark (Penguin Books, 2009) and towards the end of the chapter on Wilhelm and Foreign Policy (1888-1911), I ran into something that was incredibly eye opening and raised many questions which I'll ask here. But first, here's what Clark says on pages 212-217:

That Wilhelm’s interventions made the work of the responsible policy-makers more difficult is beyond question; that they ‘to a very considerable extent helped to provoke’ the ‘encirclement’ of Germany after 1906-7 is doubtful...

It seems highly likely, in other words, that even without Wilhelm in control, Germany would have pursued a more or less ambitious policy or naval construction...

It is questionable, in any case, whether a less confrontational naval policy would have averted German alienation from Britain over the longer term. For it was not just the naval race, but the entire spectacle of Germany’s titanic industrial and commercial expansion that triggered British anxieties and suspicions...

Significantly, it was not the inauguration of the Tirpitz plan, but the earlier seizure of Kiaochow on the Chinese coast in 1897 as a base for supporting German commercial activity in the Yangtze Valley that prompted the first Anglo-Russian soundings toward a possible global compromise between the two embattled world empires — a compromise to be founded on shared concern over German commercial expansion into areas of shared Anglo-Russian interest

In a climate of mutual suspicions fanned by press speculation and bordering periodically on the paranoid, an unruffled ‘partnership’ with the island power could have been purchased only with a drastic renunciation of German power. Historians have occasionally pointed to the success with which Bismarck kept the peace in Europe by performing just such a Machtverzicht (renunciation of power), implying that the foreign policy of Wilhelm II and his government success by contrast. That is as it may be. But in the era of alliance blocs, chauvinist mass newspapers, navalism and breakneck export growth, there was no way back to the narrower horizons of Bismarckian diplomacy — not for the German commercial and political classes and certainly not for the man on the throne.

The first and most obvious question that arises from this is: was Germany's "encirclement" inevitable no matter which German government or its policies were in place due to geo-political, commercial, and strategic interests? Was there any plausible way that these interests would be changed?

Was there any way Germany could have reasonably courted a great power alliance within the political constraints of the time (e.g. Germany could never give up Alsace-Lorraine to France for example due to the many overwhelming security, economic, political, and prestige reasons for not doing so)? Was there anything Germany could do to make her alliance more valuable to the other powers?

Essentially my question is, how could Germany have reversed its diplomatic fortunes and isolation in the run up to the First World War?

Thanks everyone,
-HSC

 

[caketastydelish]

Oh, it was never funny. That's what makes it funny.

The only way this is a legit joke is if Sid Meier's makes a reference in a civ game. It's entirely possible: he already listened to Perfection's spam when he included the Giant Death Robots in Civ V.

 

[Dachs]

The first and most obvious question that arises from this is: was Germany's "encirclement" inevitable no matter which German government or its policies were in place due to geo-political, commercial, and strategic interests? Was there any plausible way that these interests would be changed?

Was there any way Germany could have reasonably courted a great power alliance within the political constraints of the time (e.g. Germany could never give up Alsace-Lorraine to France for example due to the many overwhelming security, economic, political, and prestige reasons for not doing so)? Was there anything Germany could do to make her alliance more valuable to the other powers?

Essentially my question is, how could Germany have reversed its diplomatic fortunes and isolation in the run up to the First World War?

This is, arguably, worth its own thread! There's a very large historiography of the outbreak of the First World War.

My personal take on these questions - was it possible for Germany to have a more favorable diplomatic position than it was actually in in 1914 - is "maybe yes, but also no".

First, the "no".

Most historians would agree that the alliances and agreements the British foreign office of the early twentieth century pursued were done in order to neutralize military threats to Britain's colonial possessions. While the USA, Japan, Russia, and France all possessed the ability to militarily threaten British colonies, Germany did not and could not develop such a power. In addition, there was a powerful xenophobic anti-German bloc at the British Foreign Office, especially from ~1902 on, that made meaningful cooperation very unlikely. Pretty much everything else about the Anglo-German relationship - the kaiser, Edward VII, the Daily Telegraph, the Haldane mission, German negotiating tactics, even the High Seas Fleet - is a red herring. And while many of the individual steps on the British path to entering the Great War were extremely avoidable or mutable, all of them were British actions taken irrespective of anything the Germans could realistically have done.

Some French governments were willing to indulge in limited cooperation with Germany over colonial questions but not end their security rivalry in Europe. Whether this was due to the size and power of the German military, the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, France's wounded national pride over the defeat of 1870, or some other reason differs depending on the historian; however, what does not change is the general conviction that Germany could not meaningfully alter the relationship with France. That change would have had to come within France, with the ascension of politicians who could engage with the Germans meaningfully on the basis of the status quo.

German relations with Russia actually might have been possible to...manage effectively. "Patch up" might be too strong a term. Russo-French financial ties were significant in a way that relatively illiquid Germany could not easily supplant. Russia and Germany fought some tariff battles, especially over the "Grain Invasion", that increased hard feelings and decreased opportunities for cooperation. And large segments of the German and Russian governments simply did not like each other. However, financial considerations condition, but do not determine, diplomatic ties, and there were plenty of Russian and German statesmen who liked the other country just fine. The balance of competing long-term effects on Russian policy favored an alliance with France, but it's possible to see that changing...but hard to see it changing too much based on German policy decisions. The Germans tried about as hard as they could in 1905 to secure an alliance with the tsar during his meeting with Wilhelm at Björkö, but the Russian cabinet convinced him to disavow the signed treaty after consultation. Nikolai and his ministers would have needed an additional push from somewhere else.

