[RD] Russia Invades Ukraine: The 7th Thread Itch; scratch it here!

Status
Not open for further replies.
Couple of pieces of news from Russia:

1. An artist Sasha Skochilenko was jailed for seven years for replacing supermarket price tags with anti-war messages.

2. Nikolai Ogolobyak, a self-described Satanist serving a 20-year prison sentence for ritual killing of four teenagers, was given an early release after fighting in Ukraine.

 
Last edited:
Seems like the "stalemate and negotiations" idea becoming more popular in the West, but may be getting increasingly less popular in Russia.

Ukraine War: Selling Stalemate and Prolonging Pain​

Freezing the Russo-Ukrainian war with a “fight-and-talk” approach may be more challenging than its proponents appreciate.

by Matthew Blackburn

Afew months back, Chatham House issued a report underlining the hawkish consensus on the Russo-Ukrainian War: no compromise with Moscow; it must be soundly defeated and punished. Now, the war optimism that swept Western media across 2022 appears to have vanished. An increasing number are discussing the prospects of a ceasefire, and Zelensky himself is under pressure to begin negotiations with Russia.

The same experts who boldly forecasted the defeat of a feckless and incompetent Russia are changing tact. Now, the claim is that the war is a stalemate that neither side can win. Given this, it is time to freeze the conflict akin to the negotiated end of the Korean War. This idea was first proposed to the mainstream in May 2023 in a Politico article. Now, after the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, it is again being discussed. But is it realistic?

The Preconditions of Korea’s Frozen Peace

The freezing of the Korean War was based on three factors. The first was the military stalemate of positional and attrition warfare along the thirty-eighth parallel, the original borders between North and South before the war. Here, ceasefire negotiations proceeded in parallel to continued military offensives, in which neither side made substantial gains nor inflicted enough losses to exhaust their opponent.

The second factor was the agreement of the great powers (China, the USSR, and the United States) that ending the war was in their interests. Each side could make face-saving claims. China had defended its interests in the region while America rescued the South from communist rule. After the death of Stalin, the new Soviet leadership no longer saw the value of keeping America bogged down in Korea. The great powers then forced their proxies to agree to negotiations. Crucially, both North Korea and South Korea received credible security guarantees that encouraged them a frozen peace could be held. While America stationed 30,000 men in the South and kept powerful naval and airpower assets nearby, the USSR supplied the military technologies and advisors needed to secure the North.

The third was ideological. One of the key obstacles in the negotiations was the exchange of prisoners of war. North Korea and China were adamant that their prisoners be repatriated, while many in South Korea and America demanded they be freed and allowed to choose between returning or defecting. With McCarthyism in the ascendency in America, the prisoner swap clause took on added significance in U.S. domestic politics. Bipartisan resistance to forced repatriation delayed progress on negotiations for eighteen months. The election of President Eisenhower on the mandate of a negotiated settlement shifted America closer to a deal and away from anti-communist moralisma key precondition to striking a deal on the prisoners and securing the frozen peace.

Why the Ukraine War Cannot Be Frozen—Yet

These three preconditions do not currently apply to the war in Ukraine. First, it is an error to characterize the war as a stalemate based purely on the observation that little territory is changing hands. In a war of attrition, the aim is to exhaust the enemy and force them to agree to terms. Territory gained is far from the main indicator of success; military achievement can also be measured in the quantity of men and materials destroyed. In this regard, Ukraine has just given up an unsuccessful offensive that incurred heavy manpower and equipment losses. Ukrainian manpower is running low, and Zelensky is considering a new mobilization that would surely strain the country’s economic capacity and morale. Ukraine’s civilians face a harsh winter during which Russia is certain to target the energy system once again. Furthermore, Ukraine’s Western backers are struggling to keep up with the regular munitions supplies as well as other items such as drones and armored vehicles. U.S. backing is likely to be disrupted due to the collapse of bipartisan support for funding and new demands in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Russian military production in artillery and drones, the bread and butter of this war, is not only sufficient but also supplemented by purchases of Iranian drones and North Korean shells. The Russian losses, often wildly exaggerated, are at least 35,780, according to Mediazona, which has tracked the number based on open-source data. New recruitment drives have brought around 335,000 volunteers into the Russian army since January 2023, reducing the need for a second mobilization. While the Russian military is set to reach 750,000 personnel, the Russian economy grows, with little sign of elite or mass discontent inside the country. Its current operation in Andiivka is reminiscent of the battle of Bakhmut, a Russian victory that got little attention in the West but serves as a model of their slow, grinding, but successful approach to attritional warfare.

