Enlightened Absolutism: Is it possible?

[Terxpahseyton]

Could you elaborate? As I said, tossing out everything beyond the peculiarly Benthamite conception of the good life is a pretty drastic move, and not one that I think we can take too lightly.

Ramble on about my philosophical stance?
I would be delighted
In an effort to do so, I in the following will not work on quotes one by one, but will rather use two quotes as the launch pad for the whole of my argument. So my reply to Winston Hughes goes to you Traitorfish as well.

I don't think it's at all obvious that all human actions can be attributed to the pursuit of pleasure. That's a claim of psychological egoism, a very specific account of human psychology which is by no means universally accepted among philosophers, psychologists or social scientists.

It is a fundamental fact of psychology that emotions serve as the ultimate source of all motivation. Or does any respected theory of psychology actually debate that? I am pretty sure: no. It would also not make sense. The word "motivation" already implies so. To be motivated is a feeling. And now note how I personally defined pleasure: The satisfaction of emotional urges. Or emotional needs. Or however you want to call it. Doesn't matter for my point. This certainly does result in a "nebulous" nature to an extend, and is removed from a everyday use of the word pleasure. Can't argue that. But if I am to argue for a complete rational for morality which lacks arbitrary premises like "X is good, period.", I need to include the whole source of human motivation.

There's the kernel of valid point here, but you're stretching the definition of 'pleasure' to the point where it can produce any number of absurdities. 'Happiness' comes closer to what you mean, but it still seems inadequate for describing emotions which are unpleasant, but morally appropriate.

"Morally appropriate"? Morally appropriate grieving? Who grieves cause it is morally appropriate? Is it morally appropriate to demand someone to grieve if grieve is not felt? I there see an example of how stipulating morality independent of pleasure makes no coherent sense. You can certainly act like you are grieving for moral reasons. Or to refer back to my concept of pleasure, because you feel socially pressured to do so. In this sense, acting to grieve can mean pleasure because otherwise your social peers may frown up on you or you would feel like a bad person. And if everyone does so, the resulting illusion that we all grieve or at least that it is normal to grieve may be comforting to a society and hence also a form of pleasure. But actual genuine grieving is done for a direct effect of pleasure. Which is the pleasure to emotionally not have to let go of a person. Not for some arbitrary stipulation of what is right.
In Traiterforish's example of the Samurai the pleasure is to die knowing that one will not have to live without honor. To maintain this honor reflects an emotional urge which is to be satisfied.
So no, I certainly don't mean 'Happiness'. I mean pleasure. However twisted or misguided or atypical it may seem in an instance. I already granted that pleasure is misleading and confusing as a word. So that is why I also already offered a clearer meaning: Satisfaction of emotional urges.
The question for every individual just is, what satisfaction of what urges yields the greatest pleasure now and with regards to the future and what urges which are not there but could be invoked may yield even greater pleasure.
For instance, while grieving may mean a certain pleasure and may be necessary as a prerequisite to seek pleasure in the future, at some point it will be necessary to move on or one will miss other greater sources of pleasure. Like being happy. When the grieve is fresh, being happy may simply not be an option, may not represent an emotional urge one actually has, but to finish the grieving process may be important to have this urge in the future and so to be able to be happy in the future.
We of course don't think that strategically in our everyday lifes. But if it is about the rational basis of morality, to trace back moral ideas like grieving to what motivates such ideas to begin with (emotional urges) IMO is the only way to handle them in a way which makes coherent sense. And I say so, because this already is the underlining point of morality, just that many great philosophers apparently didn't get it (yes I know, me and the arrogance again ).
For one, if we look at the nature of moral ideals, that already is implied.
Take justice. What if justice made us miserable? What if the idea and practice of equal chance made people feel grumpy or sad and more so than the alternative of injustice? Would we still think that justice was a good moral idea? Of course not. We do so because justice makes us feel good. It satisfies a fundamental emotional urge to be treated fairly. This has been well substantiated by empirical psychological tests.
And you can do this with every moral ideal out there. All comes down to satisfy emotional urges, to in the best of cases make people happy and/or preserve the happiness of people.
And secondly, if all sense of meaning, of value, of good and bad is rooted in the emotional (which I think can hardly be denied), then any system of qualitative values which is not fundamentally founded on the emotional can not make coherent sense by default, but rests on an arbitrary notion of what is supposed to be good or right or whatever.. That is like wanting to philosophize about gravity without considering physics.
And this is why I can only shake my head over moral approaches which genuinely try to establish moral values which are not relative to the human condition and hence to human emotional urges in their actual relevance. Because it simply makes no sense.

