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[RD] War in Ukraine: Other topics

Well, I'm sorry for my gaslightning post, it was more a joke, some provocation,maybe.
And you absolutely right, about killing russian speaking ppl in this war. Many ppl in Russian think the same. It's a shame (soft telling).

About demolished cites - any war tactics if enemy fortified in city? How do plan win battle, if all enemy soldiers in fortified in city?

About Putin's claim.
1. Did Hitler plan war? To control most of Europe? Yes
2. Could it start with France first? Or Belgium? He could. And the ww2 could start with war with other country, not Poland.
That's was about Putin claim. Poland participated in the section of Czechoslovakia, together with Germany. But refused to make concessions regarding Danzing. Which led to the fact that Hitler chose her first victim of his war. He used word inducted (forced) to describe this situation

Well, I'm sorry I was so harsh. You seem more aware of reality than I was giving you credit for.

About fortified cities, I agree with you. Any army at war with the means to do so would destroy the cities it attacks through bombings. Similarly, any country defending itself would fight from inside its cities. Because they are valuable territory to hold, but also because they offer a defensible position to turn into a fortress. I don't think the Russian bombing of cities is particularly bad, at least compared to other countries who fought in previous wars.

And I don't think the way Russia wages war is particularly bad, at least on a global scale. Sure there have been a lots of documented war crimes perpetuated by Russians, included some gruesome ones, like the recent filmed decapitations of Ukrainian soldiers. But war crimes are an inherent aspect of war. And a lot of it is expected from a war of such large scale. Some armies have behaved worse in the past, while surely others have been better. I've seen a lot more evidence of crimes committed by Russians than by Ukrainians. That might just be because of pro-Ukrainian bias in the media, but I also follow some uncensored pro-Russian sources.

Western propaganda tries to depict Russian armed forces as barbaric to stoke popular support for Ukraine. But this misses the point. The biggest crime is not the way the war is waged. The biggest crime is starting the war itself, because all of the suffering and atrocities are an intrinsic part of it.

The decision to start the war was entirely made by Russia. Zelensky was begging to avoid the war. As was Macron and other western leaders. Meanwhile Putin was going on TV denying the very existence of Ukraine's nationhood.

The only way war can be morally defended is if it's fought defensively. Russian propaganda tries to invert the roles and pretend that Ukraine is the aggressor. Obviously that's laughable. Ukraine is a much smaller country. It never posed a credible threat to Russia, which is significantly more powerful with a gigantic nuclear arsenal. Hell, Ukraine could not maintain control of its own territory (as recognized by Russia up until the September 2022 bogus referenda). How could it threaten Russian territory? We also know that Western powers had no interest to fight Russia directly. They would have the perfect opportunity to do it now by sending troops to Ukraine, but they categorically refuse to do so. A war between Russia and Ukraine was much more likely with Ukraine out of NATO than inside of it.

There is no moral or humanitarian justification for the war. It is clearly amoral. But it could be justified from a pragmatical or realpolitik viewpoint that acknowledges Russian imperialism. This is the thesis espoused by "realists" like Mearsheimer. Russia views itself as an empire, and it views Ukraine as an important part of it. Any western encroachment in Ukraine is thus an attack on Russia. Ukraine was nowhere close to being part of NATO or hosting NATO nuclear weapons. This does not matter, Ukraine had to be turned back into a vassal state (or at least destroyed and partitioned, which seemed more feasible). That's why the supposedly generous peace terms proposed by Russia initially always seemed like a disguised way to turn Ukraine into a puppet state.

But for this war to be worth it for the imperialists, it has to make Russia more powerful. This seems very uncertain for me, even if Russia "wins". Will the human and financial costs of the war be paid back by the new conquests? Will Russia end up more powerful on the world stage? What's the opinion about these questions in Russia? I'm not sure that the reduced leverage and market access in Europe will be worth it. I really feel like Russia would have ended up being stronger by not waging the war. Especially now that Trump is in power and will likely erode relations with allies in Europe and elsewhere.

I watched the whole Putin interview where he talked about WW2. I'm still not exactly sure why he did so. It seemed to me like he tried to normalize offensive wars in Europe. And he tried, as he did with Ukraine, to invert the roles, and blame the victims for aggression. But despite what he was saying, Poland never induced Germany into invading it. And similarly Ukraine never induced Russia into invading it. Additionally, Putin seemed to try to discredit the Western Allies of the time, which are now members of NATO. As with a lot of Russian propaganda, it appeared like its main aim was to encourage cynicism. Why do you think he brought up these points about WW2 80 years later? What are their relevance in today's world?