The above picture is far from a stalemate. In fact, a new level of NATO intervention may soon be required to secure a stalemate and avert Ukrainian defeat. Now, it is anyone’s guess how long Ukraine can hold on and what actions NATO could take to help. Given these dynamics, Russia has absolutely no incentive to agree to a ceasefire, which would only undermine their entire military strategy and give Ukraine time to recuperate and ready itself to fight at a future date.

Another missing precondition is the agreement of the great powers. Ukraine is no longer fighting a proxy of Russia, as it did between 2014 and 2022, but facing Russia head-on. It is unclear whether China can induce Russia to come to terms or even that it is in its interests to do so. Russia’s alliance with China does not resemble North Korea’s dependence on the USSR; Moscow has far more space for independent action. The West may well pressure Ukraine to negotiate, but Kyiv would likely resist. The absence of Western soldiers on the frontline is a major difference to South Korea and complicates any attempt to twist Kyiv’s arm. Thus, Russia appears ready to fight on for years until it has a direct line to Washington or has achieved the collapse of the Ukrainian state.
Another sticking point is whether the West can offer Ukraine a security guarantee acceptable to Russia. On the one hand, Moscow has vehemently opposed Ukraine’s NATO membership, and its central war aim is to “demilitarize” the countrywhich means no NATO troops or heavy weaponry should be stationed in the country. On the other hand, Moscow was ready to agree to Ukraine’s neutrality combined with NATO-style “security guarantees” in the March 2022 negotiations. In any case, with the upper hand militarily, Russia will never agree to Kyiv’s ten-point peace plan. It will wait for Washington to prod Ukraine into a different stance that accepts some form of demilitarization and neutralityan outcome that the Biden administration may delay until after the Presidential Elections.

The third preconditiondialing down ideology to make a dealalso looks uncertain. Here, the most obvious area of ideological fervor is the demand for Russian leaders to stand trial for war crimes and, most crucially, what is to be done with seized Russian assets, which are said to amount to around $300 billion. There is a good chance thateven if negotiations start—there will be a strong moral demand to keep this money for the rebuilding of Ukraine rather than return it to a “terrorist state.” It remains to be seen whether this issue will be as powerful an obstacle to negotiations as the prisoner swaps were in the Korean case. America’s presidential elections may well be the deciding factor, as the Democratic Party is far more likely to take an ideological position on these points.

What comes next?

Given the lack of preconditions for a frozen peace and negotiations not having even started, a further cycle of military escalation is likely. For Ukraine, this means the delivery of airpower assets and another desperate mobilization drive. For Russia, this could mean a counter-mobilization or simply the completion of their planned military expansion through standard means to the end of 2024.
Ukraine’s top general, Valery Zaluzhny, has admitted the longer the war goes on, the better it is for Russia. Putin is pragmatic, but he will not betray his fundamental interests when the military dynamics are in Russia’s favor. And there is little reason to expect anyone in the Russian political system to advocate a radically different position. Any settlement in Ukraine that ends with it integrated and armed by NATO is utterly unacceptable for the Russian security state and military—as well as the tens of millions who strongly support the war inside Russia.

We must guard against lazy and complacent commentary on freezing the conflict. The war is not a stalemate, and further escalations are likely. The lesson of the Korean War suggests starting talks now is beneficial even if there is little likelihood of a deal in immediate termsthe “fight-and-talk” approach that took two years to freeze the conflict in Korea. While many voices will denounce such negotiations as appeasement or treachery, this process needs to be initiated to clarify the difficult points and elaborate on how the aims of each side can be accommodated. A fragile and flawed ceasefireespecially one like Korea that has held for seventy years—is preferable to increased destabilization of Eastern Europe and further destruction and death in Ukraine.