That's a lot of "no". However, the "yes" matters, too.

While British alliances were primarily based on neutralizing security threats, what the alliances actually did was more like a duct-tape solution. Japan and Russia still had strategic interests that were not about to go away, and serious friction broke out between the British and both parties before August 1914. In particular, the Russian invasion of Iran in 1911 caused major problems for their relationship with the British, while the temporary Russian window of insecurity that made a British alliance valuable in 1907 had disappeared by 1914. It's entirely possible to imagine the Russians and British abandoning their close relationship within a few years had fighting not broken out. The (second) rise of Joseph Caillaux in France also points to a possibility for the Germans to have cooled off an antagonistic relationship.

I don't know if that means that Germany's alliance would have been valuable to other powers. But it does point to a possible - far from certain - way out for the Germans. Unfortunately, as Clark himself argues in The Sleepwalkers, the multiplicity of crises developing in the Entente's internal relationships - the return of Caillaux, the impending civil war in Ireland, the confrontation over Iran, etc. - made war more likely, not less. The fragility of the alliances made it more important for statesmen to try to defend them. Absent a serious crisis in the summer of 1914, maybe they would have collapsed anyway, but that didn't happen.

 

[Arakhor]

The only way this is a legit joke is if Sid Meier's makes a reference in a civ game. It's entirely possible: he already listened to Perfection's spam when he included the Giant Death Robots in Civ V.

Are you sure Sid Meier was even involved in Civ V?

 

[caketastydelish]

I thought he was involved in all civ games?

 

[HSC]

Wow, thanks Dachs!

While the USA, Japan, Russia, and France all possessed the ability to militarily threaten British colonies, Germany did not and could not develop such a power.

Why is it that France (which had a much smaller navy than Germany) had the ability to threaten Britain's colonies and Germany could not develop such a power? Could the German's never "win" the naval race, that is create an even bigger fleet than historically (say add in Hollman's cruisers to Tirpitz's Battleships) to deter the British? Even if that were not enough on its own, would it, paired with say a Russo-German alliance (or "detente" even) be enough to tilt the scales?

In addition, there was a powerful xenophobic anti-German bloc at the British Foreign Office, especially from ~1902 on, that made meaningful cooperation very unlikely

From what I remember reading from The Sleepwalkers was that Edward VII was a complete Germanophobe and was responsible for placing the anti-German bloc in key positions in the Foreign Office.

The Germans tried about as hard as they could in 1905 to secure an alliance with the tsar during his meeting with Wilhelm at Björkö, but the Russian cabinet convinced him to disavow the signed treaty after consultation. Nikolai and his ministers would have needed an additional push from somewhere else.

How important was it that Buelow withdrew his support for the treaty after Wilhelm changed it? Also, how important was it that the Reinsurance Treaty was not renewed by Germany? Had Bismarck been around a few more months and the treaty renewed, how long would it have lasted? What are some "butterflies" that would've resulted? Britain drawing closer to the Germany?

In particular, the Russian invasion of Iran in 1911 caused major problems for their relationship with the British, while the temporary Russian window of insecurity that made a British alliance valuable in 1907 had disappeared by 1914. It's entirely possible to imagine the Russians and British abandoning their close relationship within a few years had fighting not broken out. The (second) rise of Joseph Caillaux in France also points to a possibility for the Germans to have cooled off an antagonistic relationship.

Have you read The Lost History of 1914 by Jack Beatty? Great book concerning counterfactual scenarios where WWI doesn't occur in the way it did, or at all.

I don't know if that means that Germany's alliance would have been valuable to other powers. But it does point to a possible - far from certain - way out for the Germans. Unfortunately, as Clark himself argues in The Sleepwalkers, the multiplicity of crises developing in the Entente's internal relationships - the return of Caillaux, the impending civil war in Ireland, the confrontation over Iran, etc. - made war more likely, not less. The fragility of the alliances made it more important for statesmen to try to defend them. Absent a serious crisis in the summer of 1914, maybe they would have collapsed anyway, but that didn't happen.

What was the correct policy for Germany re Britain then? Was conciliation the best course as Bethmann pursued? Or would an actual militaristic, aggressive policy by Germany been enough to deter Britain? Or would it drive her closer to the Entente? In addition to protecting the colonies, Clark points out in The Sleepwalkers that British perception of German weakness and vast overestimation of Russian strength is what drove Britain to a policy of appeasement with Russia and antagonism with Germany. Had Germany, for example, vastly expanded her army (say much larger than what the Reichstag would realistically approve) and aggressively supported Austria in all matters, have forced Britain to appease Germany as well? This is very confusing because Britain almost didn't intervene historically, but the Liberal Imperialists narrowly won out in the end. Had Grey been forced to resign in 1913 like he almost did, it is hard to imagine Britain intervening.