How the atheists fell for fundamentalism

[Terxpahseyton]

double post

 

[Whiskey_Lord]

Isn't faith "intellectual laziness" by definition?

(Sorry, I had to. It was too easy )

 

[ParkCungHee]

Isn't faith "intellectual laziness" by definition?

No, it is not.

 

[Traitorfish]

Yes it is my analogy and you have not addressed it in any way but dismissed it as half-baked. Which points do you dispute and why, based on what evidence. Do you not see that you are doing the same thing that you complain about others doing. Someone presents a vague appeal to complexity for religion and you scold people for not addressing the issue and dismissing it out of hand, perhaps even as half-baked.

Look I obviously don’t take the history and sociology of alcohol use as a serious area of study but that does not mean that my premises are incorrect, simply that it is one of many areas of complex human behavior with major impact on society that is probably not worthy of the intellectual energy. I can make it sound all fancy and deep to try and obfuscate and manipulate the discussion in the same way as the OP does with religion.

Atheism has a very simple premise and the undisputed richness and complexity of religious belief really has nothing to do with that premise. The fact that atheists occasionally argue against some of the most easily refuted fundamentalist tenets of a particular religion does not make them wrong, does not make them dogmatic or strident but more importantly does not make those with more nuanced and complex beliefs in the supernatural correct. That last part is IMO at the heart of the OP. The vast group of “moderates” or vague spiritualists or deists want to feel that the embarrassingly clear refutation of the most vocal fundie beliefs somehow does not impact them. I think they sense that they are on shaky ground but have a strong commitment to their beliefs as this seems to be a common component of human nature. The point I take issue with is this particular argumentum ad complexitum or condensentium. It is the attempt to suggest that the issue is so complex that no one is worthy to discuss it and makes their beliefs unassailable. I have no problem with people having whatever spirituality they like and they needn’t justify it to me or anyone else. But if you choose to come discuss that particular topic then do so in a straightforward manner rather than resort to this kind of obfuscation.

So basically, you're arguing that in the same way that alcohol can be addressed as a chemical with known physiological and psychological effects, and that consideration of its cultural and social content are not essential for understanding this, religion can be reduced down to a similar positive "essence" with similarly measurable effects? Am I following? In that case, I would have to ask you to identify this essence and its effects, and demonstrate how you proceed to it from the near-overwhelming complexity of religion-as-she-is-practised.

Look, I'm not saying that mystifications with the intent of avoiding criticism should be respect, because they shouldn't. I just don't think you can play the fiery sword of truth if you have to pull the exact inversion, to over-simplify topics to make your already-formed criticisms valid. Because let's not pretend that the debates in question are ever as simple as whether any given set of beliefs is or is not accurate, as if they take place in some sort of vacuum. This is, as it has been for centuries, a question of secularisation, of the influence that religion and religious organisations are permitted to hold within society; attempts to disprove any given set of beliefs are a way of cutting out the ground from under an opponent, and the prominence of such methods in the United States corresponds to the prominence of such anti-secular arguments relying on religious foundations. And this real debate, the debate about the permitted social role of religion, is one that necessarily has to take the social content of religion into account, which means that it simply cannot be boiled down to a nice, neat equation.

I don't mind ^^ Got to use some word, right?

I guess, but it seems like at this point we really are just talking about generalisations, so I'm not sure what the issue ever was.

Everything I come up with seems to be arbitrary in the end and to miss out on potential implementations of religions. But here is finally a new try.
How about: A religion is an ideology which for its justification rests on one or a set of beliefs based on supernaturality and which requires worship or some kind of ritual of its followers to be carried out.
Supernatural means powers which can not be observed, directly or indirectly, in a conclusive manner.

So we're excluding Buddhism, then? It is most fundamentally not concerned with deities, however many given schools may have accumulated along the way. And what about forms of worship directed at natural forces, which can be observed quite directly, however faulty any given set of interpretations are?

To be honest, it seems that you're making the same mistake that a lot of people do, which is to begin with the premise "Abrahamism = religion", and measure all other belief-systems in terms of their departure from that declared archtype.