 
Yes, well – since posting opinion pieces that support his mistaken ideas as news is now Red Elk's new thing – the reverse side of the coin, which is the side that while stark makes the more sense, looks more like this:




There is nothing really to negotiate. And Moscow as it currently is, is not really in a position where it can credibly offer anything in negotiations – except surrender. And if it wants to be a such a position, it cannot condition it on the premise that it must first be rewarded with land and population from Ukraine, like it is. It could try, if it actually wants negotiations, to vacate Ukraine's lands, and release its captive population first.

But sure, idiot Americans, German "Putin Versteher" and general tankies to the west of Russia might still try to do a number on everyone, if allowed. That's where Red Elk dredges up these ideas.
 
If we are at "when x is dead", there will also be opportunity when 80-year-old Biden dies.
Opportunity for what? The US, just like Russia... – Biden, just like Putin... Ukraine, just like Russia?
 

Missing Ukrainian child traced to Putin ally​

A key political ally of Vladimir Putin has adopted a child seized from a Ukrainian children's home, according to documents uncovered by BBC's Panorama.

Sergey Mironov, the 70-year-old leader of a Russian political party, is named on the adoption record of a two-year-old girl who was taken in 2022 by a woman he is now married to.

Records show the girl's identity was changed in Russia.

Mr Mironov denies the allegations.

The child, originally named Margarita, was one of 48 who went missing from Kherson Regional Children's Home when Russian forces took control of the city.

They are among about 20,000 children who, according to the Ukrainian government, have been taken by Russian forces since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Earlier this year the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and his Commissioner for Children's Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, for the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territory, with the intention of permanently removing them from their own country.

Mr Mironov wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that the allegations were "fake," blaming them on "Ukrainian special services and their Western curators".

The Russian government says it does not deport Ukrainian children, but does evacuate them to give them protection from the war.

The BBC worked with Ukrainian human rights investigator Victoria Novikova to find out what happened to Margarita and the other children. Ms Novikova has prepared a dossier of new evidence for Ukraine's prosecutor-general's office, which will hand it to the ICC.

The mystery surrounding Margarita began when a woman in a lilac dress turned up at Kherson's children's hospital, where the 10-month-old was being treated for a bout of bronchitis in August 2022.

Margarita was the youngest resident of the local children's home, which looked after children who had medical problems, or whose parents had lost custody of them or had died.

Margarita's mother had given up custody shortly after her birth, and her father's whereabouts were unknown.

Dr Nataliya Lyutikova, who led infant treatment at the hospital, said she was a smiley baby who loved cuddling people.

The woman in lilac introduced herself as "the head of children's affairs from Moscow", Dr Lyutikova recalls.

Kherson - now back under Ukrainian control - was then in its sixth month of Russian occupation.

Soon after the woman left, Dr Lyutikova says she received repeated phone calls from a Russian-appointed official, who had recently been put in charge of the children's home. The official demanded that Margarita be sent back to the home immediately.

Within a week, Margarita was discharged from the hospital. The following morning, staff at the children's home were asked to prepare her for a journey.

"We were afraid, everyone was afraid," said Lyubov Sayko, a nurse at the home.

She described how Russian men - some in military-style camouflage trousers, one in black glasses and holding a briefcase - had arrived to collect the girl.

"It was like something out of a film," she said.

But this was just the start.

Seven weeks later, Igor Kastyukevich, a Russian MP dressed in military fatigues, arrived at the home and, with other officials, began to organise the deportation of the remaining children, including Margarita's half-brother Maxym.

"They took them from our hands and carried them out," Ms Sayko said.

Video footage - posted on Telegram by Mr Kastyukevich - showed the children, bundled up in their outdoor clothing, being carried into buses and ambulances, and driven away.

"The children will be taken to safe conditions in Crimea," Mr Kastyukevich said, as the children were loaded up. Crimea was annexed by Russia from Ukraine in 2014. Mr Kastyukevich portrayed the event as a humanitarian mission.

The midnight train​

For five months, the BBC has been trying to trace Margarita and the other 47 children, working with Victoria Novikova.

Finding lost children in a place as vast as Russia, a country of more than 17 million sq km (6.6 million sq miles), is no easy task.

The first job was to identify the mysterious woman in lilac who visited Margarita in the hospital last August.

Victoria uncovered a Russian document which authorised Margarita's transfer to a Moscow hospital for medical tests. A woman was named on the document: Inna Varlamova. A search on social media confirmed she was the mysterious woman in lilac.

