Soapbox: The source of morality - what it means.

Terxpahseyton

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Good, bad, wrong, right.
It is all a matter of perspective, right?
Given, we can witness that societies tend to have similar moral codes in many areas. For instance: There is no nation today where randomly killing people is deemed not so bad. But then, it would suck to live in such a nation, so that is as surprising as that there is no nation where people find it their obligation to eat their own poop and outlaw not doing so.
Why is it inherently bald to kill? Can things even be inherently bad or good?

Yes, they can. However, only in one instance.
There is, after all, only one instance that makes things good or bad in the first place. Only one thing that allows to value, appreciate, hate, love, suffer etceter to begin with.
Only this one realm, in which good and bad can even exist.
Emotional sensation.
Not murder, not eating your poop, not doing a little holocaust or slapping your mum is genuinely inherently good or bad. Because those things are foremost merely physical actions causing physical reactions. They can only be as good or bad as they relate to the only known realm of the existence of good and bad - so only as good and bad as the emotions they cause.
And if good and bad are in the end nothing but the relativity of things with regards to emotions, their impact on emotions - there emotional use - then just as emotional sensation is the only inherently moral category, the morality of decisions is inherently utilitarian. If you want morality to be an actual thing, that is.
 
What is imagination?
 
Why is it inherently bald to kill?

Because human societies are social in nature and require stability. If murder was okay, it would be much much harder to form a stable social structure, because any member of your social group could be murdered by another member, without consequence. Power struggles would erupt, potentially critical manpower could be depleted, and the tribe would just have a hard time functioning as a unit.

I think that morality has several sources. There is a bunch of stuff that seems to be almost hardwired into our brains: Do not eat babies.. Do not murder your parents.. Do not pour molten lava on your neighbours for no reason.. These seem to be almost primal instincts and probably things that have been with us for many many thousands of years.

But then you have more complex morality that probably evolved side by side with the emergence of more complex social structures...

That is probably a very basic way of looking at it, but that's my answer
 
It is all a matter of perspective, right?

No. There are fundamentally and inherently good and bad acts. Rape is inherently bad. Caring for the sick is inherently good.

This is not limited to the emotional realm as you posit. Rape may be emotionally cathartic for the rapist, but the emotional benefit received does not somehow change the inherent vileness of the act.

--

Alternatively.

Only this one realm, in which good and bad can even exist.
Emotional sensation.
...

They can only be as good or bad as they relate to the only known realm of the existence of good and bad - so only as good and bad as the emotions they cause.

No. The justness of an action can only be measured by its ultimate consequence. We can never know the ultimate consequence of an action because we have imperfect knowledge. Therefore we can never know the morality of an action regardless of the emotional status. Consequently, a knowable morality can never exist even within your emotional realm.

--

Alternatively.

And if good and bad are in the end nothing but the relativity of things with regards to emotions, their impact on emotions - there emotional use - then just as emotional sensation is the only inherently moral category, the morality of decisions is inherently utilitarian. If you want morality to be an actual thing, that is.

No, because utilitarianism ultimately relies upon a rational analysis of the world. Emotional decisions and resulting actions are not (generally) made in the rational mind; quite the opposite in fact. Consequently one canno generally make a utilitarian argument for an emotional response as no rational analysis has occurred.
 
It's not inherently bad to kill at all. Indeed, provided it's not members of your own group, it's almost universally been seen as a good thing.

If it was ever a good thing to kill members of one's own group, that would be tantamount to gene suicide for the killer. And, hey presto!, those individuals with the suicide gene wouldn't get to pass their genes on to the next generation, and the lineage comes to an end.

For me, the taboo on killing anyone comes about because I see them as being members of my own group. I'm not sure why everyone doesn't feel the same way.
 
To me, discovering morality is like discovering a good diet. If it's good, it works and things are healthy. If it's wrong, things are unhealthy
 
Some cultures do support random murder, rape and other heinous crimes: the drug cartels of Mexico. We all benefit from the fact that they are not so widespread. Minimizing such cultures helps preserve our opportunity for survival. We seem to be evolving into cultures of more and more complexity and the kill or be killed standards of the past don't work so well. Our moral codes are evolving along with us as we change how we live and interact with one another.

I try to be kinder rather than less kind when faced with choices.
 