Good point, I actually just remembered to have heard the same. That is actually a good place to see the source of religion! Which picked up from there has been cultivated by stories and narratives of course

Why is that necessarily the case? Given how religion has actually been practised, I would say that the percieved relationship between the various actors, human and non-human, seems to be more important. The various rituals, taboos, and other practices which form the daily presence of religious belief are all concerned with this, rather than what the God of X supposedly did or did not do to the Goddess of Y. (In fact, these seem to fulfil a supplementary role, providing or elaborating on a logic for the percieved relationships.) Narratives certainly play a role, yes, but they also play a role in entirely secular ideologies, of which nationalism is only the most obvious- what nation does not have its founding myths, its various heroes, its supposedly defining events? That's something that humans do in regards to almost every sphere of life, something that we would appear to be built for. (I've actually heard some anthropologists describe humans as being "story-telling animals".)

 

[Mark1031]

Look, I'm not saying that mystifications with the intent of avoiding criticism should be respect, because they shouldn't. I just don't think you can play the fiery sword of truth if you have to pull the exact inversion, to over-simplify topics to make your already-formed criticisms valid. Because let's not pretend that the debates in question are ever as simple as whether any given set of beliefs is or is not accurate, as if they take place in some sort of vacuum. This is, as it has been for centuries, a question of secularisation, of the influence that religion and religious organisations are permitted to hold within society; attempts to disprove any given set of beliefs are a way of cutting out the ground from under an opponent, and the prominence of such methods in the United States corresponds to the prominence of such anti-secular arguments relying on religious foundations. And this real debate, the debate about the permitted social role of religion, is one that necessarily has to take the social content of religion into account, which means that it simply cannot be boiled down to a nice, neat equation.

We are arguing about 2 different things, typical CFC. From my understanding the OP was trying to say that atheists arguments were too simplistic to address the complexity of religion. Lovett addressed this argument well and I reiterate that the atheist makes one simple argument-that supernatural beings/essences do not exist. I therefore extended that with my analogy and an assessment of what I thought is the underlying nature and motivation of this argument. So yes, I do see the debate as simple as whether any given set of beliefs is or is not accurate. The history and influence and evolving nature of religious belief in society is a different question entirely and does have great complexity, but why is this relevant to atheist arguments? It is not what atheists address and not my reading of the OP’s position. My reading of the OP is that he states this great historical complexity and then complains that atheists argue against only one set of beliefs and not the others. I’ll make it simple, we argue that all these beliefs are not accurate but that they have had great rich and complex influence on humanity. Done.

attempts to disprove any given set of beliefs are a way of cutting out the ground from under an opponent

Just re read this. Would you care to explain this statement? What type of argument does not do this? If you think your opponents premise is wrong is it rude or inappropriate to state this in an argument? Is it only fair to argue from the premises your opponent sets? Why should he not argue from your set of premises that he doesn't accept. Obviously it hurts your argument if someone disproves your premise but it seems to me that is the whole nature of resolving competing views. Or if not resolving at least making clear where the key differences lie.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I guess, but it seems like at this point we really are just talking about generalisations, so I'm not sure what the issue ever was.

Just view it has having gained mutual understanding in a sneaky way.

So we're excluding Buddhism, then?

Nope. I view the existence of nirvana as supernatural and its role as essential to the justification of Buddhism.

And what about forms of worship directed at natural forces, which can be observed quite directly, however faulty any given set of interpretations are?

Those interpretations would again constitute my criteria of supernaturality. It doesn't matter if you claim God or some rain spirit or Gaea to be responsible that it rains or if you declare the rain itself to be supernatural.

To be honest, it seems that you're making the same mistake that a lot of people do, which is to begin with the premise "Abrahamism = religion", and measure all other belief-systems in terms of their departure from that declared archtype.

I think you just don't realize the wide scope of my definition.

(I've actually heard some anthropologists describe humans as being "story-telling animals".)

I like that picture.

Why is that necessarily the case? Given how religion has actually been practised, I would say that the percieved relationship between the various actors, human and non-human, seems to be more important. The various rituals, taboos, and other practices which form the daily presence of religious belief are all concerned with this, rather than what the God of X supposedly did or did not do to the Goddess of Y. (In fact, these seem to fulfil a supplementary role, providing or elaborating on a logic for the percieved relationships.)

So we seem to have arrived at a chicken-egg-argument. What was first? The as you say "percieved relationship" or the narrative pointing in that direction? And like the chicken-egg-argument, it is probably solved by saying that they can not be separated from each other in the first place. So a mixture of percieved-relationships (doesn't matter if to Gods or other supernatural concepts) and narratives spreading them among the people and making the religious character more apparent over time.

Your point that this applies to all kinds of other social phenomenas is absolutely correct. Which is why it seems to me we find ourselves in a situation where religion can not be argued to have a specific or unique source other than natural tendencies of social human interaction, where religion can not be argued to be defined by this source (that is not more than any other social institution). But instead by what came of this source.

