The 1825 Treaty of London ushered in an era of mixed feelings, dubiousness and uncertainty, an era of chaos between the great wars. A general crisis of confidence set in - in economy, where commerce was cautiously recovering after Surcouf's privateering caused a panic in Britain and America in war-time; in culture, where a clash between old, established ideas and the increasingly popular "Jacobinery", new, radical, literally revolutionary ideals; in technology (especially naval), where a frantic naval race commenced; in diplomacy, where alliances fell and rose; but most noticeably, in domestic politics. Exhausted and discredited by the War of the Second Coalition, several existing governments - or, rather, establishments and factions - fell from power, not immediately ofcourse, but within the first few years, after failed attempts to capitalize on victories and recover from defeats. Revolts broke out where mere conspiracies were not enough; in some cases, even civil wars happened. The post-London world was undergoing a time of much uncertainty, without one big war, but with a very tension-filled, diplomatically-chaotic peace, and a series of lesser conflicts.
It is, however, pretty hard to make any correct generalizations beyond that - various regions and countries had their own specifics in this period. So let us go, continent-by-continent, state-by-state...
Let us start with British Canada, where a Quebecois revolt flashed up in 1833, and generally Quebecois - and Irish, as Irish immigrants begun to move in - rebelliousness grew. Many spoke at that time of an emerging Canadian national identity, though most Anglo-Canadians were either loyal, either leaning towards USA. The "nationalists" thus were largely French and Irish (and leaned, obviously, towards France). Heavy British military presence in Canada during and after the American Civil War made things little better.
In the United States of America, the situation was for many years uncertain. Both parties of the political establishment - the leading Federalists and the almost-perpetually oppositionary Democratic-Republicans - were suffering from a crisis of confidence. In the aftermath of the war, on one hand, greater national identity emerged, damaging the decentralizing, anti-nationalist Dem-Reps. On the other hand, "the Betrayal of London", which limited American gains to but Texas, Cuba and Dominica, and prevented the achievement of the main war aim (creation of a friendly Mexican Republic; instead, Mexico was mostly taken by the French, with the exceptions of Russian California). Also, in general Britain seemed weaker than before after Lizard Point. Weaker, as in incapable of properly defending American commerce - a vital condition of the Anglo-American alliance. This put everyone in a bit of a quandry, as the most commercial part of America was New England - incidentally the traditional stronghold of the Federalists. Though very Anglophilic in the past, the New Englanders always had some disagreements with Britain as well; only, as long as the commerce prospered under British protection, they were willing to let the boundary and fishing diputes rest, and let the British hang counterfeiters and filibusters at will. Now they begun raising all sorts of issues yet again, and the Democratic-Republicans seemed poised to hijack New England, especially as there was some support for a confederacy there as well.
However, after the downfall of Webster and the near defeat of the Federalists in the 1824 elections, the old Federalist elite was badly shaken, while new, even more radical cadres came to power. While in 1824-1828 the country was in a deadlock due to the Democratic-Republican predmoninance in the Senate, in 1829 the decisive elections came. The Democratic-Republicans, under John C. Calhoun, seeked to take over the Presidency AND maintain their hold on the Senate, using this power to backroll all of Hamilton's reforms, while the Federalists, under Charles Alcott (OOC: probably the first person here that didn't exist/wasn't prominent in OTL), seeked to retake power and bring the Federalist policies to a logical conclusion. The elections thus were very heated indeed. Cheating, intrigues, street violence spread. The (Alcottist) Federal Army and the (Calhounist) state militias themselves clashed - mostly figuratively, but sometimes literally - over who will get to put the riots down. And at that, the Federal Army often joined the Federalist rioters, whilst the state militias very often fought alongside the Democratic-Republican supporters, although, being less centralized (their party's programme becoming its doom), in the die-hard Federalist states such as Pennsylvania the militias just as often supported the Federalists. In other words, the country was quietly and steadily receding into civil war, as the elections dragged on and on, the side that thought itself to be losing at the moment using all methods possible to delay its completion. When the results where announced and Alcott won by a slight margin, these results were largely ignored; Calhoun easily declared the elections to be rigged and departed for Atlanta, where the provisional Democratic-Republican government of the United States of America was already in place. The Federalist government remained in Washington, despite some requests that it move from there.
