Question about Operation Barbarossa et al

[Terrance888]

General Winter simply is a timeout for the Germans beating on the Russians, which can only be good for the Russians since they can catch their wind better.

It is true that Russian Counterattacks were more effective during this time, but I usually pin it to the fact that their supply lines are shorter, not as devastated by the fighting, and the Germans aren't outflankifying them all over the place so they have a chance to build up and strike back.

 

[madviking]

The real problem, imo, with Operation Barbarossa was the complete strategic failure of Fall Blau. But that's a whole other can of worms.

 

[Blue Emu]

The real problem, imo, with Operation Barbarossa was the complete strategic failure of Fall Blau. But that's a whole other can of worms.

I feel that the real problem was underestimating the Russians.

A note from Halder's diary, in mid-August '41 (six weeks into the campaign):

"We underestimated Russia. We had counted on meeting two hundred Divisions. Already we have identified three hundred and sixty."

Bear in mind that a numerical advantage (between roughly equivalent forces) gives a battle-winning advantage equal to the difference of squares... eg: three times the force means nine times the odds of winning.

 

[Terrance888]

Lancaster's Square Law

Mind, however truth that may bring that does not address the Concentration of power the Germans were able to bring to bear, as well as Volume of Fire their artillery and infantry had that the Russians lacked.

The Germans have better led, more concentrated armored spearheads. Their infantry units generally have more available squad-based machine guns and were generally better trained (this is not to say Russians only did human wave tactics). Tactically, the Germans have a higher volume of fire and is more likely to surpress and eliminate opposing members both due to the larger numbers as well as lower quality of both weapons and training. Strategetically, the Germans are attacking and thus were able to determine the focus of campaign, leaving defending Russians often off balance and unprepared, cutting through lines and surrounding pockets of resistance to be dive-bombed into submission.

The underestimation is less about numbers of people. The thicker the hay the easier the mowing from defensive positions and behind tank armor, watching for the right moment to slash through the front lines and to cut off rail lines and logistics.

The underestimation was more about how quickly the military was able to recuperate from Stalin's purges, about how rapidly factories moved to the trans-ural region were able to set up and produce capable and even advanced tank designs. The underestimation was how tenatious the defenders were, how little anti-communist resistance they were able to find, and how successful the USSR was able to unite against the German Foe instead of collapsing like a house of cards.

The biggest argument IMHO is whether the Germans had EVER had a chance at the start. I truly believe that they had a chance, but the plausibility?

To win...

The Germans must have captured the key symbolic cities of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad.
The Germans must raise significant amounts of anti-communist or proto-nationalist resistance against USSR.
They must kill, capture, incapitate or depower a significantly large amount of skilled officials to decapitate the government.
They must prevent the activation of Patriotism and promote depression, passivism, or outright cultivation of Quislings.
They must force an semi-official capitulation, possibly by a Soviet Exile Government or a counterrevolutionary Russian force.

 

[Blue Emu]

There was also a very serious underestimation of the impact on logistics caused by the different Russian rail gauge. Russian railroads did not use the same spacing between the rails that European railroads used... European (and North American) trains run on a 1.435 meter gauge, while the Russians used a 1.52 meter gauge. This meant total chaos when trying to keep the advancing forces supplied, since every kilo of cargo had to be unloaded and transferred from one train to another... often, more than once.

 

[Terrance888]

I didn't know that. Puts the German supply issues into greater perspective, seeing as they have to essentially load and unload- the most time consuming part of transportation-each trainload twice.

 

[Blue Emu]

I didn't know that. Puts the German supply issues into greater perspective, seeing as they have to essentially load and unload- the most time consuming part of transportation-each trainload twice.

The Russians still use the same 1.52 meter gauge, incompatible with the European gauge.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Track_gauge

Sometimes supplies had to be trans-shipped more than once, too... since military operations did not always capture full stretches of track from the border forward to the advanced units. Brest Litovsk, for example, was right on one of the main rail routes, and it held out for a week after being bypassed.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

I think the common belief is that, since they lived there, they were used to it.

This. The Russians in winter are a lot like the Packers in winter: they're used to dealing with it, so they handle the suffering better. They know the tricks and such.

Much has already been said about the lack of importance of the Russian winter as a thing, so I won't comment on it again, but merely say that I agree with that assessment that time was what sealed the doom of the Germans, regardless of whatever military miracles they might have achieved or been able to achieve on the battlefield.

 

[Terrance888]

The only successful invasions of Russia begun during the winter.

See: Mongols and Vikings.

