How does this work? Who is state-owned companies and the government if not taxpayers?bloated and inefficient state-owned companies, the government and politically connected larger firms will bear the brunt of economic adjustment via reforms such as the privatizations that Mr. Milei promises
I don't know. Both Greece and Argentina's economic situation are unknown to me. I was hoping some smart person would clue me in on how to understand what I posted.How does this work? Who is state-owned companies and the government if not taxpayers?
I am most certainly not "smart" when it comes to economics, but I would read that as the author is economically on the side of Milei and goldbugs and others who think that governments not having the power to control the money supply is an inherently good thing and will have these magic effects, without any actual evidence that that is a likely outcome.I don't know. Both Greece and Argentina's economic situation are unknown to me. I was hoping some smart person would clue me in on how to understand what I posted.![]()
He wrote "The Theft of a Decade: How the Baby Boomers Stole the Millennials' Economic Future" which blames it all on low interest rates. I suspect I was right.Source; WSJ opinion piece from today
POLITICAL ECONOMICS
By Joseph C. Sternberg
Other than the employees of the company, taxpayers don't automatically benefit if a company is state owned.How does this work? Who is state-owned companies and the government if not taxpayers?
They do not automatically benefit from success, but they pretty much always lose with failure, whether that is keeping it going with taxpayers money or that service not being there.Other than the employees of the company, taxpayers don't automatically benefit if a company is state owned.
That's true.They do not automatically benefit from success, but they pretty much always lose with failure, whether that is keeping it going with taxpayers money or that service not being there.
Probably not, but I see no obvious reason to link that to dollarisation, unless it is just that they will not have any taxes to spend on anything so they will not be able to support this. It does not seem that this going under is going to do much to protect "savers, small entrepreneurs and poor households", which was the claim.That's true.
The specific example is a state airline. If privatisation fails service is reduced or removed.
In that example though is that automatically a bad thing?
Probably not, but I see no obvious reason to link that to dollarisation, unless it is just that they will not have any taxes to spend on anything so they will not be able to support this. It does not seem that this going under is going to do much to protect "savers, small entrepreneurs and poor households", which was the claim.
Small entrepreneurs are the group who most obviously need cheap money, as in relatively easy to get and low interest rate loans to get their business going.It will hurt those who are getting money too cheaply (like the state or maybe large banks, very likely not "savers, small entrepreneurs and poor households ) and will benefit those who carry the burden of inflation right now (which savers, small entrepreneurs and poor households are a part of).
Small entrepreneurs are the group who most obviously need cheap money, as in relatively easy to get and low interest rate loans to get their business going.
This all sounds like a kind of good thing, but it is interesting that it seems all the political change is being carried out by judges. Is this how it is supposed to work? How come there is this big change and no mention of any politician doing anything except appointing judges?Delaware Is Trying Hard to Drive Away Corporations
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CROSS COUNTRY By William P. Barr and Jonathan Berry
Delaware wasn’t always the go-to state for corporate law. And if it escalates its flirtation with environmental, social and governance investment principles, the First State might end up losing its privileged status, just like its neighbor once did. New Jersey became “the mother of trusts” in the late 19th century by pioneering incorporation laws that gave companies unprecedented freedom. But the Garden State lost that title in 1913 when Gov. Woodrow Wilson set out to correct perceived abuses by making executives liable for corporate “irresponsibility.” Companies responded by fleeing the state. Wilson’s successor repealed his changes, but the damage was done. As Ralph Nader and co-authors later put it: “Any state that could elect Wood-row Wilson as Governor could never be fully trusted by big business again.”
History stands to repeat itself in Delaware. New Jersey fell prey to Wilson’s trust-busting progressivism. Today, Delaware is falling in line with other blue states in embracing ESG, which rejects shareholder value as corporate law’s lodestar. Meanwhile, red states are developing potentially attractive alternatives. The federal government and many blue states are using ESG to inject the progressive political agenda on climate, race, and other issues into corporate governance. Joe Biden’s native Delaware, where state government is controlled by Democrats, isn’t immune to this trend. Indeed, the outsize importance of Delaware’s corporate law makes it a valuable asset for enterprising officeholders. Look no further than the example of former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Tamika Montgomery-Reeves, who in 2021 declared that state law allows directors “to consider interests of broader constituents,” such as “stakeholders other than stockholders.” President Biden named her to the federal appellate bench in 2022.