 

[Traitorfish]

Nope. I view the existence of nirvana as supernatural and its role as essential to the justification of Buddhism.

In what sense is it the "justification of Buddhism"? Isn't that like saying that the Good is the "justification of Platonism"?

Those interpretations would again constitute my criteria of supernaturality. It doesn't matter if you claim God or some rain spirit or Gaea to be responsible that it rains or if you declare the rain itself to be supernatural.

In that case, let's take the example of Platonism. Plato theorises a world of Ideas, existing on an immaterial level of being, and of which our world is merely a expression. Does that constitute a "supernatural" world-view to you? If so, do you extend that to other Idealist models, such as Hegelianism? And if not, then would that mean that Catholic theology, which incorporates Neoplatonist thought as its philosophical basis, is no longer "supernatural"?

I think you just don't realize the wide scope of my definition.

Perhaps not, but it also feels like you're making slightly contrived interpretations about other belief-systems to make them fit your definition.

So we seem to have arrived at a chicken-egg-argument. What was first? The as you say "percieved relationship" or the narrative pointing in that direction? And like the chicken-egg-argument, it is probably solved by saying that they can not be separated from each other in the first place. So a mixture of percieved-relationships (doesn't matter if to Gods or other supernatural concepts) and narratives spreading them among the people and making the religious character more apparent over time.

Your point that this applies to all kinds of other social phenomenas is absolutely correct. Which is why it seems to me we find ourselves in a situation where religion can not be argued to have a specific or unique source other than natural tendencies of social human interaction, where religion can not be argued to be defined by this source (that is not more than any other social institution). But instead by what came of this source.

Only if you insist on treating definitions as essential, whose function is to provide a "core" which can be identified as present or absent in any given case, rather than as generalisations, whose function is simply to denote a certain range of concrete phenomena. Which I thought we'd settled above?

We are arguing about 2 different things, typical CFC. From my understanding the OP was trying to say that atheists arguments were too simplistic to address the complexity of religion. Lovett addressed this argument well and I reiterate that the atheist makes one simple argument-that supernatural beings/essences do not exist. I therefore extended that with my analogy and an assessment of what I thought is the underlying nature and motivation of this argument. So yes, I do see the debate as simple as whether any given set of beliefs is or is not accurate. The history and influence and evolving nature of religious belief in society is a different question entirely and does have great complexity, but why is this relevant to atheist arguments? It is not what atheists address and not my reading of the OP’s position. My reading of the OP is that he states this great historical complexity and then complains that atheists argue against only one set of beliefs and not the others. I’ll make it simple, we argue that all these beliefs are not accurate but that they have had great rich and complex influence on humanity. Done.

I'm not arguing about something different than you, I'm saying that your argument is incomplete, because it attempts to address contemporary debates about religion as something isolated, almost academic, rather than as representing a particular theatre of ideological conflict. People like Dawkins don't criticise religion purely out of some academic pedantry, but because they regard religion as a malign social influence, and wish to limit its influence on society. The inverse is true of their evangelical opponents, with various positions being taken in between. This isn't exactly new- you might remember that Tom Paine set himself exactly this quest two hundred years ago with The Age of Reason.

Just re read this. Would you care to explain this statement? What type of argument does not do this? If you think your opponents premise is wrong is it rude or inappropriate to state this in an argument? Is it only fair to argue from the premises your opponent sets? Why should he not argue from your set of premises that he doesn't accept. Obviously it hurts your argument if someone disproves your premise but it seems to me that is the whole nature of resolving competing views. Or if not resolving at least making clear where the key differences lie.

I didn't make myself clear; the arguments in question are intended not to challenge any given claims made by anti-secularists, but, rather, to discredit them by attempting to demonstrating their political-ethical basis to be absurd. That's a very particular kind of argument, distinct from what you might call "everyday" debate, which typically takes the form of "concrete claim X" "concrete counter-claim Y", rather than comprehensive critiques. The equivalent would be, for example, the distinction between a conservative debating any given item of a liberal program, and making a critique of liberal ideology as such.

 

[fishjie]

Fundamentalists are all that matter to atheists who argue on the internet. Fundies are the ones bombing abortion clinics, flying planes into buildings, banning gay marriage, banning stem cell research, teaching creationism, and as bill maher said in religilous, believe in the end times and finally have access to technology that can actually make it a self fulfilling prophecy.

