Alternate History Thread II...

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North King said:
The searing spears don't sound very practical, as a) the strength of the spearhead would be somewhat diminished (though admittedly smaller openings wouldn't be too much of a problem), and b), the searing of internal organs might well cauterize the wound... If you have an abdominal wound, you're going to die anyway. Head, same. Limb, you're not a threat. The most use I could see would be blowing the steam directly in your enemy's face.
Not really. At the point such a thing would be possible steel is likely to have rolled around along with semi-modern machining (lathes, drill-press, etc), allowing you to fashion tubes only minutely less strong than solid rods, and with milled slits that don't compromise integrity. Even if the end does break off, what's left will still be jagged and capable of discharging steam directly forward, so, it'd still be lethal.

Plus, cauterized areas don't heal. A hole through your torso, even if it pierces nothing vital, that's cauterized and is thus semi-permanent, is pretty much killing. Internal organs start to liquify when a person's core body temperature starts to exceed 112°F or so. Superheated steam will pretty much ensure that, and there is something to be said for being absolutely sure your enemy is dead.

Sometimes weapons are cruel and intimidating just for the sake of being cruel and intimidating. ;)
 
Symphony D. said:
Not really. At the point such a thing would be possible steel is likely to have rolled around along with semi-modern machining (lathes, drill-press, etc), allowing you to fashion tubes only minutely less strong than solid rods, and with milled slits that don't compromise integrity. Even if the end does break off, what's left will still be jagged and capable of discharging steam directly forward, so, it'd still be lethal.

Plus, cauterized areas don't heal. A hole through your torso, even if it pierces nothing vital, that's cauterized and is thus semi-permanent, is pretty much killing. Internal organs start to liquify when a person's core body temperature starts to exceed 112°F or so. Superheated steam will pretty much ensure that, and there is something to be said for being absolutely sure your enemy is dead.

Sometimes weapons are cruel and intimidating just for the sake of being cruel and intimidating. ;)

I would think the added business of carrying around the steam and insulating the shaft would make it impractical. Especially given that, as I said, most people will die anyway.
 
So can we have steam grenades?
 
North King said:
I would think the added business of carrying around the steam and insulating the shaft would make it impractical. Especially given that, as I said, most people will die anyway.
It's fairly easily solved by using gauntlets or cloth-lined leather gloves (spiffy oven mittens). Rapid temperature change might also result in condensation. The reason I posit it at all is, as I mentioned earlier, man-portable steam guns. Their chief advantage over air guns would be that their "propellant" can be scanvenged very easily out in the field; all you need is water and something decently flammable. Compressed gas on the other hand requires at least a moderate amount of machinery and support staff, and much more if you use some other, more ideal gas like CO2. Much easier to keep an army on the move supplied. Meanwhile, with a decent fuel like coal, you can keep the engine stoked for a great long time, to enable such fanciful things; it's not a very difficult thing to rig up some plumbing to such a weapon and attach it to the "backpack" in addition to the gun - if the enemy forces charge in overwhelming number or otherwise just generally close distance (since these weapons aren't that rapid firing) it makes a good backup weapon that utilizes the engine's capabilities instead of making it pure dead weight (which you might not have time to take off). Alternately it could be something else entirely such as a "steamthrower" or some combination. Interestingly this would also allow for basic smoke-screen tactics.

The drawbacks, comparatively, are the danger of explosion, and "warm up" time.

So can we have steam grenades?
Don't see it as practical. You'd either have to chuck a micro generating steam engine at them and have it rupture, or pump the steam into some vessel which then ruptures (and anything strong enough to hold it without blowing immediately probably wouldn't consistently give a predetermined amount of time later). Molotovs or something similar would probably be used instead, since they have a nice and well-documented anti-armor function.
 
Symphony D. said:
It's fairly easily solved by using gauntlets or cloth-lined leather gloves (spiffy oven mittens). Rapid temperature change might also result in condensation. The reason I posit it at all is, as I mentioned earlier, man-portable steam guns. Their chief advantage over air guns would be that their "propellant" can be scanvenged very easily out in the field; all you need is water and something decently flammable. Compressed gas on the other hand requires at least a moderate amount of machinery and support staff, and much more if you use some other, more ideal gas like CO2. Much easier to keep an army on the move supplied. Meanwhile, with a decent fuel like coal, you can keep the engine stoked for a great long time, to enable such fanciful things; it's not a very difficult thing to rig up some plumbing to such a weapon and attach it to the "backpack" in addition to the gun - if the enemy forces charge in overwhelming number or otherwise just generally close distance (since these weapons aren't that rapid firing) it makes a good backup weapon that utilizes the engine's capabilities instead of making it pure dead weight (which you might not have time to take off). Alternately it could be something else entirely such as a "steamthrower" or some combination. Interestingly this would also allow for basic smoke-screen tactics.

The drawbacks, comparatively, are the danger of explosion, and "warm up" time.

Once again, the cost-effectiveness of it over regular melee weapons simply does not merit production. Not even as a psychological weapon.
 
Like I said, it'd be a simple addition to a ranged weapon system, not an exclusive melee weapon all on its lonesome. It'd basically be comparable to a bayonnet on a gun. It would be expensive as a whole, yes, however its performance could possibly offset that (I'd have no idea since nothing like this has ever been built, but there are plenty of real world military analogues). The very nature of the system means its advantages would best be played by deep strike forces, which by their role must be heavily armed and armored, so it'd likely wind up in the hands of the elite and be produced in small numbers regardless.

By the time such a thing would be practical anyway, mass production would be very near, or likely already online, lessening the problem of manufacture. Any world in which technology advanced like this would be highly likely to have asymmetrical technological progression.
 
The 1825 Treaty of London ushered in an era of mixed feelings, dubiousness and uncertainty, an era of chaos between the great wars. A general crisis of confidence set in - in economy, where commerce was cautiously recovering after Surcouf's privateering caused a panic in Britain and America in war-time; in culture, where a clash between old, established ideas and the increasingly popular "Jacobinery", new, radical, literally revolutionary ideals; in technology (especially naval), where a frantic naval race commenced; in diplomacy, where alliances fell and rose; but most noticeably, in domestic politics. Exhausted and discredited by the War of the Second Coalition, several existing governments - or, rather, establishments and factions - fell from power, not immediately ofcourse, but within the first few years, after failed attempts to capitalize on victories and recover from defeats. Revolts broke out where mere conspiracies were not enough; in some cases, even civil wars happened. The post-London world was undergoing a time of much uncertainty, without one big war, but with a very tension-filled, diplomatically-chaotic peace, and a series of lesser conflicts.

