Well, yes, this is the Internet.
TIL: Today I Learned
- Thread starter Cutlass
- Start date
- Status
Ajidica
High Quality Person
- Joined
- Nov 29, 2006
- Messages
- 22,482
TIL: The story of Yang Kyoungjong. He was a Korean forced to fight in the Japanese Imperial Army against the Soviets. He was captured by the Soviets and then forced to fight in the Red Army against the Nazis. He was then captured by the Nazis and forced to fight for them at Normandy where he was finally captured by American troops and rode out the rest of the war in a POW camp.
Zkribbler
Deity
1) IIRC, there was no fighting between the Japanese and Soviets until late 1945.
2) "The Soviets short on manpower..." In reality, the Soviets had manpower up the wazoo.
2) "The Soviets short on manpower..." In reality, the Soviets had manpower up the wazoo.
Traitorfish
The Tighnahulish Kid
There was no official state of war, but they'd been trading shots along the Manchurian border since 1932. The period 1940-1944 is as much a lull in the fighting as an actual peace.
Last edited:
1) There were skirmishes throughout the 1930s, as mentioned by Traitorfish. A certain Mr. Zhukov had to fight the Japanese in Khalkin Gol to finish that cycle. And in fact Yang Kyoungjong was at that batle.
2) The Soviets losses in the first half of the war can be conservatively described as ‘horrendous’.
2) The Soviets losses in the first half of the war can be conservatively described as ‘horrendous’.
Last edited:
stinkubus
Emperor
- Joined
- Aug 21, 2016
- Messages
- 1,845
Zomg someone with photoshop skills please put an image of Reagan (from the movie where he plays Knute Rockne) in front of the French Notre Dame with a caption that says "Win one for the Gipper."
Lexicus
Deity
Not in 1941-42. The Germans actually outnumbered them for most of the time during those crucial years, at first by destroying most of the Red Army in the initial battles of Barbarossa and on to the Moscow offensive, and then by smashing the Soviet counteroffensive at Kharkov in the summer of 1942.
Timsup2nothin
Deity
- Joined
- Apr 2, 2013
- Messages
- 46,737
No. The German army out-materialed them, but never outnumbered the Red Army. Stalin always had plenty of bullet catchers available through conscription. Problem being that battles are not won by catching bullets...you're supposed to be firing them.
Lexicus
Deity
Well, not overall, but in terms of soldiers deployed on the actual Eastern Front...they did. During much of 1941-42. I'm not sure whether the Red Army possibly managed to outnumber them during the 1941 winter counteroffensives or just before the 1942 summer offensive.
That's actually the opposite of true.
At the beginning of BARBAROSSA, the Wehrmacht had very slight numerical superiority - they deployed slightly over three million men, whereas the Red Army numbered a few hundred thousand less than that. As the various other Axis nations and cobelligerents deployed forces through the summer, their numerical superiority grew to a maximum disparity of one million men. However, as the summer dragged on into fall, that numerical superiority began to decline. Wehrmacht forces still had at least a local numbers advantage as late as the beginning of TAIFUN in October, when they committed the 1.9 million men of Heeresgruppe Mitte against 1.25 Soviet soldiers in the Reserve, Western, and Briansk Fronts. However, by the time of the Moscow campaign, increasing German casualties, low levels of replacement troops in the Ersatzheer, and continuing Soviet mobilization reduced the local German numerical disparity to effectively nil. During the Soviet counteroffensive in December, the Germans had theoretical parity (although counting walking wounded and fall-outs may have given the Soviets a slight edge in frontline strength). The battles at Khar'kov and Kerch may have flipped the numbers slightly in German favor again in mid-1942, but only for a short time. Soviet manpower mobilization was severely hindered by the loss of the most populous part of the USSR to German occupation. Although by late 1942, one can speak of Soviet numerical superiority across the front, it wasn't very large and had to be concentrated in local offensives to be anything like overwhelming. Without the destruction of the German 6. Armee and the Soviet reconquest of Ukraine in the second half of 1943, it's entirely possible that the RKKA would have run out of troops within a few years.
By comparison, the USSR had a clear superiority of several thousand in terms of heavy indirect fire weapons (large-caliber mortars, artillery, and rocket artillery) from the beginning of the war, and a massive superiority in number of armored fighting vehicles. Most estimates give the Wehrmacht about 3,000 AFVs in June 1941 compared to a staggering 23,767 Soviet AFVs. Both totals were inflated by obsolete vehicles. The Soviets still retained a very large amount (12,000) of T-26 light tanks, which served well in Spain during the 1930s and which could still theoretically penetrate even the best German armor in 1941. Germany also possessed a very large number of light tanks - the Pzkpfw. I, II, 35(t), and 38(t) - with much more limited battlefield utility. At the beginning of BARBAROSSA, the Germans could deploy only 1,673 of the best of their AFVs: the Pzkpfw. III and IV, and the StuG III. Compare that number to the 1,861 Soviet T-34s and KV-1s available at the beginning of BARBAROSSA, both of which had far better armor and armament than the German models. Only in 1942 did the Germans begin to deploy the upgraded marks of Pzkpfw. IVs, the "long-barrels", that could outduel the T-34 at any range; only in the winter of that year did the Tiger and Panther tanks appear, which for the first time gave the Wehrmacht's panzers technological superiority over the Red Army's armor.