Hitler attacked and threatened countries that were easy targets, at least initially. Austria was a German country with a lot of Nazi sympathizers. Czechoslovakia had a large German population. Poland was then attacked because it was crucial to his planned Lebensraum, which was a central part of his ideology. It was also a significantly weaker neighbor. There was almost nothing Poland could have done differently to avoid war, except turning itself into a vassal state. In this way, the current situation with Ukraine seems similar. There was very little that Ukraine could have done differently to avoid the invasion. Russia had already realized it had failed to reach its goals in Ukraine with soft power, so it decided (since 2014) that violence would be the only way to reach them. Germany was destroyed by the wars it started. We'll see what are the consequences for Russia's similar actions.

Dude your Soviet Union was in it with Hitler long before Poland. If Hitler didn't attempt Barbarossa there's is now evidence that Russia might've broken the pact as well, but until then let's go hand in hand on a massacre conquest over Europe, you get half I get half. Yay!
Both Hitler and Stalin were little else than bloody warlords and Putin misses those days.

Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs during the 30s, tried to organize collective security in Europe against Nazi Germany. It failed for different reasons, including distrust toward the Soviets. France and the UK eventually opted for appeasement toward the Nazis. It's hard to blame the Soviets for trying to find a modus vivendi with the Nazis afterward. That's why in 1939 they replaced Litvinov with Molotov, who then signed his infamous pact. This obviously doesn't excuse the Soviet conquests and atrocities that would ensue, but it gives some context.
 
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Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs during the 30s, tried to organize collective security in Europe against Nazi Germany. It failed for different reasons, including distrust toward the Soviets. France and the UK eventually opted for appeasement toward the Nazis. It's hard to blame the Soviets for trying to find a modus vivendi with the Nazis afterward. That's why in 1939 they replaced Litvinov with Molotov, who then signed his infamous pact. This obviously doesn't excuse the Soviet conquests and atrocities that would ensue, but it gives some context.

QFT
 
Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs during the 30s, tried to organize collective security in Europe against Nazi Germany.
For all of *checks notes* two weeks.
On 15 April 1939, Litvinov sent a comprehensive proposal to Stalin for a tripartite agreement with Britain and France.
On 3 May 1939, Stalin replaced Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov. At a prearranged meeting, Stalin said: "The Soviet Government intended to improve its relations with Hitler and if possible sign a pact with Nazi Germany. As a Jew and an avowed opponent of such a policy, Litvinov stood in the way."
 
For all of *checks notes* two weeks.
Yeah, that's the thing. The USSR could have pursued such a policy of creating and alliance to contain Nazi Germany – but didn't. It instead pursued a policy where it allied itself with Nazi Germany, including the secret clauses to the treaty where the USSR and Nazi Germany divided up several independent nations between themselves.

As per the 1928 instructions of the Komintern, the Fascists, and Nazis, were not the real enemy anyway – that was the "social Fascists", i.e. the reform-socialist Social Democratic movements across Europe.
 
For all of *checks notes* two weeks.

This is nonsense, that proposal was itself the result of considerable diplomacy.

The USSR could have pursued such a policy of creating and alliance to contain Nazi Germany – but didn't.

Again, this is simply false - the USSR wanted an anti-German alliance through most of the 30s and only turned to an agreement with Germany after the actual negotiations with the British and French fell apart (and the Soviets were partially at fault for that - this isn't about exonerated them from mistakes or wrongdoing).
 
This is nonsense, that proposal was itself the result of considerable diplomacy.
So that "considerable diplomacy" culminated with a proposal that was presented for Stalin's approval mere two weeks before he dismissed Litvinov for good.


We will never know how sincere that proposal was, or whether or how USSR would have honored treaties with Britain and France, had those been signed.

We do know, however, how they "honored" their treaties with Baltic States.