It is, however, pretty hard to make any correct generalizations beyond that - various regions and countries had their own specifics in this period. So let us go, continent-by-continent, state-by-state...

Let us start with British Canada, where a Quebecois revolt flashed up in 1833, and generally Quebecois - and Irish, as Irish immigrants begun to move in - rebelliousness grew. Many spoke at that time of an emerging Canadian national identity, though most Anglo-Canadians were either loyal, either leaning towards USA. The "nationalists" thus were largely French and Irish (and leaned, obviously, towards France). Heavy British military presence in Canada during and after the American Civil War made things little better.

In the United States of America, the situation was for many years uncertain. Both parties of the political establishment - the leading Federalists and the almost-perpetually oppositionary Democratic-Republicans - were suffering from a crisis of confidence. In the aftermath of the war, on one hand, greater national identity emerged, damaging the decentralizing, anti-nationalist Dem-Reps. On the other hand, "the Betrayal of London", which limited American gains to but Texas, Cuba and Dominica, and prevented the achievement of the main war aim (creation of a friendly Mexican Republic; instead, Mexico was mostly taken by the French, with the exceptions of Russian California). Also, in general Britain seemed weaker than before after Lizard Point. Weaker, as in incapable of properly defending American commerce - a vital condition of the Anglo-American alliance. This put everyone in a bit of a quandry, as the most commercial part of America was New England - incidentally the traditional stronghold of the Federalists. Though very Anglophilic in the past, the New Englanders always had some disagreements with Britain as well; only, as long as the commerce prospered under British protection, they were willing to let the boundary and fishing diputes rest, and let the British hang counterfeiters and filibusters at will. Now they begun raising all sorts of issues yet again, and the Democratic-Republicans seemed poised to hijack New England, especially as there was some support for a confederacy there as well.

However, after the downfall of Webster and the near defeat of the Federalists in the 1824 elections, the old Federalist elite was badly shaken, while new, even more radical cadres came to power. While in 1824-1828 the country was in a deadlock due to the Democratic-Republican predmoninance in the Senate, in 1829 the decisive elections came. The Democratic-Republicans, under John C. Calhoun, seeked to take over the Presidency AND maintain their hold on the Senate, using this power to backroll all of Hamilton's reforms, while the Federalists, under Charles Alcott (OOC: probably the first person here that didn't exist/wasn't prominent in OTL), seeked to retake power and bring the Federalist policies to a logical conclusion. The elections thus were very heated indeed. Cheating, intrigues, street violence spread. The (Alcottist) Federal Army and the (Calhounist) state militias themselves clashed - mostly figuratively, but sometimes literally - over who will get to put the riots down. And at that, the Federal Army often joined the Federalist rioters, whilst the state militias very often fought alongside the Democratic-Republican supporters, although, being less centralized (their party's programme becoming its doom), in the die-hard Federalist states such as Pennsylvania the militias just as often supported the Federalists. In other words, the country was quietly and steadily receding into civil war, as the elections dragged on and on, the side that thought itself to be losing at the moment using all methods possible to delay its completion. When the results where announced and Alcott won by a slight margin, these results were largely ignored; Calhoun easily declared the elections to be rigged and departed for Atlanta, where the provisional Democratic-Republican government of the United States of America was already in place. The Federalist government remained in Washington, despite some requests that it move from there.

This was on the 3rd of January 1829 - the official date of the American Civil War's beginning, as several states recognized the Federalist governments - and several, the Democratic-Republican one. The situation on the outset was awfully confusing, as the Federalists, more keen on domestic issues this time, have shifted diplomatically towards France, prompting the Democratic-Republicans to align with Britain by the good old American political dualism worked out by then (as each of the contending parties felt obliged to oppose whatever the other party supported). This and various other clashes - on new states, on border legislations, on tariffs, on banking, on the military, on slavery and the expansion thereof - was what made this election particularily heated. But the former decision was of much importance, as the Federalists managed to regain some support in New England, which in the end amounted for Massachussets - a single state, but a crucial one. The rest of New England fell to the Dem-Reps in the end. The "Middle Atlantic" region, with Pennsylvania and New York, remained firmly Federalist. The newer states of Midwest were very divided, with Ohio, Illinois and the newly-introduced Michigan siding with the Federalists as a result of a lenghty campaign of propaganda (and - as the Midwest was very late to take up the side of one government or another - a bungled Dem-Rep attempt to befriend the Amerinds as to open a third front against the Federalists), but with the rest, most notably Kentucky, siding with the Dem-Reps. The western and Carribean territories, despite uprising by local populace, were firmly in the hands of the Federal army. Early into the war, another incident worsened the Dem-Rep position; although they held pretty much all of the south, in the bitterly-contested Virginia the situation remained indecisive. Finally, Calhoun ordered loyal forces (Federal army defectors and militias from nearby states) to support the Dem-Rep retainers. This intervention caused the Virginian government to finally side with the Federalists, interpreting this as an "unprovoked invasion" and inviting Federal troops to assist it - and the Federalist loyalists. Despite some population support, the Dem-Reps were forced out of most of Virginia before the summer. Thus with New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Virginia in their hands the Federalists had created a pretty solid base for operations against the Dem-Reps.

Technically this and the Dem-Rep problems of coordination had already predetermined the outcome of the war. The Dem-Reps were put before the choice of abandoning their policies (and losing many supporters) or conceding several key advantages to their enemies. Even had they tried to form a coordinated strategy they would have faced problems due to being geographically divided, by contrast with the closely-packed Federalists. Nonetheless, the Dem-Reps won several early victories; though their rebellions in Cuba and the West collapsed quickly, they were able to launch a succesful coup d'etat in Michigan, defeat an invasion of Kentucky and overrun Massachusetts. In the latter, they received some decisive assistance from Britain. The British were already disturbed by the rise of American power and of the anti-British sentiments. As the Federalists grew more radical and militant, and (though this was mostly a result of the war's beginning) switched their focus from commerce to industry, their policies became indirectly less favourable to the British. When Alcott publically denounced the previous pro-British foreign policy, the British had had it, and begun assisting Calhoun in secret. Thus British troops dressed as Federal defectors fought on the Dem-Rep side in New England. Later British involvement in the war would increase...

