New NESes, ideas, development, etc

Intended start date is 1948. I have taken a little bit of liberty in this to allow for a more diverse agency list.

As for the Gehlen organization, Gehlen was a German and eventually goes on to head the BND.

@Ryaz
No KGB yet this is 1948. It was founded in 1954. Right now it is called the MGB and is a subordinate orgsnization in the NKVD. I am happy that you are interested though.

1948 means the Germany is not an indipendent nation, nor does Gehlen work for germany.. that`s all i`m saying... the startsituation would be that Gehlen works for the US..
 
Another note on ancient navies, land armies tended to support them on offensive campaigns rather than the other way round - a fleet of galleys would proceed along the coast whilst an army went on land and it would be the army that held the supplies.

Also notion of an amphibious landing was very rare in the classical era due to the difficulty of supplies, see Hanibals march to Rome the long way. Even after Empires dominated they areas they still generally prefered to walk most of the way and only take ship when it was unavoidable.
 
Another note on ancient navies, land armies tended to support them on offensive campaigns rather than the other way round - a fleet of galleys would proceed along the coast whilst an army went on land and it would be the army that held the supplies.

Also notion of an amphibious landing was very rare in the classical era due to the difficulty of supplies, see Hanibals march to Rome the long way. Even after Empires dominated they areas they still generally prefered to walk most of the way and only take ship when it was unavoidable.

Pretty much everything I've read confirms that naval landings anywhere near the type of amphibious assault involved in D-Day would have been suicidal. And you generally don't have to read anything of the type to get that picture, considering just how many people died in that landing.
 
Also notion of an amphibious landing was very rare in the classical era due to the difficulty of supplies, see Hanibals march to Rome the long way. Even after Empires dominated they areas they still generally prefered to walk most of the way and only take ship when it was unavoidable.
Um...that's not really the case. While amphibious landings in the face of armed opposition on the beach were extremely rare and generally prone to failure (e.g. Pylos-Sphakteria, cf. Kyzikos), naval transport of armed forces to a theater of warfare and operational amphibious transport were not perceptibly less common than in any other period. The median troop size of amphibiously landed units may have been smaller than in other periods, true enough.
 
Marathon?
 
As far as I am aware, Marathon was a land battle.

They landed on the beach and then were attacked by the Athenians shortly thereafter: amphibious assault scenario.
 
I don't really think that's what Dis was talking about - the Achaemenid army had ample time to set up a camp and was in place on the beach well before the Athenians and Plataians engaged.

An amphibious-assault scenario would be more like the Athenian and allied assault on the satrapal army at Mykale in 479 BC (successful), the Spartan attack on the Athenian fort at Pylos in 425 BC (unsuccessful), the Athenian attack on the Spartan-held island of Sphakteria a few months later (successful), and the Athenian attack on a Spartan and satrapal army at Kyzikos in 410 BC (successful). In all cases the troops disembarking from their ships were faced with armed opposition immediately upon disembarking, and engaged on the beach in that "classical D-Day" scenario LoE mentioned.
 
They landed on the beach and then were attacked by the Athenians shortly thereafter: amphibious assault scenario.

Durp, somehow I managed to confuse the Battle of Marathon with the Battle of Thermopylae.
 
I don't really think that's what Dis was talking about - the Achaemenid army had ample time to set up a camp and was in place on the beach well before the Athenians and Plataians engaged.

I might be misreading him, but that seems like exactly what he was talking about, given the mention of Hannibal, who presumably wouldn't have had to land in the face of opposition unless he did something very wrong (feel free to correct me, Dis).

Durp, somehow I managed to confuse the Battle of Marathon with the Battle of Thermopylae.

Thermopylae also involved a naval battle. >_>
 
I might be misreading him, but that seems like exactly what he was talking about, given the mention of Hannibal, who presumably wouldn't have had to land in the face of opposition unless he did something very wrong (feel free to correct me, Dis).
True enough. The example isn't that great for what he wants to say, though. Hannibal's reluctance to use naval transport had nothing to do with difficulties of supply. He wanted to employ the Gauls in northern Italy against the Romans, as an extra source of manpower. It's also not clear that Hannibal could have even relied on naval transport at all if he had wanted it, since his relationship with the Punic softim is still kind of murky. Besides, Hannibal didn't receive supplies from extra-Italian sources anyway, and relied on forage, captured Roman granaries and depots, and supplies from turncoat Roman allied cities.
 
True enough. The example isn't that great for what he wants to say, though. Hannibal's reluctance to use naval transport had nothing to do with difficulties of supply. He wanted to employ the Gauls in northern Italy against the Romans, as an extra source of manpower. It's also not clear that Hannibal could have even relied on naval transport at all if he had wanted it, since his relationship with the Punic softim is still kind of murky. Besides, Hannibal didn't receive supplies from extra-Italian sources anyway, and relied on forage, captured Roman granaries and depots, and supplies from turncoat Roman allied cities.

And still managed to dick around pillaging Italy for no less than 14 years straight.. :crazyeye:

What a man! :lol:
 
So why didn't work in Italy?
 
Given the amount of time it took the Romans to defeat him, I'd say it did work. Unless you mean he should have somehow won the war, which seems like an unrealistic expectation.
 
It didn't work in Italy for the same reason Rome wasn't defeated by all the other powers in the Mediterranean that it fought: Rome was simply more effective at mobilizing manpower than any other contemporary state. Roman manpower reserves were so large that they only came close to being depleted after thirty-five years of virtually constant, heavy fighting (in 190 BC). Hannibal just couldn't kill enough Romans to win.
 
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