The IMO actually sensible use of abstract moral ideas is the try to morally "legislate" society. And as every legislation, that is bound to be abstract and removed from the original intention. And in that sense, abstract moral ideas without a direct relation to emotional urges have a justification to exist. So philosophers were not totally off to concern themselves with them. But this justification holds only true, if it is assumed that by being abstract and hence applicable in a general fashion, this will in the end serve pleasure. Otherwise you start again to forget the physics of gravity. Or in other words: Start again to advocate arbitrary stuff for no good reason.
And finally, if we accept all I have said so far, the question to be concerned with is: What does yield the greatest pleasure? And there I think the answer is: Happiness. To me happiness is - in its ideal form - a state of absolute emotional satisfaction. But while morality is founded on individual pleasure, it of course is not about individual, but common pleasure. Otherwise there would be no use for morality to begin with. That is its function. As a consequence, the role of morality is to provide abstract guidelines for how to achieve happiness for the whole of the people and to motivate people to look for ways where reality may call for a deviation from those rules. And if happiness can't commonly be achieved, how to achieve the next best thing and so on. General rules for that purpose can be things like being honest, things like to not hurt others, things like being fair, things like sharing and be sensitive to the needs of others etcetera. All those may not represent the greatest satisfaction of ones emotional urges in a given case (while they certainly can of course), but if we collectively make use of them anyway, the potential individual lack of pleasure might be outweighed by the personal benefit in pleasure of having others do the same.

Now this all took me quite a few words to lay out, but well, morality described in a coherent manner is a complex thing. In my head it all is pretty obvious and simple though. Just the transition into words which get the point across can get a little complicated.

 

[Winston Hughes]

Sure, if you want to reduce it that far. Ultimately, all meaning and value in human life is just a bunch of chemical reactions.

The question then becomes: what makes one reaction better than another?

 

[timtofly]

Sure, if you want to reduce it that far. Ultimately, all meaning and value in human life is just a bunch of chemical reactions.

The question then becomes: what makes one reaction better than another?

Or the ultimate question: is there an absolute governor of each and every chemical reaction?

 

[lovett]

@lovett
Autonomy and freedom may sound nice on paper, and I respect their general importance for the individual. But if you translate those ideals into the institutional reality of a national democracy, the single individual usually and that inevitably has next to none actual influence regarding the actual policy decisions of the government unless he or she carries a mandate or in other ways is directly involved in politics (which can only be a quit limited number of people for practical reasons). For the simple reason that so many individuals are concerned that the single average individual drowns in their mass. And the important thing to note is, that this holds true even if you had some hypothetical thoroughly direct democracy, or some kind of fluid system for a constant window to directly sway policy. Because - unless I am missing something here - the idea of equal participation of millions and a direct experience of autonomy and freedom through this participation are incompatible.
So I don't see a reason to accept them as self-serving. But rather just see them in deed as conceptional ideas which have to be justified by their political yield.
It is no different with responsibility. If your single vioce does not actually make a difference, you rightfully will not feel responsible for the results of public opinion.

What is left is as I see it a general interest in the fate of a nation and the wish to somehow be engaged in it. But that one can have without institutionalized participation. You can still organize political groups, debating clubs, demonstrations, you can still write letters to the people in charge, make public speeches, collect signatures and so on. You can still feel responsible or autonomous. All you can not do anymore is vote. Hence why I reduced for a democracy unique democratic participation to making a cross on a peace of paper.

The picture you draw of 'enlightened despotism' is a very unusual one. To whit, your idea of enlightened despotism is one in which a despot exists who can govern perfectly (on a scale of metrics) but does so in concurrence with an active, engaged citizenry. The citizenry publicly debate policy, have the opportunity to participate in government, so on and so forth.

However, without the engagement of the citizenry - if the citizenry were not so engaged - the despot would still govern in the exact same way. After all, he is enlightened. He would still pursue the perfect policies because that is in what his enlightenment consists.

I think this situation is unusual because it is psychologically implausible. It is implausible that citizens would continue debating publicly and participating in government when there participation was pointless; their debate not actually necessary. The civic participatory part of this Constitution would be like a wheel that could turn, but was not attached to the rest of the mechanism. People don't generally worry away at ornaments like that; succinctly, it seems very difficult to stimulate the degree of participation we think good amongst a citizenry to whom participation was substantively pointless. For this Constitution to work, you have to idealise not just the dictator, but also his subjects.

I suppose we can fall back from this position if one says that the despot is not all that enlightened after all; his enlightenment consists in always listening to his subjects. He does not govern at all as well without their input and, wanting to govern well, always seeks their input. Their participation is a necessary part of policy outcomes. But here, what you have is something very like a constitutional republic. But it is constitutional not for institutional reasons, but because we stipulate certain things about the psychological state of the despot.

It is a fundamental fact of psychology that emotions serve as the ultimate source of all motivation. Or does any respected theory of psychology actually debate that? I am pretty sure: no. It would also not make sense. The word "motivation" already implies so.

This is something else worth picking up on. You seem to be arguing that it is an analytic truth that motivation is emotional. That the proposition 'All motivation is emotional' is true in the same way as 'All bachelors are unmarried'. It is true by virtue of some synonymy between the terms.