But later about that. The military defeats of 1829 had forced Alcott to force through radical measures; he temporarily suspended the constitution and was granted dictatorial powers to save and reorganize what was already reffered to as "the Federation". With those powers he made a call for volunteers, organized several divisions, and took a very active part in war planning. The American army was modernized and reorganized (with some clandestine French help, ironically enough dispatched under Prime Minister Lafayette); throughout the rest of the year it regroupped and generally sat on the defensive. In 1830, General Samuel Beardsley headed a second invasion of Kentucky; this time, it was a complete success, with the rout and death of one of the most promising Dem-Rep commanders, Zachary Taylor at Lexington. The offensive continued to occupy Tennessee despite guerrila resistance, and advance along the Mississippi. Dem-Rep attempt to check the Federalist advance failed badly in the battle at Vicksburg, as the Federalist army was more modern and had far superior leadership and organization. A pro-Federalist French revolt in Louisiana and another invasion of Missouri caused the Dem-Rep surrender in the western South, especially as Federalist forces from Texas begun making threatening moves. In New England things were harder; in fact, the Dem-Reps and the British at first captured Albany. But they were defeated at Oneonta and a re-invasion of New England begun. Yet the Federalist fortunes there weren't quite restored; the invasion of Vermont bogged down completely, although Connecticut surrendered and an advance into Massachusetts commenced. It wasn't very succesful, with a defeat at Amherst, but for a minor incident in which several British men were captured and confessed their identity. Alcott immediately made an international scandal out of it, and French threats of war in combination with domestic outcry of British radicals (who have once more returned to prominence under new, vociferous leaders such as William Lovett) forced a reluctant British withdrawal and recognition of Alcott's government; the British government just wasn't quite ready for war, especially if there was to be an American front to it.

So in 1831 things went well. Several western southern states surrendered after receiving guarantees that though the expansion of slavery will bel imited, no radical measures such as an immediate abolition would be taken. The west itself was partially reconquered. In New England, the Federalist rebellions allowed Edwin Vose Sumner to attack Massachusetts once more, this time - succesfully, eventually linking up with rebels at Boston and forcing the surrender of a large Dem-Rep force at New Bedford. Despite continued resistance in Vermont, the Dem-Reps collapsed here as well. With a steady stream of French and Irish volunteers, the Federalists were able to, in 1832, overrun both Carolinas. Calhoun commited suicide, and though guerrila resistance in Vermont and the south continued for quite a while, the American Civil War was over.

Five years later, in 1837, Alcott resigned, both as dictator and as president, just in time for the scheduled elections. By then resistance was crushed; great progress was achieved with the construction of new railroads and industries; the state militias were practically disbanded, and instead, a powerful Federal Army and Federal Navy were created. The presidential term was extended to eight years, and though the dictatorial rights were only temporary the post gained much in power. The United States of America were no more, as a North American Federation was created in its stead, not QUITE an unitary republic Hamilton had wanted it to be but still bound close together. Having emerged all the stronger (but for some internal disagreements) out of the civil war, the NAF was now about ready to start a new phase of expansion, with the main question being that of direction, though the most likely and popular version was an invasion of Canada in alliance with France.

There are, ofcourse, other options. Such as a war with Russia and California, the latter being a "principality" independent in all but in name, ruled by knyaz Mikhail/Miguel Nikolaevich Rezanov, son of Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, the Russian diplomat who had since early 19th century worked to strenghthen Russian influence in California, ultimately allowing its annexation. As Russia was unable to exercise any real power there, especially with its domestic troubles, the Rezanovs - who, along with the other Russian officials and noblemen sent there, quickly intermarried with the existant local Spanish elite - were granted both Californias as a principality by the Empress Maria. Innovative, open-minded, but competent and strong-willed, Mikhail continued his father's work, encouraging immigration, growing rich from the newly-found gold and building up a proper state with a new buerocracy and prospering commerce. California also expanded by buying off more Russian American lands (leaving Russia with Alaska and the Aleut Islands under direct control) and marching into the frontier, where it begun to clash with both the British and the Americans. Lastly the Californians gained much commercial and political influence at the court of Kamehameha III of Hawaii, who had with their help built up a modern unitary state in Hawaii and begun eyeing nearby unclaimed primitive islands...

Despite some occasional insurgencies (the most notable one being the 1834 rising headed by Santa Anna, previously a loyal collaborator), French Mexico - with Bernadotte as its military and later civilian governor - stabilized and even prospered, alongside France in these golden days of the "Orleans Monarchy", as French trade and investment flooded the country. The region around Veracruz underwent the most intensive development, and as lots of opportunities emerged in Mexico hordes of French (and minority) colonists overwhelmed the region, the city itself getting a narrowly French ethnic majority.

During all this time, Francisco de Miranda - and after his death in 1829, his successors Bernardo O'Higgins and Simon Bolivar - struggled to keep the vast Colombian Republic together. Under O'Higgins very radical reforms were implemented (nobility was abolished, lands were split up) and the country nearly fell apart as a civil war commenced, but the government barely held on to power, recruiting a large popular army and carrying out a campaign of merciless reprisals. When O'Higgins died of an illness (many suspect poisoning by General Bolivar, who had a long-term personal feud with O'Higgins), Simon Bolivar took power and adapted a new, pragmatic policy. Though many had considered it more of an egoistic, narcisstic coup at first... In other words, he proclaimed himself Emperor of Colombia, reinstitued nobility (but DIDN'T restore it to the old aristocrats, many of whom fled or were killed by now; instead, he created a new, meritocratic one and ennobled his loyal followers), and divided Paraguay with Portugal (until now, Paraguay continued resistance succesfully with secret French backing and had itself secretly assisted a variety of separatist and later radical conspiracies against Colombia). Befriending the foreign powers and drawing on the support of the military and the urban middle class, Bolivar defeated a major uprising of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian "ranceros", but at the same time cracked down hard on the Logia Lautara, which by now became something like a Colombian Jacobin Club and thus disapproved of Bolivar's moderation. In any case, he managed to hold on to power, but the Colombian Empire remained rather shaky as separatism begun to pick up again and a Platine rebellion was put down with much bloodshed. Corruption also begun to grow, and the various foreign powers - France, NAF, Britain, Portugal and even Spain/Two Sicilies - begun to search for and acquire allies amongst the various court factions to preach their cause and at the same time get into a better position to benefit from Colombia's seemingly-inevitable collapse...

All was mostly quiet in the various British colonies despite the gradual abolition of slavery since the century's beginning. Brazil, despite some separatism fueled by dislike of Portugal's increasingly liberal policies, generally prospered as well and the great wave of Portuguese patriotism was probably felt there better than anywhere else.