 
Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs during the 30s, tried to organize collective security in Europe against Nazi Germany. It failed for different reasons, including distrust toward the Soviets. France and the UK eventually opted for appeasement toward the Nazis. It's hard to blame the Soviets for trying to find a modus vivendi with the Nazis afterward. That's why in 1939 they replaced Litvinov with Molotov, who then signed his infamous pact. This obviously doesn't excuse the Soviet conquests and atrocities that would ensue, but it gives some context.
...er I don't follow. France and the UK believed were not ready for another war with Germany; not because they were interested in finding any sort of common ideological ground with Germany.
Now if the Soviet-Russians thought that that was true and then sought a pact to try and stave off a war, well, I couldn't have helped reassure them. In fact I think this anecdote you mention only serves to highlight their ongoing paranoia as state policy.
 
...er I don't follow. France and the UK believed were not ready for another war with Germany; not because they were interested in finding any sort of common ideological ground with Germany.
Now if the Soviet-Russians thought that that was true and then sought a pact to try and stave off a war, well, I couldn't have helped reassure them. In fact I think this anecdote you mention only serves to highlight their ongoing paranoia as state policy.

It's well-documented that it is Chamberlain for the UK who didn't want to back Czechoslovakia. France, being a direct neighbour of Germany, was a lot more alarmed by Hitler's expansionism. Yet Daladier assumed he couldn't go it alone without the Brits, and Chamberlain forced his hand. He was actually very nervous about it. It's told that when his plane arrived in Paris and he saw the a crowd which came to cheer him for having avoided the war, he told to his team "what a bunch of morons, if they only knew".
 
For all of *checks notes* two weeks.
I can't say I'm particularly knowledgeable about the history of the interwar period in Europe. And I'm not too keen to defend Soviet foreign policy. But the attempts at collective security I was talking about predate 1939.

-In 1935 the Soviet Union signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia.
-From 1935 to 1939, the Comintern advocated for a popular front strategy to fight the fascist threat.
-In 1938 the Soviet Union proposed a joint military intervention with France to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany.

But there were too many obstacles in 1938 to collectively resist Germany's expansion. The Conservatives in the UK viewed the Soviets as much as an enemy as Nazi Germany. They were thus not keen to ally them. And Poland and Romania refused to let Soviet troops transit through their territory (very understandably). So instead of collective defense, we got appeasement and the Munich Agreements. It is hard to blame the Soviets for then making deals with Nazi Germany at the expense of other countries, when France (reluctantly) and the UK did the same previously. Once again, this doesn't excuse the following Soviet occupations and its many atrocities.

One can be doubtful about Soviet's intentions. There is a good likelihood that they viewed causing a war between France/UK and Germany as a way not only to destroy the fascist threat, but also to weaken the Western European capitalist states. It is also likely that they viewed a general European war as a way to expand their territory and influence in Eastern and Central Europe, as they did later on. Their treaties and proposed interventions might have been as dishonest as the ones they signed with the Baltic states. Still, from my knowledge of the historical record, it seems that the Soviets truly viewed the fascists, and especially the Nazis, as their greatest threat (rightfully so, as history would prove). They were more hawkish against the Nazis than the future Western Allies until 1939.

...er I don't follow. France and the UK believed were not ready for another war with Germany; not because they were interested in finding any sort of common ideological ground with Germany.
Now if the Soviet-Russians thought that that was true and then sought a pact to try and stave off a war, well, I couldn't have helped reassure them. In fact I think this anecdote you mention only serves to highlight their ongoing paranoia as state policy.

I didn't suggest that France and the UK sought a common ideological ground with Nazi Germany. I don't think that was the main fear of the Soviets either. What drove the Soviet Union away from the idea of collective security against Germany was at least partially the impression that the West was not willing to fight the Nazis.

That being said, I wouldn't label it as paranoia to suspect that liberal capitalist states might form an alliance with fascists states. In 1935, the UK and France themselves had formed the Stresa Front, a sort of alliance with fascist Italy to contain Nazi Germany, which they perceived as a greater geopolitcal threat. It is not far fetched to think they might have done the same against the Soviet Union (hell, the Nazis themselves thought for a while they could form an alliance with the British Empire, whose ruthlessness they admired).

And well, it is easy for me to criticize with hindsight. I know that some people try to excuse or at least explain the appeasement strategy of the UK and France by saying that they were not ready for war at the time. It might be true. But by 1938, they had the possibility (in theory at least) of fighting Germany as a united front with the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets. This surely would have been worth more than the additional soldiers and arms they could get by delaying the war.