We then showed a photo of Ms Varlamova to Dr Lyutikova and she identified her as the same woman who had visited Margarita on the children's ward.

After further searches, we discovered that Ms Varlamova works in Russia's parliament, though it is not clear in what capacity, and owns property in Podolsk, near Moscow.

We had solved part of the mystery. But questions remained.

"Margarita did not need a special examination," said Dr Lyutikova, speaking of the night the child was taken.

"Why take a small child so far away?"

With Inna Varlamova's name in hand Panorama then acquired train records from sources inside Russia. These showed that she arrived in occupied Ukraine on the same day that witnesses say Margarita was taken from the children's home.

Later that night, at 12:20, Ms Varlamova took the train back to Moscow, with extra return tickets.

Margarita, the evidence suggests, was spirited out on this midnight train.

But why?

A Russian source then delivered another crucial piece of information: a document showing Ms Varlamova had recently married political party leader Sergey Mironov.

Mr Mironov, a former paratrooper, is the leader of Just Russia Party - part of Russia's state-authorised opposition - and supports President Putin. He has been sanctioned by a number of Western countries, including the UK and the EU.

Then came a key revelation.

We accessed a birth record, created last December, for a 14-month-old girl named "Marina". The child's parents were named as Inna Varlamova and Sergey Mironov. The entry was irregular, showing no original record of the child's birth.

"Marina's" birthday was listed as 31 October 2021 - the same day Margarita was born.

"When I saw Marina's birthday was the same as Margarita's, I realised it was 'bingo'," said Victoria.

Through anonymous Russian sources, our team has now been given Margarita's adoption record. Margarita Prokopenko has been renamed Marina Mironova, after her adoptive father Sergey Mironov. Her birthplace is listed as Podolsk.

The Russian government said it had no knowledge of Margarita's case and could not comment.

Adoption decrees​

The Geneva Convention, which defines what constitutes a war crime, says it is unlawful to deport civilians in times of war, unless it is essential for security or imperative military reasons and it is temporary. The convention also bans changing a child's family status.

When President Putin and his children's commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova were indicted by the ICC earlier this year, the court alleged that the unlawful deportation of hundreds of Ukrainian children from orphanages and children's homes was done with the "intention to permanently remove these children from their own country".

This followed President Putin's decision to issue decrees which had the effect of making it easier for Russians to adopt Ukrainian children.

Ms Lvova-Belova has said that Russia only takes children into foster care or guardianship.

"We don't have adoptions," she said last month. "This is a very important fact because adoption means that the child becomes fully native. You can change his last name, first name, patronymic [middle name], you can change the place of birth."

But in its response to our investigation, the Russian government said it was "incorrect" to say that Russia does not authorise the adoption of Ukrainian children from the newly declared regions of Russia. It said it now considers large parts of Ukraine to be Russian, and the people living there its citizens, including children.

One child collected​

We have written to Sergey Mironov and Inna Varlamova, asking where Margarita is now, but they have not replied.

Almost all of the other children who were taken from the home are believed to remain in Russian hands. At least 17 are in Crimea, according to the Russian authorities. All have relatives in Ukraine, Victoria Novikova says.

Ukraine says it has identified 19,546 children who have been taken to Russia. It claims that fewer than 400 have returned.

Russia disputes these figures.

Moscow says it will reunite children with family or friends if a legitimate claim is made and they travel to get them. But many parents do not know where their children are, and the process of finding and retrieving them is difficult and complex.

We know of only one child from Kherson Children's Home who has been brought back to Ukraine. Last month, three-year-old Viktor Puzik, who had been in the facility waiting for an operation for a health condition, was collected from Crimea by his mother, Olha.

She said waiting to know he was safe had been agony.

"I kept thinking, where is he, how is he? Is he alive or not? Everything crossed my mind."

Victoria wants to find all the other missing children from the Kherson Children's Home but is worried they could soon become untraceable.

"Time is not on our side," she says. "The problem is [the Russian authorities] try and erase the children's identity when they issue Russian birth certificates or even passports."

In the meantime, she has not given up hope of returning Margarita to Ukraine.