As already mentioned, in Britain social tensions rose again, culminating in the radical riots in 1830 and 1834, the latter being put down with much bloodshed. Some even predicted a civil war, but the radical support base, how ever wide, was lacking in the simple daring (and desperation) required for a revolution. So a few isolated insurrections were put down during 1834 and early 1835, and that was all. An Irish rebellion was more fierce and at first succesful, but the rebels, as usual, were defeated; this, in combination with droughts and starvation, forced many Irishmen to move to Canada or the Federation, impairing the British positions and influence there. Aside from this, it was a time of modernizing the fleet, industrializing the homeland, strenghthening British presence in the Orient (economic infiltration of Egypt and China, consolidation of India) and, especially after the ACW, looking for new allies.

France ofcourse also needed to continue its naval buildup (it thankfully still was ahead in the naval technology race, but only barely), likewise expanded its various African colonies (growing particularily strong in West Africa, after purchasing the remaining Dutch colonies there despite last-moment British attempts to hijack the deal; and also crushing the Merinas with an iron fist in 1834-1838), and, ofcourse, similarily played the diplomatic game. The French courted the North American Federation with some success and partially (very partially) reconciled with Austria and Russia, though Austria ofcourse remained pretty hostile even then. The grand Anglo-French diplomatic game I will describe later, country-by-country; as for French domestic affairs, I will give but a brief summary of the developments there; fortunately it wasn't quite as confusing as previously.

After Talleyrand's retirement in 1827, Augereau became Prime Minister. His was a turbulent tenure, as he constantly squabbled with both the king and the Parlement, and allegedly intended to overthrow both, even as he shook up international affairs by threatening pretty much all of France's neighbours with war on several occasions. Fortunately, he died in 1830 of old age and numerous wounds, and before that he was succesfully, though barely, held up by his enemies in the Parlement and his cautious friends in the officer corps; many suspect that had he lived just a little longer, he indeed would have taken full power and started a new war over the Spanish issue (see below). His successor Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de la Fayette, was also short-lived, but unlike his firebrand, overactive predecessor this old man was a figurehead, though a very popular one; some have called him the spirit of Orleanism personified. King Louis-Philippe, always cautious and wary to antagonize the Parlement, not to mention a liberal himself, didn't use this opportunity to expand his influence, though he did greatly encourage the liberal reforms of this period of peace and prosperity, the golden age of the Orleans monarchy. French commerce prospered world-wide, and the monarchy's alliance with the bourgoise seemed unbreakable and omnipotent. After Lafayette's death in 1834, several nonentities held the increasingly-powerless office of Prime Minister, but, as already mentioned, the king and the Parlement fortunately remained in harmony. Alas, this idylly begun to fall apart in the 1840s, caused tragically by its two of its several most-praised aspects - the great industrialization (that caused the rise of a large, discontent proletarian mass) and the intellectual flourishing (that resulted in the rise of Falangism (OOC: yes, I like inventing alternate names for communism ;) ), inspired by the works of Babeuf and Fourier, an ideology that naturally gained a large following amongst the workers). Charles Cesaire launched in 1841 a Falangist "revolution populaire" in Paris itself; though it, and some other risings later that year and in 1842, were put down rather easily, it was not without bloodshed, and provided a rude awakening to France's ruling elite. This bound the sovereign, the Parlement and the bourgoise even closer together; all of the establishment, whether liberal or conservative, felt threatened by this new, untamed, unexpected third force, having let their watch down after the decline of neo-Jacobinism. New riots and later Falangist and separatist uprisings have further increased the ageing king's paranoia, also fueled by his various advisors, and caused him to reform the police system and crack down on the Falangists, as well as on other radicals (all these actions being supported wholeheartedly by most of the Parlement). Crisis was averted, but a bad aftertaste remained. Also, the army's surprisingly poor performance against rebels and Berbers during the 1840s prompted a general military reform, and a new rise of militarism in France. As relations with Britain dropped to a new low, the king died suddenly in 1850, despite being quite healthy, if old (so naturally the most vociferous Anglophobes quickly and effectively pointed to the Perfidious Albion and its never-ending plotting against France). His son, Ferdinand-Philippe I, was of a more militaristic mind, having played a large role in the army reform (to such an extent in fact that some have called him, rather than the obscure War Minister, "la Pere d'Armee")...

Spain, France's ever-more-junior ally, was going through very very very bad times ever since this century begun (and bad times with only two "verys" for a few centuries now in any case). The War of the Second Coalition was the worst of it all; Spain was stripped of its entire colonial empire (save for the Canaries) in a few years after three centuries of being one of the foremost colonial powers, and Fernando VII's opportunistic colonial landgrabs in West Africa were only succesful in a few isolated situations, and even there were not at all cost-efficient. Fernando only held on to power through the support of the military; and even that was slipping, so he had to request several French military interventions, to the point when in 1829 the entire country was briefly occupied by the French to defeat all rebels. Such a situation however couldn't continue for long; the king's death in 1831 only sped up the collapse, when Spain was simultaneously seized by a succession crisis and a radical neo-Jacobin revolution, resulting in a five-sided war as the Carlists, the Isabellists, the Republicans and the confused French and Portuguese intervents fought each other, even as the peasants added into the fun in 1832 by starting a millenialist rebellion. After the extremelly young (two years old) Queen Isabella II was captured and executed by revolutionaries, however, they had succesfully united everyone around them for a while. This coalition didn't last long, especially as the British begun meddling as well to defend their interests and occupied Seville with Portuguese assistance, while the French, after some pondering, refused to recognize Carlos as the ruler of Spain, rightfully deciding that they needed someone more liberal - in line with the Orleanist ideology and not as widely-hated by his subjects. At first, the plan was to send Louis-Philippe's second son, Louis Charles Philippe Raphael, to be king of Spain; but just before this decision could be announced, yet another pretender announced himself - King Ferdinando V of Naples, who cleverly played on the continued French attempts to bring him into their alliance. Secretly contacting Louis-Philippe, he promised to join that alliance if the crowns of Naples and Spain were to be merged. After some hard bargaining and power-gaming, the French, despite having some doubts about this arrangement, agreed. The moderate and liberal ("Orleanist") Spanish monarchists accepted Ferdinando's candidature as well after the French leaned on them properly and after the Neapolitan himself pledged to support liberal ideas, reform Spain in French manner and allow it to retain some autonomy. By this moment the republicans were mostly crushed, and by the time new King Fernando VIII arrived for his coronation in Madrid, the French forces already won the crucial battle at Vitoria, routing the Carlists. All that remained now was the hardest bit - negotiating with Britain and Portugal.