This seems rather implausible. In the following, I shall attempt to undermine this hypothesis by examining putative counter-examples. I shall put forward counterexamples to the thesis 'All motivation is emotional' and concurrently sketch a more plausible account of 'motivation'.

Let's start by looking at 'motivation' in contexts not directly linked to individual action. We say conglomerates are motivated to do things; countries, corporations, clubs. Questions like 'What motivated Germany to declare war on Russia in 1914?' Or 'What motivates BMW to build a new plant in Leipzig?' make sense. Prima facie, our first answers need not make any reference to 'emotion'. In fact, it is hard to make sense of the claim that organizations like these have emotions.

I'll spell out both these claims. Generally, we answer a question like the former by some reference to the beliefs the German high command held about railway timetables and the European system of alliances. We say that Germany believed that the only way to win the war was to defeat Russia in the East before engaging in the West. We answer the second by talking about German productivity and technical expertise, as well as the fact that BMW is a company Headquartered in Germany. This means local expansion has certain organization efficiency.

We don't say 'Germany hated Russia' or 'BMW just adores Leipzig'. These aren't appropriate answers; they don't tell us what motivated the behaviors in question. For organizations like the two discussed above, we do not explain their actions by reference to emotion. And this is partly because (the second claim) calling such organizations emotional is often a difficult game. Emotions are things individuals have; our concept of emotion stems from experience of individuals (and often, first person experience of our own emotions). We can only apply it to organizations by analogy. We say 'BMW was happy' in the same way we say 'The moon was angry' (thinking of its colour). We apply emotional terms analogously, and they do not have quite the same meaning applied in this way. Note, one can say the same thing about 'desire'.

Let's return to the answers we gave in reference to the motivational questions about Germany and BMW. Note that 'motivation' doesn't seem to be applied by analogy in these cases. Motivation means the exact same thing as when we talk about individual motivation. So what are we asking for when we ask for a motivation? By the answers we give, it seems we are asking for an explanation. We identify the motivations for organizations actions by explaining those actions. German technical expertise motivates BMW's expansion in Leipzig because it explains it. I needn't give an account of 'explanation', but we might try a causal one. X explains Y just in case X caused Y (this is very rough). From this idea stems, I think, a plausible account of motivation: motivation is the explanation of action. To find the motivation, we find the explanation.

And in this case it is certainly not an analytic truth that motivation is emotional. Many appropriate explanations do not reference emotion. Let's go back to individual motivation; consider the case of John the former law-student:

John used to study law. His family has pressurised him into studying law. They had told him constantly that he liked it and that he wanted to be a lawyer. He ended up believing he liked law. However, during his studies he was deeply unhappy. He couldn't concentrate on the subject-matter, despite thinking he liked it. Eventually, after a long talk with a perceptive uncle, he realised that it was the subject matter which was the problem. He didn't like law. He didn't want to be a lawyer. John realised he had never liked law and never wanted to be a lawyer; he has only believed he liked it and wanted to be a lawyer. This belief had been formed by familial pressure. Now, ten years on, John is an artist. He loves painting, and is very happy with his life.

What motivated John to spend years in law school? Well, not his love of law; he realised he never loved law. Nor his desire to be a lawyer; he realised he never wanted to be a lawyer. What motivated John were beliefs, and these are not emotions. To whit, his belief that he liked law and his belief that he wanted to be a lawyer. These were false beliefs, but beliefs nonetheless (and don't say we can't be mistaken about our emotions; 'I love her? I love her not?'). They were beliefs formed by familial pressure. But these beliefs are what motivated John, not emotions.

This case constitutes a counterexample to the thesis 'All motivation is emotional'. So do the cases of BMW and Germany. The weight of this evidence is, I think, sufficient to abandon that thesis in favour of the one 'Motivation of action is appropriate explanation of action' or something very much like this.


Of course, you can re-interpret the case I elucidate in emotional terms. You can reference the emotions John, as a normal human being, must have had during his law degree. Perhaps you will want to talk about his love of his family or some such. You could talk about the emotions of the German high command or those of BMW's board of directors. But what I mean to say is that this cast on motivation is by no means necessary, and probably not sufficient. We can answer questions about motivation without reference to these emotions; I have done so above. And reference to these emotions will in many cases be insufficient to explain action; we can't explain John's action without talking about his false beliefs. Re-interpreting these cases in this way is an attempt to save a poor theory by extravagant interpretation of the facts, in my opinion (and, do you want to say that an emotionless robot could have no motivations? It seems we can certainly imagine otherwise).

 

[timtofly]

Following a false belief would be an emotion, but the wrong emotion. How does one determine which emotion is true and which emotion is false. Even the same emotion can make one feel good one moment and feel terrible the next. It is the instant gratification that people tend to go for, not the miserable feeling that comes seconds later. There is still an emotion that feels good even after the point that an "instant gratification" emotion stops feeling good.