She has not yet found relatives who can take in Margarita so she herself has been appointed the little girl's legal guardian by the Ukrainian government, and has plans to apply to the Russian authorities to return her.

"The world needs to know about Margarita's existence. They wanted to erase her. We need to bring her back."
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646
 
If we are at "when x is dead", there will also be opportunity when 80-year-old Biden dies.

Biden isn't a dictator. If he dies today or tomorrow, Kamala will take the chair, but the whole state apparatus will continue to work. Very little would change except the face. Although president is important position in US political system, it's not a top-down dictatorship like Russia. Presidents are replaceable.

If Biden dies, Trump is the massive favorite to be elected, and he won't be pro-Ukraine.

I dare to say, on the contrary. Biden is only leading the primaries since he's an incumbent. Other candidates would have much better chance beating Trump.
 
Democracy should solve the problem. Russia is less democratic than "the west", yet all kinds of countries bow down to equally undemocratic regimes - eg Sweden had to change its laws to "convince" Turkey to let it into nato. So let's not overplay the lack of democracy being a factor always and not merely when it suits one.
 
Democracy should solve the problem. Russia is less democratic than "the west", yet all kinds of countries bow down to equally undemocratic regimes - eg Sweden had to change its laws to "convince" Turkey to let it into nato. So let's not overplay the lack of democracy being a factor always and not merely when it suits one.

Pf - they can change them again as soon they're in, what do the Turks know anyway :)

Heard they deported the Koran burner, he was an Iraqi iir.
 
Democracy should solve the problem. Russia is less democratic than "the west", yet all kinds of countries bow down to equally undemocratic regimes - eg Sweden had to change its laws to "convince" Turkey to let it into nato. So let's not overplay the lack of democracy being a factor always and not merely when it suits one.
In this case Sweden adopted a new anti-terrorism law in response. It's still pretty standard legislation elsewhere in the EU however. (There is weird crap legislative stuff being continuously proposed by the Swedish Democrats right now– civil-servants-to-be-obliged-to-snitch-on-immigrants-laws, the idea that 13+ year olds can be locked up not just without trial but even on no actual suspicion, a proposed "anti-social-behaviour-law" that would allow rescinding citizenship for being just "morally questionable" – but this one isn't one of theirs.)

Erdogan, the Turkish parliament, media pundits etc. have widely panned it as Totally Insufficient. (The legislation criminalizes membership in organizations recognized as terrorist – what it doesn't do, that Turkey demands but can whistle for, is legislation prohibiting expressions of opinion.)

They are still refusing to admit Sweden into NATO. So is Hungary.
 
Last edited:
Forced end to the war - through lack of US help.
Though at the rate it is going, US help is already too little due to Israel.
Lack of US aid won't force the end of anything. It pretty much ensures the Russians might redouble their efforts of attack, and the Ukranians have to switch to 100% defence. They aren't now. They can do that, if things go south.

The only question is if Russia would like a little breather to re-arm and rebuild before attacking again?
 
their entire hope of victory rests on it.
You may put it this way.
Though >100 billions of US aid eventually led to failed counteroffensive and net loss of territory since the beginning of 2023.
If Biden dies he's just replaced, that doesn't change anything.
At this point, "not changing anything" seems an outcome more favorable to Russia than to Ukraine.
 
You may put it this way.
Though >100 billions of US aid eventually led to failed counteroffensive and net loss of territory since the beginning of 2023.
I would say this 100 billion of US aid led to an independent Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of Russian deaths, losing the Black Sea fleet and losing 50% of conquered Ukrainian territory.

Just because the counteroffensive has not achieved immediate breakthrough does not mean that Ukraine failed. Quite the contrary, they have proven to be more capable and better fighters than the Russians. Oh and don't even get me started on Wagner, the invisible "Armata", the failed Kinzhal etc. lol.

Every single Russian soldier death in this conflict was worth its price. It's a cheap price for this many dead imperialists, an uprising and societal degradation.
 
Last edited:
May your wishes return back to you and your family.
Why are you surprised? Russia started a war, killing civilians en masse, threatens us with nuclear strike and violation of sovereignity of multiple EU member states and other European states. Don't be surprised when those who you threaten will actually root for higher Russian military deaths. We are not providing weapons to Ukraine for safekeeping.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top Bottom