Well, in the end, the negotiations were succesful, though it very nearly came to war. Portugal was given back Olivienza (annexed by Spain in compensation after the War of Second Coalition) and allowed to annex Galicia, and the new king had to officially renounce all Spanish claims on Latin America and other lost colonies. Seville was all but opened up to British (and French, but this was ofcourse a nominal gesture recognizing the de facto state of affairs for years now) trade with only the slightest tariffs. But Fernando VIII was officially recognized, and immediately set about on a vigorous liberal reform campaign. He conducted it quite well, drawing on the French example as he had promised, and thus managed to avoid getting too much criticism for tricking his new subjects when he promised them autonomy. Instead of becoming a dual monarchy, a monarchic federation of sorts, Fernando's realm was centralized around Madrid as the Kingdom of Spain, something that the Spanish easily forgave him. The Neapolitans were more outraged, but they no longer mattered all that much, having become but a Spanish province in all but in name.

Anyway, after consolidating his gains with French assistance, Fernando VIII succesfully reinvigorated Spain at last. Realizing that every cloud had a silver lining, he saw one in the past defeats. Spain was no longer bound by a vast empire; and with his reforms, it was capable of building a new one, only a one that will be ran much more efficiently, and won't be as overstretched. Much like Talleyrand before him, he decided to use the loss of the Atlantic, American empire to build up a Mediterranean, African one. Most notably, this involved a French-backed conquest of Morocco in 1842, but also, Fernando VII's African gains were expanded upon.
 
Portugal was undergoing a general renaissance. Despite some strife between liberals and conservatives, especially after the gradual reform of Portugal into a limitedly-parliamentary monarchy, pretty much all factions were united by a genuine patriotism, as things once more looked up for this country. Remaining firmly a British ally despite the latter's abolition of slavery, Portugal got in exchange protection under which its commerce flourished, and recognition of its vast African claims; though Portugal didn't actually seize most of these lands, in the comparatively peaceful quarter-century since 1825 it has done much expanding throughout the Dark Continent, gaining ground in West Africa, Congo Basin and Mozambique alike. Not wanting to antagonize the British by meddling in East Asia, the Portuguese nonetheless bought West Timor and the various Arafura Sea island chains from the Dutch.

At this point I suppose I might as well mention the weird fates of the Dutch since we last left them in, oh, 1799. As I had mentioned, they had a pretty turbulent political history for the next few years, eventually settling down for a decentralized, weak Dutch Confederation. A stagnant state made impotent by a chronically-inefficient parliament, it lived by quietly on the sidelines of history for two decades, as corruption accumulated. It already reached a bad point when the British and the French alike begun bribing Dutch officials hoping to bring the Confederation into the War of the Second Coalition on one side or another, but things were bound to get even worse. Corruption grew, and it already reached scandalous proportions when things got even worse with a terrible economic crisis. All this caused popular dissent to rise even higher, while the crisis itself bit into the pockets of the oligarchs that by then de facto (and often de jure) controlled the Dutch government. So a desperate gambit was undertaken in 1831, in the name of getting more cash. The crippled, but still huge Dutch colonial empire was unwieldy as it is, and the government's weakness made it even worse; without a regular army left, the Dutch soon found their remaining East Indies to suck down enormous amounts of cash - if not for maintaining troops, then for bribing local rulers. So perhaps the decision to get rid of the colonies was, in the long run, a logical one, though this was not immediately appreciated. But I am getting ahead of myself; after succesfully selling Timor and the nearby lands to Portugal, and the Dutch West African territories to France, the Dutch government ran a de facto auction for the rest of the East Indies. The main competitors were France and Britain; but through bluffing, promising, bribing and also honestly beating the French bids, the British managed to buy the Indies and, coincidentally, a pretty large part of the Dutch fleet (not that it was much good - obsolete and partly-rotten - but still). That was scandalous enough, especially as in the last moment the pro-sale elements in the government and the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie clashed with the opposition, causing an additional political scandal. Finally, at French incitement, the Dutch masses rose up, overthrew the government (a large portion of it fled to Britain with a large portion of the treasury), proclaimed the Second Batavian Republic and demanded a renegotiation of the British purchase. This and the pleas for extradition of the government-in-exile was ignored, but Batavia then proceeded to ally with France, and this, in combination with the Spanish conflict, nearly caused a new war. But finally, the issue was settled; the new "Batavia" was officially recognized, and the government-in-exile resigned as such, but remained to live in Britain; it had to hand over the treasury however in exchange for British estates and pensions. Britain also agreed to cancel the debts to Batavia, provided France did the same. Franco-Batavian alliance was formally disbanded, but Batavian neutrality was clearly no more, though the British immediately begun to lure the Batavians over to their side, promising them gains at French expense come next war if they join it. That notwithstanding, Batavia clearly remained aligned with France for now, and dropped the issue of the previous FRENCH purchase of their colonies. Domestically, the Batavians avoided a lenghty period of terror after a quick and violent crackdown on the corrupt and on the innocent bystanders that got knocked over accidentally, and after that transformed their country into an unitary republic, somewhat inspired by the NAF, politely rejecting the offering of Louis-Philippe's younger son as parliamentary monarch (talk about bad luck; that was the second country he was rejected in!).

The Swiss got him instead as King Louis(-Charles-Philippe-Raphael) I of Helvetia, a centralized French puppet kingdom.

Denmark-Norway-Sweden at first remained a good Russo-British ally, but, as it grew ever less useful to both powers and accordingly begun to be treated ever worse, even as Norwegian and Swedish nationalist rebellions took place, incited by a wide array of unsympathetic foreign powers, the new king Christian VIII decided to kill the two birds - the one called "foreign pressure" and the one called "internal national tensions" - with one stone by adapting a policy of Scandinavism and renaming the country into the Scandinavian Empire, with the help of the sympathetic statesmen from Denmark, Norway and Sweden alike. This wasn't quite as succesful as was hoped, but in combination with some reshuffling and progressive reforms that turned Scandinavia into a parliamentary monarchy, Christian managed to attain the necessary popular support. He also planned an alliance with France, being inspired like many other reform-minded monarchs of the day by Orleanism, but the British pre-empted this by privately making it clear that they would not tolerate a French ally in their very backyard, and by bribing several Riksdag officials. Frustrated thusly, Emperor Christian I nonetheless begun to secretly work with the French and modernize his rather ragtag military, seeking to break out of the Anglo-Russian encirclement, which seemed all the more dangerous after (at least as far as the reasonably-paranoid monarch saw) the Prussians had joined it.