Czechoslovakia had a considerable arms industry and army, but it was annexed between 1938 and 1939 with no country bothering to help defend it. The Soviet Union was powerful, despite the purges, with large amounts of people and natural resources. But by the summer of 1939, it was clear that it would not be coming to the help of the Western powers that had rebuked its earlier offer for help. Poland had a considerable army and could have helped wage a two-front war against Germany. But after Poland was invaded in 1940, France didn't even bother seriously invading the the poorly defended German western border to at least relieve Poland of some pressure.

One might say that a country is never truly ready for war. But by the time the war came to French territory in 1940, France had lost three potential allies in Central and Eastern Europe. And considering its swift defeat, it still doesn't seem like the French Army was ready for war, at least not strategically. And Germany had no way to invade Britain by 1940, but it didn't in 1938 either.

This is what puzzles me about Russian propaganda bringing up the history of the interwar period. At least according to pop history (and my very superficial knowledge), the main lesson from that period is that appeasement toward an aggresive power does not work. So what are we supposed to extrapolate to Russia?
 

Ukraine did not build Kharkov, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporozhye, Lugansk and Sevastopol. Russia built.
Ukraine did not pay for Kyiv. Russia did it.
Ukraine did not give thousands of lives, building the Dnieper, Azovstal and DMZ. Russia did it.
It is quite true that Russia raises questions about the territory of modern Ukraine.
©
Speaking as an American Ted Cruz embarrasses me just as trump does and I disagree with him completely. Plenty of Americans hate what trump and his people are saying not just me. Russian citizens should also criticize Putin likewise.
 
And Poland and Romania refused to let Soviet troops transit through their territory (very understandably).
Indeed. If the Soviets had been genuinely interested in containing Germany, they could have offered support (arms, ammunition, trade embargo against Germany) without demanding free military access to their neighbors. Their subsequent actions clearly demonstrated this "joint defense plan" was never anything else but pretext to a landgrab of their own.
 
Indeed. If the Soviets had been genuinely interested in containing Germany, they could have offered support (arms, ammunition, trade embargo against Germany) without demanding free military access to their neighbors. Their subsequent actions clearly demonstrated this "joint defense plan" was never anything else but pretext to a landgrab of their own.
Some parallel.
Did it stop Putin?
 
At the current rate of 30km2 per day, it will take 3 more years for him to capture all of Donbas.
Which is anyway the bare minimum Putin has indicated for even taking about a ceasefire so far... So ceteris paribus at least another three years of active war, to see what breaks first?
 
I read them all...and so should you:D

The Kremlin's medical system is likely overloaded as Russian soldiers on crutches keep appearing at the front line: UK intel​

Repeated frontline sightings of Russian soldiers on crutches suggest Moscow's injured troops are returning to combat from a medical system struggling to keep up, the UK's Defense Ministry said.

Citing open-source reports, the ministry wrote in an intelligence update on Sunday that it's "highly likely injured Russian personnel are being returned to combat duties in Ukraine with unhealed wounds, often on crutches."

It specifically named the 20th Combined Arms Army, which the intelligence update said had likely formed "assault groups" of wounded soldiers.

"There is a realistic possibility Russian commanders are directing this activity to retain personnel who would otherwise become lost in the overburdened medical system," the ministry wrote.

The update pointed to Ukraine's estimate that 830,000 Russian soldiers have been wounded or killed in the war so far, with about 400,000 requiring treatment at medical facilities outside the war zone.

"The injured soldiers have likely been returned to their units after being discharged from forward medical facilities, prematurely, at the behest of their commanders," the British ministry wrote. "This reduces the pressure on the overburdened military medical system and increases unit's ability to track and use wounded servicemen for operational tasks."

"The lack of proper medical attention in facilities away from the front line necessitates the transfer of the administrative and medical burden back to troops' units," it added.

The UK's assessment comes as pro-Ukraine Telegram channels posted clips last month of Russian men in military uniforms moving on crutches through a forested area near Pokrovsk. Several others were filmed complaining about the deployment.

In mid-January, Ukrainian sources posted drone footage of two men walking on crutches in an open field that was also said to be near Pokrovsk. The drone dropped several munitions on both men, appearing to incapacitate them.