The "middle ground" is guilty too, because the existence of the middle ground makes it possible for fundies to exist. If the author believes that there were social/political/pyschological forces motivating the authors of the bible, he should realize all that crap is made up. So why do these middle ground people believe anything at all, knowing that all religions are man made? This stupidity is what allows fundamentalism to flourish. However, fundies are the enemy, and they need to be wiped out before their stupidity ruins the world.

 

[warpus]

So why do these middle ground people believe anything at all, knowing that all religions are man made?

Tradition..

Look at Europe.. or Sweden specifically, cause I can't find continent-wide numbers. 70% people are technically Christian, yet only 20-25% believe that god exists

I'm not even Christian and I celebrate Christmas

 

[fishjie]

Yeah but those people aren't really believers. I go to a buddhist temple but I don't believe in any of the religious crap, I just like meditation.

Gallup poll says 9/10 believe in God, but when hard pressed I think they just do it for the social club. If people were more vocal about their disbelief and doubts in God, we could finally get rid of this superstitious nonsense plaguing the country and make better choices. In 2012, with all the advances made in science and human rights, nobody should take a fundamentalist approach to the bible. to take it literally would mean regressing on not only science but all the human rights we've achieved over the centuries and having the morals of a primitive warlord tribe in the desert. there's just no excuse.

 

[plarq]

God gives me a break. I am in Indiana, where pi is not 3.14.

PS. 5000 posts!

 

[Whiskey_Lord]

Pi is exactly 3, according to the Bible.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

In what sense is it the "justification of Buddhism"? Isn't that like saying that the Good is the "justification of Platonism"?

According to wiki the whole point of Buddhism is to reach nirvana and to break the cycle of death and rebirth. So nirvana is like the Buddhist version of the Christian salvation. So you ask in what sense it is its justification? In the way that it is the promised ultimate gain of adhering the teachings of Buddhism.
I am not well-versed on Platonism, so can't judge if "good" plays the same role with Platonism. But if Platonism promised that the adherence to its teachings will bring about this "good" - and in fact is the only way to do so - then the answer is yes, it is a justification in the same way. Otherwise: no.

In that case, let's take the example of Platonism. Plato theorises a world of Ideas, existing on an immaterial level of being, and of which our world is merely a expression. Does that constitute a "supernatural" world-view to you?

That is a tough one. But I say yes.

If so, do you extend that to other Idealist models, such as Hegelianism?

I don't think so. From what I have quickly gathered on wiki, Hegelianism doesn't seem to be about making up stuff that gives the universe its structure or meaning or whatever, but - whatever this structure is - that it can be explained rationally. And that is just a claim as by what methodology the universe can be understood in a correct manner. I find nothing supernatural about that

Perhaps not, but it also feels like you're making slightly contrived interpretations about other belief-systems to make them fit your definition.

I certainly don't hope so, as that would mean that my definition kind of sucks (though that wouldn't really surprise, religion is a hard thing to be defined and my attempt is a work in progress - thank you for helping me). But I have yet to see a demonstration of where that would be the case.

Only if you insist on treating definitions as essential, whose function is to provide a "core" which can be identified as present or absent in any given case, rather than as generalisations, whose function is simply to denote a certain range of concrete phenomena. Which I thought we'd settled above?

I agree (now anyway) that definitions don't make up the "core" of what is. They solely constitute what differentiates something from something else, while both can share the same "core" (whatever that then is).
Now, do I define the Niagara Falls by referring to the big bang? Of course not. That is not a very differentiating attribute. Likewise, based on my conclusion you quoted, I wouldn't refer to the source of religion to define it, because it does not seem to differentiate it from other social institutions.
What exactly is there to be objected about this?

 

[ParkCungHee]

Hegelianism doesn't seem to be about making up stuff that gives the universe its structure or meaning or whatever

That's pretty much exactly what Hegelianism is about.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Then it seems to be of a supernatural nature, too.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Yes, but the God it worships is Prussia.

 

[Traitorfish]

According to wiki the whole point of Buddhism is to reach nirvana and to break the cycle of death and rebirth. So nirvana is like the Buddhist version of the Christian salvation. So you ask in what sense it is its justification? In the way that it is the promised ultimate gain of adhering the teachings of Buddhism.
I am not well-versed on Platonism, so can't judge if "good" plays the same role with Platonism. But if Platonism promised that the adherence to its teachings will bring about this "good" - and in fact is the only way to do so - then the answer is yes, it is a justification in the same way. Otherwise: no.