In truth, the Prussians didn't really ally with Britain, or with Russia with which relations remained strained after the past war, Poland pointing at Prussia's heart as a dagger. But for Britain, distraught at its recent diplomatic losses in America and Scandinavia (how ever gradual both were, the British could sense that their allies were wavering already in 1825), Prussia seemed like an obvious choice; that country needed to be befriended and brought out of French camp. Though Basel Pact officially ended during the Spanish crisis, Prussian bitterness at the French failing to save them properly and uncertainty over the values of the French alliance as compared to a renewed British one effectively annuled it a few years after the peace. The British and Prussian royal families intermarried (well, the junior members of both did), clearly signifying a reconciliation. But only few had known that there was also a secret agreement signed back then that went into effect upon the death of George IV and ascendancy of his son George V to the throne of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. NOT to the throne of Electorate of Hannover, which was handed over to Prussia in a realpolitik fashion. Subsequent trade agreements confirmed a de facto alliance. For France, this was a serious loss, yet also perhaps a blessing in disguise; immediately, the French strategists could sign in relief as they were unlikely to have to bail out Prussia any more, while the diplomats hurried to reconcile with Vienna, though the French and the Austrians, unlike the British and the Prussians, had very clashing natural interests, and so an alliance was not recreated.

Meanwhile, domestically, the Prussians had to rather reluctantly allow several reforms and a shift in ideology. The war and the peace changed much in the Prussian state, the two main reasons being the necessity of popular mobilization in wartime, and the demographic change caused by the peace terms that lost Prussia Poland and gained it more German territories. With the acquisition of Hannover in 1832, Prussia's past concept - that of a Baltic/East European power - had to be finally exchanged for that of a [North] German national power. Though the Junkers retained much power, some progressive reforms had to be put into place to appease the masses; but above all, whether Friedrich Wilhelm IV liked it or not, Prussia needed to shift from the reactionary/traditionalist line to the nationalistic, populist one, if only on paper. Clashes with lesser German rulers and Austria (which was now seen as a lesser evil by said lesser rulers; at least it didn't immediately seek to annex all their lands, though really, neither did Prussia, but it looked quite vicious AND hungry) were unavoidable, and far from all of the old junta approved this. Also, major military reforms took place; a popular mass army was indeed confirmed in place, augmented by a smaller professional force, but also a whole new military doctrine was adapted and the military academies were thoroughly overhauled by War Minister Karl von Clausewitz.

As for Austria, having finally gotten 25 years of peace, it entered an era of reform and reorganization under Franz II. And it certainly needed that. The recent wars were not all that unsuccesful; though Austrian hegemony in Italy was broken and was threatened in Germany, it retained influence in both areas, and finally got to annex Bavaria; while gains, both territorial and diplomatic, were made in the Balkans, especially after the 1840s civil war (long story, but you know how those old family feuds get bloody in the Balkans. Milos Obilic knows too, or knew before he and most of his relatives were brutally slaughtered by Aleksandar Karadjordje, initiating a few years of all-out chaos and powerstruggle between various warlords and noble families in the land) left Serbia decimated and, after some bickering with its weakened Russian allies, Austria managed to first put a Habsburg in power there, and then annex the country altogether by 1850. However, all these new gains needed to be reorganized. And the old territories needed to be somehow organized, because the Habsburg territories were utterly disorganized, a confused, ragtag mix of territories instead of a true empire, with bureaucrats, German colonists, local middle class, reactionary feudals and the dissenting underlings fighting for power, especially in the Crown Lands of St. Stephen. So there was a new for grand reforms to somehow rearrange this empire into an efficient, competitive modern state, AND hopefully without antagonizing too large a percentage of the population. Plus the military needed reorganization, disciplinne and punishment, while the salon liberals needed to whine about decentralization, quadruple monarchy and free Hungary and stuff; sadly, enough of those salon liberals also happened to be important army officers, resulting in the 1827 Hungarian Rising, which thankfully was put down before any foreign powers could exploit it properly. A new diplomatic policy was needed as well; after British reconciliation with Prussia, the Austrians were unsure with whom they should align - with the French, the British, the Russians or possibly just with themselves. Or who knows, maybe even with the Prussians!

Karl VI was up to the task ahead of him, however. Sadly, being more of a soldier than an administrator, he often went along in too straightforward a manner, despite Klemens von Metternich's advice to which he often listened. In any case, towards 1845, by a method of trial-and-error (read: reform-and-rebellion), a new "Danubean Empire" with capital in Budapest (and imperial residence in Vienna) was set up, though Karl I of Danubea didn't abandon his Holy Roman Imperial crown neither. Having grown fed up with the Hungarians, Karl stripped the Crown Lands of St. Stephen of various autonomies and priveleges (to be fair, he did the same with everyone else, but to a lesseer extent), encouraged various poor Bavarians and other Germans to colonize it, and also befriended the various Slavic revival movements to further undermine the Hungarians when they rebelled again. The Danubean Empire was generally an absolute one, with a centralized buerocracy, though a Reichstag was kept in Budapest in any case as an advisory popularily-elected organ. The armies were reorganized, modernized and drilled taking into account the war experience (Karl VI personally and particularily up-close controlled all these military reforms, ofocurse), and weapons were tested out against the various rebels, mostly Hungarians; fortifications were set up as well in various border and rebel-threatened areas. Ideological line was that of "cautiously-reformist enlightened autocracy" and South German/"Danubean" nationalism. Diplomatically, Danubea decided to stick to the Russian alliance for now, but distance itself from Britain as well as from France, feeling, quite reasonably, that both will still approach it and Russia begging for their help later on. Danubea also retained alliances with the Pope, Habsburg-ruled Greece and several lesser German states.

The Russian situation was strange, especially with Pavel I's death in 1826 being accompanied so quickly by the death of his successor Nicholas I (Constantine was given the semi-autonomous Kingdom of Poland slightly before that; Pavel was beginning to regret his reversal of Peter the Great's succession decree) at the hands of a neo-Jacobin assassin. A short period of chaos came, with ex-serf revolts, street violence and court intrigues, but in the end, young, unhealthy mentally-feeble Pavel II came to power, with his aunt the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna succesfully maneuvering her way into real power held by the Regency, with the assistance of, big surprise, a conspiracy amongst the military officers, though these officers weren't radicals, but rather just wanted the chaos to end (and the empire - to expand, as Maria Pavlovna was one of the most vociferous supporters of imperial expansion, especially in Central Asia). Young Pavel II died most inconveniently a few months after the coup, but by then Maria was able to gather enough support to be proclaimed Empress, metaphorically spitting at Pavel I's grave. After getting rid of all opposition, she and the new chancellor knyaz Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich likewise set about to the task of reorganizing their empire.

