But anyway, it seems by "transcendent authority" you mean some universal source of morality. Am I getting this right? So you think a "free market competition" of moral concepts is bound to fail and we need this central common source?
I think we already have a universal source of morality: the human condition. As Whiskey Lord points out above, moral behaviour itself is far older than any attempts to describe, proscribe or systematise it. Rooted deep in our psychology, an overwhelming majority of humans have a desire to behave morally. The questions we have to address, however, are concerned with the form that morality takes, how it works itself out into practical choices, and, above all, how we can frame and promote morality (or, perhaps, moralities) of a kind that best serves human needs.
When I talk about a 'transcendent' morality, I'm thinking very much in practical terms, responding to the dangers inherent to a society where massive, impersonal organisations wield such enormous power over how we live and how we think. The problem posed by these organisations is their limitation to narrow sets of aims, whereby morality is something to be used and manipulated, rather than being an end in itself. At any given time, the individuals working within (or, in more extreme cases, against) an organisation can mitigate the effects of this amorality through their own corrections. But, over time, the internal logic of organisations exercises a gravity that is extremely difficult for individuals to resist.
Nanocyborgasm frames the next part of my argument quite neatly, so I'll continue this line of thought in response to his post:
With all respect, Winston, that is no different than what was done in times of old. The role of the official state religion was to justify the authority of the ruler and ruling class. And the usual gimmick was to claim divine establishment of authority on earth in the form of the king. Morality was of secondary importance and only relevant when applied to maintain the state's control of both the wills and hearts of the people. Controlling the minds of the people by internalizing a notion of morality was useful in a society that didn't have widespread media and surveillance technology, ensuring that the people behaved in a predictable manner, especially one that benefited the state. All that has changed today is that this form of indirect mind control has shifted from the church to other sources. (But even there, televangelism still allows some hold to be maintained.)
You are on the right lines here about the role of organised religion in the past: it behaved in a manner very similar to that which I am pointing out with regards to organisations in the modern age. Where I think you have it backwards, however, is the notion that its purpose was to serve the interests of the state. Rather, in providing legitimacy and moral guidance to the state, organised religion acted in pursuit of its own interests. Certainly, these actions could often serve the interests of particular rulers or classes. But, when push came to shove, organised religions would have no hesitation in going against state interests if those conflicted with their own.
For the present point, though, the key difference between religious and (most) non-religious organisations is the presence in the former of a transcendent moral purpose - a purpose that is not limited to the advancement of the organisation in question. As I mentioned earlier, the many examples religion offers us of how such purposes can be corrupted by the internal logic of organisation are valuable indeed. But these all-too-common failings should not be allowed to disguise the fact that the transcendent moral purpose was preserved in religion even through some of its most egregious subversions. Indeed, looking over the history of Christianity in particular, we can see a constantly evolving battle taking place between its higher moral aims and its more basic organisational interests.
Considering a world dominated by organisations that have no commitment to morality beyond that which serves their narrow interests, in which the myths and narratives that sustain morality are relentlessly corrupted by such interests, we can see that the passage of time might diminish our ability to recognise and preserve notions of higher purpose in our societies. The desire to act morally will persist, at least for as long as we remain recognisably human in our psychology, but a weakening of our grasp on transcendent moral aims might leave us, as a species, terribly impoverished.
The reason, then, that I believe we must look to the history of religion is that it holds answers as to how higher purposes might be sustained against the relentless pressure of interest and power. Some of its examples are positive - they give us clues as to how we might maintain a space for transcendent morality in our lives - while many others are negative, illuminating the pitfalls that must be avoided.
What alternative to do we have? If we don't have a coherent ethical philosophy, then we don't have a basis on which to evaluate the effectiveness of religion as providing a model of ethical behaviour. Your proposed project necessarilly presupposes an ethics- unless I'm misunderstanding?
It presupposes the same meta-ethical assumption that underpins (most) ethical philosophy: that 'might makes right' does not provide a satisfactory account of morality. Without doubt, we could spend much time finding justifications for this assumption, but I don't think it's necessary to do so, beyond saying that the 'might makes right' formula contradicts the very notion of morality as conceived and practiced by humans around the world and throughout history. That is to say, aside from a few socially detached and philosophically inclined individuals, nobody seriously questions the idea that morality should be more than just a justification for power.
You don't think that this is also true of religiously-derived morality? I can't say that the average Medieval potentate behaved much like somebody who got his script from Aquinas any more than from Aristotle, however more enthusiastic they may have been for rituals of the former than the physics of the latter.
Absolutely, I agree that religious
theory is no better (and, often, much worse) a guide than its secular counterparts.
What I'm more interested in here, though, is the sustenance of transcendent morality through
practice, which is something that religion, for all its faults and failings, has proved remarkably adept at achieving.
But at last, you cut to the point:
) is in principle a good point, but the way you present it, it also stays hopelessly vague. How would one actually go about to capture such a need I ask?
