Truthy and Adjidica's posts are exactly right. I wrote a post about this in the Tesla thread, where someone similarly claimed that GM killed LA's public transit. GM may have put one of the nails in the streetcar coffin, but it was one of many nails and not even the last one. And no one thinks this is a crank conspiracy, because it seems to come up in literally every conversation about LA transportation ever. The irony behind the love affair with the extinct streetcars and the hatred of the car-dependent sprawl is that the streetcars were created to enable the sprawl. A major reason Pacific Electric even existed was that Henry Huntington needed a way (before cars) to make his far-flung suburban tract housing real estate empire feasible. Essentially, he needed to give people a way to commute to the city before much of the city even existed.
Whenever people talk about LA's lack of transit it always seems to go one of two ways: 1) turns into a chicken vs. the egg conversation about whether LA lacks transit because it has a car dependence or it has a car dependence because it lacks transit (for an example, see Timsup vs. Rah) or 2) someone insists that LA would have transit but GM killed it (for an example, see Owen). But these conversations always neglect that LA has been fighting with itself to create a subway/metro system for 50 years. In the late 60s, less than a decade after the last streetcar died, mayor Tom Bradley was elected on a mandate to bring a subway to Los Angeles. Why was this? Because after people basically voted with their wallets to kill the streetcars, they got buyer's remorse, felt nostalgic, and wanted them back. On top of that, pollution and traffic were starting to get really bad. But they didn't want more lame streetcars, but a modern transit system like that of New York or London (yes, people have been drawing these comparisons about LA for 50 years. This debate is not new.). But then what happened? First, popular support for rail waned almost as soon as it kicked off and Bradley failed numerous times to get ballot approval to issue transportation bonds even after being elected on a transportation mandate. This ebb and flow of popular support has been an important trend in LA's transit debate ever since. Secondly, city politics surrounding which routes to fund first paralyzed progress. For example, county supervisor Kenneth Hahn wanted the first line to go through South LA to better service poor black neighborhoods. Mayor Bradley wanted the first line to go through the wealthier, but more urban, West LA neighborhoods. Without any agreement, it was hard for them to get things off the ground. Third, the city ran into federal funding issues. While the federal government enthusiastically funded rail in the early 70s, the Carter and Reagan administrations thought it was a waste of time. This further exacerbated the funding issue in point 1). Fourth, hardcore NIMBYism (related to point 1) helped ensure projects would stay tied up in lawsuits and environmental reviews (see below).
By the early 80s, the city finally got the funding and support for a light-rail line from Long Beach to Downtown. By the 90s, they mustered the cash and support for a light-rail line along the newly built 105 freeway (this made sense because they could just stick the tracks on an elevated section along the freeway while it was being built). However, the city's largest urban corridor (which generally runs along Wilshire from downtown to Santa Monica) lacked a rail line. City politics and NIMBYism kept this project (the purple line) at bay. Motivated by a fear that rail would excessively urbanize their neighborhoods and ship in homeless people and drug dealers, residents of neighborhoods like Hancock Park and Beverly Hills (which is technically an independent city) used their access to politicians and ability to litigate to indefinitely delay the purple line project. In the 80s, a Ross clothing store randomly exploded due to a ruptured methane gas pocket that somehow got trapped underground from the city's oil field days (early 1900s). This added another element of opposition: residents literally complained that subway construction would trigger additional explosions. Congressman Henry Waxman used this opposition to further kill federal funding. After years of this, West LA residents started to warm up to the purple line subway and the city is now finally trying to finish it. However, it still faces legal issues. The city of Beverly Hills is still trying to kill the project, but now on the basis that tunneling under Beverly Hills high school will cause the school to collapse (or something like that). While the purple line faced hurdles from the 80s onwards, the city managed to squeeze in a few other lines (the expo line and red line) in the 90s and 2000s. But even these were shrouded in drama. Proposed routes for the red line in the San Fernando Valley had to be re-done because Orthodox Jews in studio city thought it would disrupt their ability to walk to temple on Sabbath. In Hollywood, residents similarly complained that the redline would gentrify their neighborhood, and became even more apprehensive after a tunnel collapsed during construction. There are numerous other examples.
Here we are in 2019 after 50 years of trying to build a metro. We sort of have a rail system (but with declining ridership) and the long-anticipated purple line is getting built with a completion date of 2026 (which will probably get delayed to 2030). To summarize, GM isn't uniquely responsible for killing LA's streetcars, and LA has been struggling to build a transit system for half a century. For that, we can blame LA residents, their politics, and the cost of building metro systems in the late 20th and 21st centuries.