This was on the 3rd of January 1829 - the official date of the American Civil War's beginning, as several states recognized the Federalist governments - and several, the Democratic-Republican one. The situation on the outset was awfully confusing, as the Federalists, more keen on domestic issues this time, have shifted diplomatically towards France, prompting the Democratic-Republicans to align with Britain by the good old American political dualism worked out by then (as each of the contending parties felt obliged to oppose whatever the other party supported). This and various other clashes - on new states, on border legislations, on tariffs, on banking, on the military, on slavery and the expansion thereof - was what made this election particularily heated. But the former decision was of much importance, as the Federalists managed to regain some support in New England, which in the end amounted for Massachussets - a single state, but a crucial one. The rest of New England fell to the Dem-Reps in the end. The "Middle Atlantic" region, with Pennsylvania and New York, remained firmly Federalist. The newer states of Midwest were very divided, with Ohio, Illinois and the newly-introduced Michigan siding with the Federalists as a result of a lenghty campaign of propaganda (and - as the Midwest was very late to take up the side of one government or another - a bungled Dem-Rep attempt to befriend the Amerinds as to open a third front against the Federalists), but with the rest, most notably Kentucky, siding with the Dem-Reps. The western and Carribean territories, despite uprising by local populace, were firmly in the hands of the Federal army. Early into the war, another incident worsened the Dem-Rep position; although they held pretty much all of the south, in the bitterly-contested Virginia the situation remained indecisive. Finally, Calhoun ordered loyal forces (Federal army defectors and militias from nearby states) to support the Dem-Rep retainers. This intervention caused the Virginian government to finally side with the Federalists, interpreting this as an "unprovoked invasion" and inviting Federal troops to assist it - and the Federalist loyalists. Despite some population support, the Dem-Reps were forced out of most of Virginia before the summer. Thus with New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Virginia in their hands the Federalists had created a pretty solid base for operations against the Dem-Reps.
Technically this and the Dem-Rep problems of coordination had already predetermined the outcome of the war. The Dem-Reps were put before the choice of abandoning their policies (and losing many supporters) or conceding several key advantages to their enemies. Even had they tried to form a coordinated strategy they would have faced problems due to being geographically divided, by contrast with the closely-packed Federalists. Nonetheless, the Dem-Reps won several early victories; though their rebellions in Cuba and the West collapsed quickly, they were able to launch a succesful coup d'etat in Michigan, defeat an invasion of Kentucky and overrun Massachusetts. In the latter, they received some decisive assistance from Britain. The British were already disturbed by the rise of American power and of the anti-British sentiments. As the Federalists grew more radical and militant, and (though this was mostly a result of the war's beginning) switched their focus from commerce to industry, their policies became indirectly less favourable to the British. When Alcott publically denounced the previous pro-British foreign policy, the British had had it, and begun assisting Calhoun in secret. Thus British troops dressed as Federal defectors fought on the Dem-Rep side in New England. Later British involvement in the war would increase...
But later about that. The military defeats of 1829 had forced Alcott to force through radical measures; he temporarily suspended the constitution and was granted dictatorial powers to save and reorganize what was already reffered to as "the Federation". With those powers he made a call for volunteers, organized several divisions, and took a very active part in war planning. The American army was modernized and reorganized (with some clandestine French help, ironically enough dispatched under Prime Minister Lafayette); throughout the rest of the year it regroupped and generally sat on the defensive. In 1830, General Samuel Beardsley headed a second invasion of Kentucky; this time, it was a complete success, with the rout and death of one of the most promising Dem-Rep commanders, Zachary Taylor at Lexington. The offensive continued to occupy Tennessee despite guerrila resistance, and advance along the Mississippi. Dem-Rep attempt to check the Federalist advance failed badly in the battle at Vicksburg, as the Federalist army was more modern and had far superior leadership and organization. A pro-Federalist French revolt in Louisiana and another invasion of Missouri caused the Dem-Rep surrender in the western South, especially as Federalist forces from Texas begun making threatening moves. In New England things were harder; in fact, the Dem-Reps and the British at first captured Albany. But they were defeated at Oneonta and a re-invasion of New England begun. Yet the Federalist fortunes there weren't quite restored; the invasion of Vermont bogged down completely, although Connecticut surrendered and an advance into Massachusetts commenced. It wasn't very succesful, with a defeat at Amherst, but for a minor incident in which several British men were captured and confessed their identity. Alcott immediately made an international scandal out of it, and French threats of war in combination with domestic outcry of British radicals (who have once more returned to prominence under new, vociferous leaders such as William Lovett) forced a reluctant British withdrawal and recognition of Alcott's government; the British government just wasn't quite ready for war, especially if there was to be an American front to it.