However, it's visually unclear what initial injury either man sustained before the drone attack. Neither is it clear whether they were assaulting Ukrainian forces or moving between Russian positions.

The footage has gained traction in Russia, too. Military blogger Svyatoslav Golikov, for example, criticized the reported practice of sending wounded troops to fight, calling it an "entire wild disgrace" in a post in late January.

"In particularly egregious cases, obvious cripples can even be sent to assault, but more often they are sent to fortify newly recaptured positions," he wrote.

Golikov wrote that it's possible the two men in the drone video were seen without weapons or equipment because Russian soldiers are often told to find their own supplies on the front line.

The criticism also follows recent backlash on Russian social media toward the treatment of the war's wounded, after a video that went viral in mid-January showed a man in military fatigues assaulting two injured Russians with a baton and a stun gun.

Local authorities in Kyzyl, a city in the Russian region of Tuva, told Moscow-based news agency Interfax that they were investigating the incident.

The Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to a comment request sent outside regular business hours by Business Insider.

Signs of strain in Russia's troop supply are significant, because the war now increasingly hinges on whether Moscow or Kyiv can outlast each other in terms of gear and soldiers.

To enlist recruits, the Kremlin has been raising sign-up bonuses and benefits for newcomers, with some Russian regions seeing cash incentives almost on par with the US military's.

Russia is already set to spend almost a third of its federal budget on defense in 2025, or 13.5 trillion rubles (worth $135 billion, at press time), as its economy grows isolated by Western-led sanctions.
"Golikov wrote that it's possible the two men in the drone video were seen without weapons or equipment because Russian soldiers are often told to find their own supplies on the front line.":eek:

The West is seeing Kim Jong Un's army in action. The North Korean soldiers are brutal zealots undeterred in the face of death.​

North Korea's soldiers are relentless, almost fanatical, in the face of death. They're determined and capable in battle, even in an unfamiliar fight, and their tactics are outdated but brutal.

That is what the West has been learning watching Kim Jong Un's army in action after Russian President Vladimir Putin called on the North Korean leader to supply fighters for his war on Ukraine.

Pyongyang deployed 11,000 men to Kursk in November disguised as Russian soldiers and carrying fake IDs. These troops are largely special operations forces, meaning they are more ardent in their beliefs and better trained than other units.

Russia has been pushing the North Koreans headlong into bloody assaults. The costs are high, but Kim's army is learning an important lesson in return: how to fight a modern war.

North Korea sent some of its best soldiers

This war is North Korea's largest military deployment to a foreign conflict in its almost 80-year history. To determine what the West is learning from this moment, Business Insider spoke to experts who have been closely following North Korea's performance, examined publicly released intelligence, and reviewed Ukrainians' observations.

Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence services have said that many of the troops that deployed to Russia are some of Pyongyang's best, drawn from the 11th Corps, also known as the Storm Corps. The unit is trained in infiltration, infrastructure sabotage, and assassinations.

Ukraine's top general, Oleksandr Syrsky, has said the North Korean troops are "highly motivated, well-trained," and "brave." And the Pentagon said this month that "these are relatively well-disciplined, competent forces" that are by all accounts "capable."

Some Ukrainian soldiers have relayed their experiences to Western media, describing the troops as fast and nimble, good shots, and seemingly fearless as they rush into battle despite heavy losses. North Korean soldiers have also been found carrying diaries with written dedications to Kim and their country.

"They, as individuals, are more skilled as soldiers, more disciplined as soldiers, more willing to fight as soldiers than some sources had presumed when they were first being sent there," said Joseph Bermudez, an expert on North Korea's armed forces at the Center for International and Strategic Studies. North Korea has a culture driven by a martial philosophy that celebrates hard military power, and it maintains one of the world's largest standing armies with around 1.2 million soldiers.
The country's direct entry into the war has complicated the situation for the Ukrainians, particularly in Russia's Kursk where Ukraine is struggling to hold captured ground. Ukraine has lost roughly half of the territory it once held inside Russia, and the relentless human wave attacks and brutal assaults have worn down Ukraine's already strained defenses, depriving Kyiv's forces of time to rest and brace for further attacks.

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff said last month that North Korea may be planning to deploy additional forces and military equipment to Russia.

Pyongyang has denied sending troops to Russia, and Kyiv has said Russian and North Korean forces attempt to remove dead North Korean soldiers from the battlefield or even burn the faces of dead North Koreans to make them difficult to identify.