You're conflating premise and conclusion, and, as far as I know, neither Platonism nor Buddhism can be easily denounced as simply begging the question in this regard. Noting that Nirvana, the Good, etc. are the end which adherents of the philosophy are advised to pursue doesn't imply that they precede the whole of the rest.

That is a tough one. But I say yes.

I don't think so. From what I have quickly gathered on wiki, Hegelianism doesn't seem to be about making up stuff that gives the universe its structure or meaning or whatever, but - whatever this structure is - that it can be explained rationally. And that is just a claim as by what methodology the universe can be understood in a correct manner. I find nothing supernatural about that

So if Idealist philosophies such as Platonism and Hegelanism (taking your exchange with Park on Hegelianism into account) are to be classed as dealing with the "supernatural", and that for your makes them religious in character, doesn't that end up stretching the definition of "religion" far beyond its practical usage? It means that "religion" becomes detached from any particular form of practice or social function of religion, and becomes merely a set of points which are upheld in an abstract, intellectual fashion. It becomes a genre of philosophy, rather than something with a concrete historical presence.

I certainly don't hope so, as that would mean that my definition kind of sucks (though that wouldn't really surprise, religion is a hard thing to be defined and my attempt is a work in progress - thank you for helping me). But I have yet to see a demonstration of where that would be the case.

Your definition of the "supernatural" is an essentially Abrahamic one- that: which is not bound by "nature", which is to the laws of physics. That's a conception that is rooted in the maintenance in the Abrahamic traditions of an Aristotelian physics on the one hand, and a belief in an omnipotent deity on the other, and is absent in many other philosophical schools, most prominently those of South and East Asia. That means that you're obliged to introduce alien conceptions of "nature" into these philosophies to determine whether their basis is or is not "supernatural", driving an artificial wedge into them which renders their actual conception of the the world and of humanity incomprehensible.

I agree (now anyway) that definitions don't make up the "core" of what is. They solely constitute what differentiates something from something else, while both can share the same "core" (whatever that then is).
Now, do I define the Niagara Falls by referring to the big bang? Of course not. That is not a very differentiating attribute. Likewise, based on my conclusion you quoted, I wouldn't refer to the source of religion to define it, because it does not seem to differentiate it from other social institutions.
What exactly is there to be objected about this?

Actually, I think I misunderstood your last comment, so just consider whatever objection I thought I had withdrawn.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

You're conflating premise and conclusion, and, as far as I know, neither Platonism nor Buddhism can be easily denounced as simply begging the question in this regard. Noting that Nirvana, the Good, etc. are the end which adherents of the philosophy are advised to pursue doesn't imply that they precede the whole of the rest.

I only referred to the relationship of what is one supposed to do and what the reward for that is. I don't see how for that exercise it even matters what is premise and conclusion

So if Idealist philosophies such as Platonism and Hegelanism (taking your exchange with Park on Hegelianism into account) are to be classed as dealing with the "supernatural", and that for your makes them religious in character, doesn't that end up stretching the definition of "religion" far beyond its practical usage? It means that "religion" becomes detached from any particular form of practice or social function of religion, and becomes merely a set of points which are upheld in an abstract, intellectual fashion. It becomes a genre of philosophy, rather than something with a concrete historical presence.

True, but it seems over our dispute over supernaturality you have forgotten that my definition entails more - to prevent exactly what you criticize:

A religion is an ideology which for its justification rests on one or a set of beliefs based on supernaturality and which requires worship or some kind of ritual of its followers to be carried out.

Your definition of the "supernatural" is an essentially Abrahamic one- that: which is not bound by "nature", which is to the laws of physics. That's a conception that is rooted in the maintenance in the Abrahamic traditions of an Aristotelian physics on the one hand, and a belief in an omnipotent deity on the other, and is absent in many other philosophical schools, most prominently those of South and East Asia. That means that you're obliged to introduce alien conceptions of "nature" into these philosophies to determine whether their basis is or is not "supernatural", driving an artificial wedge into them which renders their actual conception of the the world and of humanity incomprehensible.

So why does my "Abrahamic" definition of supernatural seems to fly just fine with many assumed religions of South and East Asia?
As already demonstrated, it fits Buddhism. It surely also fits Hinduism, which is all about gods. It fits Shintoism, which is translated to mean "Way of the Gods", it seems to apply on Taoism, which is about imagined forces of good and evil (hence supernatural forces). It does not seems to fit Confucianism, but so what? As I see it, a definition of religion that includes Confucianism would have to be so encompassing it would also include many philosophies not viewed as religions. If Confucianism, why not view the teachings of Kant as religion? Why not view any philosophy as religion? I am sure we agree that this would obscure the term religion to utter redundancy.