EDIT: I agree. Germans are on the ticket to cause a Soviet Collapse, and the longer it took the stronger the soviet resolve ect ect ect.

AS for Barbarossa specifically, Winter might be seen as sorta a failine for the Germans for success, and the loss of a month due to Italian ineptitude in the balkans cost them those months.

 

[madviking]

The thing with the Mongols is that it's easier for horses to run over sheets of ice than vast expanses of mud.

 

[Blue Emu]

... and the loss of a month due to Italian ineptitude in the balkans cost them those months.

Contrary to the common "folk wisdom", I'm not aware of any real evidence that the Balkan adventures imposed any significant delay on Barbarossa. Spring came unusually late in 1941... as late as early June (less than a month before the attack) the river Bug was still over its banks for miles. The ground just wasn't hard enough for mobile operations until about the time that the attack was actually launched.

On the other hand, the loss of six weeks right in the middle of the campaign... after the successful initial encirclements, but before the Kiev operation... was unforgivable. The attacking forces basically stood still, marking time while the high command argued among themselves about whether to press on towards Moscow or turn the mobile forces aside to help with the northern and southern encirclements. An astonishing example of the German high command losing sight of the principle of "maintenance of the prime objective".

 

[ParkCungHee]

Contrary to the common "folk wisdom", I'm not aware of any real evidence that the Balkan adventures imposed any significant delay on Barbarossa. Spring came unusually late in 1941... as late as early June (less than a month before the attack) the river Bug was still over its banks for miles. The ground just wasn't hard enough for mobile operations until about the time that the attack was actually launched

Thank you for posting this. I get tired of repeating it.

 

[Lord Baal]

I think the common belief is that, since they lived there, they were used to it. But it's pretty clear that the Soviets suffered in the winter as well. However, they're the ones who benefited from an end to campaigning, not the Germans.

The emphasis in these discussions is usually on Moscow. I'm not convinced that simply taking Moscow would really have done much to end the war (what with industry being east of the Urals). However, it's been pointed out that they would have had access to the rail lines, so I don't know.

The Soviets had already launched their counterattack before winter set in, so it actually worked out well for the Germans.

 

[dutchfire]

The thing with the Mongols is that it's easier for horses to run over sheets of ice than vast expanses of mud.

The thing with the Germans is that it's easier for tanks to run over sheets of ice than vast expanses of mud.

 

[Terrance888]

Not when they forgot to pour antifreeze in the gas and anti frostbite clothing for the men.

 

[Agent327]

The Hitler's decision to turn advance to the South had good reasoning, since the Soviets still had large forces there, and attacking Moscow without destroying them was too dangerous. It delayed advance of army group center to Moscow, but unlikely changed the outcome of entire operation.

I'm not quite following what you are saying here, but Hitler's decision to not attack Moscow wasn't based on German intellligence of Russian reserves: it was actually believed they were out of reserves, hence "Moscow can wait" and the redirection of the 1942 offensive to the South. With the Stalingrad encirclement it then became painfully clear that German ideas had been sadly mistaken.

Evacuation of Soviet government and Stalin to Kuibyshev was planned and prepared. It was Stalin's decision to risk and stay in Moscow during Moscow battle, and obviously, making 7 November parade and his speech on Red Square was very good idea which boosted morale of Moscow inhabitants and defenders.

It wasn't just Soviet government and officials that were leaving the city, most of its inhabitants were evacuated as well, in view of the feared loss of the city. And yes, the parade was held, with the paraders going straight onwards towards the frontline. It wasn't morale that saved Moscow during 1941-'42, it was the fact that the Germans were actually out of reserves.

Even during the 1942 German summer offensive Stalin was still reluctant to rlease the reserves from the Moscow front, fearing that it was all a diversion for the main attackw which was still expected to come on Moscow. When it was finally clear it was not, Zhukov got the armies he needed for the Stalingrad trap, and to great success.

 

[red_elk]

I'm not quite following what you are saying here, but Hitler's decision to not attack Moscow wasn't based on German intellligence of Russian reserves: it was actually believed they were out of reserves, hence "Moscow can wait" and the redirection of the 1942 offensive to the South. With the Stalingrad encirclement it then became painfully clear that German ideas had been sadly mistaken.

The Southern direction of German offensive was the least successful in the first months, they had to redirect some forces of group army center to Kiev, to straighten the frontline. This was probably sensible decision for them, that was what I meant.

It wasn't just Soviet government and officials that were leaving the city, most of its inhabitants were evacuated as well, in view of the feared loss of the city. And yes, the parade was held, with the paraders going straight onwards towards the frontline. It wasn't morale that saved Moscow during 1941-'42, it was the fact that the Germans were actually out of reserves.