Good, bad, wrong, right.
It is all a matter of perspective, right?
Given, we can witness that societies tend to have similar moral codes in many areas. For instance: There is no nation today where randomly killing people is deemed not so bad. But then, it would suck to live in such a nation, so that is as surprising as that there is no nation where people find it their obligation to eat their own poop and outlaw not doing so.
Why is it inherently bald to kill? Can things even be inherently bad or good?

Yes, they can. However, only in one instance.
There is, after all, only one instance that makes things good or bad in the first place. Only one thing that allows to value, appreciate, hate, love, suffer etceter to begin with.
Only this one realm, in which good and bad can even exist.
Emotional sensation.
Not murder, not eating your poop, not doing a little holocaust or slapping your mum is genuinely inherently good or bad. Because those things are foremost merely physical actions causing physical reactions. They can only be as good or bad as they relate to the only known realm of the existence of good and bad - so only as good and bad as the emotions they cause.
And if good and bad are in the end nothing but the relativity of things with regards to emotions, their impact on emotions - there emotional use - then just as emotional sensation is the only inherently moral category, the morality of decisions is inherently utilitarian. If you want morality to be an actual thing, that is.
Morality is not untilitarian. The famous trolley problem shows this -- the morality of partisipating in the events leading to the deaths of a group of people depends not only on how many people are harmed vs not, but also in your responsibility to those people and others.

So what's you're describing, a system of morality based solely on net emotional pain causes, will not sit well with most people in any culture.

IMO, the source of morality is a bunch of emotions, and we use reason to decide which moral imperatives take precedence in a particular circumstances. People have the same basic emotions and values, but the relative importance of those varies from person to person and culture to culture.
 
I think that the trolley problem isn't meant to show "morality is not utilitarian", but more that our moral intuitions are a bit finicky
 
I think that the trolley problem isn't meant to show "morality is not utilitarian", but more that our moral intuitions are a bit finicky
What's the difference? It shows that our moral intuition cannot be pinned down to simple utilitarian rules.
 
What's the difference? It shows that our moral intuition cannot be pinned down to simple utilitarian rules.

We might be talking past each other. I don't think that our moral intuitions are the perfect guide to discovering moral laws, even though they can create a starting point.
 
It's not inherently bad to kill at all. Indeed, provided it's not members of your own group, it's almost universally been seen as a good thing.

If it was ever a good thing to kill members of one's own group, that would be tantamount to gene suicide for the killer. And, hey presto!, those individuals with the suicide gene wouldn't get to pass their genes on to the next generation, and the lineage comes to an end.

For me, the taboo on killing anyone comes about because I see them as being members of my own group. I'm not sure why everyone doesn't feel the same way.
For me, the taboo on not killing anyone comes because I can put myself in their shoes: I wouldn't wanna be killed, so they wouldn't. So it's empathy, not in-group dynamics.
Some cultures do support random murder, rape and other heinous crimes: the drug cartels of Mexico. We all benefit from the fact that they are not so widespread. Minimizing such cultures helps preserve our opportunity for survival. We seem to be evolving into cultures of more and more complexity and the kill or be killed standards of the past don't work so well. Our moral codes are evolving along with us as we change how we live and interact with one another.

I try to be kinder rather than less kind when faced with choices.
I would not say those or any culture looks well on random murder and rape. Rather, there may be circumstances where things like pacifying a group of people to complacency is more important that the moral considerations of rape and murder. In other words, random rape and murder is still bad, but rape and murder are more easily justified in those cultures.
 
We might be talking past each other. I don't think that our moral intuitions are the perfect guide to discovering moral laws, even though they can create a starting point.
I'd say the trolley problem does have implications about morality, not just moral intuition. Specifically it points out the role of responsibility to others in the morality of our actions. It can point out other nuances too, but that's one of them.
 