Which leads me to the conclusion that what is commonly viewed as religion doesn't follow any inner logic, but is just a way to lump philosophies with historically strong cultural impacts into one entity. Which is IMO just misleading and not useful.

 

[Mark1031]

I'm not arguing about something different than you, I'm saying that your argument is incomplete, because it attempts to address contemporary debates about religion as something isolated, almost academic, rather than as representing a particular theatre of ideological conflict. People like Dawkins don't criticise religion purely out of some academic pedantry, but because they regard religion as a malign social influence, and wish to limit its influence on society. The inverse is true of their evangelical opponents, with various positions being taken in between. This isn't exactly new- you might remember that Tom Paine set himself exactly this quest two hundred years ago with The Age of Reason.

I guess many people think this way but I must ask why does the motivation of a Dawkins affect the primary thesis that there is or is not a supernatural entity? I find statements like “a particular theatre of ideological conflict” to be a frustrating form of obfuscation. Sure, some atheists feel that some religious tenants are harmful to society but to go back to my analogy it is like saying you can’t claim alcohol makes you drunk if you don’t address all the broader aspects of alcohol in history and society. It denigrates a simple argument by appeal to complexity. The various ideological conflicts will still be there even if everyone was an atheist they would just be argued on different grounds and it is difficult to tell the precise influence of religion on the various ideological conflicts anyway so why even bring it up? The key point is about the supernatural.

I didn't make myself clear; the arguments in question are intended not to challenge any given claims made by anti-secularists, but, rather, to discredit them by attempting to demonstrating their political-ethical basis to be absurd. That's a very particular kind of argument, distinct from what you might call "everyday" debate, which typically takes the form of "concrete claim X" "concrete counter-claim Y", rather than comprehensive critiques. The equivalent would be, for example, the distinction between a conservative debating any given item of a liberal program, and making a critique of liberal ideology as such.

But those are 2 perfectly valid types of arguments had all the time. What should medicare cover is one type of specific argument. Whether individual liberty trumps collective action is the other type. We have many arguments about the broad liberal/conservative ideology. I am not responsible for what arguments look absurd. Probably not believing in a deity looks absurd to most people in the US. You are essentially saying that if someone makes an absurd argument but then bases a broader richer ideology that is widespread on that absurdity then I am banned from addressing the underlying absurdity and must engage some sort of broad theater of ideology on other grounds. I do not accept this. Simple solution, don’t make absurd arguments and you won't get your feelings hurt by looking absurd.

 

[Traitorfish]

I guess many people think this way but I must ask why does the motivation of a Dawkins affect the primary thesis that there is or is not a supernatural entity? I find statements like “a particular theatre of ideological conflict” to be a frustrating form of obfuscation. Sure, some atheists feel that some religious tenants are harmful to society but to go back to my analogy it is like saying you can’t claim alcohol makes you drunk if you don’t address all the broader aspects of alcohol in history and society. It denigrates a simple argument by appeal to complexity. The various ideological conflicts will still be there even if everyone was an atheist they would just be argued on different grounds and it is difficult to tell the precise influence of religion on the various ideological conflicts anyway so why even bring it up? The key point is about the supernatural.

I don't consider it very helpful, or even very honest, to pretend that these debates exist in isolation from the secularisation debate, as you seem to be doing. Yes, you can argue in an abstract, academic fashion about whether or not a god or gods exists. But that is not what people are actually doing.

But those are 2 perfectly valid types of arguments had all the time. What should medicare cover is one type of specific argument. Whether individual liberty trumps collective action is the other type. We have many arguments about the broad liberal/conservative ideology. I am not responsible for what arguments look absurd. Probably not believing in a deity looks absurd to most people in the US. You are essentially saying that if someone makes an absurd argument but then bases a broader richer ideology that is widespread on that absurdity then I am banned from addressing the underlying absurdity and must engage some sort of broad theater of ideology on other grounds. I do not accept this. Simple solution, don’t make absurd arguments and you won't get your feelings hurt by looking absurd.

I know they are, and I didn't mean to suggest otherwise. I was merely describing the role of theological criticism in the secularisation debate, not making a criticism of it.