Russia is sending North Korean soldiers into bloody assaults

Russia has been sending the North Korean forces into very high-casualty front-line assaults. Biden's White House said late last month that "it is clear that Russian and North Korean military leaders are treating these troops as expendable and ordering them on hopeless assaults against Ukrainian defenses."

A White House spokesperson previously described the North Koreans as "highly indoctrinated, pushing attacks even when it is clear that those attacks are futile."

The Trump administration did not respond to a request for comment on its assessment of North Korean forces fighting in Russia.

Ukraine's Special Operation Forces said Friday the North Koreans fighting for Russia had not been seen in the Kursk area for around three weeks and had likely been withdrawn due to the heavy combat losses. BI was unable to independently confirm these details.
On the front lines, Ukrainian soldiers have said that the North Koreans are a capable fighting force that is adept at neutralizing drones. The soldiers are ruthlessly tough and determined, relentlessly pushing forward in "human wave" assaults, using fellow soldiers as bait, and casting aside armor for faster infantry movements. And they refuse to surrender, often opting to kill themselves with a grenade or bullet rather than be captured.

This is a defining element of the North Korean special operations training: soldiers are trained to follow orders aggressively, even if they suspect it will cost them their lives. If they disobey orders or fail without sacrifice, their families could suffer the consequences, Bermudez said.

North Korea is learning lessons in modern warfare

North Korean forces have suffered heavy losses fighting for Russia, per Western intelligence. Despite training with Moscow on infantry tactics, flying drones, artillery, and trench-clearing operations, the troops are still new to this war.

The soldiers "have been observed engaging in light infantry operations of a Second World War vintage — one man draws out enemy fire (in this case, drones) to locate a target, and others attempt to neutralize said target," said Michael Madden, a Stimson Center Korea expert. They have not prepared for a mechanized battlefield like Ukraine's, filled with armored vehicles and tanks.

"They've been trained to fight a war on the Korean Peninsula," Bermudez said, and while North Korea has watched various armed conflicts closely over the decades, its forces are now getting a real taste for it on a battlefield and in an environment they haven't been prepping for.

In the short term, that could have devastating consequences for the North Korean forces fighting for the Russians. The Institute for the Study of War think tank assesses that the entire 11,000-man contingent of North Korean forces could be killed or wounded in action by April if the current casualty rate continues. The latest estimates put losses around 4,000.
North Korea may consider these sacrifices worth it — if not for the Russian cause, then for what it learns in return.

"It is a dark version of the concept of 'you learn by doing,'" Madden said, noting that it's still early. "We will need further incidents and engagements to make more sound observations as to whether they are adjusting their tactics given the state of play in Russia and Ukraine."

But there is no doubt they're learning, acquiring knowledge critical for future conflicts that will make North Korea a more challenging combat force in East Asia. They're seeing the Ukrainian use of US- and Western-provided weapons systems, such as HIMARS and Abrams, for example, and how the Russians have adapted to them.

"They're bringing these lessons home in the hardest way possible: by bleeding for them," Bermudez said.

European Investment In The Ukrainian Defense Industry Threatened By Personnel Shuffle​

In mid-2024, as the war in Ukraine ground into a third year and Western military aid showed ominous signs of flagging, Kyiv and its friends in Europe began moving toward a different approach: producing weapons closer to the fighting, on Ukrainian soil. This would require help from Europe and the U.S.—significant funding and oversight. But it promised in the long haul to reduce Ukrainian dependence on the West and, after the war, to provide a powerful new arsenal for Europe.

Denmark was the first country to participate, followed by other northern European nations, and early efforts were promising. Altogether in 2024, what became known as the “Danish model” provided more than a half billion dollars for Ukrainian weapons production, and the approach was warmly welcomed in Kyiv, with President Volodymyr Zelensky and others calling for its expansion in 2025.

Then, astonishingly, in late January, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov suspended the well-regarded director of the agency that had made the new approach possible by bringing transparency and accountability to the agency that purchases weapons and ammunition for the Ukrainian army.

The move ignited a firestorm of criticism from anti-corruption activists and Western diplomats. Many saw a throwback to another era: an overreaching executive branch eager to protect itself and its associates firing a reformer intent on eliminating corruption. The two sides fought it out for several days in full public view—a byzantine game of bureaucratic chess and legal maneuvering. But by the end of the week, agency head Maryna Bezrukova had been formally dismissed, and the supervisory board created at NATO’s urging to guide and oversee the agency had been stripped of its power.