What is imagination?
A world where your desires and fears turn into ghosts and where those ghosts turn into flesh and blood.
At the risk of sounding less poetic: What is the relevance of this question?
Because human societies are social in nature and require stability. If murder was okay, it would be much much harder to form a stable social structure, because any member of your social group could be murdered by another member, without consequence. Power struggles would erupt, potentially critical manpower could be depleted, and the tribe would just have a hard time functioning as a unit.
That explains in how far it is useful to handle murder as something inherently bad. It however doesn't make it so. To the contrary, this reasoning makes murders not something inherently bad, but a mere tool to organize society.
I.e. - it wouldn't be bad to murder at all - wasn't it for the phenomena of fairly widespread murder and its consequences for society at large.
Which is precisely the ideology I adhere to.
I think that morality has several sources. There is a bunch of stuff that seems to be almost hardwired into our brains: Do not eat babies.. Do not murder your parents.. Do not pour molten lava on your neighbours for no reason.. These seem to be almost primal instincts and probably things that have been with us for many many thousands of years.
"Several sources"... yes you embark on a interesting distinction here. You differentiate between as you put it "almost hardwired into our brians" or "almost primal instincts" on the one hand and on the other "complex morality that probably evolved side by side with the emergence of more complex social structures". I agree with this general distinction as an useful one. There are moral concepts which rests on hardcoded emotional responses and there are moral concepts which rest on circumstantial social responses. Though doesn't this "complex morality" rest on "hardwired" responses all the same? That appears to make the circumstantial moral concepts an - in the end - superfluous category, doesn't? After all, if all morality can be traced back to emotions, why bother with the symbols civilization as brought forward? Civilization will only be a particular manifestation of hardwired emotional urges. Hence, those hardwired emotional urges will suffice to explain primitive as much as civilized cultures. And accordingly, moral concept will - while being adapted to a particular social environment - remain rested on primitive/hardcoded emotional urges.
But I am afraid all this misses completly the point.
You describe the genuine origin of humans caring about morality.
I seek to desctibe the genuine origin of morality itself.
No. There are fundamentally and inherently good and bad acts. Rape is inherently bad. Caring for the sick is inherently good.

This is not limited to the emotional realm as you posit. Rape may be emotionally cathartic for the rapist, but the emotional benefit received does not somehow change the inherent vileness of the act.
That is so because...? Oh - you didn't bother to substantiate your point. I see... Thank you for... demonstrating your ignorance?
You say "No" (again, one hopes this time with some backing) to the by you quoted claim of mine that "They can only be as good or bad as they relate to the only known realm of the existence of good and bad - so only as good and bad as the emotions they cause."
Then you go on to say that "We can never know the ultimate consequence of an action because we have imperfect knowledge." That is correct. It however doesn't make my initiative claim false, it merely is a statement regarding its usefulness.
So, again your "No" is totally disconnected to your argument.
Therefore we can never know the morality of an action
Correct.
regardless of the emotional status
Regardless? This is where you stopped to make any sense (besides saying seemingly randomly "No"). So far all you have been saying rests on my reference to emotional statuses. Suddenly, you say "regardless of the emotional status", without further explanation.
This makes no sense.
Consequently, a knowable morality can never exist even within your emotional realm.
Again correct.
However, you have failed to substantiate your "No" in any way whatsoever (did I mention that already?). You have merely bothered to concern yourself with the implications of my argument instead of refuting it, as your "No" implies.
There it is again. This is getting tiresome very quick. I hope now you finally start to actually argue in support if your "No."
And I have to wonder - you actually do!
You argue that because emotions were irrational in them themselves, one could not rationally analyze them.
As much as I am delighted that you have finally actually attacked my argument, as much I am disappointed, as your attack is as easily blown away as a leaf is by the wind.
Note how I have given criteria to rationally judge good and bad. I did so by saying that feeling good is good and feeling bad is consequently bad. What we can witness here is that morality embodies irrationality in so far as it embodies emotions in so far as it embodies "good" and "bad".
Now, as soon as we can assess preferences, as soon we can act rationally. Rationality is about the pursuit of goals. And goals are about preferences. Preferences are about the distinction of desirability. Desirability is in essence about irrationality.
Rationality can by definition only concern itself with irrationality. Hence, you pointing out that this was the case with my view of morality is not an argument that this view was falty. On the contrary - it is a fundamental necessity of logic.
It's not inherently bad to kill at all. Indeed, provided it's not members of your own group, it's almost universally been seen as a good thing.

If it was ever a good thing to kill members of one's own group, that would be tantamount to gene suicide for the killer. And, hey presto!, those individuals with the suicide gene wouldn't get to pass their genes on to the next generation, and the lineage comes to an end.