So in 1831 things went well. Several western southern states surrendered after receiving guarantees that though the expansion of slavery will bel imited, no radical measures such as an immediate abolition would be taken. The west itself was partially reconquered. In New England, the Federalist rebellions allowed Edwin Vose Sumner to attack Massachusetts once more, this time - succesfully, eventually linking up with rebels at Boston and forcing the surrender of a large Dem-Rep force at New Bedford. Despite continued resistance in Vermont, the Dem-Reps collapsed here as well. With a steady stream of French and Irish volunteers, the Federalists were able to, in 1832, overrun both Carolinas. Calhoun commited suicide, and though guerrila resistance in Vermont and the south continued for quite a while, the American Civil War was over.
Five years later, in 1837, Alcott resigned, both as dictator and as president, just in time for the scheduled elections. By then resistance was crushed; great progress was achieved with the construction of new railroads and industries; the state militias were practically disbanded, and instead, a powerful Federal Army and Federal Navy were created. The presidential term was extended to eight years, and though the dictatorial rights were only temporary the post gained much in power. The United States of America were no more, as a North American Federation was created in its stead, not QUITE an unitary republic Hamilton had wanted it to be but still bound close together. Having emerged all the stronger (but for some internal disagreements) out of the civil war, the NAF was now about ready to start a new phase of expansion, with the main question being that of direction, though the most likely and popular version was an invasion of Canada in alliance with France.
There are, ofcourse, other options. Such as a war with Russia and California, the latter being a "principality" independent in all but in name, ruled by knyaz Mikhail/Miguel Nikolaevich Rezanov, son of Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, the Russian diplomat who had since early 19th century worked to strenghthen Russian influence in California, ultimately allowing its annexation. As Russia was unable to exercise any real power there, especially with its domestic troubles, the Rezanovs - who, along with the other Russian officials and noblemen sent there, quickly intermarried with the existant local Spanish elite - were granted both Californias as a principality by the Empress Maria. Innovative, open-minded, but competent and strong-willed, Mikhail continued his father's work, encouraging immigration, growing rich from the newly-found gold and building up a proper state with a new buerocracy and prospering commerce. California also expanded by buying off more Russian American lands (leaving Russia with Alaska and the Aleut Islands under direct control) and marching into the frontier, where it begun to clash with both the British and the Americans. Lastly the Californians gained much commercial and political influence at the court of Kamehameha III of Hawaii, who had with their help built up a modern unitary state in Hawaii and begun eyeing nearby unclaimed primitive islands...
Despite some occasional insurgencies (the most notable one being the 1834 rising headed by Santa Anna, previously a loyal collaborator), French Mexico - with Bernadotte as its military and later civilian governor - stabilized and even prospered, alongside France in these golden days of the "Orleans Monarchy", as French trade and investment flooded the country. The region around Veracruz underwent the most intensive development, and as lots of opportunities emerged in Mexico hordes of French (and minority) colonists overwhelmed the region, the city itself getting a narrowly French ethnic majority.
During all this time, Francisco de Miranda - and after his death in 1829, his successors Bernardo O'Higgins and Simon Bolivar - struggled to keep the vast Colombian Republic together. Under O'Higgins very radical reforms were implemented (nobility was abolished, lands were split up) and the country nearly fell apart as a civil war commenced, but the government barely held on to power, recruiting a large popular army and carrying out a campaign of merciless reprisals. When O'Higgins died of an illness (many suspect poisoning by General Bolivar, who had a long-term personal feud with O'Higgins), Simon Bolivar took power and adapted a new, pragmatic policy. Though many had considered it more of an egoistic, narcisstic coup at first... In other words, he proclaimed himself Emperor of Colombia, reinstitued nobility (but DIDN'T restore it to the old aristocrats, many of whom fled or were killed by now; instead, he created a new, meritocratic one and ennobled his loyal followers), and divided Paraguay with Portugal (until now, Paraguay continued resistance succesfully with secret French backing and had itself secretly assisted a variety of separatist and later radical conspiracies against Colombia). Befriending the foreign powers and drawing on the support of the military and the urban middle class, Bolivar defeated a major uprising of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian "ranceros", but at the same time cracked down hard on the Logia Lautara, which by now became something like a Colombian Jacobin Club and thus disapproved of Bolivar's moderation. In any case, he managed to hold on to power, but the Colombian Empire remained rather shaky as separatism begun to pick up again and a Platine rebellion was put down with much bloodshed. Corruption also begun to grow, and the various foreign powers - France, NAF, Britain, Portugal and even Spain/Two Sicilies - begun to search for and acquire allies amongst the various court factions to preach their cause and at the same time get into a better position to benefit from Colombia's seemingly-inevitable collapse...