This emotion would be tied to a moral compass that keeps the "feel good" moment continuous. So yes emotions that produce pleasure drive us forward, but there are emotions that feel like pleasure that cause a step backwards. Most people have just accepted that the step back is ok, as long as one keeps moving forward on a whole. This process has nothng to do with external governing, but the internal governing that produces responsible people. I would not even attach this emotion to religion at this level. It is easy for a child to experiment with this set-back approach to learning. They desire something and an adult through touch or sound causes them a set back. (Although I would argue there is already a moral compass). Even setting aside this moral compass, one can either build one over time, or totally ignore this moral compass and grow up without one altogether.

I do not think that one can disallow emotion totally as a driving factor. For one a corporation or governance does not even have an emotional state. The corporation for instance relies on the emotions of those in charge, who for the most part already have money/bottom line as the motivational thrust. All petty emotions that would drive an individual have already been resolved and the emotional need for money has already won the debate (likely through vote of the board) over all the other "emotions" that may have been invoked.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

But here, what you have is something very like a constitutional republic. But it is constitutional not for institutional reasons, but because we stipulate certain things about the psychological state of the despot.

Yes, this is just what I assumed an ideal despot to represent. So I guess this is most of all a clash of different perceptions of what was originally meant by an "enlightened" despot. You seem to stipulate a despot which is so awesome exclusively because of his or own body of enlightenment. While I stipulate a despot which partially is so awesome because of his or her treatment of his or her subjects' opinion.
I don't think one interpretation is inherently superior to the other in the context of this thread. I think it is just two people assuming different things for rather irrelevant reasons.
But assuming my interpretation: Would you now actually agree with me?
Assuming your interpretation, I retreat my "of course".

Sure, if you want to reduce it that far. Ultimately, all meaning and value in human life is just a bunch of chemical reactions.

The question then becomes: what makes one reaction better than another?

I feel you just skipped over my post and didn't get the gist of it.
Because it is not about (the IMO obvious lack of) morality when we look at the workings of the human condition in a purely objective way.
It is about what founds the notion of morality, which requires an subjective perspective. The origin of this perspective being: emotions.
You ask what makes one reaction better than another? From an purely individual point of view: Whatever yields the greatest pleasure.
From a moral point of view, whatever yields the greatest pleasure for the whole of humanity. And by extension, whatever yields the greatest pleasure for the whole of beings with emotional intelligence. This exertions requires the willingness to extend empathy to not-human creatures though. Which is something I personally avoid in a consistent manner, for I prefer to continue to eat meat and other animal products.

Or the ultimate question: is there an absolute governor of each and every chemical reaction?

From what we actually know: yes. It is called natural law. And its apparent lack of emotionality leaves any kind of moral implications to be desired. Go ahead and believe something else. Just don't bretend an objective point of view suggests so.

This is something else worth picking up on. You seem to be arguing that it is an analytic truth that motivation is emotional.

I do.

That the proposition 'All motivation is emotional' is true in the same way as 'All bachelors are unmarried'. It is true by virtue of some synonymy between the terms.

Well yes with the precondition to understand motivation as it applies to all living creatures with "emotional intelligence". Not sure how exact that term is in an academic sense, but what I mean by that is creatures which are, as humans, governed by emotional impulses rather than unemotional instincts like say any given insect. Which IMO reduces those insects to be just as much worthy of moral consideration as a printing machine or a staple gun. But I see that you are arguing that human motivation actually was merely governed by emotional impulses, so that is what I am eager to have a look at. But it seems at first you require me to clarify the meaning and use of the word "motivation".

Let's start by looking at 'motivation' in contexts not directly linked to individual action. We say conglomerates are motivated to do things; countries, corporations, clubs. Questions like 'What motivated Germany to declare war on Russia in 1914?' Or 'What motivates BMW to build a new plant in Leipzig?' make sense. Prima facie, our first answers need not make any reference to 'emotion'. In fact, it is hard to make sense of the claim that organizations like these have emotions.

Ah well, that is a good point, but only so far in that it illuminates the different subtle meanings of "motivation" as context calls for, and along with that how my point might be misinterpreted or how I made it not as clear as necessary - but it is not a good point in the sense that it would actually challenge the claim that all human motivation is governed by emotions.
Because the way I used the word "motivation", it clearly referred to individual motivation. Collective motivation is I see it a concept abstracted from individual motivation to vividly describe collective dynamics. But wouldn't you agree, that to attribute to a collective an homogeneous motivation necessarily means to obscure to a degree what motivation actually means? That it necessarily means to generalize assumptions which in detail may not apply on the individual part of the collective, and in practice most likely won't? I think you could hardly deny so, hence my point stands, just with the emphasized precondition to understand motivation in the context of individual motivation.
And in light of that, I think to claim that

Motivation means the exact same thing as when we talk about individual motivation.

is pure nonsense. But I concede that it is a way one could understand motivation. Just not that way which the contexts I used it in IMO clearly defines. The context of what motivates humans, so the human individual.

motivation is the explanation of action. To find the motivation, we find the explanation.