The stakes could hardly be higher for Ukraine. Even as Ukrainians struggle on the battlefield to expel Russian troops, they are also fighting on the home front to root out centuries of Russian and Soviet influence—not just corruption but, arguably more damaging, authoritarian government unchecked by independent institutions. Ukraine has made huge strides in the past decade, as Kyiv devolved much of its power and worked with civil society activists to create a network of independent institutions that check the executive branch. But every now and then, old habits come to the fore.
The West is watching closely. Not just financing for the defense industry but also, much more broadly, future investment in Ukrainian reconstruction and development will depend on Western confidence that the rule of law prevails in Kyiv.

Well-Regarded Defense Official Abruptly Dismissed​

In Ukraine, as in many countries, military procurement has traditionally been shrouded in secrecy and susceptible to shady dealings. In 2015, Kyiv instituted a world-renowned online system, ProZorro, to make public contracting fully transparent, cutting back insider influence and saving millions of dollars at all levels of government. But the defense ministry held off participating for reasons of security. Then, in 2023, two big scandals rocked the armed forces, resulting in the dismissal of former minister, Oleksii Reznikov.
The new Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) was an ingenious solution to this problem. It oversees only lethal purchases—weapons and ammunition—allowing all other military spending to be made public on ProZorro. Appointed as director in early 2024, Maryna Bezrukova had a long history as a reformer—she had cleaned up procurement at Ukraine’s giant state-owned electric company, UkrEnergo. Her mission at DPA seemed clear enough: to spend its allotted budget, some $7 billion in 2024, in as transparent and efficient a manner as possible, eliminating shady third parties that bought weaponry abroad and sold it to Kyiv at inflated prices.

Bezrukova and her team achieved impressive results in 2024. The first step was overhauling internal procedures, conducting rigorous due diligence before deals were signed and rearranging payment schedules to ensure that firms delivered on their contracts. By year’s end, DPA had reduced the share of weapons buys flowing to third-party dealers from 81% to 12%, with 61% of contracts now going to Ukrainian manufacturers.

Kyiv’s Western partners, previously reluctant to invest in Ukrainian weapons production for fear of shady dealings—corruption, mismanagement, and unenforceable contracts—took note. In June, Denmark became the first country to provide financing for a DPA weapons purchase—the experiment that became the Danish model.

Still, for all this success—or perhaps because of it—the DPA began encountering obstacles. Bezrukova received threatening phone calls. Sensitive personal information was made public on social media. Other officials at the ministry complained about her work, and defense minister Umerov started to talk about shutting down the agency. His accusation: that Bezrukova was too focused on getting media attention and not delivering weapons to the front.

In fall 2024, NATO intervened, blocking the ministry from closing the DPA and urging Kyiv to create an independent board—reputable Ukrainian and international defense experts—to oversee Bezrukova’s team. But the day before the board’s first meeting, the defense minister moved to undermine its authority, engineering a revision of its charter so that he rather than the independent supervisory group would control hirings and firings at the agency. In January, the board voted unanimously to extend the director’s contract for another year. But Umerov had a different idea. Just days later, he fired two members of the board and replaced Bezrukova.

Civil society reformers blitzed social media with angry denunciations of the ministry. Influential legislator, Anastasia Radina, who chairs the parliamentary committee on corruption, denounced Bezrukova’s dismissal as illegal and called for the defense minister to resign. A few days later, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau opened an investigation to determine if Umerov had abused the power of his office.

“The ministry of defense’s refusal to recognize the supervisory board’s extension of the contract will have devastating consequences,” anti-corruption crusader Daria Kaleniuk wrote in a guest column in Ukrainska Pravda, “for the supply of weapons to the army and the Danish model.”

The ‘Danish Model’ Is A Win-Win for Europe And Ukraine​

The new Danish approach to Ukrainian weapons development was born of necessity. Copenhagen has been at the forefront of European efforts to provide Kyiv with military aid. Although its total giving, €7.5 from February 2022 through October 2024, paled in comparison to Washington’s €89 billion, for Denmark, this represented a whopping 2.3% of GDP. By early 2024, Copenhagen could no longer spare anything more from the dwindling store of weapons it relies on for its own defense. The one thing it could provide was money, and encouraged by the sterling record of the new procurement agency, it began exploring the possibility of investing directly in Ukrainian weapons production.