The Red Army faced a lot of problems during the 1941 campaign. Their supply systems were in a shambles; often, troops fighting on home ground would be just as far from their railheads as the rapidly-advancing German panzer spearheads. Most of their troops and officers were poorly trained due to the Red Army's rapid expansion in the few years immediately before the war, combined with the pernicious after-effects of the purges. Poor leadership meant that the Soviet armored advantage was utterly wasted. The mechanized corps were too large for most officers to command and too tank-heavy; most Soviet tank attacks suffered from severe maldeployment and resulted in committing the armor in dribs and drabs. Poor staff work and maintenance procedures resulted in as many as 60% fall-out rates on road marches, leaving the tank units virtually useless when they finally got to the front line. And, of course, the VVS was totally unable to contest German air superiority wherever the Luftwaffe chose to deploy its forces. German air superiority nullified most of the technical armored advantages that the Soviets had; to all intents and purposes, only the Soviet road system, the German 88mm Flak artillery, and the Ju-87 Stuka could destroy medium or heavy Soviet armor in 1941. (There were isolated incidents, such as a unit of Waffen-SS swarming onto, I think, a KV-1 like cockroaches to set it alight, but they were few and far between.)
It took until the aftermath of TAIFUN for the Germans to actually amass numerical superiority in armor along the main attack axis. Over half a million men and thousands of Soviet tanks were removed from the board in the aftermath of the battles of the Briansk and Viaz'ma pockets. The Battle of Moscow was the only time that the Germans - briefly - held an advantage in tanks. By January 1942, Soviet tank production (and German tank casualties, partially due to weather) was high enough that even that German advantage disappeared. In the summer of 1943, before the introduction of the T-34/85 and the IS-2 but after the development of the Tiger I and Panther-D, the Germans had qualitative (but not quantitative) armored superiority - but, of course, the German high command wasted that advantage by attacking the massed anti-tank fortress at Kursk.
In other forms of materiel, like artillery, the Germans never even came close to Soviet superiority. The Wehrmacht semi-consciously de-emphasized artillery (which had nearly won the Germans the First World War) in favor of close air support and tactical airpower. By comparison, Stalin called artillery "the Red god of war" and prioritized the production of rocket artillery, dual-purpose field guns and AT weapons, and heavy howitzers; in virtually every battle in the war, the RKKA massed more artillery than the Wehrmacht. To be fair, CAS was a better fit than heavy artillery for the rapidly-advancing German armored spearheads of 1939-42. But whenever Bewegungskrieg, the war of movement, downshifted into Stellungskrieg, the war of position, the Germans were invariably at a disadvantage due to inferiority in fire support. A Stuka attack delivered very little firepower compared to an artillery barrage. This was an even bigger problem in the West, where the Allies had less artillery than the Soviets but employed it with much greater skill and coordination. And, of course, after 1943 the Luftwaffe was virtually destroyed by the Western air offensive, leaving the Germans completely screwed in terms of fire support: they had little artillery and no CAS.
During its period of greatest military success, the Wehrmacht emphasized mobility over firepower, although they always tried to balance the two. German military officers weren't concerned about bullets and bullet-catchers, so much as outflanking the enemy, attacking concentrically, or kesseling him. By comparison, while Soviet doctrine presupposed high casualties, Soviet formations were always well-equipped with fire support - a condition that only improved as the war went on. By 1945, the average rifle division in the Red Army had been rebalanced to account for the high casualties of the previous years of war, reducing manpower in favor of even greater artillery, mortar, and even armored support. Soviet units took heavy losses until the very end of the war, but describing them as unimaginative cannon fodder is a gross historical misrepresentation.
Initial guide to some recommended texts (in English) (not a full Great Patriotic War bibliography by any stretch of the imagination):
Alexander Hill - The Red Army in the Second World War
C. J. Dick - From Defeat to Victory
David Glantz - Stumbling Colossus
David Glantz - Colossus Reborn
David Glantz and Jonathan House - When Titans Clashed
David Stahel - Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East
David Stahel - Kiev 1941
David Stahel - Operation Typhoon
David Stahel - The Battle of Moscow
Dennis Showalter - Hitler's Panzers
James Corum - The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War
Robert Citino - Death of the Wehrmacht
Robert Citino - The Wehrmacht Retreats
Robert Citino - The Wehrmacht's Last Stand
Steven Mercatante - Why Germany Nearly Won (something of a polemic but with some useful data and insights)
Last edited:
basically just imagine her voice saying everything in my postsThanks for the lesson, Avril Lavigne.