And here you highlight our apparent misunderstanding. You choose to view motivation as a term universally applicable. I choose to view motivation as a term originally only applicable to the individual with an emotional inner live, while applicable to anything else only in a grossly obscuring way to explain things in a vivid way. But this is a mere argument of semantics. If you want to argue my actual point, assume my choice to interpret the word "motivation". If you just want to argue the different potential interpretations of the word "motivation" - well I am honestly not that interested in linguistic theory.

Let's go back to individual motivation

Now we are talking.

<The case of John> (inserted by my)
....
"This case constitutes a counterexample to the thesis 'All motivation is emotional."

It only illustrates that we don't consciously think in terms of prime emotional urges. So what we usually realize as our motivation and what actually is our original motivation are two different things. I am sure you will find that psychology concurs with that. But yeah I get that you see or at least interpret this differently than I am and I'll address it.

So do the cases of BMW and Germany.

They just assume a different meaning of motivation, as explained above.

Of course, you can re-interpret the case I elucidate in emotional terms. You can reference the emotions John, as a normal human being, must have had during his law degree. Perhaps you will want to talk about his love of his family or some such. <boldfaced by me>

I do!

But what I mean to say is that this cast on motivation is by no means necessary

I passionately and strongly disagree. If it was in deed not necessary, wouldn't that require actual beliefs like "I don't like law" to be hardwired into our brain? Because if not, they are only are product of other factors, which raises the question: Of what factors? And how do these factors work?
I in deed agree with that emotions alone are not sufficient to explain actions as you argued further on. Of course, what emotions bring forth has to interact with dynamics not originating in the emotional. Most noteworthy: The exterior environment of an individual. The feedback received. But also the parts of the sub-consciousness which are concerned with "programmed" or in other words instinctive reactions. And they can safely be assumed to have multi-layered interdependencies with the emotional world. Yet, what governs the whole? One may answer: Laws of physics. But what governs the whole in the realm of personal experience(which is crucial if we accept that personal experience is the only source of meaning and hence morality)? Then the answer IMO must be: emotions. There simply is nothing else left to account for. Though what you have accomplished here is to not only highlight the ambiguous meaning of motivation, but also that my assumption of emotions governing motivation rests on a perspective aimed at conscious experience. That is something I kind of intuitively assumed, but fair enough that this may need to be officially established.

and, do you want to say that an emotionless robot could have no motivations? It seems we can certainly imagine otherwise

I think said robot would have the same kind of motivation as an insect. That is, motivations which are void of any subjective point of value and hence which are as much motivation as a stone is motivated to roll down a hill when pulled by gravity.

 

[Winston Hughes]

It's important to bear in mind that this all-encompassing 'emotional pleasure' is not something which actually exists - it's just an abstraction used to try and clump together a very large number of very different experiences so as to provide the appearance of a nice, easy solution to all questions of morality.

It doesn't really explain anything on a meta-ethical level, because the definition of pleasure has been stretched to a point of meaninglessness, including things which to which pleasure (as understood in any other context) would be irrelevant or even directly antithetical. Strip away the value implicit in the word 'pleasure' and all you're saying is that people are motivated by motivation.

And, on the ethical level, this reduces 'what is good?' to an entirely subjective judgement. We only experience our own emotions, and the only thing which gives an emotion value is the experience of it. Far from providing answers to moral questions, this merely rephrases them in a way which makes any answer no more than a statement of personal preference.

Talk of 'the greatest total happiness' assumes a prior moral commitment to caring about other people's happiness even where it does not affect our own. But you've already done away with all prior moral commitments by reducing value to nothing more than an emotional experience.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

It's important to bear in mind that this all-encompassing 'emotional pleasure' is not something which actually exists

Of course. Just as morality is founded on subjective perception, a rational for morality inevitably is, too. But you can decide to argue on said subjective basic along objective or subjective lines. Objective lines constitute a coherent complete rational. Subjective lines constitute intuitive arguments as "x is good, that's it".

- it's just an abstraction used to try and clump together a very large number of very different experiences so as to provide the appearance of a nice, easy solution to all questions of morality.

That is a quit loaded interpretation, but suit yourself.

It doesn't really explain anything on a meta-ethical level, because the definition of pleasure has been stretched to a point of meaninglessness, including things which to which pleasure (as understood in any other context) would be irrelevant or even directly antithetical. Strip away the value implicit in the word 'pleasure' and all you're saying is that people are motivated by motivation.

That is certainly not all I am saying. Now you go from loaded interpretation to misrepresentation of the facts.