Ukraine is well-positioned to make use of the funding. Ukrainian engineers once played an integral part in the Soviet defense industry. Ukraine has emerged in recent years as a leading global supplier of IT services and digital innovation, and its defense industry has been growing robustly since the war began in 2022. Wartime regulations prevent these manufacturers from exporting what they produce. But their sole client, the central government, operates on an extremely limited budget, buying only an estimated 30% of what the industry could have produced in 2024.

Copenhagen’s innovative approach solves all these problems. Denmark continues to support the war effort with direct financing for Ukrainian defense production. This helps Ukrainian firms produce at full capacity, increasing the flow of weapons and ammunition to badly strapped Ukrainian troops. Direct funding is faster than conventional military aid. Weapons production is cheaper in Ukraine than in Denmark or elsewhere in the West, and Ukrainian manufacturers are much better positioned than Europeans to respond to developments on the ever-changing front line in eastern Ukraine.

Bezrukova’s team and Copenhagen worked together to funnel Danish financing. Kyiv chose the companies and products most in need of investment. Danish defense experts audited the manufacturers and, once a contract was signed, followed up to ensure delivery of the weapons. In 2024, Denmark helped boost Ukrainian production of artillery systems, long-range drones, and anti-tank missiles. By the end of December, according to Zelensky, Danish financing was paying for the production of 20 Bohdana self-propelled artillery systems per month, compared to just six in December 2023.

By the end of 2024, Sweden, Finland, and Lithuania were following in Denmark’s footsteps and contributing directly to Ukrainian weapons production. Funding is still relatively limited—it meets only a fraction of Ukraine’s defense needs. But Danish defense minister Troels Lund Poulsen predicts the model could produce $1.4 billion in European investment in 2025.

Even with Bezrukova now officially out, much remains uncertain. The DPA stood all but idle for more than a week, leaving contracts in limbo at a time when troops are running desperately short of weapons and ammunition. Zelensky has said nothing, despite growing appeals to intervene, including from the national association of defense manufacturers. Legislation designed to guarantee the independence of institutions like the DPA in a position to check executive power is languishing in parliament. Also still uncertain: whether and to what degree allies like Denmark are reconsidering their support for Ukrainian defense production.

Ambassadors representing the G7 nations cautioned Kyiv to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible. “Consistency with good governance principles and NATO recommendations is important,” they warned, “to maintain the trust of the public and international partners.”
 
I read them all...and so should you:D

The Kremlin's medical system is likely overloaded as Russian soldiers on crutches keep appearing at the front line: UK intel​


"Golikov wrote that it's possible the two men in the drone video were seen without weapons or equipment because Russian soldiers are often told to find their own supplies on the front line.":eek:

The West is seeing Kim Jong Un's army in action. The North Korean soldiers are brutal zealots undeterred in the face of death.​



European Investment In The Ukrainian Defense Industry Threatened By Personnel Shuffle​

Free advice. Don't read propoganda)
Use telegram war news channels

Western mass media now far away from real journalism. Unfortunately. Use telegram news channels.

Edit. About UN and war crimes. I can give them link to Ukraine war channel, big one, with 386k of subscribers. There a lot of war crime activities. Not only Russian, but and made by Ukraine. They just freely post such videos. No wonder, since west or UN will never condemnation
 
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Their subsequent actions clearly demonstrated this "joint defense plan" was never anything else but pretext to a landgrab of their own.

Again, this is just not true. What the Soviets wanted was a buffer against Germany after the attempt at collective security failed. And one point Conquest left out of their post was that Britain and France along with Polish and Czech forces had all intervened in the Russian Civil War fighting against the Reds. Given this background Soviet reluctance to provide arms unconditionally is perfectly understandable.
 
Free advice. Don't read propoganda)
I understand that all the articles are prone to propaganda, but western media is still very subject to scrutiny....can you say the same about pro-russian media and other sources?
Do you think all 3 articles are just propaganda? I can understand the first one as it's more of an opinion piece, although with some sources in, but what about the others? I see no propaganda in each of the other 2 articles, do you?
 
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