Timsup2nothin
Deity
- Joined
- Apr 2, 2013
- Messages
- 46,737
Some of the sources you recommend directly contradict you. I suspect the difference is in the use of the word "deployed."
It's pretty easy to consider the entire German contingent as 'deployed' from start to finish. As an invasion force they effectively defined the front by their presence. It is less clear whether a hundred thousand troops assigned near Moscow can be considered as 'deployed' when the front is still several hundred miles away. If you do consider such troops as 'deployed,' you get a higher total for the Red Army. There is no question that the Axis forces enjoyed local numerical superiority, especially early on, but ultimately they were outnumbered and had to rely on some other advantage if they were going to have any chance to prevail.
It's pretty easy to consider the entire German contingent as 'deployed' from start to finish. As an invasion force they effectively defined the front by their presence. It is less clear whether a hundred thousand troops assigned near Moscow can be considered as 'deployed' when the front is still several hundred miles away. If you do consider such troops as 'deployed,' you get a higher total for the Red Army. There is no question that the Axis forces enjoyed local numerical superiority, especially early on, but ultimately they were outnumbered and had to rely on some other advantage if they were going to have any chance to prevail.
Traitorfish
The Tighnahulish Kid
Thanks for the lesson, Avril Lavigne.
Some day, long after Dachs has changed his avatar, some poor bugger is going to be trawling through the OT archives looking for interesting WW2 talk, and isn't going to have the slightest idea what you two are talking about.
Synobun
Deity
- Joined
- Nov 19, 2006
- Messages
- 24,884
In 3000 AD, historians will all agree: Avril Lavigne, pen-name of Dachs, was a leading WW2 history authority. When asked about Hitler's fall from grace, children in history classes will be assigned a dramatic reenactment of "Complicated".
If one is sufficiently cavalier with numbers, then yes, one can claim that the USSR mustered more men than the Axis and cobelligerent powers in 1941; simply count the entire Wehrmacht and the entire RKKA, regardless of whether those divisions were in France, Siberia, or Eastern Europe. I'm not sure what point you'd be trying to make by doing such a thing. While there's a bit of fuzziness around the edges of the kind you identify that results in some disparities, pretty much all modern sources agree that the Axis enjoyed overall numerical superiority in the area where people were actually fighting at the beginning that dissolved over the ensuing months and years as the Soviets mobilized more reservist classes and conscripted more manpower. If you count those reservist classes or conscripts into the original total, you end up with a virtually meaningless number.
This planning assumption was shared by OKH, which assumed that the USSR had about 180 total divisions (more or less true) and lacked the capacity to effectively raise reserve units (disastrously untrue). Halder and Brauchitsch were quite convinced that Germany would not have to "fight outnumbered and win". Their bedrock belief, which underwrote the entire campaign, was that the RKKA could be destroyed beyond capacity to repair itself in a few massive battles of annihilation relatively close to the border. Stahel, who has done the best work on the BARBAROSSA plans, has shown this fairly conclusively. The Wehrmacht would assemble numerical superiority for the border battles, execute a few quick breakthroughs, concentric attacks, and encirclements, and then be free to exploit the victory in all directions. The German high command did not believe that they had to prepare for a long war or that they would have to fight against a much vaster force.
It only took three weeks for this assumption to collapse. After being confronted with incontrovertible evidence that the first battles would not be enough to annihilate the Red Army, and that Soviet reserve formations were numerous enough and possessed enough combat power to prevent the Germans from simply exploiting their victories near the borders, the Germans simply assumed that the next battle - whatever it was - would be enough to crush the Red Army. This was not the case, although the sheer scale of German operational victories in 1941 and 1942 brought them perilously close to victory all the same.
Now, if all you're trying to say is that the USSR mustered more troops (by a lot) than Germany in the Great Patriotic War, then yes. That is true. It is also true that, for the most part, German troops retained an overall qualitative edge over Soviet troops for most of the war. Those are relatively uncontroversial things to say. They're not the same as saying that the Soviets didn't deal with manpower difficulties during the war (they unquestionably did), which goes back to the original comment @Zkribbler made.
Timsup2nothin
Deity
- Joined
- Apr 2, 2013
- Messages
- 46,737
Well, yeah, if we start from a simplification such as "manpower up the wazooo" we could end up pretty much anywhere.
Winding up in somewhat different places is therefore pretty understandable.Ultimately, the question of numerical superiority at the actual front was a standard function of attack and defense. The Soviets, being on the defensive, felt compelled to hold troops away from the actual front line in anticipation of subsequent defensive efforts rather than being able to fully commit to an all or nothing one off that would lead to being totally overrun if they lost. The Germans, as the attackers, had far more freedom to commit forces since defenders are seldom really prepared to launch a countering invasion even if they win a decisive battle.
Oh, great. Now that song is running through my head. Thanks a lot.
And for those of us with good taste?
- Status