All was mostly quiet in the various British colonies despite the gradual abolition of slavery since the century's beginning. Brazil, despite some separatism fueled by dislike of Portugal's increasingly liberal policies, generally prospered as well and the great wave of Portuguese patriotism was probably felt there better than anywhere else.
As already mentioned, in Britain social tensions rose again, culminating in the radical riots in 1830 and 1834, the latter being put down with much bloodshed. Some even predicted a civil war, but the radical support base, how ever wide, was lacking in the simple daring (and desperation) required for a revolution. So a few isolated insurrections were put down during 1834 and early 1835, and that was all. An Irish rebellion was more fierce and at first succesful, but the rebels, as usual, were defeated; this, in combination with droughts and starvation, forced many Irishmen to move to Canada or the Federation, impairing the British positions and influence there. Aside from this, it was a time of modernizing the fleet, industrializing the homeland, strenghthening British presence in the Orient (economic infiltration of Egypt and China, consolidation of India) and, especially after the ACW, looking for new allies.
France ofcourse also needed to continue its naval buildup (it thankfully still was ahead in the naval technology race, but only barely), likewise expanded its various African colonies (growing particularily strong in West Africa, after purchasing the remaining Dutch colonies there despite last-moment British attempts to hijack the deal; and also crushing the Merinas with an iron fist in 1834-1838), and, ofcourse, similarily played the diplomatic game. The French courted the North American Federation with some success and partially (very partially) reconciled with Austria and Russia, though Austria ofcourse remained pretty hostile even then. The grand Anglo-French diplomatic game I will describe later, country-by-country; as for French domestic affairs, I will give but a brief summary of the developments there; fortunately it wasn't quite as confusing as previously.
After Talleyrand's retirement in 1827, Augereau became Prime Minister. His was a turbulent tenure, as he constantly squabbled with both the king and the Parlement, and allegedly intended to overthrow both, even as he shook up international affairs by threatening pretty much all of France's neighbours with war on several occasions. Fortunately, he died in 1830 of old age and numerous wounds, and before that he was succesfully, though barely, held up by his enemies in the Parlement and his cautious friends in the officer corps; many suspect that had he lived just a little longer, he indeed would have taken full power and started a new war over the Spanish issue (see below). His successor Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, marquis de la Fayette, was also short-lived, but unlike his firebrand, overactive predecessor this old man was a figurehead, though a very popular one; some have called him the spirit of Orleanism personified. King Louis-Philippe, always cautious and wary to antagonize the Parlement, not to mention a liberal himself, didn't use this opportunity to expand his influence, though he did greatly encourage the liberal reforms of this period of peace and prosperity, the golden age of the Orleans monarchy. French commerce prospered world-wide, and the monarchy's alliance with the bourgoise seemed unbreakable and omnipotent. After Lafayette's death in 1834, several nonentities held the increasingly-powerless office of Prime Minister, but, as already mentioned, the king and the Parlement fortunately remained in harmony. Alas, this idylly begun to fall apart in the 1840s, caused tragically by its two of its several most-praised aspects - the great industrialization (that caused the rise of a large, discontent proletarian mass) and the intellectual flourishing (that resulted in the rise of Falangism (OOC: yes, I like inventing alternate names for communism

), inspired by the works of Babeuf and Fourier, an ideology that naturally gained a large following amongst the workers). Charles Cesaire launched in 1841 a Falangist "revolution populaire" in Paris itself; though it, and some other risings later that year and in 1842, were put down rather easily, it was not without bloodshed, and provided a rude awakening to France's ruling elite. This bound the sovereign, the Parlement and the bourgoise even closer together; all of the establishment, whether liberal or conservative, felt threatened by this new, untamed, unexpected third force, having let their watch down after the decline of neo-Jacobinism. New riots and later Falangist and separatist uprisings have further increased the ageing king's paranoia, also fueled by his various advisors, and caused him to reform the police system and crack down on the Falangists, as well as on other radicals (all these actions being supported wholeheartedly by most of the Parlement). Crisis was averted, but a bad aftertaste remained. Also, the army's surprisingly poor performance against rebels and Berbers during the 1840s prompted a general military reform, and a new rise of militarism in France. As relations with Britain dropped to a new low, the king died suddenly in 1850, despite being quite healthy, if old (so naturally the most vociferous Anglophobes quickly and effectively pointed to the Perfidious Albion and its never-ending plotting against France). His son, Ferdinand-Philippe I, was of a more militaristic mind, having played a large role in the army reform (to such an extent in fact that some have called him, rather than the obscure War Minister, "la Pere d'Armee")...
