What if ancient Greece hadn't invented the early version of democracy?

[ParkCungHee]

but nobody would say that, for instance, furverts are an interesting comparison to Athenian or ANE or North Indian democracy.

But, but, but....

 

[JTWuest]

The U.K. is exceptional in Western republics in not having a written constitution. That aside, it's not exactly much different from the United States in practice, since presidents like FDR got around that by appointing justices to the Supreme Court that he knew would, to his favor, make rulings based on incorrect interpretations of the Constitution. Such is the fallacy of viewing it as a "living document."

I would disagree on one point here. The US Constitution specifically states that the Supreme Court makes judgements about what is or is not the correct interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, no judgement the Supreme Court makes can be "incorrect"

 

[LightSpectra]

I would disagree on one point here. The US Constitution specifically states that the Supreme Court makes judgements about what is or is not the correct interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, no judgement the Supreme Court makes can be "incorrect"

Needless bump aside, I guess that means the SCOTUS has generated a dozen paradoxes, given their retroactive overturning of past rulings?

 

[ace99]

I would disagree on one point here. The US Constitution specifically states that the Supreme Court makes judgements about what is or is not the correct interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, no judgement the Supreme Court makes can be "incorrect"

There's nothing in the US constitution about the Supreme Court's role in judicial review. Come on man, Marbury v. Madison.

 

[Ailedhoo]

There was a demoractic model in Ancient India, although like the Athien democracy it was democracy for a selected membership, this time of the caste system.

This may be a source of information for this topic.

 

[Quackers]

We probably wouldn't call it "democracy". That's about it.

This is a disturbingly Whiggish view of history. Democracy may never of come about!

 

[Ailedhoo]

This is a disturbingly Whiggish view of history. Democracy may never of come about!

More likely it have come about with a different name mate. Traitorfish's view was of a consideration of how ideas are forged.

 

[Dachs]

There's nothing in the US constitution about the Supreme Court's role in judicial review. Come on man, Marbury v. Madison.

Judicial review is not the same thing as Constitutional interpretation. The former power is implied by the Constitution and formalized by Marbury, while the latter is specifically enumerated in the Constitution.

 

[ace99]

Not quite. Up till Marbury was decided Jefferson had basically said the he as President had just as much power if not more as the elected leader in determining what the Constitution meant as the Court did. He fully intended to disregard the Court's ruling if they had issued write commanding him to grant Marbury his office. It's with hindsight we can say this sort of stuff. The Court the Constitution established was circumscribed in its jurisdiction and powers. It wasn't even clear that the Court had the right to hear cases involving the state courts and federal courts were limited in all sorts of ways themselves.

It was never clear exactly what powers rested with them and there are plenty of people who back then would have contested the notion the the Court was the sole arbiter of the Constitution. Anyway what's Constitutional interpretation without judicial review anyway? No better than an advisory body. Moreover jurisdiction stripping is a thing, and the Court has on occasion had it's jurisdiction stripped. Congress can severely circumscribe the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.

 

[JTWuest]

There's nothing in the US constitution about the Supreme Court's role in judicial review. Come on man, Marbury v. Madison.

Ha ha, I will grant that you are partially correct since the issue was not fully settled until the Marbury v. Madison decision. However, the article 3, section 2 of the US Constitution does seem to grant the power - "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority"

 

[JTWuest]

Needless bump aside, I guess that means the SCOTUS has generated a dozen paradoxes, given their retroactive overturning of past rulings?

Sometimes it has! I find the history of the Court pretty fascinating. A previous ruling sets a precedent. However, even precedent can be overturned!

 

[ace99]

Ha ha, I will grant that you are partially correct since the issue was not fully settled until the Marbury v. Madison decision. However, the article 3, section 2 of the US Constitution does seem to grant the power - "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority"

I think you have to look at Federalist 80 for Hamilton's explanation of what that means and I think you can see that it wasn't quite so clear that the Supreme Court would be the sole arbiter it's jurisdiction was clearly delineated between it's appellate and original jurisdiction, and jurisdiction stripping of the appellate jurisdiction is possible. I'd say it was at least the early 1800's after Martin v. Hunters Lesee, after Marbury v. Madison, after McCulloh v. Maryland before it was really clear what the powers of the Supreme Court was and I think some might even argue that it wasn't until the various amendments of the Constitution were becoming incorporated against the states that it was really clear. If you're interested in the Court, it's history and development I can send you some law review articles if you'd like once my Westlaw nausea subsides.

Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed. It is to comprehend "all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands and grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, and subjects." This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is, then, to extend:

First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. This corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been asked, what is meant by "cases arising under the Constitution," in contradiction from those "arising under the laws of the United States"? The difference has been already explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emited, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the Constitution and not the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole.

It has also been asked, what need of the word "equity What equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants of different States, may afford another example of the necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.

The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend:

Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evident connection with the preservation of the national peace.

Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts.

Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party. These constitute the third of those classes.

Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last.

Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States. These fall within the last class, and are the only instances in which the proposed Constitution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes between the citizens of the same State.

Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national judicature.

 

[LightSpectra]

Sometimes it has! I find the history of the Court pretty fascinating. A previous ruling sets a precedent. However, even precedent can be overturned!

... the point being that the SCOTUS interpretation may be the final word, but nevertheless, is not infallible.

 

[dutchfire]

unlike the Pope.

Moderator Action: Do not understand what this has to do with the conversation. Please stay on topic.
Please read the forum rules: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=422889

 

[Suisami]

Easy. I would have been your dictator XD lol!!

 

[Traitorfish]

Needless bump aside, I guess that means the SCOTUS has generated a dozen paradoxes, given their retroactive overturning of past rulings?

I'm surprised that someone as well-read as you is only just encountering the concept of a common law system.

This is a disturbingly Whiggish view of history. Democracy may never of come about!

Why- what bearing does the internal structure of a handful of ancient city-states have on political developments in early modern Europe?

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Why- what bearing does the internal structure of a handful of ancient city-states have on political developments in early modern Europe?

While some places, like the early United States, as well as thinkers like Montesquieu and Rousseau, did actively seek to emulate parts of both Greek democracy and the Roman republic, it can't really be argued that Geneva, Ragusa, Novgorod, or the Low Countries did anything more than be more adaptive to socio-economic dynamics than the entrenched monarchies of Europe.

 

[Plotinus]

Also, when did "Whiggish" become an automatic defeater? It's always dangerous to create an orthodoxy so unquestioned that any unfashionable idea is rejected simply because it doesn't fit with that orthodoxy.

Not that that's exactly relevant to this thread, of course. Or maybe it is. Maybe one of the fundamental issues here is: was the emergence of democracy as we know it (more or less) inevitable, or at least not very evitable, no matter what happened? It doesn't seem to me that this is a question with an obvious answer.

 

[JTWuest]

I think you have to look at Federalist 80 for Hamilton's explanation of what that means and I think you can see that it wasn't quite so clear that the Supreme Court would be the sole arbiter it's jurisdiction was clearly delineated between it's appellate and original jurisdiction, and jurisdiction stripping of the appellate jurisdiction is possible.

Given that Congress has the power to create amendments, I would tend to agree with you that the Supreme Court is not the "sole arbiter", I would simply argue that the Court's power as arbiter is greater than the other branches. Of course the Court can always make a decision and then have the Congress come back and write a new law, but barring additional amendments (a tricky proposition!) then the Court may basically rule however it sees fit. Admittedly, my argument ignores Andrew Jackson proclaiming something like the Court has made their decision...let them enforce it. But there are exceptions to all rules.

The Federalist Papers as clear explanation on what the Constitution means is problematic. They certainly are not a grand source of authority on the Constitution. They were not intended to be an objective document! They are very subjective, and written as a really big commercial advertisement for the new experimental Constitution. Some things are exaggerated, while others aren't talked about in great detail.

 

[Flying Pig]

Also, when did "Whiggish" become an automatic defeater? It's always dangerous to create an orthodoxy so unquestioned that any unfashionable idea is rejected simply because it doesn't fit with that orthodoxy.

I think the idea that history moves towards any sort of goal has been shown to be the product of selective and often simplistic readings of history; Marx' in particular. I have a book on my shelf by a chap called RJ Evans, who spends an awful lot of time arguing that historical theories can never have predictive power - he comments quite wryly that 'whenever Marxists in government have thought that they have identified an immutable historical law, they have proceeded to do their level best to break it'