It was decided to concentrate on Asian ventures now, so the grip on Bulgaria and Poland (as already said, ruled by Constantine I) was loosened, albeit not completely removed; also, Russia formally withdrew from that old Second Coalition, and Malta regained independence for all purposes, becoming a neutral island due to Russian guarantees of independence that remained in place (and because neither Britain nor France would have trusted the other with it). Instead, wars were waged against rebellious Caucasian tribes, and several expeditions throughout the quarter-century broke the resistance of the Central Asian khanates, forcing them to ask for Russian protectorate eventually, while the various tribal lands in Central Asia were simply annexed. Border conflicts with China grew, and in fact they flared out into an open war in 1841, though it ended almost immediately, with the Russian conquest of the smallish Ili region in northwestern Sinkiang. Russian commerce made more headway into China, however, as the officials there grew ever more corrupt, while the Europeans begun to realize that they're easily-bribeable (more much later, actually). Lastly, the onslaught of Russian (and Californian) and British trade expeditions finally forced Japan to begin gradually opening up.

Domestically, the country was also reorganized. There was no reenserfment (contrary to public fear just about Maria came to power), and in fact many of the things Pavel only did on paper Maria made real, most notably breaking the power of the malcontent landowners and elevating the loyal ones. The bureaucracy was reshuffled, ofcourse, and the military was rebuilt from the ruin into which it was turned by Pavel I, and efforts were made to modernize it. But generally, as far as domestic politics went, Maria I followed fairly cautious conservative (though definitely not reactionary) policies. And rooted out all opposition with an iron fist, ofcourse, though much of the serious resistance was crushed by 1830. Bulgaria and Poland pretty much followed suit with some "assistance".

Greece remained on the sidelines, but increasingly it turned into a Danubean puppet, especially after a popular uprising against the king was defeated by Danubean intervention. However, popular dissent is on the decline as of 1850 anyway, due to the partially-perceived, partially-real rise of the Turkish menace.

But before we get to that, Africa, because I want to cover as much of the world as possible in this installment. In West Africa, the French advanced through Sahara from Algiers, and set up a protectorate over Segu operating from Senegal (although the eastern Seguan territories fell to the ascendant Fulani state of Masina); they were also checked by the Ashanti when they tried to expand out of the former Dutch colonies. Spain, having captured Morocco, begun to secure the northwestern parts of West Africa, though, just like Britain, it did not avoid establishing lesser coastal outposts elsewhere in West Africa. Meanwhile, in Central Africa, the Portuguese waged brutal colonial wars, gaining ground on the Congo, in Angola and in Greater Mozambique. In the south, the British fought off a Boer rebellion and crushed the Zulus when they tried to invade; the British struck back later in full force and annexed Zululand altogether. In East Africa, the situation was only getting more confusing, with pro-French and pro-British factions struggling in the corrupt Abyssinian court especially as the country headed into one of its tribal-feudal wars, and Britain, France, Ottoman Empire and Portugal all tried to lure the Omanese, with their Swahili empire, over to their side, the British having a head start but antagonizing the Omanis due to a few incidents during the British assistance against the local rulers in East Africa that opposed Sa'id ibn Sultan's centralization efforts.

The Mamluke Sultanate in Egypt was terribly unstable from the start - with internicine strife amongst the Mamlukes and various local rebellions, the Ottomans were only stopped from recapturing all lost Arabic territories by persistant British threats of intervention in the rest of the 1820s and the early 1830s. In 1833, much to the initial British relief, one last Mamluke civil war saw an energetic, charismatic young Mamluke leader, Rostom Radmazda, ascend to power, slaughter all the other Mamluke leaders, and begin to create a modern, centralized state, all while reforming and modernizing the Egyptian army. He did all that along the French lines, and, as the British soon found out to their dismay, with French help. So the Middle East also had a confusing situation, as the British now raced to reconcile with the Ottomans (but carefully enough as to avoid bluntly provoking Russia), while still not abandoning the hope to get Egypt on their side one way or another, even as the French military advisors and troops poured in en masse to assist Rostom against British-incited rebels.

In the end, the French had to pull all of that out, in exchange for the British pulling out of Iraq where they were helping crush rebellions and modernize the Turkish army. It nearly came to proxy war a few times since then, but Rostom died in 1843 (and just after finally conquering Sennar, too) and his son Mitsar I was promising, but inexperienced, while Sultan Suleyman III still was busy with his own (British-funded) modernization, mostly military-driven as opposed to Rostom's general mix. The 1850s seem very unlikely to be a peaceful time in the Middle East...

Persia, incidentally, had already degenerated back into violence by now, as the more diehard Turkmen leaders fled Russian invasions by conquering Khorasan, the Azeris rose up and after some defeats against them the entire Qajar Empire was up in flames all over again, though the British managed to secure Bandar-e 'Abbas and other vital coastal regions.

The Sikhs of Punjab, meanwhile, continued to ascend in power. With British assistance, they not only defeated domestic Muslim rebels, but also crushed the Afghans at Mardan, and advanced into the Afghan lands themselves. Ranjit Singh, a great conqueror, led his Sikhs to subdue Kalat and Afghanistan, though in the latter, fierce resistance continued. Ranjit Singh's empire nearly fell apart after his death in 1845, and seems to be on the brink of doing so anyway despite his past efforts to create an unitary state in India; the Sikhs simply made themselves too many enemies, and were outnumbered too badly, although in Punjab the conversions picked up greatly later in Ranjit Singh's reign.

The rest of India, to one extent or another, was eventually subdued by Britain, despite fierce resistance and a new wave of rebellions in 1844. Likewise, the British takeover in the former Dutch East Indies wasn't smooth at all; it was terribly violent with ongoing rebellions, especially on Java. But eventually the British secured most of the territory and conquered Bali as well.

Meanwhile, the French in the region concentrated on inciting rebellions against the British and propping up Burma (allowing it to capture several Siamese border territories as well), as France was too far away to exercise a greater influence here at this stage.

Lastly, as Qing China was filled with corruption and rebellions with no hope in sight... Nope, no last-moment reforms to save the day, instead the British figured out they could bribe pretty much any Chinese official and assassinate those that don't go along AND carry on that lucrative opium trade mostly-undeterred. That gave them and some officials lots of money while the country was quickly flying to hell with never-ending peasant revolts finally stopping in favour of a general coordinated uprising of the Taiping millenarians.