Spain, France's ever-more-junior ally, was going through very very very bad times ever since this century begun (and bad times with only two "verys" for a few centuries now in any case). The War of the Second Coalition was the worst of it all; Spain was stripped of its entire colonial empire (save for the Canaries) in a few years after three centuries of being one of the foremost colonial powers, and Fernando VII's opportunistic colonial landgrabs in West Africa were only succesful in a few isolated situations, and even there were not at all cost-efficient. Fernando only held on to power through the support of the military; and even that was slipping, so he had to request several French military interventions, to the point when in 1829 the entire country was briefly occupied by the French to defeat all rebels. Such a situation however couldn't continue for long; the king's death in 1831 only sped up the collapse, when Spain was simultaneously seized by a succession crisis and a radical neo-Jacobin revolution, resulting in a five-sided war as the Carlists, the Isabellists, the Republicans and the confused French and Portuguese intervents fought each other, even as the peasants added into the fun in 1832 by starting a millenialist rebellion. After the extremelly young (two years old) Queen Isabella II was captured and executed by revolutionaries, however, they had succesfully united everyone around them for a while. This coalition didn't last long, especially as the British begun meddling as well to defend their interests and occupied Seville with Portuguese assistance, while the French, after some pondering, refused to recognize Carlos as the ruler of Spain, rightfully deciding that they needed someone more liberal - in line with the Orleanist ideology and not as widely-hated by his subjects. At first, the plan was to send Louis-Philippe's second son, Louis Charles Philippe Raphael, to be king of Spain; but just before this decision could be announced, yet another pretender announced himself - King Ferdinando V of Naples, who cleverly played on the continued French attempts to bring him into their alliance. Secretly contacting Louis-Philippe, he promised to join that alliance if the crowns of Naples and Spain were to be merged. After some hard bargaining and power-gaming, the French, despite having some doubts about this arrangement, agreed. The moderate and liberal ("Orleanist") Spanish monarchists accepted Ferdinando's candidature as well after the French leaned on them properly and after the Neapolitan himself pledged to support liberal ideas, reform Spain in French manner and allow it to retain some autonomy. By this moment the republicans were mostly crushed, and by the time new King Fernando VIII arrived for his coronation in Madrid, the French forces already won the crucial battle at Vitoria, routing the Carlists. All that remained now was the hardest bit - negotiating with Britain and Portugal.
Well, in the end, the negotiations were succesful, though it very nearly came to war. Portugal was given back Olivienza (annexed by Spain in compensation after the War of Second Coalition) and allowed to annex Galicia, and the new king had to officially renounce all Spanish claims on Latin America and other lost colonies. Seville was all but opened up to British (and French, but this was ofcourse a nominal gesture recognizing the de facto state of affairs for years now) trade with only the slightest tariffs. But Fernando VIII was officially recognized, and immediately set about on a vigorous liberal reform campaign. He conducted it quite well, drawing on the French example as he had promised, and thus managed to avoid getting too much criticism for tricking his new subjects when he promised them autonomy. Instead of becoming a dual monarchy, a monarchic federation of sorts, Fernando's realm was centralized around Madrid as the Kingdom of Spain, something that the Spanish easily forgave him. The Neapolitans were more outraged, but they no longer mattered all that much, having become but a Spanish province in all but in name.
Anyway, after consolidating his gains with French assistance, Fernando VIII succesfully reinvigorated Spain at last. Realizing that every cloud had a silver lining, he saw one in the past defeats. Spain was no longer bound by a vast empire; and with his reforms, it was capable of building a new one, only a one that will be ran much more efficiently, and won't be as overstretched. Much like Talleyrand before him, he decided to use the loss of the Atlantic, American empire to build up a Mediterranean, African one. Most notably, this involved a French-backed conquest of Morocco in 1842, but also, Fernando VII's African gains were expanded upon.