And, on the ethical level, this reduces 'what is good?' to an entirely subjective judgement.

Now please don't start with this cute faith in idealism. I am tired enough of arguing with religious people as it is. I don't need another kind of religion to be argued.

We only experience our own emotions, and the only thing which gives an emotion value is the experience of it. Far from providing answers to moral questions, this merely rephrases them in a way which makes any answer no more than a statement of personal preference.

No, no no! I explicitly stated that morality IS NOT A MATER OF MERE PERSONAL PREFERENCE. Of course I don't deliver any concrete solutions to moral dilemmas. Because may argument was about establish the foundational theoretic. From which any solutions of moral dilemmas would have to be launched.

But you've already done away with all prior moral commitments by reducing value to nothing more than an emotional experience.

Sigh... the idealism again.
Please explain to me the fundamental difference between having faith in say the Abrahamic god and having faith in any moral value for any other reason than the satisfaction of emotional urges. Because I don't see it. And I don't think that you or any one else could provide it.

@Traitorfish, you wanted to know why I dismiss non-utilitarianism that easily. I think in that last quote-response of mine to Winston Hughes I managed to wrap it up.

 

[GenjiKhan]

To Absolutism be Enlightened,I think the two main elements to achieve such thing are diplomacy and social order . If you can stabilize Social order without taking actions that may threat it later and can avoid problems with other countries(war),the path to Enlightened Absolutism is half-completed .

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

What is "social order" and why is that desirable?

 

[timtofly]

At what age does a person realize their emotions drive them? Is curiosity an emotion? I am not trying to derail the thread. I am trying to differentiate my earliest "knowledge" and seperate it from experience. I think I would claim, that I am not motivated by emotion, but alas even curiosity is an emotion.

At age 1 I knew who I was and that there was a world around me. I also had no fear. I also thought I had a purpose and that was to figure everything out in the world. This came to a screaching halt when my parents realized I was walking too far from the house by myself, and confined me to their little world. So I do not know everything there is to know. What I know, is real to me. So I have to admit what is real to me, may not be what is true. Which may be why I have problems with communication. So, I do not live in an ideal world where everything is perfect for me, even though the situation I live in is a perfect one, without any worries. I may stand in a world falling apart, but I still stand. The reality I face is that every one around me seems to have problems and life is miserable for them. I learn from them, and I learn from my own poor choices that have been made and I continue on my journey to learn everything there is to know, even though the odds are against me, since the advent of the internet. While this opens the door to vast worlds of knowledge, it also makes it clear that it is not possible to learn everything in this world around me.

So to wind this rambling down, I know it is possible to understand each and every need that can be imagined by every human on the planet. It is also possible to do it without religion, and without any one sacrificing a thing. Now that may sound to some like an idealist speaking, and that it is just my imagination. Some will also say that enlightened absolutism is only just a belief.

I say I don't care, I am content in the world that I live in and changing it would be too hard of a task for me. I am selfish and just want to see the thread carry on in the vein that it is going. This is probably just a scientific experiment that will convince me I am wrong when someone can prove I am wrong.

 

[Winston Hughes]

@SiLL

I'm not saying that ethics requires idealism. I'm saying that your ethics seems to require idealism, because otherwise it contains nothing to bridge the gap between subjective experience and moral responsibility.

And, what's more, it's you who's engaged in the search for God in ethics here, seeking to reduce everything to a single first cause, even though none of us - except for, on occasion, religious fundamentalists - actually talk or behave as if morality has so clear and obvious a source.

The only way you're able to sustain this single-source hypothesis is by stretching definitions of 'pleasure' and 'happiness' to the point where they no longer mean anything we can actually work with. Under their usual definitions, both can certainly be conceived as good things, and worthy of moral consideration. But they are not the same thing, and nor are they the only things to which we must give such consideration.

Morality does not arise in some kind of sterile vacuum where pure intellect rules, but through the interaction of a vast range of different social pressures over the course of thousands (and, indeed, millions) of years. Conflicting motivations certainly have played an essential part in creating the need for morality. But there is no reason at all to assume that reducing it all down to a single motivation will help us understand things any better. Rather, and as the history of utilitarianism makes abundantly clear, it's much more likely to lead us to crass oversimplifications of what are often very complex questions.

(I should add that utilitarianism can provide a useful perspective on ethical questions; it's only when one assumes it is the be-all and end-all of morality that it becomes problematic.)

 

[Traitorfish]

@SiLL: I haven't responded yet because I haven't quite been able to get myself in the right brain-place, but Winston has addressed a lot of the points that I would have raised (and more coherently so), so I'll leave that to him.

The one additional criticism I have is I suppose what you'd describe as an ontological one, so please bear with me because it's coming at this from a slightly sideways angle compared to what's already been discussed.