As new alliances begun to form and crystalize during the 1840s, some predicted that war will come soon, and indeed, there was suspicion, wariness and anxiety in the hearts of peoples of all nations. But unlike that of the Second Coalition, this new geopolitical system was not naturally predisposed to warfare. Instead, all sides involved continued to build up throughout the 1840s, defeat domestic rebellions and, while eyeing each other with suspicion, dared not attack. The NAF consolidated its gains, strenghthened its navy and eyed all of its neighbours, as Russia, Britain and France alike feared the other getting the valued Federal allegience and thus desperately intrigued and bribed; Britain and France expanded in the colonies and backed rebellions against each other and each other's allies. Prussia and Austria remained uncertain, both maintaining some ties with France, Britain and each other; clearly Central Europe wasn't a place for clearcut alliances, as both these and lesser players from (Danish) Spitzbergen to (Russian) Malta waited out cautiously and likewise prevented themselves from making any final decision, knowing that a mistake in these volatile times may well mean the end of their independence (or, in the case of the greater powers, hegemony). Russia abstained from making a final decision. Turkey, Egypt, Persia, China and Japan remained backwards, rebellion-struck and weak, but also retained a great potential given the right leadership - a fact realized and dreaded by all sides involved. So for now, the situation remained more uncertain than ever, and the next few decades would decide whether sword or quill or both or something else shall end this present status quo, and what will come after it.

OOC: TECHNICALLY, I think this is as good an end point as any. Key words in last paragraph are "volatile times"; such times are best for NESes, as they allow the most freedom of movement, and the best variety of possible outcomes. On the other hand, I still do entertain plans of advancing this further... Don't know. If anybody wants to make a NES based on this, let me know (incidentally, that doesn't necessary prevent me from moving this timeline further; nobody ever said that there cannot be divergences within already-divergent timelines). Any opinions, criticism and so forth are welcome as well; I realize that parts of it seem rushed, probably because they WERE rushed. Map will come later.
 
Read Dachspmg's new timeline.

Venice would now have a source of timber for ships and ports for collecting duties, and Basil would have the protection of the coast from a nation that could actually maintain it, with fewer interests to get in the way anyway.

One little problem is that Dalmatia was controlled largely by Croatian tribes; though I doubt the Byzantines or the Venetians recognized that fact. ;)

Constant low-level internecine warfare would continue among these states for the next few decades.

If one ruler is in control of such a powerbase as Turkmenistan, one decade is the maximum I would give to a Balkanized Persia. It is ridicilously easy to conquer, especially from Central Asia and if the other states are weak, divided and busy fighting each other.

they all failed

Again, rather unlikely; its a pretty natural monoimperial region, and whoever controls Egypt should have no problems retaking it all in a few campaigns. ;)

Hungary was initially hostile to the Byzantines

They do have dynastic ties in this world. ;) The Byzantines actually had a decent chance of capturing Hungary - or at least puppeting it, as they did do in OTL - during this period.

landed a victory at Zurich in 1044

Why would the Burgundians and the Imperials clash in the middle of the Alpes? There are far better battle spots that are more readily-accessible... Plus I think you're overestimating the fighting skills of the Normans way too much.

One large problem is the Normans in Iberia. North Iberia is (COMPARATIVELY!) dirt-poor, but very well-guarded. South Iberia is in the middle of a confused multipolar civil war but is very, very rich and generally far easier to attack, especially for the seafaring, Mediterranean-invading Normans. Why settle in some Navarre when you can easily create a Norman kingdom in southern Spain? Conquering the north would have been much more difficult, really, and much less rewarding in the short-term. Different in the long-term, but the Normans aren't known for long-term thinking. ;)

All-in-all, however, nice timeline Dachs, though I agree with NK about the Byzantines being way too lucky. ;)
 
das said:
One little problem is that Dalmatia was controlled largely by Croatian tribes; though I doubt the Byzantines or the Venetians recognized that fact. ;)
No, but those were the Doge's original reasons for getting Dalmatia in the first place.

das said:
If one ruler is in control of such a powerbase as Turkmenistan, one decade is the maximum I would give to a Balkanized Persia. It is ridicilously easy to conquer, especially from Central Asia and if the other states are weak, divided and busy fighting each other.
Maybe this was a bad stopping point: things won't stay this way for long.

das said:
They do have dynastic ties in this world. ;) The Byzantines actually had a decent chance of capturing Hungary - or at least puppeting it, as they did do in OTL - during this period.
I figured they'd be too busy being lucky elsewhere. ;)

das said:
Why would the Burgundians and the Imperials clash in the middle of the Alpes? There are far better battle spots that are more readily-accessible... Plus I think you're overestimating the fighting skills of the Normans way too much.

One large problem is the Normans in Iberia. North Iberia is (COMPARATIVELY!) dirt-poor, but very well-guarded. South Iberia is in the middle of a confused multipolar civil war but is very, very rich and generally far easier to attack, especially for the seafaring, Mediterranean-invading Normans. Why settle in some Navarre when you can easily create a Norman kingdom in southern Spain? Conquering the north would have been much more difficult, really, and much less rewarding in the short-term. Different in the long-term, but the Normans aren't known for long-term thinking. ;)
Well, not the middle, technically, but yeah, that does seem relatively unlikely. Maybe a penguin, who found out about the polar bear bases in Switzerland (where they and the Knights Templar would later establish the Swiss banking system), influenced Henry's mind and made him go over there to spook the polar bears. :p

About the Normans; maybe, but at this point they had good leadership as well. In OTL Drogo and William were great fighters in Italy, and the Guiscard (who is going to cause trouble in this timeline too) merits listing among top generals in history. Northern Spain just seemed closer than the south, and although I toyed with the idea of them going into the taifas, their ability to get men and material there is relatively limited. Besides, the Normans can't do everything right...;)
 
when do you guys have time to write all of that stuff? When i try i cant help myself spending most of the time researching rather than writting :lol:

good stuff
 
their ability to get men and material there is relatively limited

Its even more limited further north. The south has more and better harbours. And lots of stuff to loot. And harems. And so forth.

In the long-term, I suppose, the north MIGHT be better. But in the short-term there is no way you could get a Norman there.

And here's the map for 1850, though Oceania is oversimplified.
 

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Cool jazz Das

And Symph, when you said steam pike, i was invisioning a pike that stabbed rapidly and automatically like a whirring piston.....
 
Well, what's wrong with that? In my turn, I imagine that to be like a harpoon-gun, except its really a pike-gun. Scary.
 
I'm shocked, the Qing Chinese borders are actually different this time! :eek:
 
*laughs maniacally as his EVIL Chinese border-changing plans go into place* :evil: :lol:

Um, right. Well, at least I know now that people have been studying the map in-depth. Still no real proof that anybody read the althist, however...
 
Federalist USA winning an early Civil War! Woot. That's like two dreams for the price of one. I'd gladly kill anyone and/or everyone for that. I'll continue reading the rest shortly.
 
I've read up to the bit about the Dutch, and am now finishing it. Good read.
 
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