For me, the taboo on killing anyone comes about because I see them as being members of my own group. I'm not sure why everyone doesn't feel the same way.
As warpus, you embark on the emotional / evolutionary angle of moral behavior. As warpus, very much correct and very much besides the point.
To me, discovering morality is like discovering a good diet. If it's good, it works and things are healthy. If it's wrong, things are unhealthy
You now follow the path of warpus and Borachio to another depth - not concerning yourself with generalized patterns but submerging into the personal experience of it. Which I find impossible to conclusively comment on as I can not possibly know what your personal experience of "good" entails.
However, knowing your posting history to some considerable degree, I can say that I admire your moral experience (assuming it is genuine).



I felt that was enough reply for one post.
 
That is so because...?

Based upon a priori standards. Which is how most of the population sees morality as being obtained.

Regardless?

Under the premise I previously postulated, the morality of any given action cannot be known. It does not matter what the emotional consequence of the action or the emotional state in which the action was performed. Emotion simply doesn't enter into it. Therefore inclusion of emotion into a morality calculus is unwarranted.

There it is again. This is getting tiresome very quick.

Oh, I'm sorry, I thought this was a soapbox thread where the OP defends a claim rather than Big Rock Candy Mountain. I'm going to get some root beer from the springs, can I grab something from the cotton candy tree for you?

What a minute. This is a soapbox thread and not Big Rock Candy Mountain after all!

You argue that because emotions were irrational in them themselves, one could not rationally analyze them.

No. What I said was that emotional actions generally are not the result of rational consideration and therefore not utilitarian. That's not the same as saying one cannot rationally analyze emotions or emotional actions.

I did so by saying that feeling good is good and feeling bad is consequently bad.

You say that without any proof to demonstrate that premise. Eating my vegetables is good not because I want to eat vegetables or because I achieve some emotional result from eating my vegetables, but because vegetables are what a growing boy needs. This is true even if I don't want to eat my vegetables because I would rather have cake. The fact that my emotional response to vegetables is negative doesn't change the fact that they are demonstrably good for me.

Rationality is about the pursuit of goals.

What? No. That's not what rationality is. Rationality is the quality of having reason, of being coherent. There is nothing inherent in rationality that it must be about the pursuit of goals. I can say:

Max is a cat.
All cats have four legs.
∴ Max has four legs.

That's a perfectly rational argument, and it has nothing to do with goals.

You now follow the path of warpus and Borachio to another depth - not concerning yourself with generalized patterns but submerging into the personal experience of it.

Focusing on the personal experience is too narrow. Morality isn't about how you live your life in a vacuum, it is about how you life your life in relation to other people. If you take something that no one else owns, that is not theft and is not immoral. However, if you take something that someone else owns it is theft and is immoral.

That's a big element of what are missing in your post. You seemingly only look at the consequences for the actor in determining whether or not an action is moral. You neglect to review the consequences for other people.

Those consequences can extend beyond the emotional realm. The victim of a confidence game may be quite happy to be defrauded of his money and the con man may be perfectly happy to obtain it, but neither of those facts modify the morality of the action. Neither the desire of the victim nor that of the con man changes the morality.
 
I think that the trolley problem isn't meant to show "morality is not utilitarian", but more that our moral intuitions are a bit finicky

Very perceptive.

The only lesson that can be securely drawn from the trolley problems is that our moral intuitions are badly prone to error.
 
@Sill: you might find Nietzsche's "The Genealogy of morals" to be of interest :)

Everybody with a modicum of interest in moral philosophy must read this book.
 
Thanks lovett.

You now follow the path of warpus and Borachio to another depth - not concerning yourself with generalized patterns but submerging into the personal experience of it. Which I find impossible to conclusively comment on as I can not possibly know what your personal experience of "good" entails.
However, knowing your posting history to some considerable degree, I can say that I admire your moral experience (assuming it is genuine).

No, I don't think you can know either. I think that while an objectively ideal moral system can exist, I don't think humans are capable of discovering it. As you say, you cannot know my personal experience well enough to properly integrate it as completely as we'd like.

That said, you can get better or worse moral systems merely by careful and empathetic consideration. Some moral systems are better than others, and we can observe, intuit, learn, and even experiment to see what works. Can we get to 'perfect'? No, but that doesn't mean we should let perfect be the enemy of good. :)
 
Very perceptive.

The only lesson that can be securely drawn from the trolley problems is that our moral intuitions are badly prone to error.
This conclusion I disagree with completely. What alternate standard do you judge morality by to dismiss the nuances of our moral intuition as error? And why is that moral standard superior?
 
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