When you talk about "happiness" (a nebulous term, as Winston pointed out, but for my fairly abstract purposes it will suffice), it is posed as something that we experience passively, which we receive from outside of ourselves. Even when our own actions bring about the results that produce a state of happiness, a distinction is drawn between our actions and our experience of that result. Whether I bring about this result, or somebody else does, becomes a simple matter of efficiency. It may be that in certain circumstances only I am capable of bringing about the desired result, yes, but that's a contingent rather than necessary state of affairs.

I would offer in contrast to this an opposing view, that we experience our actions not merely as the precondition of this-or-that result, but as as a process of active engagement with the world, in which there is no clear distinction between action and effect. The subject is not an isolated entity engaged only externally with the world, enacting or experiencing a series of discrete effects, but something constituted within the world, and so constituted as something actively engaged with the world, caught within a continuous stream of happening. The subject, in this view, isn't something that simply is and may do, but something that necessarily does, for which being and doing are not practically distinguished.

What this suggests to me is that, if we take your premise that a reliable ethics has to be derived from within the human subject (something with which I whole-heartedly agree), is that the hedonic consequentialism you propose is not satisfactory as a description of how humans actually live, and so of how they attain happiness. If you'll excuse the mangled classical verbiage (it's really just the best way I can think to put it), we can make a distinction between happiness as "hedonia", and happiness as "eudaimonia", which is to say, between happiness as a state of passive well-being, an experience of "pleasure" (broadly defined) and between happiness as a state of active well-being, an active process of engagement. (In particular, I would say it is a process of engagement through which we give our lives meaning- but that might be getting a bit existentialist-y for this thread.)

The political upshot of this is that it is not obvious that there can even in theory be a despotism which is capable of bringing about the greatest happiness, because it is not obvious that the pursuit of "eudaimonia" is compatible with despotism. It may be that the modes of engagement by which we achieve "eudaimonia" require forms of self-rule, individual and collective, that are contrary to, and that cannot be in any other way fulfilled by, an enlightened despot. If one takes this to be the case, then one could then argue (as I would) that it is in a very real sense better for us to rule ourselves and risk screwing it up than to be ruled by somebody else, because the former at least gives us the opportunity for authentic well-being, well the latter can only ever give us a state of security.

 

[ParkCungHee]

While I don't believe liberty is possible under any form of government, if I was inclined to believe such a thing, I'd also be inclined to believe Fascist claims to maximize human freedom compared to a democracy. Authoritarians usually have much more coherent models of liberty and oligarchy then liberalism has offered, so it's at least possible.

 

[Tahuti]

While I don't believe liberty is possible under any form of government, if I was inclined to believe such a thing, I'd also be inclined to believe Fascist claims to maximize human freedom compared to a democracy. Authoritarians usually have much more coherent models of liberty and oligarchy then liberalism has offered, so it's at least possible.

Does Fascism even make the pretense of being for freedom? I always though Fascism, openly even, proclaimed that the ideal of freedom can be sidestepped "for the good of the nation."

 

[ParkCungHee]

Does Fascism even make the pretense of being for freedom? I always though Fascism, openly even, proclaimed that the ideal of freedom can be sidestepped in the name "for the good of the nation?"

No, Fascism took the problem of human freedom very seriously, and felt that the Fascist State maximized human freedom.

 

[Cutlass]

How so?

 

[Winston Hughes]

No, Fascism took the problem of human freedom very seriously, and felt that the Fascist State maximized human freedom.

Fascism seeks to maximise one type of human freedom, whilst denying all others. Like the type of utilitarianism discussed above, it reduces all ethics to the pursuit of a singular end. In doing so, it aims at providing theoretical coherence and clarity, but at the cost of narrowing the range of things we regard as having value, and, thus, diminishing (to what I would consider a horrific degree) the overall value of human existence, experience, and expression.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

@SiLL
I'm not saying that ethics requires idealism. I'm saying that your ethics seems to require idealism, because otherwise it contains nothing to bridge the gap between subjective experience and moral responsibility.

The bridge I use is the assumption that the purpose of morality is to promote the common good. I really don't see what about that constitutes idealism.

And, what's more, it's you who's engaged in the search for God in ethics here, seeking to reduce everything to a single first cause, even though none of us - except for, on occasion, religious fundamentalists - actually talk or behave as if morality has so clear and obvious a source.

Er..hugh? Emotional urges obviously are a very complex thing, so my "God in ethics" is in practice is a very complex thing. So I am certainly not arguing a way to simplify ethics per se. In fact, if anything it makes its implementation more complicated as compared to a mere stipulation of moral values. I am arguing against unduly attempts to simplify it. That is, to just assume stuff.

The only way you're able to sustain this single-source hypothesis is by stretching definitions of 'pleasure' and 'happiness' to the point where they no longer mean anything we can actually work with.