Yes, morale, parade and speech were not enough to save Moscow, but that was what the Soviet people were certainly needed in late 1941. That was the most dramatic moment of modern Russian history and Stalin's decisions played major role here, no matter if we like it or not.

As for evacuation, there was a moment of panic in the city in a couple of days in late October IIRC, with hearsays of German paratroopers in Khimki (close Moscow suburb), which was not far from truth. Lots of people were fleeing from the city to the East. The city authorities had to undertake measures against panic (I read that they even put posters announcing concert of Lyubov Orlova as one of countermeasures). I'm not sure how many people fled, but I doubt it were majority of Moscow inhabitants.

 

[Dachs]

And pushing for Moscow and not for the Caucaus would not just move german troops to that front, it would also move russian defenders there!

It actually did move Russian defenders there. The drive on Kiev, which is frequently decried as foolish and having been a distraction from the "true objective" at Moscow, did not take place in a vacuum. Concurrently, several major engagements were being fought around Smolensk, in which a) the Red Army used up several Armies on ill-considered offensives that could have dented the Germans quite badly had they attempted to attack Moscow at that time and b) those Armies were severely mauled by local German troops, creating the preconditions for TAIFUN and the battle of Moscow.

And he should furthermore turn in his political science diploma if he's assuming that (in the very unlikely event of Moscow falling) just because a capital falls a country will necessarily collapse or sue for any peace. Russia wasn't France, it wasn't divided as France (that much Stalin had achieved) and it had no shortage of land and cities to retreat to.

True, but at the same time, the country would not resist indefinitely merely because Stalin, or Stavka, or Sovnarkom, or whomever simply decreed it from their "undisclosed location" bunker in Kuybyshev. On more abstract questions, like the morale of the Red Army, the willingness of soldiers and civilians to continue to resist, and how unified a front the Soviet government could present in the wake of the fall of Moscow or wherever, there is no possible definitive answer.

It's reasons like that that make me uneasy about declaring that the Nazis simply Could Not Have Won. Things like the fall of Moscow or Leningrad would be pretty huge game-changers, as far as that goes. Not necessarily in concrete terms - there's an argument about national rail infrastructure, bureaucracy, and so on that I'm simply unequipped to have, but one can at least make an argument about it - but in more general terms. And it's hardly like the fall of Moscow would've hurt. It's not like with the Confederacy, where in operational terms the fall of Washington (for instance) was basically an impossibility, and the South simply lacked the capacity to deliver the kind of severe defeats that would lead the country to question the war. On the contrary, the war was so popular in the North that the supposedly anti-war candidate in the 1864 election had to modify his platform so as to not appear to be too willing to negotiate with traitors. The Wehrmacht at least theoretically had the combat power to win those kinds of victories; it had been winning them all campaign, and would win more before the war was out. Maybe it couldn't win them indefinitely, sure, but there's no country that even fights a war indefinitely.

 

[Agent327]

The Southern direction of German offensive was the least successful in the first months, they had to redirect some forces of group army center to Kiev, to straighten the frontline. This was probably sensible decision for them, that was what I meant.

Fair enough. I thought you were speaking of the '42 campaign.

Yes, morale, parade and speech were not enough to save Moscow, but that was what the Soviet people were certainly needed in late 1941. That was the most dramatic moment of modern Russian history and Stalin's decisions played major role here, no matter if we like it or not.

As for evacuation, there was a moment of panic in the city in a couple of days in late October IIRC, with hearsays of German paratroopers in Khimki (close Moscow suburb), which was not far from truth. Lots of people were fleeing from the city to the East. The city authorities had to undertake measures against panic (I read that they even put posters announcing concert of Lyubov Orlova as one of countermeasures). I'm not sure how many people fled, but I doubt it were majority of Moscow inhabitants.

You are probably correct, as I couldn't find a source for evacuation of Moscow period. I would point out that having government and officials leave the city can't have stiffened up morale for its inhabitants. But Stalin's decision to stay and hold the parade apart, that wouldn't have made much difference had not Siberian troops been called back from the Japanese front (December being the time of the Japanese offensives south, not north towards the USSR).

 

[r16]

nazis could not have won , considering the first time they started fighting seriously they came up with a blackmail campaign (in Wannsee) on how they would really kill people if the International Consapiracy didn't fold immediately and surrender Russia , Europe , Asia whatever . Before that they were only satisfying "internal politics" .