Newly assertive progressive politics threatens to upset the time-honored legal formula that helped Delaware maintain its corporate-law monopoly for a generation. Delaware earned its reputation by scrupulously deferring to companies’ good-faith pursuit of shareholder value, freeing up executives to focus on business.
That era may soon be over. Not only Delaware’s politicians, but even its corporate-law elder statesmen today advocate that the state should adopt a more assertive and explicitly pro-ESG corporate law. The watchword is Delaware’s Care-mark doctrine, which makes executives liable for failures in risk management. Once reserved for outright corporate crime, this notable exception to Delaware’s signature deference to executives has demonstrated expansive potential. Two former Delaware Supreme Court justices have stated that, under the doctrine, ESG issues should become more than optional social-responsibility topics. They should be “risks” that boards are required to oversee. The influential former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has coauthored several papers—including one titled “Caremark and ESG: Perfect Together”—addressing how the doctrine invites companies to undertake ESG initiatives.
Recent trends at Delaware’s highly specialized business court, the Court of Chancery, follow this change in the political wind. Claims under Caremark— which a leading chancellor once called “the most difficult theory in corporation law” for plaintiffs to win on—are increasingly succeeding, and thus have proliferated on the court’s docket. Companies have noted the shift’s legal import, but less so its political implications. It is no coincidence that the board-level Caremark “risks” that both the plaintiffs’ bar and companies’ legal advisers stress correspond to du jour ESG issues like climate change, DEI, and #MeToo—or even the 2020 presidential election. Activists wield Caremark to pressure companies on ESG initiatives. But it won’t stop there. As the logic of ESG-inspired “risk management” takes hold, expect Delaware law to elevate issue activism steadily over old-fashioned shareholder value throughout corporate law. Witness the recent case rejecting a Disney shareholder’s request for corporate records after the company’s stock plummeted following its opposition to Florida’s Parental Rights in Education Act. The Court of Chancery held that the shareholder’s motivation was improperly “political,” but Disney management’s campaign to improve its image with progressives at the expense of alienating its customers was “an ordinary business decision.”
A flirtation with ESG is jeopardizing its status as a preferred destination for corporate headquarters.
While batting away a shareholder lawsuit might score temporary points with executives, wise leaders will look closer. The Disney case is significant because it foreshadows the completed evolution of Delaware corporate law. Companies not in step with ESG will have litigation risk under Caremark; companies that go overboard will be free from accountability. Politicizing corporate law will be far more costly in the end. The clear signal is that Delaware’s commitments to both board-level deference and shareholder value will bend to accommodate ESG. That is bad news for management and shareholders alike. Delaware’s weakness presents an opportunity for red states that oppose ESG. This year Texas elected to set up its own designated business court. Georgia, Utah and Wyoming recently did the same. Ambitious legislators and attorneys in these states and others can capitalize by developing an efficient alternative that upholds shareholder value.
Like corporations, corporate law itself competes in a market. Some companies have learned the hard way that embracing ESG can boost their competitors. Delaware may soon learn that lesson too.
Mr. Barr served as the U.S. attorney general, 1991-93 and 2019-20, and is managing partner of Torridon Law PLLC. Mr. Berry served as head of policy at the U.S. Department of Labor, 2018-20, and is managing partner of the law firm Boyden Gray PLLC.
WSJ
I have very strong feelings about this entire garbage editorial in general but as way of not just coming in guns blazing on this post, I will say two things... Law is political always, its fudging dumb (two lawyers wrote this mind you) to even write this sentence. Second, Bill Barr and Jon Berry are former Trump officials. They would spit on their grandmothers if they thought it would get them another dollar.Politicizing corporate law will be far more costly in the end.
Mr. Barr served as the U.S. attorney general, 1991-93 and 2019-20, and is managing partner of Torridon Law PLLC. Mr. Berry served as head of policy at the U.S. Department of Labor, 2018-20, and is managing partner of the law firm Boyden Gray PLLC.
WSJ