So you argue, that the satisfaction of emotional urges is too encompassing as that we were able to work with them (I hope you realize that to criticize the dubious implications of my terms pleasure and happiness isn't a viable attack against my theory as such, but well, just its choice of terminology)? Not necessarily true, it just requires the insight, that it is necessary to simplify them. An insight I'll support without hesitation. Just doing so with keeping in mind what those simplifactions were originally abstracted from, so we have a bigger chance to do so in a due way. That is why I think it to be imported. To expose moral idealism as what it is. Either a tool of utilitarianism. Or a religion-like perversion of philosophy.

To illustrate: The ideal of lying being bad. That raises the question: why? Just for the heck of it? Well that sounds sensible... In the very end, if you keep on digging, we either end up with another arbitrary stipulation (God says so, stupid) or emotional urges. I guarantee you that. And if one realizes so, than this helps a lot to make moral discussions of lying to be more productive.

Under their usual definitions, both can certainly be conceived as good things, and worthy of moral consideration. But they are not the same thing, and nor are they the only things to which we must give such consideration.

You really need to stop to hang yourself with my choice of terms. It is just a terminology for God's sake. Hence why I clarified.

Morality does not arise in some kind of sterile vacuum where pure intellect rules, but through the interaction of a vast range of different social pressures over the course of thousands (and, indeed, millions) of years. Conflicting motivations certainly have played an essential part in creating the need for morality. But there is no reason at all to assume that reducing it all down to a single motivation will help us understand things any better.

My theoretics is not about how morality is shaped by social dynamics. It is about a coherent philosophical explanation of what morality actually is. Not how it may or may not be perceived for whatever arbitrary reasons. Every idiot can have an opniion what is moral. Like every idiot can have an opinion what a physical law should be or as Larry Flint said every idiot has an a-hole. But if morality is supposed to serve an actual purpose when followed - that is enhancing "good" - just as physics is supposed to explain the material world - than you simply find out what good actually means and how that is achieved best. And what means "good"? Well the satisfaction of emotional urges is the only objective answer we have, as it does not require arbitrary assumptions. So you move on from there.
There is no reason at all to assume that this increases understanding? So I suppose, we should go back to decide the nature of physics based on intuition perhaps? After all, we don't perceive natural law like those sketchy physicians claim. I for one never witnessed any molecules. The Greeks's explanation of physics by groups of elements though corresponds alright with my perceptions...

And you didn't answer my question, so I ask again:
Please explain to me the fundamental difference between having faith in say the Abrahamic god and having faith in any moral value for any other ultimate reason than the satisfaction of emotional urges. Because I don't see it. And I don't think that you or any one else could provide it.

Rather, and as the history of utilitarianism makes abundantly clear, it's much more likely to lead us to crass oversimplifications of what are often very complex questions.

Hm well, utilitarianism certainly requires a lot delicacy in its use. You know, I even am willing to toy with the idea that in practice and overall utilitarianism means a too great temptation/potential to be misused. But then we would still reject utilitarianism for utilitaristic reasons, as we would judge practical usefulness. So actually, we would still engage in utilitarianism, just with a practical preference for idealism.

What this suggests to me is that, if we take your premise that a reliable ethics has to be derived from within the human subject (something with which I whole-heartedly agree), is that the hedonic consequentialism you propose is not satisfactory as a description of how humans actually live, and so of how they attain happiness.

I think you are right that the mere process of an action can constitute happiness, or the satisfaction of emotional urges, just as much as a result from an action. The way is the aim and all. I take no issue with that. And I did not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, the yields of action itself is from my POV just as much a consequence as the consequence of an action.

The political upshot of this is that it is not obvious that there can even in theory be a despotism which is capable of bringing about the greatest happiness, because it is not obvious that the pursuit of "eudaimonia" is compatible with despotism.

This gets us to my assumptions about what constitutes ideal despotism, as highlighted in my last response to lovett (or in his last response to me). And as I admitted there, I admit here that if one uses lovett's assumption of what constitutes an ideal despot, my claim it was obviously superior fails, exactly for what you argue. But if we assume my assumption, then it to me still is clearly desirable, at least in the terms of a national governing body. As this still allows for a wide range of participation, hell even local self-governance in a federal sense, just that granted at the mercy of the despot (and he or she may of course intervene when viewed as due). But well, I think it is moot to argue that this has to be viewed as obvious. I think this thread established that "obvious" or "of course" don't reflect the actual range of opinions on the matter, and maybe rightfully so. So I at least partially declare defeat.

 

[timtofly]

I would not declare defeat just yet. Even Traitorfish acknowledges that a sense of state gives a sense of security. I think that both of you are relying on self-government via a personal willingness to act in a way to ensure the maximum happiness for all. The hurdle is to educate people to realize that this is possible.

Humans by nature distrust each other, and by action usually let people down. The more secure we feel, the more we are willing to open up to others. We even have the capability of looking past peoples actions that hurt us to a certain extent.